Can theists be rational?

[RandFan]

The great red spot doesn't look anything like a giraffe or a building. It looks exactly like a great red spot should look. We should stick to something we've actually experienced, since the claim is that we are experiencing a fine-tuned universe.

What does the face on mars prove?

If you ask me it, and a giant giraffe would both prove pareidolia.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Had it only risen once, there would be little if any compelling evidence that it will rise again,

Wonderful! But not the point. Oh, it's the point you want to make, but it's not the point you need to get.

You're comparing A to B. We damned well have the right to say they contrast, and you don't get to reformulate our objections. Nobody is talking about compelling evidence but you.

But we are talking about a significant difference. You know, something having to do with reason^dict sense 4?

And in this case, sure. The fact that the sun rose once isn't compelling evidence that it will rise again. But it matters that it rose once, right? Say "yes".

particularly without knowing the conditions by which it rose the one time.

That we happen to know the conditions is irrelevant. The sun has been rising since the dawn of man, and we haven't merely recently ran into a reason to suspect it will rise tomorrow.


You, and only you, are talking about "compelling evidence". Meanwhile, the rest of us are trying to have the discussion you are having when you aren't chasing rabbits about this--that there's a critical difference.

You can't deny there's a critical difference by ignoring it and pointing out similarities. Doesn't fly.

 

[Bri]

I don't think it means 'likely', either. I don't think that it needs to mean 'likely', in that SETI is considered a long shot with a potentially big pay-off (as far as I can tell).

I'm referring to the fact that a belief in something generally means that it's more likely than not. If I say "I believe that faeries exist" I generally mean that I believe that the probability of their existence is higher than the probability that they don't exist.

Just like there is evidence that if the conditions surrounding the great red spot varied much from what they are, the great red spot wouldn't be sustained.

I don't think the probability of a red spot on a planet is considered particularly remote, so I'm not sure what you're comparing it to. That's why I pointed out that a spot on a planet that is in the shape of a giraffe would be a much more apt analogy.

I don't think there is a valid difference between the two arguments (although you're free to propose some other observation that is more likely in the presence of an alien civilization than in its absence, if you don't like the great red spot observation).

Sorry, I was referring to the argument that a god exists and the argument that aliens exist. I assume you believe that there is a valid difference that doesn't require special pleading, correct?

The great red spot doesn't look anything like a giraffe or a building.

Which is why it's a poor analogy. The probability of a red spot isn't particularly small, unlike the probability that our universe would have the rather specific values that are required to support life.

-Bri

 

[RandFan]

Can you give me an example of what you mean by "theoretical hurtle?"

How a being can construct an objects 100 times the size of our sun and light years apart? How does a being travel those distances?

The fact that we don't understand the conditions by which intelligent life emerges seems like a theoretical hurtle to the notion that intelligent life might exist elsewhere.

See, this is the problem. We exist. So there is no such "theoretical" hurtle. We have already put that one to rest. If you look in the mirror you will see proof that intelligent life can exist. A being that can create trillions of objects, many the size of The Pistol Star and at distances of many, many light years? We have no conceptual basis. We have no theoretical basis.

We DO have a conceptual basis for intelligent life (look in the mirror). We have a theoretical basis (look in the mirror and then look out the window).

God? Nothing. Nada. Zip.

Case in point, it is no more rational to believe in teapots orbiting Jupiter than aliens simply because we have a thousand examples of teapots here on earth. There is no compelling evidence of teapots orbiting Jupiter, and there is no compelling evidence of aliens.

I'll grant a theoretical basis for a teapot orbiting Jupiter. What is the conceptual basis for a teapot orbiting Jupiter?

BTW: I don't think the teapot advances anything. I'm happy to agree that a teapot orbiting Jupiter is more likely than ET intelligent life for argument sake. It's of very little comparative value.

 

[fls]

What does the face on mars prove?

[qimg]http://img150.imageshack.us/img150/572/faceonmarsww9.jpg[/qimg]

If you ask me it, and a giant giraffe would both prove pareidolia.

I imagine it proves the same thing that the great red spot proves - that it would be more likely in the presence of an alien civilization than in its absence, therefore it's presence supports the idea of an alien civilization.

Linda

 

[westprog]

Actually they are.

Not all and to the extent they are they are only laws of physics from the perspective of our universe. It's not theoretically impossible for them to be different. If it is, then that would in and of itself obviate a fine tuner.

