The Hard Problem of Gravity

[AkuManiMani]

Well, to be more accurate, it is a phenomenon of a particular type; experience.

What does that mean?

-_-

....

Don't play dense, Pixy. I give you a lot more credit than that.



It means that I'm calling 'consciousness' a specific class of phenomenon:

"An observable fact or occurrence or a kind of observable fact or occurrence; an appearance. "

More specifically, consciousness is THE "observable fact or occurrence", sine qua non. Its the fundamental basis of every human pursuit, including science. Without 'consciousness' there is no observation of anything.

I know from direct observation that there are periods of time that the phenomenon of my conscious experience has varying qualities (moods, sensations, colors, thoughts and accompanying emotional overtones, directions of focus, etc.) and varying degrees (ranging from full wakefulness, to drowsiness, and unconscious sleep).

You've already told me what your criteria for consciousness are and I reject them for a number of reasons [many of which I've already repeatedly and clearly stated in this an every other thread discussing this topic] but one of the primary reasons is that your criteria are met when I am, in fact, unconscious. From the empirical laboratory of my own experience I know that the criteria you've proposed are falsified. I don't need to refer to the intellectual authority of Dennett or any other person to see that this is the case.

The argument in favor of the "toaster as conscious" view is, on its face, a lousy one because its based on an equivocation of the term 'consciousness'. Many of the thinkers you've referenced in support of your definition of consciousness, I feel, are very intelligent people who should know better, so I can't help but concluding that this equivocation is deliberate.

I also believe that you're intelligent enough to know better yourself and that you already know what is meant when I use the term 'consciousness'. It seems that you're deliberately being obtuse. I'm referring the the phenomenon of qualitative experience that you undergo every waking moment. I've pointed this out to you before and you responded with comments to the effect of:

"Irrelevant"

or

"Oh, that's just factory added extras"

Well, we just so happen to be discussing the "factory added extra" of consciousness. There's no compelling reason to conclude that appliances like microwaves and thermostats have been endowed with this "factory added extra"; in fact there are strong reasons to suspect the contrary. So lets just cut the bull, shall we?

Your invoking of "appliances are conscious too" is a deliberate dodging of the issue at hand. Quite frankly, its getting really old.

How can there not be experience? Experience is simply the result of processing and storing information. If you have a brain, experience is unavoidable.

Wha....?

Dude... Do..Do you READ what you're typing before you post it? That's one of the most asinine things I've ever known anyone to say.

Ever hear of sleep? Comas, maybe? Hows about death???

Jebus, Pixy, you're seriously pushing it.

What do you think is actually incorrect in Dennett's position? Random expostulations of incredulity don't actually confer any useful information, so try to be specific.

"Random expostulations of incredulity"????

I'm...I'm speechless.

I think I've found a genuine aku-zombie -_-

 

[quarky]

I can't find the evidence that sub-atomic particles aren't conscious.

 

[rocketdodger]

The way you conceptually approach a problem is a behavior, is it not? Newton and Einstein were both doing science but they conceptually tackled some of the same problems (in this case, gravity) in a different way.

If you actually pay attention to the arguments I'm bringing forward you'd have already noticed that I've already pointed out a atleast one major flaw in your current conceptual approach and a more cogent way of addressing the problem you are choosing to disregard.

Blah blah blah blah.

Apparently you don't have an answer, which is what I suspected to begin with.

If you can tell me what any cognitive science or artificial intelligence researcher should actually do differently -- as opposed to the vague "change their conceptual approach" hogwash you have spouted so far -- then I will take you seriously.

Until then, you are just another keyboard philospher who thinks they know what they are talking about but can't put their money where their mouth is.

How so? Have you produced something that has the capacity for imagination?

Huh? To show that something is not an unsupported assumption requires a mathematical proof of the contrary -- that it is a supported fact.

... yet you reply with a question about artificial intelligence?

Here is a clue: nobody -- including Penrose -- has ever shown that humans, or any conscious entity for that matter, can "think beyond any formal system." What people -- including you -- do is just "assume" that we can, mainly because certain human mathematicians can generate statements that go beyond a given formal system. Big difference, big fallacy on your part.

How do ya figure? Its no more unsupported than saying the symbol "1" is not identical to the concept of one.

That is great, but it isn't what you claimed.

