The Hard Problem of Gravity

[Nick227]

"Qualia" means what we subjectively experience. Calling them qualia doesn't have any particular implications. It's just a name for what everyone reading this experiences. If that experience rules out certain analyses of how consciousness works, then it's bad science to discard the data.

If we say that the sentence "what we subjectively experience" is valid at the level of the whole organism, what do think it looks like if we examine it in terms of brain processes? Where is the "we" and where is the "experience?"

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

If we say that the sentence "what we subjectively experience" is valid at the level of the whole organism, what do think it looks like if we examine it in terms of brain processes? Where is the "we" and where is the "experience?"

They're brain processes. You will find brain processes mostly in the brain.

 

[Dancing David]

How would you define the phenomenon? Or would you simply ignore it because of the lack of a sufficiently precise definition, and assume that whatever is precisely defined is therefore both accurately described and complete?

No I would call it perception, which is the psychology jargon for the patterns generated from the sensation. So visual sensation gets processed into visual perception.

If you would care to offer a meaningful definition of qualia, I will entertain it. But considering that it is a philosophical term, I am not sure I will agree with it.


The color red as perceived is generated by visual column processing in the visual cortex, it is generated from the sensations of the longer wave cones in the fovea. It is painted and manufactured from those sensations, with the brain making up substantial portions of it.

(The fovea is about the size of a dime held at arms length in the visual field, about the width of a finger at arms length. This visual field does float a little due to the eye motion but the vast majority of the color you see is made up from very little sensation and a lot of guessing.)

But as someone who was in psych school back in the 70s and 80s, I see the perceptions as perceptions (a brain process based around the sensations), I do not know what benefit there is to describing them as qualia.

There may be one or more to the uses of the term qualia.

What definition do you use for qualia?


(I did not mean to be offensive, there have been some fairly varied and vague expressions used to define qualia on the JREF, that is why i said they were incoherent.)

 

[Dancing David]

I find the idea that qualia can simply be regarded as an absurdity. All the people making this argument presumably experience qualia - and yet they seem to regard them as some kind of guilty secret; a shameful betrayal of their materialist principles.

If there's no precise definition of qualia, then the first task should be to find such a definition.

And when I have asked for one, I have not received one, which is why I do not find it useful.

The paths from sensation to perception are somewhat understood, if imperfectly. Perceptions can be generated directly as well, if crudely.


There are biochemical/mechanical interactions with the world (apparent) around the body, they generate changes in sensory cells which get filtered, cross referenced and passed onto the main central nervous system. There they are further processed and manufactured into perceptions.
I think that the vestibular senses/perception is about the most interesting because it combines somatic sensation, ear sensations and visual sensations into the vestibular perceptions of motion and orientation. Then that is combined with the kinesthetic/somatic sensations in the way people move their bodies around. Very cool stuff.

 

[Dancing David]

"Qualia" means what we subjectively experience. Calling them qualia doesn't have any particular implications. It's just a name for what everyone reading this experiences. If that experience rules out certain analyses of how consciousness works, then it's bad science to discard the data.

Ah, the meat of the matter.

I have visual and other sensations, these get turned into perceptions, which are then translated into verbal cognition (during reading) (while sometimes enjoying some perceptions co-currently and tuning out others), this then cascades into memories and associations, often emotions and associative recall.
Then after similar processes in reverse I turn verbal cognition into somatic motions (guided by visual perceptions as I watch my fingers type) and the words I type back appear in my sensation/perception.

That is the sort of language I tend to use, although it can be fleshed out considerably.

 

[Dancing David]

If we say that the sentence "what we subjectively experience" is valid at the level of the whole organism, what do think it looks like if we examine it in terms of brain processes? Where is the "we" and where is the "experience?"

Nick

Great question, the sense of self comes fom many different sources, first of all the sensations and perceptions of which there are multiple, interactive and varied (Auditory, somatic(different flavors of that), kinesthetic ( a variation of specific somatic), visual, smell taste, vestibular.)

So we have have all these great perceptions, then we have cognitions, memory and various forms of association. (All coming in different flavors)

Then we have internal habits of association (IE the software/fuzzy logic of neurons), social training and cueing and all sorts of choice/consequence conditioning.

The 'we' is a body, the 'experience' is usually a melange of perceptions, memories, cognitions and the like (Emotions are a wierd one they are part sensation/perception part memory, part association, part habituation and part cognitive framing).

(This can be fleshed out in a very deep branching web structure)

 

[rocketdodger]

Ah, the meat of the matter.