No, because once we include these other possibilities the perceived significance of fine-tuning is obviated.

That's the part you are missing. You find something you think is significant but it really isn't. But even if we assume that it is it is, in some way, "significant", it is only significant with tunnel vision (the exclusion of other possibilities).

Statistics teaches us two things. One is that certain patterns are not significant, because they can be expected by chance. The other is that certain patterns are significant, and they probably indicate something.

Let us consider what would constitute proof, or even evidence, that the universe were constructed. According to Randfan, just about nothing would do, because it would simply be just another unlikely event. If the Hubble telescope were looking at the furthest galactic clusters, and we found that they clearly spelled out "I did this - signed God" Randfan could say, quite rightly, that this configuration was no more or less likely than any other pattern.

But if we see thirty heads in a row we are right to suspect the game is rigged. If we see the lottery throw up 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 then we think there's something odd going on. And we are right to be suspicious.

 

[Bri]

You're comparing A to B. We damned well have the right to say they contrast, and you don't get to reformulate our objections.

Sure, they are different, but not in any way that can be used to label one necessarily irrational and another rational short of special pleading.

And in this case, sure. The fact that the sun rose once isn't compelling evidence that it will rise again. But it matters that it rose once, right? Say "yes".

No, it makes no difference. You can't extrapolate from a sample size of 1. If it never rose before but isn't impossible, it would have the same probability of rising tomorrow as it did if rose once before, which is to say the probability would be greater than 0.

That we happen to know the conditions is irrelevant. The sun has been rising since the dawn of man, and we haven't merely recently ran into a reason to suspect it will rise tomorrow.

You may have misread what I wrote. If it had only risen once, without any knowledge of the conditions by which it rose, we would have no basis to assume that it will rise again tomorrow (we would have no reason to believe it likely that the conditions would be the same tomorrow as they are today given that they were apparently different yesterday).

You, and only you, are talking about "compelling evidence". Meanwhile, the rest of us are trying to have the discussion you are having when you aren't chasing rabbits about this--that there's a critical difference.

You can't deny there's a critical difference by ignoring it and pointing out similarities. Doesn't fly.

I don't see a critical difference. Every supposed difference you point out seems to also apply to some other belief that is generally considered "irrational," which just indicates special pleading.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

How a being can construct an objects 100 times the size of our sun and light years apart? How does a being travel those distances?

Oh, so you're saying that the mechanism of a being that can do those things isn't understood. Like the theoretical hurdle that we don't understand the conditions by which intelligent life emerges and therefore don't know the chances of it occurring elsewhere.

See, this is the problem. We exist. So there is no such "theoretical" hurtle.

Teapots exist too, so you're willing to concede that there's no "theoretical hurdle" that makes a belief in a teapot orbiting Jupiter to be irrational?

I'll grant a theoretical basis for a teapot orbiting Jupiter. What is the conceptual basis for a teapot orbiting Jupiter?

Please explain what you mean by "conceptual basis" (or lack thereof) as it pertains to aliens but not to teapots orbiting Jupiter.

BTW: I don't think the teapot advances anything. I'm happy to agree that a teapot orbiting Jupiter is more likely than ET intelligent life for argument sake. It's of very little comparative value.

The lengths you have to go to in order to justify your special pleading! I imagine that most people would consider belief in a teapot orbiting Jupiter irrational. Since you agree that a teapot orbiting Jupiter is more likely than ET intelligent life, are you conceding that those who consider the former irrational can assume the latter to also be irrational?

-Bri

 

[Bri]

I imagine it proves the same thing that the great red spot proves - that it would be more likely in the presence of an alien civilization than in its absence, therefore it's presence supports the idea of an alien civilization.

I sure hope you're joking. You're not really going to slap each other on the back and pretend that the picture RandFan posted equates to the analogy I gave are you? I even specified that the giraffe was accurate down to the nose hairs, and made it clear that the analogy indicated something that was unlikely to occur by chance. To pretend that the analogy is indistinguishable from pareidolia seems disingenuous.

-Bri

 

[yy2bggggs]

Oh, so you're saying that the mechanism of a being that can do those things isn't understood. Like the theoretical hurdle that we don't understand the conditions by which intelligent life emerges and therefore don't know the chances of it occurring elsewhere.