You said formal structure is just putting symbols and representations to meaning, and until you know what "meaning" is there is no support for such a claim. It might seem different, but that has nothing to do with whether it is different.

Perhaps I should rephrase.

I can't tell you how to invent something that hasn't been invented yet. In this particular instance, don't know exactly how to solve the problem. What I'm attempting to do is help better define the problem so that is lends it self more to being solved.

Well thank you very much for your concern, but no thanks.

Until you can tell people what they should do differently I don't think you assistance is wanted.

 

[rocketdodger]

I can't find the evidence that sub-atomic particles aren't conscious.

What is the difference between a sub-atomic particle, a p-sub-atomic-particle, an aku-sub-atomic-particle, and a g-sub-atomic-particle?

 

[AkuManiMani]

But -- I do know that there is atleast one being in the universe who is conscious: me.

No you don't - that is every much just an assumption as the assumption that there are any conscious beings in the world is.

With all due respect, anyone who does not know they are conscious cannot be said to know anything. Just being aware is an implicit knowledge of one's own existence.'Conscious' is just the label I put on my experience. One's own awareness is the one thing each of us can know with certainty; its the epistemological base upon which we set all our knowledge.

No that is your re-definition of the HPC. You can of course decide to define the HPC to be whatever you want but if you don't use the same definition as the rest of us you'll not be able to contribute in a meaningful way to the discussion. It's like how earlier you redefined what a p-zombie is, the HPC starts with the premise that consciousness is dualistic.

If that's true it seems the field of philosophy is littered with a bunch of archaic dilapidated concepts and needs a bit of an overhaul.

No wonder people've been so bogged down debating the same problems in the same way for so long. Its time to reformulate a lot of these old problems so there can be some progression of understanding. The HPC is a group of related questions, imposing necessary dualism on it is logically unjustified.

 

[westprog]

Hmmm, an interesting theory.

If you are correct, what is to be done? I mean, you are complaining about a problem --what is your solution?

How should the people at the cutting edge of the search behave differently? What should I, as an A.I. programmer, do to 1) remedy my cowardice and 2) work harder towards the single problem that I want to solve more than anything else in the world?

Perhaps the problem is not soluble in the current era. The ancients had no way to determine the nature of lightning. That doesn't mean that the Thor hypothesis was correct. Saying "I don't know" would have been better.

In this case, the fact that there's no physical theory of consciousness (which is where the gravity joke falls down) tends to mitigate against a likelihood of understanding it in the short term.

Well, we know some things about it. For instance, we know that if it can be understood by us then it must be mathematically describable.



Again -- assuming we come to grips with it, how should our behavior change?

 

[westprog]

Umm, people are trying to do this all around the world. Programmers and robotics specialists have been trying to make artificial intelligence for years.

The only problem is that people like you will never be satisfied that something is self aware, or conscious. Even if a mechanical being were build that had a mechanical brain that was every bit as complex as a human brain, and exhibited all the correct characteristics, you would still say 'but how do we know for real and for true that it really is really conscious?'

A physical theory.

 

[PixyMisa]

By definition? I sense a tautalogy.

No, not by definition actually.

What we refer to as consciousness is, when you examine it, self-referential information processing. And that's all it is.

The details that support your assertion. Maybe you can explain how self-referential information processing systems account for human behaviours associated with consciousness.

Give me an example.

A definition does not an explanation make.

Now, that depends on what the definition is, doesn't it?

I never meant to give the impression that I know what is required. My proposition is that you also don't know.

That's just wonderful.

You don't know, so you assert that I don't know. You don't have a counter-argument, you're just saying If I can't understand it, nobody can understand it!

No it's not. It is self-referential but it is not saying "I am self-referential, therefore I am conscious." How do you get that?

It's self-referential. It's an assertion of consciousness. Its assertion of consciousness is based upon its self-reference. Therefore it says exactly what I said it said.

Why?

Because - and this is blindingly obvious - I didn't say we understood anything because we understood consciousness. I didn't say, for example, that we understood human brain function. We just understand consciousness.

I knew I sensed a tautalogy.

Fail, again.

It is also trivial. Rain is rain therefore I am right.

Fail, yet again.

No, consciousness is sand. Beaches have it, therefore they are conscious. Words can mean anything. Why is your definition a good definition of consciousness? It doesn't seem to track all that well with things/beings that most people would agree are conscious.

