No more of one than it already has via Hezbollah. But which costs quite a bit and cannot be used as easily.
This isn't an issue of legitimacy. It's an issue of effective allocation of resources. Ballistic missiles with only conventional warheads are not an efficient allocation of resources for Iran.
Read the article I cited. You'll like it.
Iran shares missiles with Hezbollah, but Iran's own missile arsenal is superior. Not only that, but for launches from within Iran a much wider variety of targets is available. Conventional missiles could be used on population targets, but I've seen other targets suggested; i.e. US bases in the region and oil refineries in the GCC.
Also, missile use for conventional deterrence is a cornerstone of China's Taiwan strategy. So even if the mUlLAHs arE CrAzY, rational states have built up conventional ballistic missiles as a strategic deterrent.
And you have studiously ignored my point about non-conventional non-nuclear warheads. Why?
I didn't studiously ignore your point about CBW warheads, but I didn't answer it as I figured it was just fun speculation as opposed to a cornerstone of your position. If you have some analyses or assessments that suggest that a key component of Iran's missile program is the ability to deliver CBW (in the way that I've provided a number of assessments outlining Iran's strategy of conventional missile deterrence) then I'd be interested in reading it. However, I imagine that using CBW missiles would be counter productive, as it would likely incite a very rapid escalation which would not be in Iran's favour.
Indeed, it is not, because the implicit threat is that they will be armed with warheads that will not require pinpoint accuracy for effectiveness. Perhaps Iran is simply bluffing, but without at least the possibility, the deterrent effect is quite weak indeed.
The strength of the deterrent effect is debatable. Nonetheless, this doesn't negate the fact that conventional deterrence could be (and from what I've read since starting in this thread, likely is) a part of Iran's missile strategy.
Look at Iran's anti-aircraft capabilities. Their 'deterrence through denial' capabilities are very weak in this area, yet they nonetheless have some anti-aircraft systems. Does the fact that their denial capabilities wouldn't be sufficient to dissuade a US airstrike (except marginally) negate the fact that these capabilities were acquired with an air denial rationale?