Resolution of Transporter Problem

[Nick227]

Yes, there is a persisting self. I think you're confusing 'self' with 'momentary awareness.' Self is a much broader term than that. It includes memory, subconscious brain states, and a host of other things which are continuous and dynamic. Lose any part of that, and you lose self. In fact, memory is a vast part of self - see what happens when someone suffers total amnesia!

What I mean by "self" is a recipient of experience, a subject, a holder of various attributes or possessions. IMO there simply is no self and I have never seen objective physical evidence to the contrary.

You want to claim that "Self" is short-term data storage and recall? You really want to claim that?

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I agree: It's a mechanism that promotes self-preservation by identifying my thoughts and emotions with my body, so that my thoughts make plans about how to protect my body. And so "I" refers to that entire system.

~~ Paul

Personally, I would reword that a little... it's a mechanism that promotes self-preservation by identifying thoughts and emotions as my thoughts and emotions. Thoughts don't become your thoughts and emotions don't become your emotions until thinking ascribes identity to them. Thus I would say that any level of selfhood ascribed to mental or emotional processes is purely notional and itself merely another process. There is no subject of experience in actuality. It is simply an useful and evolutionarily-favoured illusion to believe there is.

So, to try and get back to the original point, I would maintain that it is simply impossible to destroy an "I."

Nick

 

[Gate2501]

I think that Z is trying to say what I have been saying.

The newly created being, on the destination pad, would be YOU as far as any and everything in the universe is concerned, with the exception of one person. The man who originally stepped into the teleporter. He is dead.

Lets say that this teleporter goes to Mars.

You are going there for a new job, and they need you immediately, so fire up the teleporter!

Before entering the teleporter, you ask yourself "Will I get to experience life on Mars, in the same way that I experience a new day after waking up in my bed?". I say no.

We clearly do not understand consciousness, self-awareness, well enough scientifically, to answer the questions of continuity presented here. However I think that it takes a logical leap, to think that your own self-aware mind would *jump* to the new body that contained an exact copy of your consciousness, instead of a NEW self-aware COPY being born, experiencing a NEW life independently of the experience(self-awareness) of the destroyed/killed man.

Unless awareness itself can be shown to be an illusion in the same way that free will is, I feel that it is a bad idea to teleport.

And Dodger, I did read your OP like 30 times (cause this is so damn interesting), and I do understand what D2 is. We probably both agree that consciousness arises during the processing of information. I just disagree that a copy of that information would give rise to the same(not a new) consciousness as far as the original person who is destroyed is concerned.

As far as the rest of the universe is concerned, you are correct 100%(imo).

 

[RandFan]

The newly created being, on the destination pad, would be YOU as far as any and everything in the universe is concerned, with the exception of one person. The man who originally stepped into the teleporter. He is dead.

Meh~ How do you know you haven't died a thousand times. You are being somewhat presumptuous.

Before entering the teleporter, you ask yourself "Will I get to experience life on Mars, in the same way that I experience a new day after waking up in my bed?". I say no.

Well, to be honest it's hard to argue against that logic since it is only an assertion. I say there are Amazon women in the guacamole jungle. Argue against that.

We clearly do not understand consciousness, self-awareness, well enough scientifically, to answer the questions of continuity presented here.

It's possible but I seriously doubt that, are you arguing Cartesian theater (ghost in the machine, homunculus)?

However I think that it takes a logical leap, to think that your own self-aware mind would *jump* to the new body that contained an exact copy of your consciousness...

Yeah, that would be a logical leap, assuming a Cartesian model where the homunculus would have to take the trip also. But why would you assume a Cartesian model? Isn't that in and of itself a logical leap?

As a former dualist and passionate proponent for a Cartesian model I've not seen any evidence to presume that it exists or that our "self" is anything more than a physical process that could in theory be replicated. I seen no reason to have any other perspective of consciousness. Hey, I tried for years. If you could do it I would be very impressed.

 

[Z]

It's perfectly clear to me. If I walk up to you with a gun, and offer to shoot you in the head, with the assurance that I've created a perfect identical copy of you that will come to life the second I shoot you... do you gladly accept getting shot?

