Can theists be rational?

You mean like the face on Mars ? You DO also know they found a smiley on Mars, right ? So did Wall-Mart use that planet for advertising ?
I made the same mistake. Bri is a bit more explicit in her original post. Her claim is about a high resolution image that is correct down to the nose hairs and couldn't be explained by natural forces. A Jupiter version of Mount Rushmore.

Of course, fine tuning has nothing to with that.
 
The fine-tuning argument claims that evidence of fine-tuning is evidence of a god.

And that's pretty much why it's circular. What the hell is "fine-tuning" if not the result of a fine-tuner ?

We don't know the means for extra terrestrial intelligence to exist

Yeah we do. It's pretty much the same as that of terrestrial intelligence.
 
The concept of an intelligent being that has the power to adjust the universal constants so that the universe supports life is also theoretically possible...

It's logically possible, I guess. But what kind of a theory could posit such a thing ?
And that's the point. I think Bri is confusing logically possible and hypothetically possible with theoretical (theoretically possible).

To be theoretical the proposition must be amenable to theory and that theory must take into account the mechanisms for doing whatever it does.

Given the right premises a perpetual motion machine is hypothetically possible but it is not theoretically possible.
 
So it seems as though you agree that the "significance" is only a function of the labels that have been assigned to the balls, not the actual results. You put the emphasis on the wrong word above. (Bolding mine)

And you are assuming that this significance is not important. It is, and I will try to show why below.

You keep interchanging 'unlikely' and 'significant'. By your statement above, it would not be foolish to be suspicious of every lottery result, as they were all equally unlikely.


Then I will have to explain in more detail. If a small subset of possible results are considered significant - then it is improbable that a given result would belong to that subset.

It's made slightly more difficult because there are far more apparently significant sequences of numbers than people might think. However, there are degrees of significance. The sequence 123456 would normally be regarded as being the most significant sequence. It would be considered more surprising than 132546, for example - though exactly as probable.

When obvious common sense appears to clash with the laws of probability, sometimes common sense is just wrong. Sometimes, the laws of probability are being misapplied. In this case, the error is in simply ignoring the probability that the fix is in. In any given real life game, there's always a chance that it's being manipulated.

The next thing to consider is whether someone stands to gain by the result being returned. In the case of 123456 that's not obvious - but it's not difficult to think of ways in which such a result might be exploited. But to make it clearer, let's think of a different example.

There's a national lottery played by millions of people. One week, the man who operates the machine wins the prize. We can't see any possible way for him to manipulate the machine. It's just a matter of releasing the balls. Nevertheless, are we suspicious? Of course we are, because in real life, probabilities are never a matter of pure mathematical formulae.

People's "normal suspicions" are the reason why when you type "how to win the lottery" into the 'search books' function of Amazon.com, you get 664 returns.

And people who lack "normal suspicions" and rely on naive application of the laws of probability can lose a lot of money playing three card monte.
 
And what makes you believe that the laws of physics are fixed and immutable? That is a belief.

Though elsewhere in the thread you were arguing that the laws of physics were mutable under certain undefined circumstances.

So, let me get this straight. Saying that the laws of physics, something we've always observed to be immutable, are immutable, is a belief, but saying that they might not be is not ?
 
No, HHHHHHH...(30) is a significant pattern.

Says who ?

Six heads in a row is to be expected every now and again. Thirty heads shouldn't happen in a lifetime.

But it might. All else being equal, there is no reason to suspect magical genies playing with reality.

So nobody should ever be surprised at anything.

Depends what you mean by "surprised". Did you mean "amazed" or "suspicious", or what ?

I wonder how many people really mean it if they say that there's no reason to be suspicious if 1-2-3-4-5-6 comes up on the lottery?

If I played the lottery, I'd pick exactly those numbers, because they're JUST as likely to come up as any other combination. Are you saying that, were I to win, you'd find it suspicious ?
 
And people who lack "normal suspicions" and rely on naive application of the laws of probability can lose a lot of money playing three card monte.
Sure, but those who think there is significance given improbability alone is irrational. If improbable events didn't happen we would live in a very, very unusual world.

Given the suspicion of 1-2-3-4-5-6 I would not jump to conclusions if they came up in the lottery. Why would anyone use those numbers if they were going to cheat and call attention to the fact?

You are now playing Vizzini's game and you've given everything away.
 
Says who ?

Says the average human being, whose ability to see patterns is the result of many millions of years of evolution.

But it might. All else being equal, there is no reason to suspect magical genies playing with reality.

If you were to see someone tossing coins and he threw 30 heads in a row that the only possible explanations were magical genies or pure chance? And you think I'm the one who's naive about games of chance? People can cheat. They can cheat in many ways, and sometimes it's not possible to figure out how. Sleight of hand and lying would be a more reasonable assumption than magic.

Depends what you mean by "surprised". Did you mean "amazed" or "suspicious", or what ?

Amazed and suspicious have to come from surprised.

