The Hard Problem of Gravity

[Ichneumonwasp]

Well, here we're looking at how consciousness manifests according research based around a GWT-style model. One of the basic precepts of such a model is that there exists unconscious information which can become conscious if certain conditions are met. One of those conditions is that certain areas of neurons begin to reverberate at specific frequencies and that this allows a rapid transfer of information across a wide range of unconscious brain modules.

So, for me, this is not so much about learning but more about how unconscious information becomes conscious.

Nick

What in the world does the bolded part even mean?

Yes, we have noticed that 40 Hz event related potentials correlate with becoming aware of some bit of information, but I have no idea how you see that being operationalized in the wording of that sentence.

As far as I can tell no one clearly knows what 40 Hz event related potentials mean in a larger picture.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

But when we discuss the simulated dog, or the fictional dog, or the photograph of a dog, we need to remember that when we are using the word "running" then it means something quite different to what we mean when we speak of a real dog. However the relation between the simulated dog and its background, and a real dog and its environment are very different. The relationship implied by "running" is entirely defined by its context.

In what way does it mean something different?

If I see a simulation of a dog running past some trees I say, "Oooh, look at the pretty doggy running through the forest."

If I see a real dog running past some trees I say, "Oooh, look at the pretty doggy running through the forest."

In both cases I say the same words, I mean the same thing -- because 'running' is defined in terms of relationships. There is no platonic ideal for 'running'. It is a word I have learned through use in a language community and I have applied it correctly in both situations.

What is the difference? That one takes place in the real world and one in a simulated world? What difference does that make to the "running"? It makes a difference to the dog, but I can't see how it makes any difference to the realtional action we call "running".

 

[westprog]

I'm not sure because I'm having some problem following the conversation between the two of you.

I suppose it's all a question of how we define a "switch". I wouldn't venture to give my own definition, seeing as how I'm not the one arguing for or against that position, but perhaps it'd help if the both of you restated yours so we all know where we stand.

There's really not much point in defining what I call a switch. I don't think switches are anything very significant at all in the workings of the universe. I certainly don't think that the operation of switches - under any definition - is a plausible explanation for consciousness. However, if I'm to argue with Rocketdodger about it (and Pixy seems to agree on this point) then I have to argue with what he thinks. No point in arguing over what a switch really is.

 

[Nick227]

What in the world does the bolded part even mean?

I constructed it from the last part of Dehaene et al, quoted below...

We adopted a theory-driven approach, trying to test experimentally a set of explicit predictions derived from the global workspace model of conscious access. This model, in part inspired from Bernard Baars' theory [30], proposes that at any given time, many modular cerebral networks are active in parallel and process information in an unconscious manner [22,23,31,32]. Incoming visual information becomes conscious, however, if and only if the three following conditions are met [23]: Condition 1: information must be explicitly represented by the neuronal firing of perceptual networks located in visual cortical areas coding for the specific features of the conscious percept. Condition 2: this neuronal representation must reach a minimal threshold of duration and intensity necessary for access to a second stage of processing, associated with a distributed cortical network involved in particular parietal and prefrontal cortices. Condition 3: through joint bottom-up propagation and top-down attentional amplification, the ensuing brain-scale neural assembly must “ignite” into a self-sustained reverberant state of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain.

You feel I'm misrepresenting the authors?

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

No, the relationship between a running man and his environment, and a simulated running man and his environment are not the same. They have very little in common.

Probably because you are including all sorts of stuff in "running."

Why don't we use a simpler example -- an atom.

Given a perfect simulation of an atom -- down to the planck constants -- what is the mathematical difference between the relationships in the simulation and the corresponding relationships outside the simulation?

 

[rocketdodger]

I don't think switches are anything very significant at all in the workings of the universe.

I find switches to be significant because they are what has allowed life to evolve on our planet. No switches, no life.

You seem to disagree. So, what do you think is significant?

 

[westprog]

In what way does it mean something different?

If I see a simulation of a dog running past some trees I say, "Oooh, look at the pretty doggy running through the forest."

If I see a real dog running past some trees I say, "Oooh, look at the pretty doggy running through the forest."

In both cases I say the same words, I mean the same thing -- because 'running' is defined in terms of relationships. There is no platonic ideal for 'running'. It is a word I have learned through use in a language community and I have applied it correctly in both situations.

What is the difference? That one takes place in the real world and one in a simulated world? What difference does that make to the "running"? It makes a difference to the dog, but I can't see how it makes any difference to the realtional action we call "running".