I mean, it's pretty clear you'll never know if the duplicate awakens - ever. You'll be dead. Once you're dead, you're dead.

That's how we know we haven't been dead a thousand times - because death is permanent. Dualists and idealists might think otherwise, but once you die, you die.

You could make a million clones, but the second your original self dies, that's all she wrote - end of story.

If you take the engine out of a car, it's not a complete car anymore. The engine is as much a part of the car as the wheels, the seats, the paint. Sure, some parts you can do without - but the car remains incomplete. But once you remove key parts, it's no longer a car - engine, wheels, etc.

And if you replace bits and pieces of a car, eventually you get a new (different) car. At what point? At the point you replace all key pieces.

Incidentally, I'm of the opinion that I'm about to get a different car. They're replacing my engine this week - and maybe the transmission. As far as I'm concerned, it's going to be another, very similar car.

As a former dualist and passionate proponent for a Cartesian model I've not seen any evidence to presume that it exists or that our "self" is anything more than a physical process that could in theory be replicated.

I agree. But a replicant is not the same as the self. A duplicate is not the original. It may be the same in structure, form, function, but it is never the original.

And since, in the case of humans, we have a first person POV, any duplicate will never be us.



It's that clear a choice. Only a moron would use such a device.

 

[cyborg]

The newly created being, on the destination pad, would be YOU as far as any and everything in the universe is concerned, with the exception of one person. The man who originally stepped into the teleporter. He is dead.

I mourn the cyborg who posted this. I knew him well.

 

[RandFan]

It's perfectly clear to me. If I walk up to you with a gun, and offer to shoot you in the head, with the assurance that I've created a perfect identical copy of you that will come to life the second I shoot you... do you gladly accept getting shot?

Can you show me the evidence that your device works?

It amazes me when people refuse to acknowledge the consequences of logic and reason. Intuitively I don't accept that time is anything other than something we measure change with. Intelectually I accept the facts and the conclusion of the arguments.

I'm sorry if the thought experiment troubles you so.

That's how we know we haven't been dead a thousand times - because death is permanent. Dualists and idealists might think otherwise, but once you die, you die.

Entirely beside my point.

How do you know that while you were sleeping at some point a clone of you was made and the original was killed? You don't.

You could make a million clones, but the second your original self dies, that's all she wrote - end of story.

This is asserted and without any basis.

And if you replace bits and pieces of a car, eventually you get a new (different) car. At what point? At the point you replace all key pieces.

Again, this is just asserted. And all of your key pieces have been replaced.

Incidentally, I'm of the opinion that I'm about to get a different car. They're replacing my engine this week - and maybe the transmission. As far as I'm concerned, it's going to be another, very similar car.

And by then you will be another, very similar you.

I agree. But a replicant is not the same as the self. A duplicate is not the original. It may be the same in structure, form, function, but it is never the original.

I don't even know what "original" means. You are not the original as you were at conception, zygote, fetus, birth, 10, 20, etc...

And since, in the case of humans, we have a first person POV, any duplicate will never be us.

Again, this is just asserted only it's asserted with conviction. I appologize for rudeness but that's not argument. It really isn't.

It's that clear a choice. Only a moron would use such a device.

{sigh} Ad Hominem. The most clear cut example I've ever seen on this forum.

Dude, I don't care what you believe but I'm sure you can do much better than this. Assertions and conviction and ad hom make for rather poor argument.

 

[Gate2501]

Meh~ How do you know you haven't died a thousand times. You are being somewhat presumptuous.

I don't. But I haven't been incinerated in a teleporter either, so it isn't a perfect analogy. You do still have a point however. I just don't know.

Well, to be honest it's hard to argue against that logic since it is only an assertion. I say there are Amazon women in the guacamole jungle. Argue against that.

I could say the same thing about your assertion that you(the man about to be destroyed) would experience the life of the copy on Mars. Couldn't I? I think that we are all making assertions about the unknown in this thought experiment.

It's possible but I seriously doubt that, are you arguing Cartesian theater (ghost in the machine, homunculus)?

Yeah, that would be a logical leap, assuming a Cartesian model where the homunculus would have to take the trip also. But why would you assume a Cartesian model? Isn't that in and of itself a logical leap?

