There really might be an afterlife

[rocketdodger]

I'm afraid you're misusing the word "isomorphic" here. Isomorphism is something that applies to algebraic structures. The contents of a hard drive is not an algebraic structure, it's simply a natural number, X.

If you meant to ask, "will there be anything else that represents the number X in some encoded form", the answer is, of course. Everything represents the number X in some encoded form. It's just a question of choosing a proper decoding function.

No, that is not quite the whole story. Thats why in my OP I was careful to stipulate "isomorphic under the same set of rules."

So for example, there are a number of rules stipulating how the data is organized on your hard drive. Lets just forget about everything else and suppose it is a string of binary digits. Suppose further that the distinction between the digits are location on the disc, and the value of each digit is represented by the polarity of a magnetic field measured from some location relative to each digit, say the center.

Now, it is quite clear how a finite number can be represented on this substrate given this set of rules -- if the field in a location is closer to one polarity than the other, that location is attributed either a 1 or 0.

Could we do the same with any old system? Not really, because the structure of most systems is not amenable to this set of rules. Where is the distinction between bits in a glass of water, for instance? Or the physical properties that correspond to value?

And given that P1 is that consciousness is information processing, or flow, the complexity of any isomorphism increases exponentially, because it is no longer just a static arrangement that must be accounted for but a dynamic system where each informational component has direction.

 

[rocketdodger]

Also, you haven't explicitly defined what isomorphism you want to use. Same state? Same operations to be performed on states? Same state and operations to be performed on states? These make a big difference! There's also the issue that you can turn operations to be performed into state (ie. a computer program instead of a hard-wired computer).

The isomorphism shouldn't matter, as long as it is valid.

Think about it. If the isomorphism is valid, that means every component of one system is mapped to a distinct component of the other system, and that every operation on those components in one system is mapped to a distinct operation on the components of the other system. Mathematically that also means that every series of operations performed on the components of either system will have a counterpart in the other that is a series of operations performed on those other components.

And, mathematically, that means the information flow in each system will be the same -- flow from A --> B --> C in one will be (for example) X --> Y --> Z in the other.

 

[Thabiguy]

No, that is not quite the whole story.

I see now. Apparently I didn't interpret your post #16 correctly before, and what you meant was a bit different from what I thought you meant.

Thanks for the clarification; this resolves some of the questions I had earlier.

 

[Skeptic Ginger]

While information processing is undoubtedly a component of consciousness, this processing happens in living neurons. I don't think it's likely that consciousness can be divorced from the biological tissue that's doing the processing.

There's certainly no evidence for any non-physical existence.

What evidence supports the OP formula? It's pure nonsense. Throw out some math terms, pretend they have meaning when in reality no meaning has been established and claim you have some debatable hypothesis. Pure nonsense.

 

[Skeptic Ginger]

Premise 1) -- consciousness is a type of information processing.

If you disagree with premise 1, then goodbye, this thread is not for you.

Let E(t) be the pattern of information that constitutes consciousness C(t) at time t. Let R be the rules, or the language, used to describe E(t).

Premise 2) -- if another pattern of information P is isomorphic to E(t) under R, then C(t) will be instantiated by P.

Premise 3) -- for every t, there may be some n, at any given time, such that P is isomorphic to E(t) under R. Extended to infinity, we can assume that there will be some such n.

Conclusion:

It is plausible that "we" are merely a series of information patterns, instantiated randomly throughout some other universe, inhabiting a solipsistic world. In fact, it is plausible that "we" are a single pattern that happens to include all of our memories up to the instant prior, and that only a single instance of a similar pattern existed, and there is no existence beyond the current instant.

At any rate, it is therefore also plausible that there is a pattern P(n == some number) that is isomorphic to E(t == time of death of C) and a series of patterns P(n == some other numbers) that are isomorphic to E(t == some time during an afterlife of C) under R.

In other words, if "we" are merely these random patterns, then there is no good reason why there are not such random patterns corresponding to "we" in some afterlife.

A corollary is that there is no good reason there are not such random patterns corresponding to "we" in a whacky world where up suddenly becomes down, or whatever, so in fact there are such patterns and other branches of "we" are experiencing them. This is very close to multiverse theories, I suppose.

