The Hard Problem of Gravity

If you take the thermally expansive element out of a thermostat it is no longer conscious.

Unless you consider the element all by itself to be the thermostat.

In any case, the principle is simple -- if a decision is made, it is conscious. So no, the element all by itself is not conscious with respect to the information about it being hot or cold enough to trigger some external event.

So...just to get this clear, you are claiming the stat is conscious and the rock not whereas Pixy agrees neither are conscious?

BTW, no decisions are being made here. Materials are altering their physical characteristics according to environmental conditions. This happens anyway.

Nick
 
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AkuManiMani said:
I've been giving this issue a great deal of thought. From what I've been able to tell reasoning, is the processing of representations of 'things' while experience is the direct apprehension of a 'thing'. Quanta are the means of formally conveying descriptions of things and qualia are the direct experience of what quanta merely describe. In other words, quale and quantum are complementary aspects of reality.

No.

You are using dualistic definitions and approaching the concept from an already dualistic standpoint.

Stick with "reasoning == generating new facts using existing facts and rules of inference," and remember that your neural networks are going to reason whether you realize it or not.

Now, tell me if you think there can be "direct apprehension" without reasoning. Is it possible to apprehend something without generating any new facts? No, because at the very least the apprehension constitutes a new fact.

Uhm...I don't think you're catching my meaning. I'm not disputing the reasoning capacity of neural nets or any other intelligent system. What I'm going is distinguishing quale from quantum. I'm not sure how I can better clarify it but the two concepts are not contradictory; infact, they are interdependent.

Reasoning is the processing of representations; experiencing is the apprehension of significance which may be conveyed by representations. As I mentioned earlier, they are complementary in much the sense as inside/outside, up/down, continuous/discrete, is/not etc. Fundamentally, its simply another expression of a binary relation. For a reasoning entity to be conscious in some sense, it must generate the capacity to experience significance values for the representations it processes. Being that experience is inherently qualitative, a conscious reasoning entity will have a range of qualitative values that can be assigned to quantitative representations. In other words, each logical element within an entity's conscious field is necessarily linked with a range of 'suchness' values.

An entity that can consciously sense light experiences quanta of light as some range of qualities. The qualities can be experienced as 'color', 'sound', 'taste', or any other subjective vagary. The only way different conscious entities can communicate is if they share a common representational structure [i.e. language] and a common intersubjective basis [i.e. they have overlapping 'suchness' values].

Again, I stress qualia and quanta are not metaphysically distinct entities but complementary aspects of reality in much the same way that wave and particle are complementary.
 
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actually, this reminds me... I reviewed an intro psych text written by a well-known neuropsych expert prior to its first edition; the chapter on nerves, brain & behavior was seriously messed up. At one point, the author, writing about the process of nerve transmission (specifically, the depolarization of the dendritic membrane due to neurotransmitter action at the synapse, and the threshold event that separates local potentials from action potentials), said "when a neuron decides it has had sufficient stimulation, it fires an action potential" (emphasis mine). Note the consciousness-language, being used in a clear S-R situation. There is no "deciding" taking place; the membrane's depolarization is a well-known phenomenon that does not require each cell to have a homunculus.

Of course, if we wish to argue that the cell does, in fact, decide, and that deciding is simply acting on the deterministic inputs by emitting the determined outputs... perhaps it is not all that different from how we decide after all.

Needless to say, the language did not make it to the first edition.

Such language seems to pop up in particle physics sometimes as well. A particle is often said to 'decide' to take one path or another. :p
 
westprog said:
Assuming that it's possible for that P not to have access to its own consciousness, and still be a P.


Notice how you are using the 3rd PP when you say "...to have access to its own consciousness..."

Since we're using your own way of reasoning here: How do you have access to your own consciousness from a 1st PP? Do you not see the duality here? The only way to get away from that duality is to say that access is consciousness.

You might also say that you are conscious of your consciousness, but isn't that a little bit like saying you can lift yourself up from your own bootstraps?
 
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Sure, if I observe and measure its behaviour.

No, this time YOU are processing the information.

So...you're saying that if I measure the behaviour of a rock under different physical conditions, the rock is now conscious? And if I stop observing or measuring it then it ceases to be conscious?

No, that's what YOU are saying in your first sentence. Did you really think anybody would fall for that ?
 
That doesn't make any sense at all.

A self-refering system does not need to know how it self-refers to self-refer.

Erm...That doesn't actually contradict what I said. I said that you're not directly conscious of your neurons because conscious and self-referential processing are simply phenomenon being generated by neural activity. The statements I made is in agreement with the one you just made. If I didn't know any better I'd say that you're being reflexively contrary ;)
 
The thermostat doesn't care what it does. Whatever happens is just fine with the thermostat. It is a physical object. It can't fail to be a physical object, following the laws of physics. It doesn't matter to the thermostat whether the AC is connected, any more than it matters to the rock if the microbe lives or dies.