As a former dualist and passionate proponent for a Cartesian model I've not seen any evidence to presume that it exists or that our "self" is anything more than a physical process that could in theory be replicated. I seen no reason to have any other perspective of consciousness. Hey, I tried for years. If you could do it I would be very impressed.

I certainly don't fancy myself a dualist.

I just feel each copy that you could create would have it's own unique sense of self-awareness, just like the one that was destroyed on the entry pad. I do not see it as a soul, and if indeed self-awareness/consciousness itself is an illusion, then I am wrong.

 

[rocketdodger]

I agree. But a replicant is not the same as the self. A duplicate is not the original. It may be the same in structure, form, function, but it is never the original.

This is categorically untrue in the case of certain things, such as numbers.

Any duplicate of an integer is the same as the original integer. In fact, the notion of "original" has no meaning in the realm of numbers. A number is a number, period.

So how do you respond to my claim that if consciousness is information and can be godelized into a super-large integer then the transporter would preserve the self?

And since, in the case of humans, we have a first person POV, any duplicate will never be us.

What if the point of view is transferred as well?

I predict you will respond "but it can't." Why not?

It's that clear a choice. Only a moron would use such a device.

Or someone who knew something you don't.

Neanderthals don't ride helicopters -- how could such a thing stay in the air!

 

[Lithrael]

With such a thing as an everyday, well understood and reliable mode of transport, I for one would be happy to sacrifice me for the good of my copy and that copy, being me, would be happy to sacrifice itself for the return trip. At which point the new me will 'only' be a copy of the me that got to go to freaking Saturn or whatever. It's certainly close enough for 'me' and all 'my' business will continue to be taken care of. Why should I value *this* POV more than one that begins as an exact copy of it? The entirety of the scary part seems to be the not knowing what would really happen, but if it's commonplace and everybody who does it is happy with it and their families don't get creeped out then whence the actual problem?

But last time I said that people told me I hadn't really thought about it.

 

[Z]

I don't think most of you are really thinking about it. Oh, sure, there's sophistry aplenty; but not actual thought.

If you are vaporized right now, what do you experience in 20,000 years? nothing.

If you are vaporized right now, and 20,000 years from now someone assembles a group of matter that is your duplicate, what do you experience in 20,000 years? nothing.

Why would that experience change just because matter was arranged in the same or similar pattern somewhere else in time? What piece of magic information allows your first person POV experience to jump space and time and continue elsewhere?

The whole experiment dies at the point the original is killed - period. Anyone who asserts otherwise is positing dualism or some abstract form of idealism.

It's not assertion - it's just plain fact.

And, rocketdodger, numbers are not things, but ideas.

Is this -->2 identical with this -->2? No. If nothing else, the two have different spacetime coordinates.

It's kind of weird, though - I've seen some of the smartest people on this forum make some of the silliest claims because of this thought experiment. What's so hard to understand? If you survive the process on this end, for whatever reason, you're not aware of ever having transported - because you didn't transport. You were cloned, that's all.

And if you don't survive the process, which is as intended, you're not aware of ever having transported - because you died.

In either case - you never transported at all.

What's so hard to understand?

If the original you survives, and the clone appears, which one is you? Which one has the continual and dynamic awareness from your current POV? The original - the duplicate would have the disconcerting awareness, at some point, of having spontaneously appeared somewhere else in the universe... probably when he can't find his car.

Yes, his awareness is a perfect copy of yours - but your current POV wouldn't suddenly jump into his situation. So why would you expect it to if they kill you on this end?

Or are you REALLY asserting that your first person POV WOULD in fact jump from your current body to the duplicate at the moment the duplicate appears - even if your original self survives here?

(This is usually where we hear that, for a split second, BOTH of 'you' are the same you, and that, somehow, you experience jumping AND not-jumping at the exact same time...)

Silly.

 

[RandFan]

I don't think most of you are really thinking about it. Oh, sure, there's sophistry aplenty; but not actual thought.

This is a bit hypocritical as you are engaging in it. You've not made a coherent argument. You are just intimidating and using fallacy including ad hominem.

Get off your soap box.