If I played the lottery, I'd pick exactly those numbers, because they're JUST as likely to come up as any other combination. Are you saying that, were I to win, you'd find it suspicious ?

If you were to win the lottery playing 123456 I would indeed find it suspicious.

(That was not precisely what I said though. I said that 123456 would appear in that order, but that's a minor quibble).

Indeed, if 123456 came up in the lottery I'd be suspicious even if nobody won. Even if I couldn't tell how anyone could have taken advantage. Even if I could not see how the fix could possibly have taken place. Because the chances of a fix having taken place are not independent of the result, and it's not sensible to assume that they are.
 
Just take the argument to its natural conclusion: You could toss a coin 90 heads in a row and some of the people here would still given even odds on the next throw being tales. Nevermind the odds of 90 heads in a row with a fair coin are
1 / 1,237,940,039,285,380,274,899,124,224

It could happen, so we would have no reason to think it was a two-headed coin :rolleyes:
 
And you are assuming that this significance is not important. It is, and I will try to show why below.

Then I will have to explain in more detail. If a small subset of possible results are considered significant - then it is improbable that a given result would belong to that subset.

Why is this small subset of possible results considered significant? Is it significant in any way that is not simply a function of the recognizable patterns in the labels we've chosen to define the outcomes? And just so we don't stray off topic, I'm assuming you are defining 123456 as improbable outcome that we call the known universe, correct? Would you have any problem if we reframed the argument to define the known universe as the equally unlikely lottery outcome of 11 04 08 26 06 14? (Which, by the way, is a pattern of significance to me.)

It's made slightly more difficult because there are far more apparently significant sequences of numbers than people might think. However, there are degrees of significance. The sequence 123456 would normally be regarded as being the most significant sequence. It would be considered more surprising than 132546, for example - though exactly as probable.

Again, why are you regarding this as the most significant sequence? Why is it more surprising than 132546 when you obviously agree that they were equally probable results? Simply because 123456 is a pattern that you comfortably recognize (i.e. the known universe), and 132546 is not?

When obvious common sense appears to clash with the laws of probability, sometimes common sense is just wrong. Sometimes, the laws of probability are being misapplied. In this case, the error is in simply ignoring the probability that the fix is in. In any given real life game, there's always a chance that it's being manipulated.

This I agree with. But I disagree that looking at the pattern 123456, or any other pattern for that matter, gives, on its own, any indication that the fix is in, or that something has been manipulated. Or, to stay on topic, that the outcome has been fine tuned.

The next thing to consider is whether someone stands to gain by the result being returned. In the case of 123456 that's not obvious - but it's not difficult to think of ways in which such a result might be exploited. But to make it clearer, let's think of a different example.

I'm not certain of the relevance of this to the argument.

There's a national lottery played by millions of people. One week, the man who operates the machine wins the prize. We can't see any possible way for him to manipulate the machine. It's just a matter of releasing the balls. Nevertheless, are we suspicious? Of course we are, because in real life, probabilities are never a matter of pure mathematical formulae.

Agreed, we are suspicious. And that's why lottery employees can't legally play. But even if they could, the outcome pattern itself, whether it is 123456 or any of the other possible combination, has no bearing on our suspicion.
 
Even better: You have a lottery made up of 2600 balls, each correpsonding to a letter of the alphabet (100 A's, 100 B's... 100z's). The lottery commences, the balls are drawn, and you get this result:

HA HA SUCKERS I CHEATED OR IS THIS JUST A RANDOM RESULT MAKES YOU WONDER DONT IT

Since such a result is possible on chance alone, clearly we would have no reason to suspect someone rigged the lottery.
 
That's why I said the hypothesis should be watered down to "Something created the universe." or "A fine-tuner created the universe". We, ourselves, engage in small-scale fine-tuning all the time. If the argument can establish that it's more likely the universe was created by something than happened naturally
(PR(E/H) >> Pr(E/~H)), the theist can get a metaphorical foot in the door.

Yes, that's exactly why I find it insincere.

You "watered down" the hypothesis to use weasel words when you mean "God". Again, look at the thread title--it's about "theism".

What does it mean for a theist to get a foot in the door unless you are talking about God?

This dishonesty doesn't bother you in the least?

Especially given the history of this sort of thing from some of the most extreme theists who want to get their religion taught in public schools? (The Dover case, for example.)
 
Indeed, if 123456 came up in the lottery I'd be suspicious even if nobody won.
That doesn't make any sense. The lottery is regulated and there are laws against fraud and tampering with the lottery. That combination would likely bring attention to it. Who is stupid enough to take a risk with no benefit?
 
So my question is, in what fields and in what situations is Bayes' theorem used to analyze ideas which are too vaguely specified (similar to the fine-tuning argument) to allow a well-formed conclusion? Can someone give me some examples?