Or, the theoretical hurdle that we don't understand the conditions by which intelligent life emerges, and therefore don't know the chances of it occurring here?

Oh, wait. Maybe it's not like that after all.

And you're complaining about special pleading?

 

[fls]

I'm referring to the fact that a belief in something generally means that it's more likely than not. If I say "I believe that faeries exist" I generally mean that I believe that the probability of their existence is higher than the probability that they don't exist.

Yeah, if someone doesn't give a high probability to something existing, they probably don't believe it exists.

I don't think the probability of a red spot on a planet is considered particularly remote, so I'm not sure what you're comparing it to.

Why wouldn't it be remote? It's the only example we have. However, if it isn't sufficiently remote, pick something else that is.

That's why I pointed out that a spot on a planet that is in the shape of a giraffe would be a much more apt analogy.

Yeah, but there isn't a spot in the shape of a giraffe. We could use the face on Mars, if you like. It just needs to be something we've already experienced for which we've now concocted an explanation.

Sorry, I was referring to the argument that a god exists and the argument that aliens exist. I assume you believe that there is a valid difference that doesn't require special pleading, correct?

I've concocted an argument that aliens exist that is not different from the argument that gods exist. I presume you find them both valid.

Which is why it's a poor analogy. The probability of a red spot isn't particularly small, unlike the probability that our universe would have the rather specific values that are required to support life.

-Bri

So the only difference between the two is the probability? That seems an easy thing to fix.

Linda

 

[RandFan]

Statistics teaches us two things. One is that certain patterns are not significant, because they can be expected by chance. The other is that certain patterns are significant, and they probably indicate something.

(emphasis mine) Agreed. The problem is avoiding finding significance when none is warranted. Your existence is perhaps more improbable than anything. Yet you don't conclude anything from that because there is no reason to.

Let us consider what would constitute proof, or even evidence, that the universe were constructed. According to Randfan, just about nothing would do, because it would simply be just another unlikely event. If the Hubble telescope were looking at the furthest galactic clusters, and we found that they clearly spelled out "I did this - signed God" Randfan could say, quite rightly, that this configuration was no more or less likely than any other pattern.

No. Now you are being presumptuous.

But if we see thirty heads in a row we are right to suspect the game is rigged.

Only if we have a reason to suspect. That is where you are making your mistake. You are suffering form innumeracy.

Take a million people. Have each flip a coin. Those who have tails sit down. Do it again. And again, and again, and again. Eventually you will come up with one person who has gotten heads thirty times in a row.

What should we conclude from that fact?

If we see the lottery throw up 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 then we think there's something odd going on. And we are right to be suspicious.

Innumeracy.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Yeah, if someone doesn't give a high probability to something existing, they probably don't believe it exists.

Especially if that "probability" is just an expression of "degrees of belief"!

 

[RandFan]

Oh, so you're saying that the mechanism of a being that can do those things isn't understood.

No. Only that there is no theoretical basis for such a person.

Like the theoretical hurdle that we don't understand the conditions by which intelligent life emerges and therefore don't know the chances of it occurring elsewhere.

If you look in the mirror you will understand the theoretical basis for inteligent life.

Teapots exist too, so you're willing to concede that there's no "theoretical hurdle" that makes a belief in a teapot orbiting Jupiter to be irrational?

Yes. Of course. (see above post).

Please explain what you mean by "conceptual basis" (or lack thereof) as it pertains to aliens but not to teapots orbiting Jupiter.

I can conceptualize inteligent life because A.) It exists and B.) there are reasonable hypothesis for its existence. I can't think of a reasonable hypothesis for the existence of a tea pot orbiting Jupiter but the example is a very poor one and doesn't advance the discussion. I'm willing to concede, for arguments sake, that such a belief in the possibility of a Jupiter orbiting tea pot isn't all that unlikely.

So, let's move on from the tea pot. No magical entities are needed for its existence. God requires magical or unknown entities. It's unparsimonious. Inteligent life has been shown to exist. A magical being that travels accross distances measured in light years and creates things as large as the Pistol Star and as many as a *hundred of billions (stars in galaxy) times hundreds of billions (number of galaxies) has never been shown to exist.

The lengths you have to go to in order to justify your special pleading!

There is no special pleading. I don't need to posit magical entities for ET inteligent life.

You do need to posit magical or unknown phenomenon to justify a belief in the possibility of a god.