EDIT -- this theory does not imply soplisism, after all, because there is no reason each pattern P couldn't be isomorphic to some combination of E1(t), E2(t), .... Em(t), where Em(t) corresponds to the m'th consciousness of some other individual from our point of view.

"Premise 2) -- if another pattern of information P is isomorphic to E(t) under R, then C(t) will be instantiated by P."


You've merely stated a false analogy and called it an isomorphism. Come on, there are all kinds of "information processors" which are not alive. And since when does information processing occur without the hardware?


Someday we might be able to transfer all the data from a single brain to an artificial processor that has achieved AI capabilities. In that respect there is the potential for a future afterlife for human individuals. That's about as far as you can take this hypothesis of yours.

 

[scimystic]

A corollary is that there is no good reason there are not such random patterns corresponding to "we" in a whacky world where up suddenly becomes down, or whatever, so in fact there are such patterns and other branches of "we" are experiencing them. This is very close to multiverse theories, I suppose.

EDIT -- this theory does not imply soplisism, after all, because there is no reason each pattern P couldn't be isomorphic to some combination of E1(t), E2(t), .... Em(t), where Em(t) corresponds to the m'th consciousness of some other individual from our point of view.

Rocket,

If you haven't yet read 'Anathem' (Neil Stephenson's latest) then get your skates on and head down to B&N. Its basically Plato meets QM, and in particular, the 'many worlds' interpretation. I'm pretty sure you'll like it.

Best regards,

Keith

 

[HansMustermann]

More maths

Let's do even more maths, to put those numbers into perspective.

IIRC the number of electrons in the observable universe is anywhere between 10^79 (for an average one atom of hydrogen per cubic metre) and 10^130 (how many spheres the size of an electron you can pack in it).

Let's say that each electron once a second would form a different configuration equivalent to a different brain. (Absurd, because one single electron isn't enough for a a brain, but let's be unbelievably generous with our upper limit.) Basically it's the "monkeys on keyboards" scenario with as many monkeys as electrons you could fit in the observable universe.

A year is 31 556 926 seconds, and let's give the universe a good 300 billion years for that experiment. That works out to about 10 billion billion seconds, or basically 10^19 seconds.

So if every single electron in the universe formed the equivalent a different brain configuration every single second, the universe would only have time to "try" a maximum of 10^149 different combinations. While your brain is one in 10^300,000,000,000,000 different combinations as shown earlier.

So I _really_ wouldn't set my hopes high of such a clone of your synapse configuration happening randomly.

 

[rocketdodger]

Let's do even more maths, to put those numbers into perspective.

IIRC the number of electrons in the observable universe is anywhere between 10^79 (for an average one atom of hydrogen per cubic metre) and 10^130 (how many spheres the size of an electron you can pack in it).

Let's say that each electron once a second would form a different configuration equivalent to a different brain. (Absurd, because one single electron isn't enough for a a brain, but let's be unbelievably generous with our upper limit.) Basically it's the "monkeys on keyboards" scenario with as many monkeys as electrons you could fit in the observable universe.

A year is 31 556 926 seconds, and let's give the universe a good 300 billion years for that experiment. That works out to about 10 billion billion seconds, or basically 10^19 seconds.

So if every single electron in the universe formed the equivalent a different brain configuration every single second, the universe would only have time to "try" a maximum of 10^149 different combinations. While your brain is one in 10^300,000,000,000,000 different combinations as shown earlier.

So I _really_ wouldn't set my hopes high of such a clone of your synapse configuration happening randomly.

Well, it doesn't have to be the same configuration, it just has to be isomorphic.

But I understand your point. If this is the only universe, and it's extents are what we understand them to be, then yes the chance is very slim.

 

[rocketdodger]

You've merely stated a false analogy and called it an isomorphism.

Huh? If it is an isomorphism then it is analagous. I don't think I said anything incorrect here, if you think I did, would you mind being specific?

Come on, there are all kinds of "information processors" which are not alive.

Being alive and being a transient instantiation of a consciousness are two totally different things.

And since when does information processing occur without the hardware?