I have visual and other sensations, these get turned into perceptions, which are then translated into verbal cognition (during reading) (while sometimes enjoying some perceptions co-currently and tuning out others), this then cascades into memories and associations, often emotions and associative recall.
Then after similar processes in reverse I turn verbal cognition into somatic motions (guided by visual perceptions as I watch my fingers type) and the words I type back appear in my sensation/perception.

That is the sort of language I tend to use, although it can be fleshed out considerably.

That about sums it up.

So, David, why do people find this stuff so hard to understand?

 

[Nick227]

That about sums it up.

So, David, why do people find this stuff so hard to understand?

Because in a healthy brain the process should appear dualistic. This is why the HPC is imo entirely a valid thing to consider. People who consider the HPC "utterly ridiculous" from the outset...scratch below the surface and you'll probably find all sorts of madness lurking.

The brain creates a "user illusion," the sense of there being someone inside who is the recipient of experience

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

Because in a healthy brain the process should appear dualistic.

Why? It does not appear so to me.

This is why the HPC is imo entirely a valid thing to consider.

No.

People who consider the HPC "utterly ridiculous" from the outset...scratch below the surface and you'll probably find all sorts of madness lurking.

It's not just "utterly ridiculous", it's logically incoherent. That's a very specific problem, and means that HPC per Chalmers doesn't mean anything.

The brain creates a "user illusion," the sense of there being someone inside who is the recipient of experience

No it doesn't.

 

[Nick227]

It's not just "utterly ridiculous", it's logically incoherent. That's a very specific problem, and means that HPC per Chalmers doesn't mean anything.

The phrase "my body" is logically incoherent. Billions of people still use it.

The HPC is simply to assert that there is/may be something left to explain once all the processing aspects of consciousness have been explained. To a strict materialist this is logically incoherent. To the average man-in-the-street it probably seems quite reasonable.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

The phrase "my body" is logically incoherent.

No.

The HPC is simply to assert that there is/may be something left to explain once all the processing aspects of consciousness have been explained.

Yes.

To a strict materialist this is logically incoherent.

To any monist it's incoherent. And dualism is incoherent. So, your choice.

To the average man-in-the-street it probably seems quite reasonable.

So it's reasonable if you don't actually understand it?

 

[Dancing David]

Because in a healthy brain the process should appear dualistic. This is why the HPC is imo entirely a valid thing to consider. People who consider the HPC "utterly ridiculous" from the outset...scratch below the surface and you'll probably find all sorts of madness lurking.

Huh?
What does that have to do with critical thought?

I have many irrational processes and patterns. That does not have an impact upon the process of critical examination.

The brain creates a "user illusion," the sense of there being someone inside who is the recipient of experience

Nick

This is where I disagree, that is to me largely an idiom of social and cultural contruction and one that is part of the dualistic language of dualistic cultures.

 

[Apathia]

The Hard Problem of The Marvelous Lake

The desert town of Chelm has amazing retail property for sale.
You can get a lakeside view.
Yes, from your new home, you can see the marvelous Lake Specter.
You can't swim in it, or boat on it,
because it's a mirage.

The townsfolk are divided into sharp fragments about the true nature of Lake Specter.
There are those who believe there is a real lake there: an extraordinary one whose shoreline recedes from anyone who tries to get close to it.
Then there are a lot of New Age tourists and new landowners who believe that the lake isn't in the desert on our world, but that everyone is looking into a parallel universe.
This notion is especially good for real estate sales and promoted by many realtors.
Of course there are a few people who aren't fooled.
They are upfront that it's just a mirage.

But this is the town of Chelm.
And in the town of Chelm, all arguments must go to absurdity.

ScepticC1: I don't see what the problem is. There's nothing there.

ScepticC2: True, it's just a mirage, but the people who see it get so impressed that they want it to be something real.

ScepticC!: Impressed by what? There's nothing there.

ScepticC2: There's not a lake there, but there is a temperature inversion that gives the illusion of a lake. People argue about the illusion.

ScepticC!: I don't see a lake.

ScepticC2: But you see the mirage don't you?

ScepticC1: What's a mirage? Define "mirage."

ScepticC3: Precisely! The only people who are seeing lakes and mirages are people who have the words "lake" and "mirage" in their cultural vocabulary.

ScepticC2: C3, do you see the mirage?

ScepticC3: There are no mirages. "Mirage" is just a weasel word to substitute for "lake." There is no lake out there.

ScepticC4: And there's no "temperature inversion" either. What people see is a reflection of the sky.

ScepticC2: And how is that?

ScepticC4: The water acts as a mirror.

ScepticC2: What water?

ScepticC1: the lake water, you idiot!

ScepticC2: There is no lake? Right?

ScepticC1: Wrong!