If you honestly don't know how to construct a logical argument google. But the intimidation and ad hom, accusations that others aren't thinking and you are is a waste of everyone's time. I HAVE THOUGHT ABOUT IT.

You're clearly not listening but this is something that I've been studying for a couple of decades so stop with the projecting, take a deep breath and try and figure out if you can come up with a valid logical argument to justify your position because so far, as far as I can tell there's nothing there. And then to come and accuse others of what you are doing is a bit ridiculous.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

There is no subject of experience in actuality. It is simply an useful and evolutionarily-favoured illusion to believe there is.

But what does this have to do with ascribing meaning to "I"? Why do you say there is no "I"? Do you mean there is no "I" of the dualistic, subject-of-experience sort?

~~ Paul

 

[RandFan]

If you are vaporized right now, and 20,000 years from now someone assembles a group of matter that is your duplicate, what do you experience in 20,000 years? nothing.

??????

And you think this is some how important or compelling? Why?

Why would that experience change just because matter was arranged in the same or similar pattern somewhere else in time? What piece of magic information allows your first person POV experience to jump space and time and continue elsewhere?

I don't even know what this means? "Jump"? What "jump" No argument that I'm making, Rocketdoger is making or anyone else that I can tell has anything to do with jumping. This is all in your head. I've no idea what this thing is that jumps. I'm (for all intents and purposes for this discussion) a materialist. There is nothing to jump because the process is the self. Only if one were a dualist would you need to posit a "jump".

I seriously think you are a dualist trying to shoe horn your ideas into materialism and that is why you keep coming up with a "jump". It's BS because in terms of materialism or physicalism the self is the process and not a homunculus or ghost in the machine. Since, according to materialism or physicalism, the process IS the self then the only thing that needs to "jump" is the process.

You are adding entities that are not warranted. Your argument (for lack of a better word) is not parsimonious and it damn sure has nothing to do with materialism or physicalism.

The whole experiment dies at the point the original is killed - period. Anyone who asserts otherwise is positing dualism or some abstract form of idealism.

Odd since you are the one positing dualism.

It's not assertion - it's just plain fact.

What in the Sam hell are you even talking about? What fact? You've provided not one single fact. Do you even know what a fact is? You can't declare something a "fact" with out a basis.

You've invented this "jumping" out of whole cloth that has absolutely nothing, zero, nada to do with the discussion. At best you are talking dualism, Cartesian theater.

We don't need anything to "JUMP" in our model because there is no homunculus. The process IS the self. Why can't you get that? That is what materialism is. Brain states. Nothing less nothing more. A spreadsheet is it's process. It's not simply the software. It's the processing of that software. There is NO ghost in the machine which is what you would need to justify a "jump".

So, please, stop with that strawman. It's a waste of time. I'm not a dualist and my view does not require a "jump". If you believe that there is a jump that is required then that is your problem and a consequence of thinking in dualistic way. It has nothing to do with materialism, physicalism. A spreadsheet or database or virtual reality program can work just fine after any period of time without having to jump. You are inserting a ghost into the machine and I'm telling you it's just not there.

Silly.

And this is what you call argument?

 

[Gate2501]

I don't even know what this means? "Jump"? What "jump" No argument that I'm making, Rocketdoger is making or anyone else that I can tell has anything to do with jumping. This is all in your head. I've no idea what this thing is that jumps. I'm (for all intents and purposes for this discussion) a materialist. There is nothing to jump because the process is the self. Only if one were a dualist would you need to posit a "jump".

I seriously think you are a dualist trying to shoe horn your ideas into materialism and that is why you keep coming up with a "jump". It's BS because in terms of materialism or physicalism the self is the process and not a homunculus or ghost in the machine. Since, according to materialism or physicalism, the process IS the self then the only thing that needs to "jump" is the process.


We don't need anything to "JUMP" in our model because there is no homunculus. The process IS the self. Why can't you get that? That is what materialism is. Brain states. Nothing less nothing more. A spreadsheet is it's process. It's not simply the software. It's the processing of that software. There is NO ghost in the machine which is what you would need to justify a "jump".