It doesn't. Hardware "independence" only means it can happen on various kinds of hardware, not in the total absence of hardware.

 

[HansMustermann]

Well, it doesn't have to be the same configuration, it just has to be isomorphic.

That configuration is the state _and_ the way those signals are processed. (Actually a massive over-simplification of the state. As I was saying, each synapse is actually an analogue number, not a bit.) Anything which could qualify as being "you", would IMHO need that state or at least most of it.

Note that I didn't put limits on how it's implemented, just that it somehow has that (oversimplified and underestimated) state. I didn't even require that it's able to actually process that state, e.g., in that one electron brain calculation, just that it has it.

But I understand your point. If this is the only universe, and it's extents are what we understand them to be, then yes the chance is very slim.

I think "very slim" doesn't even come close to summing it up, actually. The right wording for that probability is IMHO more like "non-existent".

 

[Skeptic Ginger]

Huh? If it is an isomorphism then it is analagous. I don't think I said anything incorrect here, if you think I did, would you mind being specific?

You made a false analogy and called it an analogy then based your label of isomorphism on that false underlying premise.

Being alive and being a transient instantiation of a consciousness are two totally different things.

But this goes to your false analogy. You said the brain was an information processor. For this to be a valid analogy to an afterlife, you'd need to consider all sorts of other things besides just the information processor aspect of the brain.

It doesn't. Hardware "independence" only means it can happen on various kinds of hardware, not in the total absence of hardware.

So are you delving into the aspect of processing the brain's information on some hardware in the nether world? Or are you discussing the potential for future downloading as the proposed afterlife?

 

[rocketdodger]

You made a false analogy and called it an analogy then based your label of isomorphism on that false underlying premise.



But this goes to your false analogy. You said the brain was an information processor. For this to be a valid analogy to an afterlife, you'd need to consider all sorts of other things besides just the information processor aspect of the brain.


So are you delving into the aspect of processing the brain's information on some hardware in the nether world? Or are you discussing the potential for future downloading as the proposed afterlife?

You either did not read the OP at all, or else you tried reading it and did not understand it, or perhaps you understood it but understood it incorrectly.

In any case, you aren't at all talking about what I am talking about.

What probably happened is you read the thread title, assumed I must be speaking about woo (which I find incredible given that I am one of the most outspoken strong AI proponents on these forums), and misinterpreted everything since then accordingly.

Try starting over?

 

[wuschel]

In other words, if "we" are merely these random patterns, then there is no good reason why there are not such random patterns corresponding to "we" in some afterlife.

Provided that could actually happen, how would anyone be able to tell the difference? (Reminds me of the Multiverse interpretation of QM)

 

[rocketdodger]

Provided that could actually happen, how would anyone be able to tell the difference? (Reminds me of the Multiverse interpretation of QM)

As in that interpretation, there would be no way to know.

However, what is different here is that the Multiverse interpretation limits the possible branches of reality to instances that are physically possible. For example, if we assume the laws of physics really are the description of some kind of actual "rule" set imposed on physical reality, we can also assume that no branch of reality in the Multiverse interpretation will feature you suddenly being able to fly, or spontaneously combusting, or performing a random metamorphasis into some kind of Kafka-esque "bug."

Not so if we are these random fleeting patterns scattered about -- there is nothing preventing any of that from happening in some branch of the "Multiconsciousness" interpretation described here. In fact, if it were true, one would expect all sorts of random things to happen to the various instances of you -- turning into a turnip, for example -- and the you sitting here reading this post just happens to be the unlucky instance leading a boring "normal" life. Or, you could be one of the luckier ones, considering some of the nasty stuff that could happen to such a randomly generated consciousness...

 

[wuschel]

Not so if we are these random fleeting patterns scattered about -- there is nothing preventing any of that from happening in some branch of the "Multiconsciousness" interpretation described here. In fact, if it were true, one would expect all sorts of random things to happen to the various instances of you -- turning into a turnip, for example -- and the you sitting here reading this post just happens to be the unlucky instance leading a boring "normal" life. Or, you could be one of the luckier ones, considering some of the nasty stuff that could happen to such a randomly generated consciousness...