Any valid mathematical equation will produce a result given values for the variables. Bayes theorem (like Drake's equation) is no exception. The validity of the result depends on the accuracy of the values you put into the equation, so of course in practice they are much more useful when you have conclusive evidence upon which to base the input values. Unfortunately, in the case of aliens and gods, many of the values are only guesses (there is no conclusive evidence to support them).

-Bri
 
westprog actually has somewhat of a point, though his number's a bit of a poor example, because, frankly... only 1 out of 1 billion? There are 6 billion people on the planet, who will live about 70 years on average... that's going to happen by chance.

"Significant to us" counts, though, in this case. But it counts not merely because it's significant to us, but rather, because there are a lot of "us"'s around. (And the 1,2,3,4,5,6 doesn't have to be a terrible fraud--it would make a pretty damned cool prank).

The "us"'s that are around, are prone to things like fraud, or pranks. We know they are around, so we can formulate hypotheses about being defrauded or pranked. In doing so, we're going to be wrong on occasion--especially in this example, it's virtually certain we will be wrong. But we'll be right more often.

But the same thing applies everywhere. If we find a Rolex on Mars, what is our first hypothesis? God? No. Aliens? No. Humans... because it's much, much more likely that a human would have left a Rolex on Mars. Mind you, finding a Rolex on Mars, in itself, is an extremely unlikely thing, but, well, those humans are around, and they even make Rolex's.

Rare things do, in fact, happen. But they only suggest hypotheses that are demonstrably viable--even rare hypotheses can be on the table, but you go from most viable to least. The ones where you can account for everything, to the ones where you cannot. Parsimony before fantasy.
 
Any valid mathematical equation will produce a result given values for the variables. Bayes theorem (like Drake's equation) is no exception. The validity of the result depends on the accuracy of the values you put into the equation, so of course in practice they are much more useful when you have conclusive evidence upon which to base the input values.

So why bother using Bayes' theorem, in this situation, when you can't get valid results? Can you give me an example of any other situation where Bayes' theorem is used even though the results won't be useful?

Linda
 
Just take the argument to its natural conclusion: You could toss a coin 90 heads in a row and some of the people here would still given even odds on the next throw being tales. Nevermind the odds of 90 heads in a row with a fair coin are
1 / 1,237,940,039,285,380,274,899,124,224
Yes, let's take your argument to its natural conclusion.

The odds of you existing are
1 in 600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000.

We are not talking what "could" happen by tossing coins. We are talking what DID happen.
 
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Bri, Malerin, cj....you guys are the ones supporting this use of Bayes' theorem. Is Ivor right and there aren't any examples of this sort of use in any field of inquiry other than Religious Apologeticism?

I don't want to speak for Ivor, but I think he was saying that if the input values aren't well-supported by evidence, you will not necessarily get a valid conclusion. That's true of all equations, including Drake's. In practice, Bayes theorem is used in many applications where the input values are well-supported by evidence. Where the evidence is sketchy, the conclusion may not be valid.

See the courtroom example in this article for a "fuzzier" approach to the use of Bayes theorem to add up evidence against a defendant to try to determine whether the defendant is guilty. The accuracy of the result would depend on how certain you are of the probabilities placed on each piece of evidence against the defendant.

-Bri
 
westprog actually has somewhat of a point, though his number's a bit of a poor example, because, frankly... only 1 out of 1 billion? There are 6 billion people on the planet, who will live about 70 years on average... that's going to happen by chance.

"Significant to us" counts, though, in this case. But it counts not merely because it's significant to us, but rather, because there are a lot of "us"'s around. (And the 1,2,3,4,5,6 doesn't have to be a terrible fraud--it would make a pretty damned cool prank).

The "us"'s that are around, are prone to things like fraud, or pranks. We know they are around, so we can formulate hypotheses about being defrauded or pranked. In doing so, we're going to be wrong on occasion--especially in this example, it's virtually certain we will be wrong. But we'll be right more often.

But the same thing applies everywhere. If we find a Rolex on Mars, what is our first hypothesis? God? No. Aliens? No. Humans... because it's much, much more likely that a human would have left a Rolex on Mars. Mind you, finding a Rolex on Mars, in itself, is an extremely unlikely thing, but, well, those humans are around, and they even make Rolex's.

Rare things do, in fact, happen. But they only suggest hypotheses that are demonstrably viable--even rare hypotheses can be on the table, but you go from most viable to least. The ones where you can account for everything, to the ones where you cannot. Parsimony before fantasy.
Yes. Agreed 100%.

The problem is to equate an unlikely event that could be explained by conscious intent given that we know that conscious intent exists (three card Monty dealer) with an unlikely event that we have no such explanation for and concluding a conscious intent. (I apologize for the long sentence).

Deriving conscious intent from an improbable event when we don't know if there is conscious intent is spurious.

An improbable event is not in and of itself proof of anything. We've seen Rolex watches before and have a comparison for such a find. And forget "Rolex", we have watches. The salient point that we must not gloss over is that we don't have an analogue for a fine tuned universe.
 
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