So, please, stop with that strawman. It's a waste of time. I'm not a dualist and my view does not require a "jump". If you believe that there is a jump that is required then that is your problem and a consequence of thinking in dualistic way. It has nothing to do with materialism, physicalism. A spreadsheet or database or virtual reality program can work just fine after any period of time without having to jump. You are inserting a ghost into the machine and I'm telling you it's just not there.

Ok... I know Z was a bit rude there, but I have been calling it a "jump" too.

It seems to me, that in order for me to experience the life of the new copy, that my perspective would have to shift(better than jump?) into him(the new copy of me).

I feel that the processing of D2 in the new copy would give rise to a new perspective exactly the same as mine, but local to the new copy.

I feel that each copy would have a separate, local self-awareness.

This is what I am hung up on.

Unless consciousness itself is an illusion of some sort, I am scared to end my own local sense of self, even if an exact copy arises elsewhere.

I feel like all of us are arguing with a bit too much certainty and vitriol over this topic as well, lets stop calling eachother dualists also =p

Edit: And I do realize that my viewpoint is dangerously close to dualism here, I feel bad about it, and I am confused. If that makes you feel any better.

 

[Lithrael]

I don't think most of you are really thinking about it. Oh, sure, there's sophistry aplenty; but not actual thought.

Well, damn it. It happened again.

If you are vaporized right now, what do you experience in 20,000 years? nothing.

If I'm *not* vaporized right now I experience nothing in 20,000 years.

If you are vaporized right now, and 20,000 years from now someone assembles a group of matter that is your duplicate, what do you experience in 20,000 years? nothing.

Well, no, I won't, but the duplicate will be just like me, and will get to do all the stuff I would do, and that is quite simply good enough for me - and so it would be good enough for that me, too. I just like the idea of someone indistinguishable from me getting to do awesome things. It doesn't matter to me that it's *that* me and not *me* me that gets to do it. Compare it to something like the comfort people take in their children - only instead of getting to raise offspring before you die, you just plain die and get a fully formed 'nother you for your trouble.

Why would that experience change just because matter was arranged in the same or similar pattern somewhere else in time? What piece of magic information allows your first person POV experience to jump space and time and continue elsewhere?

Well from that me's POV that would be exactly how it felt. Original me would in fact be long dead. What's the problem?

In either case - you never transported at all.

What's so hard to understand?

Nothing's hard to understand. The first instance of me is dead. The new instance of me is fine.

Yes, his awareness is a perfect copy of yours - but your current POV wouldn't suddenly jump into his situation. So why would you expect it to if they kill you on this end?

I don't. And I explicitly asked - Why should I value *this* POV more than one that begins as an exact copy of it? What value does 'continual and dynamic' add to this POV? Why should I care? If I am at peace with the idea that this me dies, as long as there's another me to pick up, how exactly am I being silly?

 

[RandFan]

Ok... I know Z was a bit rude there, but I have been calling it a "jump" too.

It seems to me, that in order for me to experience the life of the new copy, that my perspective would have to shift(better than jump?) into him(the new copy of me).

(emphasis mine) Hang on, what do you mean by "me"? I think that you have encountered the very problem the transporter thought experiment is meant to expose.

If what we know of as self is simply brain events and those exact brain events are duplicated into another instance of you then why wouldn't that be you? I think you need to give up on the idea of self as something intrinsic to the thing you see when you look in the mirror. It's not. It's an emergent property of your brain processing information. Duplicate the processing and you've duplicated the self.

I feel that the processing of D2 in the new copy would give rise to a new perspective exactly the same as mine, but local to the new copy.

Yes. Of course. No more no less.

I feel that each copy would have a separate, local self-awareness.

This is what I am hung up on.

Unless consciousness itself is an illusion of some sort, I am scared to end my own local sense of self, even if an exact copy arises elsewhere.

Yep, that's why the thought experiment exists and it is why we find it so interesting. It's along the same lines of free will. We have evolved to see ourselves as the entire biological entity but in fact it's simply the end result of brain events.

Let me go back to my brain transplant question. If you had a terminal illness and there was a perfectly good body of a person who was brain dead and modern medicine had progressed to the point of performing routine and safe brain transplants would you, if you could, get the transplant? Would it be you even if you didn't recognize yourself in the mirror.