A and B cannot have the same relationship as C and D when they are entirely different entities.

How would you describe the experience of seeing the doggy running through the forest to a third party?

 

[westprog]

Probably because you are including all sorts of stuff in "running."

Why don't we use a simpler example -- an atom.

Given a perfect simulation of an atom -- down to the planck constants -- what is the mathematical difference between the relationships in the simulation and the corresponding relationships outside the simulation?

First of all, are you including the relations between the atom and the universe?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I constructed it from the last part of Dehaene et al, quoted below...



You feel I'm misrepresenting the authors?

Nick

I didn't accuse you of misrepresenting them, but I'm not sure you got the pint across very well, I'm afraid.

But that is to be expected because they don't really explain what a 40 Hz potential really means either. Keep in mind, first of all, that this info primarily deals with visually coded information -- that is where most of the work with 40 Hz event related potentials has been done (mostly because we are so visual). I don't keep up with that field, so I don't know all the ins and outs of it, but I don't know if others have worked out the same issues with other sense modalities. This may be a common theme, but I'm not sure we know yet. And secondly, we don't know enough about these potentials to know really what they represent.

Like everything else here, it's highly speculative, though I think it's probably correct. It is nowhere near a final answer, though.

I haven't been keeping up with your whole conversation, but you might want to tread very lightly about denying any relation to self-reference. The interaction they speak of with the frontal and parietal areas refer most likely to incorporation of visual information into planning (frontal) and body map (parietal) -- both key aspects of "self".

 

[Nick227]

I didn't accuse you of misrepresenting them, but I'm not sure you got the pint across very well, I'm afraid.

But that is to be expected because they don't really explain what a 40 Hz potential really means either. Keep in mind, first of all, that this info primarily deals with visually coded information -- that is where most of the work with 40 Hz event related potentials has been done (mostly because we are so visual). I don't keep up with that field, so I don't know all the ins and outs of it, but I don't know if others have worked out the same issues with other sense modalities. This may be a common theme, but I'm not sure we know yet. And secondly, we don't know enough about these potentials to know really what they represent.

Like everything else here, it's highly speculative, though I think it's probably correct. It is nowhere near a final answer, though.

No, I agree. In fact, directly after the above quote, the authors answer their own question "Why would this ignited state correspond to a conscious state?" by essentially stating, because that's a precept of GWT!

I haven't been keeping up with your whole conversation, but you might want to tread very lightly about denying any relation to self-reference. The interaction they speak of with the frontal and parietal areas refer most likely to incorporation of visual information into planning (frontal) and body map (parietal) -- both key aspects of "self".

Thanks for the extra info.

I'm not denying any relation to self-reference. I'm sure that the attentional circuit that mediates the amplification of an unconscious visual information into consciousness does so by refering to self. If it perceives a threat to self then attention is directed towards the perceived threatening event, along with other reactions.

What I'm saying is that visual phenomenology itself is not innately self-referencing.

Nick

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

A and B cannot have the same relationship as C and D when they are entirely different entities.

How would you describe the experience of seeing the doggy running through the forest to a third party?

What do you mean by "entirely different entities"? I don't see a problem here. Joe running past a building is just like Mary running past trees in terms of the relationships that constitute "running".

I don't see why one being simulated changes that issue in any substantive way. Running is running. With simulations it just doesn't take place in the real world. The relationships still must hold or we couldn't use the word "running".

How would I describe it to a third party -- "Hey Joe come over here and see the pretty doggy running through the forest on Mike's computer."

 

[rocketdodger]

First of all, are you including the relations between the atom and the universe?

Of course not. Why would you?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

What I'm saying is that visual phenomenology itself is not innately self-referencing.

Nick

But doesn't this model imply self-reference in the incoporation of frontal and parietal structures; and did you not say that attentional mechanisms, which are a necessary part of conscious experience, also incorporate self-reference?

Or did you mean to say 'visual processing' instead of 'visual phenomenology'?

Most of visual processing occurs unconsciously, but it seems that this model implies that for something to be a visual experience involves some form of self-reference.

Do you have an example in mind that includes the experience of some visual phenomenon that would not include self-reference?

 

[Nick227]

But doesn't this model imply self-reference in the incoporation of frontal and parietal structures; and did you not say that attentional mechanisms, which are a necessary part of conscious experience, also incorporate self-reference?