You just don't get it. If the AC is not connected, then the thermostat has no access to the physical correlates of facts about the AC.

All information is exactly equal. There are no values in physics.

Huh? I say "all information is equal, it is the processing of it that is different."

You respond with "no, all information is equal."

Wtf?

There are certainly magnified effects. A rock can roll down the slope of a volcano, block a vent and cause a gigantic explosion. But that has nothing to do with coherent information. That can be totally random.

...and?

The incredible thing about this idea is that is requires such total misunderstanding of the nature of the universe that it amazes me that it is actually taken seriously at any level. So many concepts that have no place in scientific thinking are shoehorned in in an entirely incoherent way. Placing "value" on information, having inanimate devices "want" to do things, having things that "should" or "should not" happen - it's scientific nonsense. It's the Brave Little Toaster view of the world.

Wait, wait... are you seriously saying that, for instance, the information that your food might be poisoned is of equal value to you as information about the number of children in a village in India?

And that the information about external temperature is of equal value to a thermostat as information about what pigment was used to paint the living room?

Again... you don't get it -- value is relative.

And yet when these words are used in their normal sense - the human sense - about human beings "wanting" to do something, about having "preferences" - that's described as sloppy, undefined thinking.

No it isn't. "Want" and "preference" are perfectly valid concepts that are easy to formalize.
 
Note that the element all by itself could still be argued to be conscious under certain definitions, in particular with respect to other decisions that might be made in the system. If you want to be like westprog, you could say "if molecule 32626 hits molecule 22667 instead of molecule 89989 then a decision has been made." Fair enough, but if nobody is interested in the results of that decision then... well... nobody is interested in the results.

So...you're saying consciousness is determined by whether someone is attributing functionality to a process or not?

Look, the rock isn't conscious and the stat neither. A billions stats or a billion rocks arranged in a certain way could be argued to be conscious. Complex processing can take place. But actual phenomenality? Answer = we don't know.

Read Block vs Dennett, the Chinese Brain or Chinese Nation experiment. Can a billion people connected in a certain way replicate visual phenomenology?

Nick
 
And that the information about external temperature is of equal value to a thermostat as information about what pigment was used to paint the living room?

This line struck me as odd. Is your argument on this:

The thermostat's function is to measure ambient temperature and activate/deactivate heating/cooling units based on the result.

Therefore the only information of value to the thermostat is ambient temperature.

?
 
So...just to get this clear, you are claiming the stat is conscious and the rock not whereas Pixy agrees neither are conscious?

BTW, no decisions are being made here. Materials are altering their physical characteristics according to environmental conditions. This happens anyway.

Nick

Yeah Pixy and I have different definitions of conscious. I hold that anything making decisions is conscious, whereas Pixy holds that anything making decisions about itself is conscious. I reserve that behavior for self-conscious. No biggie, we both understand exactly where the other is coming from.

BTW, a decision is being made. The thermostat has a physical correlate, in the form of it's mechanism (whether it be mechanical or electronic), of certain facts about the world. Those correlates do not exist in a rock.

Do you understand this? A rock can heat up but that is it. A thermostat heats up and then a specific part of it -- the physical correlate -- switches state.

If you took a rock, and designated part of it to be a physical correlate to some fact, and said "once it reaches a threshold temperature the fact is true, otherwise false" then it would also be a switch.

But that doesn't happen.

If you took a mountain and waited trillions of years, probability states that eventually there would be a pattern of information flow within the rock that is isomorphic with the information flow in a human mind. For that instant, the mountain would think it was a person. So what? If you waited trillions of years a copy of you might randomly assemble from molecules in the middle of Saturn.

We are talking about what happens on a regular, predictable basis. The reason switching systems work is because they have well defined physical correlates of facts that the switches represent. Rocks don't.
 
Depends on how many get invitations ;)


Btw, nice to see you're still lurking, BDZ!

Thanks AkuManiMani, :D

Not time to even read the whole thread, much less to discuss. But reading some posts here and there.. it seems to me that we are still in the dark ages.

Me? I do not believe there are such things as "minds". On the other hand, I do not believe there is anything like "a physical reality". IMO this is why this discussions never get anywhere, we mistakenly take hypothetical depictions of facts as reality and then attempt to answer questions without noticing that we are naively attributing clear ontological status to objects like "minds" and "physical reality".
 
So...you're saying consciousness is determined by whether someone is attributing functionality to a process or not?

Look, the rock isn't conscious and the stat neither. A billions stats or a billion rocks arranged in a certain way could be argued to be conscious. Complex processing can take place. But actual phenomenality? Answer = we don't know.

Read Block vs Dennett, the Chinese Brain or Chinese Nation experiment. Can a billion people connected in a certain way replicate visual phenomenology?

Nick

What is the visual phenomenality associated with a single retinal cell?

None? Hmm... what number of light receptors is required before visual phenomenality occurs?