Now, lets assume you are in a burning building and there is no physical way out. Your body is going to burn and that's that. The building has a transporter. Would you use the transporter?

I feel like all of us are arguing with a bit too much certainty and vitriol over this topic as well, lets stop calling eachother dualists also =p

Well, I'm not certain of anything. I confess I have no such certainty. My position is simply one of acceptance of the empirical data. I only know that what I used to think of as "self" has been demonstrated experimentally and logically not to exist in the way I used to think it did. I got over myself.

Edit: And I do realize that my viewpoint is dangerously close to dualism here, I feel bad about it, and I am confused. If that makes you feel any better.

Understood.

 

[Z]

??????

And you think this is some how important or compelling? Why?

The fact you have to ask this proves to me that, in spite of your decades of thinking, you've come to a faulty conclusion.

I don't even know what this means? "Jump"? What "jump" No argument that I'm making, Rocketdoger is making or anyone else that I can tell has anything to do with jumping.

So you deny, then, that your first person continuous dynamic point of view suddenly exists in some location other than that it currently exists in? Good. That's what I'm saying.

This is all in your head. I've no idea what this thing is that jumps. I'm (for all intents and purposes for this discussion) a materialist. There is nothing to jump because the process is the self.

Yes, the single instance, continuous and dynamic, of the process, is the self. A duplicate of the process is another self. And so forth. But they're not the same self.

Only if one were a dualist would you need to posit a "jump".

Actually, a dualist might be quite fine with the idea that this teletrans also duplicates the homonculus, or that the homonculus might well, once freed of one body, relocate into an identical body for which it is already 'tuned'.

A materialist ought to realize that the duplication process is not going to generate more 'you', or 'you' at location a AND b, but a separate and distinct entity, whose brain states are duplicates of yours, but who is not you.

Idealists... well, frankly, who knows WHAT an idealist really thinks.

I seriously think you are a dualist trying to shoe horn your ideas into materialism and that is why you keep coming up with a "jump".

I am a dualist. But I don't have to shoe horn anything, because in my worldview, the whole experiment wouldn't work anyway. The other end would produce a physically identical lump of dead flesh.

But assuming it didn't - whether materialist or idealist or dualist - there's only two possibilities:

1) that a 'spirit' exists which, upon the death of the individual, somehow manages to cross over to the duplicate; or
2) the duplicate individual is a separate and distinct individual, because there's no way anything can 'cross' (i.e. no way the individual first person perspective can shift from old you to 'new you').

The simple way to prove point 2) is to demonstrate a 'what if' scenario in which the teletransporter fails in some way. In these failures, where the original still survives and the duplicate does appear, we see clearly that you do not become your duplicate; yet this example, which so seems to bug Blackmore, is often forcibly removed from the discussion. It is precisely this counterexample that shows that you cannot use this method of transport to get to any other world.

Forgive me for not putting this into the proper syllogisms of logical constructs, but it's clear enough, under scientific rigour, to disprove the safety of such a device.

When someone comes up with a theory, and a counterexample is given, we generally assume that theory is faulty in some way.

It's BS because in terms of materialism or physicalism the self is the process and not a homunculus or ghost in the machine. Since, according to materialism or physicalism, the process IS the self then the only thing that needs to "jump" is the process.

'Process' though is not a thing in itself. Without the physical substrate, the process is meaningless. And in this case, we have a unique class of process - a self-monitoring, self-regulating, self-observing process (yes, circular terms, but bear with me). In fact, our 'self' could be seen more as a collection of interrelated processes operating within a given material construct. Yes, we could create a duplicate material construct, and copy the process between A and B; but process B is not process A, and the duplicate material constructs are not the same construct, any more than we would consider two duplicate watches to be the same watch.

Or... do you?

Honest question: if you have before you two absolutely identical watches, each set to absolutely identical times and running absolutely identical processes - are they, in fact, the same watch, in your consideration?

If you answer 'yes', then I can only shake my head in disbelief and withdraw from what can only promise to be a frustrating and fruitless discussion. If you answer 'no', then I must wonder what makes watches different from men, under materialism - because, as I understand it, materialism makes watches and men identical in a sense - both material substrates running processes.