ScepticC2: I thought you agreed that Lake Specter was just an illusion.

Sceptic:C1: Define "illusion."

And so it goes on, "The Hard Problem of Lake Specter"
But just where is this hardness?

 

[Nick227]

Great question, the sense of self comes fom many different sources, first of all the sensations and perceptions of which there are multiple, interactive and varied (Auditory, somatic(different flavors of that), kinesthetic ( a variation of specific somatic), visual, smell taste, vestibular.)

So we have have all these great perceptions, then we have cognitions, memory and various forms of association. (All coming in different flavors)

Then we have internal habits of association (IE the software/fuzzy logic of neurons), social training and cueing and all sorts of choice/consequence conditioning.

The 'we' is a body, the 'experience' is usually a melange of perceptions, memories, cognitions and the like (Emotions are a wierd one they are part sensation/perception part memory, part association, part habituation and part cognitive framing).

(This can be fleshed out in a very deep branching web structure)

I figure it's mostly just inner speech. There's a narrative going on inside the head and it both refers to an "I" and infers the presence of this "I" - as something that is hearing the narrative. But there's no one inside the head. Dennett calls the resultant "I" a centre of narrative gravity, coherent peripheral activity creates the illusion of there being something at the centre.

How does it go? There are heaps of dispositional representations created by thinking scattered across the neocortex. The occasional output from these neuronal structures, more thinking, maintains this sense of there being someone to whom they refer - a user illusion.

Is the user illusion useful? Or is it benign (Dennett)? Or is it just a bloated parasitic memeplex the organism could well do without (Blackmore)?

What does your user illusion say?

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

I'd say that it's (a) useful, (b) necessary, and (c) unavoidable.

(a) because it allows for complex adaptive behaviours.
(b) because it is the simplest (and hence, least expensive biologically) way to provide such behaviours.
and (c) because when you wire up a huge neural network and configure it for self-preservation via inference-building and adaptive behaviour, you're going to get a sense of self, whether that was your intention or not.

There's a a lot of debate about how far we can take each of these points, but each of them is true and relevant to a considerable degree.

 

[Apathia]

Is the user illusion useful? Or is it benign (Dennett)? Or is it just a bloated parasitic memeplex the organism could well do without (Blackmore)?

The traditional Buddhist perspective on it is that it's a delusion we eventually ought to extinguish.

I depart from Buddhism there and celebrate the self as a bit of creative fiction.
Of course we want to be aware of the quirks of these characters we create and not take them too seriously to our detriment.

But indeed this proclivity to self-hood has behaved as a "bloated parasitic memeplex."

 

[Apathia]

I'd say that it's (a) useful, (b) necessary, and (c) unavoidable.

(a) because it allows for complex adaptive behaviours.
(b) because it is the simplest (and hence, least expensive biologically) way to provide such behaviours.
and (c) because when you wire up a huge neural network and configure it for self-preservation via inference-building and adaptive behaviour, you're going to get a sense of self, whether that was your intention or not.

There's a a lot of debate about how far we can take each of these points, but each of them is true and relevant to a considerable degree.

My user-illusion will repeat these affirmations.

 

[Dancing David]

I figure it's mostly just inner speech. There's a narrative going on inside the head and it both refers to an "I" and infers the presence of this "I" - as something that is hearing the narrative. But there's no one inside the head. Dennett calls the resultant "I" a centre of narrative gravity, coherent peripheral activity creates the illusion of there being something at the centre.

How does it go? There are heaps of dispositional representations created by thinking scattered across the neocortex. The occasional output from these neuronal structures, more thinking, maintains this sense of there being someone to whom they refer - a user illusion.

Is the user illusion useful? Or is it benign (Dennett)? Or is it just a bloated parasitic memeplex the organism could well do without (Blackmore)?

What does your user illusion say?

Nick

I go with the buddha, there is a body, the self is an illusion.

 

[Dancing David]

The traditional Buddhist perspective on it is that it's a delusion we eventually ought to extinguish.

I depart from Buddhism there and celebrate it as a bit of creative fiction.
Of course we want to be aware of the quirks of these characters we create and not take them too seriously to our detriment.

But indeed this proclivity to self-hood has behaved as a "bloated parasitic memeplex."

I think the alleged historical buddha was more of a pragmatist, it is the avoidance of displeasure and the clinging to pleasure that fuels tanha, the self is not so much damaging as the behaviors that result from it.

 

[Dancing David]

(c) because when you wire up a huge neural network and configure it for self-preservation via inference-building and adaptive behaviour, you're going to get a sense of self, whether that was your intention or not.

True, even without the self preservation.