Aren't you thus assuming that consciousness can be described by a snap shot arrangement of stuff? I would have thought that being conscious takes time, i.e. consciousness was a process[*], rather than just a plain spacial affair.



[*] and, as such, not independent of the environment, as the resident behaviorist crowd will be more than happy to point out.

 

[Gate2501]

Aren't you thus assuming that consciousness can be described by a snap shot arrangement of stuff? I would have thought that being conscious takes time, i.e. consciousness was a process[*], rather than just a plain spacial affair.

I don't think that there is any way to verify that consciousness is anything more than the present moment, or "snapshot", as you say. Any judgment that you could make with regard to it being something more than the current moment of processing, would have to be made within that moment. In other words, we feel as if we are more than this "moment", however, we only ever have access to that "moment" to make that call. It appears to me, that continuity in consciousness, is perpetuated by that current moment of thought processing referencing your memories (I am talking about short term memories of the very near past). Who is to say that they are actually somehow connected by anything else?

Physical locality and memory make us feel as if we are more than just a "snapshot", in my opinion. The snapshot could exist independently of a past or future consciousness, it just would be gone as quickly as it appeared.

For all I know, I am just a fleeting instance of Gate2501, that will be replaced near instantly.

Goodbye cruel world.

Edit: I think I see more what you were saying after thinking about it a bit more. You may very well need some kind of physical process to cause that "snapshot" to emerge. So yeah, this might be more complicated than just the snapshot itself. I have no comment on how much time it would take to poop out a moment of consciousness akin to our own. I would imagine it would be quite a short time frame however given the correct "hardware".

 

[rocketdodger]

Aren't you thus assuming that consciousness can be described by a snap shot arrangement of stuff? I would have thought that being conscious takes time, i.e. consciousness was a process[*], rather than just a plain spacial affair.



[*] and, as such, not independent of the environment, as the resident behaviorist crowd will be more than happy to point out.

No, I am not assuming that -- the the delta time of any of these "snapshots" would be nonzero, since consiousness is a process, and thus they aren't really "snapshots" at all. Thats why I use the term "instantiations."

Which just means the requirements that must be met for an isomorphism are that much greater in number, I.E. you would need to look for a system that not only looked like the pattern of information in our brain but also behaved like one over a very small period of time. However, there is no limit to how small that period of time can be -- any nonzero value is suitable.

 

[HansMustermann]

I just would like to point out that when you go "infinite parallel universes" for that hypothesis, basically you're just trading one unscientific unverifiable hypothesis (heaven and hell) for another one that's just as unverifiable and thus unscientific (multiple universes.)

Yes, it's one way to imagine QM -- in much the same way as imaginary numbers make a neat representation of alternating current circuits -- but it doesn't mean they necessarily exist. Just like imaginary numbers don't actually represent a quantity that actually exists.

And it has the same caveat as Pascal's Wager: really, which version of parallel universes is the real one? E.g., the ones in String Theory (ok, string hypothesis, really) are whole different beasts than the aforementioned QM interpretation, _and_ there might actually be a finite number of universes (worst case scenario: ONE) where the paramters are just right so actually baryonic matter forms, or fusion is possible, and so on.

And there's no experiment to prove or disprove any of those universes anyway. So it's really no more scientific than just believing in the Bible or the teaching of the Alleged Historical Buddha or Tao Te Ching or whatever floats your boat, and being done with it.

That is, if you take it as anything more than just an illustration of another way in which using infinity in an equation screws it up.

 

[Babbylonian]

Is there any utility to this mental exercise, even if we assume its [potential] validity? I mean, I don't really care if a perfect duplicate of my consciousness randomly "comes together" billions of years in the future because my awareness of said duplicate would be exactly zero (given that my current consciousness would be fairly long dead). The only way it could matter to anyone is if we assume that there is something eternal about our current awareness/consciousness, which is very much wooerific.

 

[rocketdodger]

And there's no experiment to prove or disprove any of those universes anyway. So it's really no more scientific than just believing in the Bible or the teaching of the Alleged Historical Buddha or Tao Te Ching or whatever floats your boat, and being done with it.

Well, it might not be more scientific -- since there is no way to disprove the hypothesis or hypotheses -- but at least it is logically coherent.