You are adding entities that are not warranted. Your argument (for lack of a better word) is not parsimonious and it damn sure has nothing to do with materialism or physicalism.

It has to do with the only available observation we have: experience exists. If experience ceases to exist, it ceases to exist.

Our education, reason, and deduction leads us to believe that our experiences exists within a single physical construct, continuous and dynamic in nature; our observation and reason leads us to believe that, upon the death of one of those constructs which is similar to us, that construct also loses the ability to experience at all; we see no evidence that could lead us to believe that experience can start up again in some other location at some other time; and the first step of this process is the death of a similar physical construct.

The unwarranted and added entity is this 'process' which is somehow the same process even though it is now taking place in an entirely different physical construct.

I'd bring up programs, but I have a creepy feeling that you see all instances of the same program as BEING the same program. If I have one computer - say, my desktop - on which I create a simple dice-rolling program; and I have another computer - my laptop - onto which I copy the program; I see those as two programs, identical but distinct. One may fail while another may succeed. Both may share identical experiences, but then again, both may not. At some point, one copy might cease altogether; the duplicate, while useful to me, is not the original program, and vice versa. And in most cases, the only copy that could actually be considered the 'original', to my mind, ceases to exist after the first time it is run; because once the program is 'saved', that is its first copy, and the original - the one living in the RAM - ceases to exist. This actually used to worry me, because I was concerned wtih copy degradation; which is why all my earlier programs actually existed in a hard-copy form which I could then use to create new duplicates of the programs, and, therefore, could make sure I had fresh copies from time to time.

Copy degredation doesn't seem to be an issue much anymore, but I still worry about files I've moved multiple times between sources, and try always to keep one source (some kind of durable hard copy) that I can use to instantiate new copies from.

What in the Sam hell are you even talking about? What fact? You've provided not one single fact. Do you even know what a fact is? You can't declare something a "fact" with out a basis.

You can, but it may do you no good.

I wonder why it is that no one who argues for the teletrans ever wants to discuss the 'if the original survives the process' case in depth - with the exception of the rare lunatic who claims that BOTH are the same self. Why is that?

You've invented this "jumping" out of whole cloth that has absolutely nothing, zero, nada to do with the discussion. At best you are talking dualism, Cartesian theater.

Actually, I'm just putting into plainer language that which you are claiming, but trying to talk around.

This D2 construct is the homonculus in the argument. Meta-information which can be transferred from one set of material to another which, in turn, somehow moves the continuous dynamic singular first-person perspective off of one bio-mass and on to another?

Actually, if you are willing to discuss the 'no-death' case, it doesn't take anything from the original - which means there is no way you could experience 'transport' to some other orb.

Besides - supposing we saved that 'information' and later, after you² is killed, we create a you³.. and a you⁴ ... and so on. Are you claiming that you get to experience all of those many, varied lifes?

We don't need anything to "JUMP" in our model because there is no homunculus. The process IS the self. Why can't you get that?

There's your homonculus. ((apologies if I'm spelling it wrong)) A process is not a thing itself; a process is something happening to a physical mass. Without the mass, the process doesn't exist at all - hence, 'self' is process plus matter.

And process is a continuous and dynamic state - a 'static' process is a contradiction in terms.

That is what materialism is. Brain states. Nothing less nothing more. A spreadsheet is it's process. It's not simply the software. It's the processing of that software. There is NO ghost in the machine which is what you would need to justify a "jump".

But we also recognize that we deal with copies of a spreadsheet - not multiple instances of the same spreadsheet. Or, at least, that's what I've seen from those working in the field so far.

So, please, stop with that strawman. It's a waste of time. I'm not a dualist and my view does not require a "jump". If you believe that there is a jump that is required then that is your problem and a consequence of thinking in dualistic way. It has nothing to do with materialism, physicalism. A spreadsheet or database or virtual reality program can work just fine after any period of time without having to jump. You are inserting a ghost into the machine and I'm telling you it's just not there.

Well, that's an assertion on YOUR part.

And this is what you call argument?