What level of processing the output of those receptors is required?
 
This line struck me as odd. Is your argument on this:

The thermostat's function is to measure ambient temperature and activate/deactivate heating/cooling units based on the result.

Therefore the only information of value to the thermostat is ambient temperature.

?

Yes, something like that. Although information about the state of the heating/cooling system is also important.

If an entity doesn't use fact X, then information about the truth of fact X is of no value to the entity.
 
Uhm...I don't think you're catching my meaning. I'm not disputing the reasoning capacity of neural nets or any other intelligent system. What I'm going is distinguishing quale from quantum. I'm not sure how I can better clarify it but the two concepts are not contradictory; infact, they are interdependent.

Reasoning is the processing of representations; experiencing is the apprehension of significance which may be conveyed by representations. As I mentioned earlier, they are complementary in much the sense as inside/outside, up/down, continuous/discrete, is/not etc. Fundamentally, its simply another expression of a binary relation. For a reasoning entity to be conscious in some sense, it must generate the capacity to experience significance values for the representations it processes. Being that experience is inherently qualitative, a conscious reasoning entity will have a range of qualitative values that can be assigned to quantitative representations. In other words, each logical element within an entity's conscious field is necessarily linked with a range of 'suchness' values.

An entity that can consciously sense light experiences quanta of light as some range of qualities. The qualities can be experienced as 'color', 'sound', 'taste', or any other subjective vagary. The only way different conscious entities can communicate is if they share a common representational structure [i.e. language] and a common intersubjective basis [i.e. they have overlapping 'suchness' values].

Again, I stress qualia and quanta are not metaphysically distinct entities but complementary aspects of reality in much the same way that wave and particle are complementary.

Yet apprehension itself is a representation ("fact" is a better term). As such, it requires reasoning to get it.

If you disagree, then tell me why you think apprehension is not another representation. "Representation X is significant." How is that not another representation?
 
Yet apprehension itself is a representation ("fact" is a better term). As such, it requires reasoning to get it.

If you disagree, then tell me why you think apprehension is not another representation. "Representation X is significant." How is that not another representation?

My point is that while one can represent an apprehension and apprehensions can only be communicated between entities via representations [unless ofcourse, the entities have overlapping conscious experiences; in which case, one would be hard pressed to describe them as being separate. As to whether or not such a thing is possible in principle, I can only speculate]., the two aspects are fundamentally dichotomous. I'm not denying reason in favor of experience; I'm saying that they are co-equal and, in the case of conscious entities, co-dependent. Experience and representation [quale and quantum] are inherently correlational but not identical.

We must learn the representational language of conscious phenomena before we can meaningfully attempt to reproduce it synthetically. As of now, all we know is that consciousness is associated with a specific range of physiological states in the brain and that we have a limited capacity to communicate these states via language and empathetic responses. Qualitative experiences have yet to be adequately defined via some formal system. Of course, any such formal system would not be a substitute for actual experience, but a detailed formal description of such would be essential for synthetic reproduction of consciousness in a machine.

I think that it should be possible to describe the phenomenon we call consciousness in a physical equation. The first step towards doing this would be to pinpoint the exact physical correlate of conscious experiences and work from there. Like I said earlier, all the evidence currently points toward the EM field processes of the brain being the carrier of conscious experience.

[Being that you're an AI researcher, I'd recommend that you read up on EM field theories of consciousness and the holonomic brain theory. The concepts are highly speculative at this point but there is much evidence to suggest that they are worth investigating.]

The sooner we can pin down this issue the sooner we'll be able to close this chapter of the EMA.
 
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What is the visual phenomenality associated with a single retinal cell?

None? Hmm... what number of light receptors is required before visual phenomenality occurs?

What level of processing the output of those receptors is required?

My point is not related to this. If you replicate the visual cortex with a massive array of interconnected tin cans or a vast population of interconnected humans performing simple functions (a la Block)....how does it see?

Nick
 
Yeah Pixy and I have different definitions of conscious. I hold that anything making decisions is conscious, whereas Pixy holds that anything making decisions about itself is conscious. I reserve that behavior for self-conscious. No biggie, we both understand exactly where the other is coming from.

BTW, a decision is being made. The thermostat has a physical correlate, in the form of it's mechanism (whether it be mechanical or electronic), of certain facts about the world. Those correlates do not exist in a rock.

Do you understand this? A rock can heat up but that is it. A thermostat heats up and then a specific part of it -- the physical correlate -- switches state.

The notion that it is switching state is actually just humans attributing function. With the stat electron activity is switched up or switched down by the movement of the bimetallic strip. It's a simple physical process. The notion that a state is switched.....the AC capacitor charges, coolant begins to flow, the fans start to move...is purely human attribution of functionality.

This is why I actually agree with Pixy here. You can't claim a simple switch is conscious because anything can be a simple switch. You need a billion or so and then you can make claims.

Nick
 

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