Then name one!

Name one thing that people attribute to consciousness that is not accounted for by this explanation.

An argument isn't just contradiction.

I don't know that there is more to consciousness.

Argument is an intellectual process. Contradiction is just the automatic gainsaying of any statement the other person makes.

I suspect that there is more to it than just self-referential information processing since microwaves don't seem conscious to me.

You want to complain! Look at these shoes. I've only had them three weeks...

 

[westprog]

With any other definition the only being you can be sure is conscious is yourself.

Precisely right.

Defining consciousness in behavioral terms is the only useful way to define it.

"Useful" in what way? How does labelling certain behaviour as exhibiting consciousness help us in understanding the behaviour?

The only advantage of the behavioural model is that it allows us to ignore the question of subjective experience, which is at the heart of the HPOC. But it's not a scientific approach - it's a cargo-cult version of science, where two things that behave the same are considered to have identical internal states as a matter of convenience.

 

[westprog]

This is not an argument for the HPC, this is an argument for solipsism.

Never mind what the argument is for - is there any way to refute it beyond disliking solipsism?

 

[westprog]

Fall in love?

Suffer.

 

[westprog]

Can you show me where the hard problem of consciousness has been defined rigorously, rather than just vague "why is there a what it is like to be me?" questions or "it seems objectively unreasonable that consciousness can arise from physical processing"?

The inability to form a precise definition of the problem is an indication of the difficulty, not of the absence of a problem. Most easy problems are easy because it's easy to formulate the question.

 

[westprog]

Akumani, Malerin is a dualist. While I strongly oppose his viewpoints on this issue, I at least understand where he sits.

I would like to ask you again: Do you think that there is an immaterial aspect to the mind?

When the starting point is that the nature of consciousness is a vastly intractable problem, should we then be deciding exactly what solutions are to be presumed to be correct or wrong in advance?

 

[AkuManiMani]

The way you conceptually approach a problem is a behavior, is it not? Newton and Einstein were both doing science but they conceptually tackled some of the same problems (in this case, gravity) in a different way.

If you actually pay attention to the arguments I'm bringing forward you'd have already noticed that I've already pointed out a atleast one major flaw in your current conceptual approach and a more cogent way of addressing the problem you are choosing to disregard.

Blah blah blah blah.

Apparently you don't have an answer, which is what I suspected to begin with.

If you can tell me what any cognitive science or artificial intelligence researcher should actually do differently -- as opposed to the vague "change their conceptual approach" hogwash you have spouted so far -- then I will take you seriously.

Until then, you are just another keyboard philospher who thinks they know what they are talking about but can't put their money where their mouth is.

Dancing Zombie Jebus onna stick! -- I've just told you WHAT you're doing wrong and suggested WHAT you can do differently. It just so happens that the portions of my post where I specifically pointed these things out are -- tellingly -- the portions you've neglected to quote.

If you want to point by point rebut my suggestions, then please do so. If you're just going to sit there fuming like a petulant child about how I've not suggested anything while IGNORING what I've actually suggested then we've nothing to talk about, buddy.

How so? Have you produced something that has the capacity for imagination?

Huh? To show that something is not an unsupported assumption requires a mathematical proof of the contrary -- that it is a supported fact.

... yet you reply with a question about artificial intelligence?

Last I checked, we were talking specifically about artificial intelligence vs. human intelligence.

I stated that what distinguishes you from your current creations is that you have the ability to think beyond any particular formal system.

You responded that that was an unsupported assumption.

I asked, "how so?" and inquired as to whether or not you've developed a system that has the human capacity to imagine beyond any particular formal system.

Here is a clue: nobody -- including Penrose -- has ever shown that humans, or any conscious entity for that matter, can "think beyond any formal system." What people -- including you -- do is just "assume" that we can, mainly because certain human mathematicians can generate statements that go beyond a given formal system. Big difference, big fallacy on your part.

Fallacy? Lets go back to what I actually said, shall we:

One of the main differences between you and your current creations is that you're able to think beyond any particular formal system. The formal structure is just a post hoc retracing of your steps -- putting symbols and representations to meaning.

Now you want to argue that its a fallacy to say that humans have the capacity to "think beyond any formal system" just because they've shown the capacity to "think beyond any given formal system". If I didn't know any better I'd say you're shoving both feet in your mouth.