Or did you mean to say 'visual processing' instead of 'visual phenomenology'?

Most of visual processing occurs unconsciously, but it seems that this model implies that for something to be a visual experience involves some form of self-reference.

Personally, I'd avoid the word "experience," as I think it complicates things still further. I'd say that most of visual processing occurs unconsciously but it may be elevated to consciousness if it fulfils certain conditions. Self-referencing may be included in attention, and thus be one of these conditions, or it may not be. I don't see any need for self-reference in consciousness. If there is nothing that triggers attention we can still see, as myriad Buddhists will testify.

Do you have an example in mind that includes the experience of some visual phenomenon that would not include self-reference?

I would say that what is seen is not innately self-referencing. It might be directed into our awareness by a self-referencing attentional circuit, or it might not be. But what is seen is not innately self-referencing.

My basic point is in answer to Pixy's assertion that consciousness is innately self-referencing. I disagree. For me, what creates the greater part of self in phenomenality is just inner dialogue, creating as it does subject-object relationships from the world around us. Thus, for me, self-reference is simply not innate to consciousness. Consciousness exists with or without inner dialogue and with or without self-reference.

Nick

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I would say that what is seen is not innately self-referencing. It might be directed into our awareness by a self-referencing attentional circuit, or it might not be. But what is seen is not innately self-referencing.

My basic point is in answer to Pixy's assertion that consciousness is innately self-referencing. I disagree. For me, what creates the greater part of self in phenomenology is just inner dialogue, creating as it does subject-object relationships from the world around us. Thus, for me, self-reference is simply not innate to consciousness. Consciousness exists with or without inner dialogue and with or without self-reference.

Nick

My only disagreement would be with the idea that self-reference refers only to inner dialogue. That is a particular type of self-reference, and I agree with you that that is not necessary for consciousness. That is a higher-order form of self-consciousness.

I think there are other types of self-reference that do not depend on language, however, and that model seems to use this idea.

I guess it depends on what definition of 'self' one uses. The inner dialogue version depends on a higher-order integrated idea of self -- what we normally think of as a 'self', while this particular model uses a lower-level version of body map/'what does that mean?' kind of 'self', if that makes sense.

 

[Nick227]

My only disagreement would be with the idea that self-reference refers only to inner dialogue.

Well, I did say "greater part of self." Self is more than "narrative" or "psychological" selfhood, to use Dennett's terms. There is also what he terms "biological" selfhood.

That is a particular type of self-reference, and I agree with you that that is not necessary for consciousness. That is a higher-order form of self-consciousness.

I think there are other types of self-reference that do not depend on language, however, and that model seems to use this idea.

I imagine attention is mostly directed from the mid-brain.

I guess it depends on what definition of 'self' one uses. The inner dialogue version depends on a higher-order integrated idea of self -- what we normally think of as a 'self', while this particular model uses a lower-level version of body map/'what does that mean?' kind of 'self', if that makes sense.

I'd say that it's a series of defensive and acquisitional reactions largely inherited from our ancestors, with a few we've picked up ourselves.

Nick

 

[AkuManiMani]

I'll say. First we'd have to understand what the hell is a "qualitative element of subjective impressions". It comes right back to you saying that qualia are experiences (which you didn't seem too sure about), since you noew say that they constitute the "totality of our experience". It doesn't seem to me like you know what you mean by "qualia".

What I'm saying is that what one consciously experiences at any given time is made up of qualia. Qualia are the subjective correlates of internal and external stimuli. Together they make up the totality of our experience. For instance, the individual tastes, smells, sounds, sensations, emotions, and thoughts reduce to qualia; together they make up your collective experience at any given moment.

I'm proposing that the conscious mind can be reductively understood in some fashion and you just flip out because I use a taboo trigger word that gets your liver all inna quiver. It seems that the only basis for your objection to the term is that it sounds too 'soul-like' to you. If you have a more logical reason as to why you believe the term isn't suitable please share it 'cause I've yet to hear it.

The properties of an overall system are not merely the sum of the components. Of course they do not rise out of 'thin air' without rhyme or reason, but there is not a direct linear correlation between individual component properties and collective emergent properties.

I'd be interested in seeing examples of this. An example of an emergent property that is not wholly a function of the constituents.

That isn't what I'm saying. My point is that emergent properties are collective properties of a system that do not exist [or have no meaning] below a certain reductive level of organization.

One last try: You seem to imply that the human "mind" is in a special category that makes it immune to understanding.