No, that's what I call a statement. I haven't really employed much in the line of arguments, as you've said before. I went through all of this a year ago, when Interesting Ian brought all this up before. Frankly, it's rather a bore, especially hearing otherwise bright materialists suddenly tell us that it's possible for two distinct and separate instances of matter to share a singularly identical experience.

Heck, if nothing else, unique spacetime location and quantum states means that two perfect duplicates are impossible anyway.

But, you know, believe what you will. As far as I'm concerned, when the first poor sucker steps into that teletrans, he's a dead man. Two dead men, in fact, since what steps out at the other end would be a lifeless corpse.

 

[Z]

<<snip>>

Well, no, I won't, but the duplicate will be just like me, and will get to do all the stuff I would do, and that is quite simply good enough for me - and so it would be good enough for that me, too. I just like the idea of someone indistinguishable from me getting to do awesome things. It doesn't matter to me that it's *that* me and not *me* me that gets to do it. Compare it to something like the comfort people take in their children - only instead of getting to raise offspring before you die, you just plain die and get a fully formed 'nother you for your trouble.

At least you seem to understand it. I can respect your wording and attitudes on the subject, though, frankly, it seems strange to me. I don't particulary see my children as a path to immortality for me, either; I'd just as soon not die. I'm not an altruist - I prefer not dying, especially if there's nothing afterwards.

<<snip>> And I explicitly asked - Why should I value *this* POV more than one that begins as an exact copy of it? What value does 'continual and dynamic' add to this POV? Why should I care? If I am at peace with the idea that this me dies, as long as there's another me to pick up, how exactly am I being silly?

What if it's all just a scam? There could be nothing at the other end, and you'll never know - you'll be dead.

Even if they went ahead, read the pattern, waited a few minutes, and showed you video of yourself having fun on Mars - how could you possibly know it was you? Because it's not you. It's a perfect duplicate... or, maybe, just maybe, it's a computer-generated image meant only to fool you into thinking it's really you.

And you'll never be able to find out the truth about it, because you're willing to die for the illusion that you've continued elsewhere. That's why it's silly.

 

[Z]

<<snip>>
Yep, that's why the thought experiment exists and it is why we find it so interesting. It's along the same lines of free will. We have evolved to see ourselves as the entire biological entity but in fact it's simply the end result of brain events.

...which are each unique physical constructs. And, apparently, not even constructs which change significantly over the course of time, as most of your brain cells are the same ones you were born with.

Curious.

Let me go back to my brain transplant question. If you had a terminal illness and there was a perfectly good body of a person who was brain dead and modern medicine had progressed to the point of performing routine and safe brain transplants would you, if you could, get the transplant? Would it be you even if you didn't recognize yourself in the mirror.

It would be a merging of you with another. Personality-wise, since this is determined largely by the brain, it would still be you; but the body produces many of the chemicals that influence the brain, so over time, as you adapt to the new body, a new you would emerge - one that consisted of your self/brain processes, changed to accept a new chassis.

Now, lets assume you are in a burning building and there is no physical way out. Your body is going to burn and that's that. The building has a transporter. Would you use the transporter?

Only if the transporter was guaranteed painless. Burning to death is a horrible way to die.

That's why so many people jumped out of the Twin Towers on 9/11.

That's kind of a bad question to ask, since either a) someone is going to assume, dualistically, that it works, and use it anyway, or b) someone is going to recognize that it's another, albeit faster or less painful, way to die, and will use it anyway.

Well, I'm not certain of anything. I confess I have no such certainty. My position is simply one of acceptance of the empirical data. I only know that what I used to think of as "self" has been demonstrated experimentally and logically not to exist in the way I used to think it did. I got over myself.

You could show more of that in your replies to me, but then again, I'm being pretty blunt and rude in my posts.

I don't mean to be so rude, but it never fails to amaze me how someone who can accept computer intelligence, the non-existence of the divine, lack of spirits, failure of psi powers, and non-presence of Nessie and B-foot, can claim that they'd jump at the chance to be vaporized so their identical twin brother can be brainwashed into thinking they're you.

I know, that reply was meant for the much more sensible and kindly-spoken Gate... but you do posit such interesting scenarios in that post.

Will you take into consideration the living-original scenario for a moment in return, and explain how you take that scenario into account? Thanks!