*At least

 

[Bri]

Or, the theoretical hurdle that we don't understand the conditions by which intelligent life emerges, and therefore don't know the chances of it occurring here?

The fact that there is one example of intelligent life in the universe does not mean that this was a likely outcome. That would be an example of anthropic bias.

The fact that it occurred here doesn't tell us much about the probability that it occurred elsewhere unless we know the conditions by which it occurred here.

-Bri

 

[fls]

I sure hope you're joking. You're not really going to slap each other on the back and pretend that the picture RandFan posted equates to the analogy I gave are you? I even specified that the giraffe was accurate down to the nose hairs, and made it clear that the analogy indicated something that was unlikely to occur by chance. To pretend that the analogy is indistinguishable from pareidolia seems disingenuous.

-Bri

You're the one claiming that the argument aliens exist is the same as the argument that god exists. At best, Drake's equation gives us a way to estimate p(H). So what is E? What observation do you think these alien believers (whoever they are) are using to support the idea of alien civilizations?

Linda

 

[RandFan]

The fact that it occurred here doesn't tell us much about the probability that it occurred elsewhere unless we know the conditions by which it occurred here.

Actually it does (as noted by Paulos).

It's actually very significant. When we are positing the likelihood of something then we don't know for an absolute certainty that something is beyond a theoretical possibility until it happens. Once it does it is a huge advance in our understanding. It demonstrates that it is in fact possible beyond simply the theoretical.

ETA: One of the first steps in developing a new invention is to see if it is theoretically possible. The nex step is to see if it is practically possible. One has to first actually understand the physics and the constraints of the idea to decide whether something is beyond conceptual and is in fact theoretical and then they must make a prototype and verify it works before he or she knows whether it isn't simply theoretically possible.

Humans are that prototype. We move intelligent life from the conceptual, to the theoretical to the practical.

That is what you refuse to acknowledge Bri and that is what I find disappointing in your contributions to this discussion. We don't know that a god is beyond the laws of physics. We don't know if a god is theoretically possible. We don't know that a god is practical.

 

[Bri]

Why wouldn't it be remote? It's the only example we have. However, if it isn't sufficiently remote, pick something else that is.

A building on Jupiter, or a spot shaped exactly like a giraffe. Both could be the result of random or natural processes, but it would not be irrational to conclude that less likely than it being built or caused by an intelligent being.

Yeah, but there isn't a spot in the shape of a giraffe. We could use the face on Mars, if you like. It just needs to be something we've already experienced for which we've now concocted an explanation.

As the article RandFan posted indicates, the blurry "face" on Mars is most likely not a face.

I've concocted an argument that aliens exist that is not different from the argument that gods exist. I presume you find them both valid.

You mean the one about the spot on Jupiter? If it's shaped like a giraffe, they are closer to analogous, and yes I find it rational to conclude it more likely that the giraffe on Jupiter is the result of an intelligent species than that it came about randomly or by natural means.

So the only difference between the two is the probability? That seems an easy thing to fix.

The difference is probability that it occurred by other means, yes. In this case, it's easy to fix by making it something that's far less likely to have occurred by other means, like a giraffe or a building.

-Bri

 

[yy2bggggs]

No, it makes no difference.

The implication is that it never makes a difference. Look, it's just simple induction.

Given: It makes no difference if the sun rises once, or doesn't rise.
Theorem: It makes no difference if the sun rises N times, for any N greater than 1.

Proof:
First, let's establish terminology. Let S_k indicate that the sun rose k times.

Now, assume that the sun rose n times--S_n, and there's no difference between S_n and S₀. Then we notice that the sun rises. Because there's no difference between S_n and S₀, the same thing should happen with S_n and S₀. In the case of S₀, we're given that the sun rising once makes no difference. Therefore, in the case of S_n+1, it makes no difference.

The base case--that S₁ is not different than S₀, is given.

You do realize that I didn't just pick "sun rising" at random, correct? This is the classic sunrise problem^WP.

You can't extrapolate from a sample size of 1.

Again, you're ignoring the difference by focusing on the similarities. Unimpressive.

I don't see a critical difference.

Yes, I know.

 

[RandFan]

As the article RandFan posted indicates, the blurry "face" on Mars is most likely not a face.

And a giraffe would most likely not be a giraffe. But then we are speculating about a lot of BS we know nothing about. How closely does the picture look like a giraffe and can you rule out pareidolia?