Theres no need for you to try so hard to find out my position when I've already explicitly and repeatedly stated it. I'll tell you one last time. I believe that the 'mind' and 'consciousness' can be understood just like any other phenomenon. Its just that currently, we simply lack sufficient scientific understanding to realistically model or reproduce it.

Pointing out that something is not known is not the same as claiming that it is unknowable.

I asked you what a qualia is. You said it is what constitutes experience, and then you say we can experience qualia.

Okay, so whats the problem?

How indeed. Yet we have language that references and communicates our qualitative experiences and the capacity to be aware of and evaluate them. Clearly, what ever the nature of our 'program', its has the capacity to be aware of some of it's 'coding'.

Er... no. I'm not aware of how my person generates consciousness or how it operates to make a decision.

Thats exactly my point. Once humans have that knowledge we'll be able to seriously devise ways to synthetically create it.

In fact I become aware of the decision after it's been made.

Why do you claim that you aware of it after rather than when?

The mere fact that we can talk about it doesn't make us conscious because then computers that can say "I am conscious" would be conscious by definition.

You're missing the point. Us being conscious is the reason why our language has words that attempt to describe it. When a device like a computer prints something like "I am conscious" it does so because beings that are conscious programed it to do so. Its no more conscious than a wall with the words "I am conscious" printed on it and no more human than a computer than can print "I am human".

I've been stating repeatedly that many conscious functions are classes of self-referential processing but that self-reference, IAOI, does not explain or sufficiently describe consciousness because it applies to a huge range of processes which are NOT conscious. Perhaps if you actually took the time to UNDERSTAND what I've been explicitly saying, instead of mindlessly arguing against it, you would have picked up on this atleast 20 pages ago.

I have been following, and perhaps you'd make more progress with less insults.

I'd insult less if individuals would stop being deliberately obtuse. I'm not insulting because people disagree with me or don't understand; I'm insulting certain individuals because they make little to no effort to understand and are practicing blatant intellectual dishonesty. If you've been following that thats what I've been saying all along why in the world would you deliberately misrepresent it?

How are those unconscious processes self-aware ?

I never claimed that unconscious processes are self aware. I said that conscious processes can be self aware, and that such self-awareness is what we call introspection.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Nope. The switch was a molecule, not a single atom. The single atom was merely part of the switch.

[...]

Closer, but still wrong. The only example of a single atom "switch" in that paper involved an external property changing nonlinearly (the position of a Xe atom relative to a substrate), not an internal one, so it doesn't satisfy the definition I gave.

Want to keep trying?

Oh, so atoms and their constituent particles switching from quantum state to another doesn't count as switching?

 

[AkuManiMani]

Great link, thanks. I look forward to reading it through.

About reverberation, for me it's a pretty tentative link to claim that this is the same as self-referencing. Pixy was referring to information processing systems which are, AFAIK, not dependent on oscillation. Yes, any oscillating structure is behaving as a whole, but I wouldn't personally call this self-reference. Besides, I imagine that it is not the reverberation itself per se that is needed to create consciousness, rather specific frequencies or frequency groups. So, at my current level of awareness, I would consider this link pretty far-fetched. I could be wrong.

It's also not clear for me what they mean by "self-sustained" here. I'll have to read the paper. Presumably the neuronal reverberation is still driven by the RAS or whatever.

Nick

There is much talk of frequency oscillations and coherent processing in the GW model. It seems that the GWT and field theory of consciousness may be one and the same

 

[westprog]

What do you mean by "entirely different entities"? I don't see a problem here. Joe running past a building is just like Mary running past trees in terms of the relationships that constitute "running".

I don't see why one being simulated changes that issue in any substantive way. Running is running. With simulations it just doesn't take place in the real world. The relationships still must hold or we couldn't use the word "running".

How would I describe it to a third party -- "Hey Joe come over here and see the pretty doggy running through the forest on Mike's computer."

We use words in quite sophisticated ways. When we say "The picture was a man, running" we know that what it really is is something entirely static. What we mean is that the image creates an impression of running for the viewer. It doesn't say anything about the intrinsic properties of the object in relation to its environment, or quasi-environment. When we say "Hey Joe come over here and see the pretty doggy running through the forest" we are implying several real objects and all the associated relationships. If we mention Mikes computer, we instantly realise that we are describing a potentially shared experience - which is how we communicate consciousness. The only relationship that matters is between the image and the people who view it - and more profoundly, the shared qualia.