How do ya figure? Its no more unsupported than saying the symbol "1" is not identical to the concept of one.

That is great, but it isn't what you claimed.

You said formal structure is just putting symbols and representations to meaning, and until you know what "meaning" is there is no support for such a claim. It might seem different, but that has nothing to do with whether it is different.

Oh gee, what ever do you mean by that?

Well thank you very much for your concern, but no thanks.

Until you can tell people what they should do differently I don't think you assistance is wanted.

Translation of you post:

"I don't need any help because I already know all there is to know about consciousness. My assumptions are just fine and you pointing out possible flaws in them isn't helpful to my delusion that my understanding is adequate.

Everything you've told me to do differently is wrong because I don't like some stranger on a keyboard telling me I'm wrong. Until you stop disagreeing with me I'm not going to take any of your feedback seriously."

 

[westprog]

We're reliving the thread all over again.

HPC is a term that means something in philosophy. Specifically it means a kind of dualist theory.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/

It's fine if that's not your position and you want to argue something different, but trying to hijack accepted terms doesn't help.

(Now I just know it's going to be the aku-problem of consciousness. Someone get me a zombie.)

Others may seem less tractable, especially the so-called “hard problem” (Chalmers 1995) which is more or less that of giving an intelligible account that lets us see in an intuitively satisfying way how phenomenal or “what it's like” consciousness might arise from physical or neural processes in the brain.

That doesn't seem to presuppose a dualistic approach. That seems to be a statement of the problem. Indeed, the article points out the problems with a dualist solution to the HPC.

 

[tsig]

I know I'm not a p-gombie. I can defy gravity.

So can I, so can any man, but does gravity know it?

 

[tsig]

...to eat your brains.

I knew it. The big question for Philosophy is "Is it edible"

 

[tsig]

I have sky dived hundreds of times and without fail, felt like a zombie after each jump. Lasted for days.

Did you pull the ripcord?

 

[quixotecoyote]

That doesn't seem to presuppose a dualistic approach. That seems to be a statement of the problem. Indeed, the article points out the problems with a dualist solution to the HPC.

Chalmers can be confusing he dances around the issue of the 'explanatory' gap with suggestions that 'psychophysicalism', the elevation of untestable experience to the role of core theory, is necessary. He's just substituting "experiential" for "immaterial".
http://consc.net/papers/puzzle.pdf

I believe Dennet has already been cited, but here's the most relevant section of his critique of Chalmers:

Chalmers recommends a parallel with physics, but it backfires. He suggests that a theory of consciousness should "take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time." As he correctly notes, "No attempt is made [by physicists] to explain these features in terms of anything simpler," but they do cite the independent evidence that has driven them to introduce these fundamental categories. Chalmers needs a similar argument in support of his proposal, but "when we ask what data are driving him to introduce this concept, the answer is disappointing: It is a belief in a fundamental phenomenon of 'experience'. The introduction of the concept does not do any explanatory work. The evidential argument is circular." (Roberts, fn.8) We can see this by comparing Chalmers' proposal with yet one more imaginary non-starter: cutism, the proposal that since some things are just plain cute, and other things aren't cute at all--you can just see it, however hard it is to describe or explain--we had better postulate cuteness as a fundamental property of physics alongside mass, charge and space-time. (Cuteness is not a functional property, of course; I can imagine somebody who wasn't actually cute at all but who nevertheless functioned exactly as if cute--trust me.) Cutism is in even worse shape than vitalism. Nobody would have taken vitalism seriously for a minute if the vitalists hadn't had a set of independently describable phenomena--of reproduction, metabolism, self-repair and the like--that their postulated fundamental life-element was hoped to account for. Once these phenomena were otherwise accounted for, vitalism fell flat, but at least it had a project. Until Chalmers gives us an independent ground for contemplating the drastic move of adding "experience" to mass, charge, and space-time, his proposal is one that can be put on the back burner, way back.

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmers.htm

 

[AkuManiMani]

I never meant to give the impression that I know what is required. My proposition is that you also don't know.

I think that that statement is the crux of the matter. The OP of the thread, and the supporters of the OP's position, are expressing a deep dislike of the idea that there is a Hard Problem. They prefer to lie to themselves and pretend that there really isn't one because acknowledging it would highlight just how much they don't understand.

HPC denial isn't really a philosophical position; its a psychological defense mechanism.