Can theists be rational?

So as far as we know, the universe is probably not going to contract. But it might. If it did, then what? Why would it expand again? What would make it explode if all matter were concentrated in a black hole?
Why did it expand at all?

But say it did - then why would the laws of physics be different? We have no reason to suppose that they would change.
This is irrelevant. The laws of physics don't need to change. Only the variables.

The point is that the idea that "fine-tuning" could mean anything requires the rejection of other possibilities. It's having your cake and eating it too.
 
However, sometimes a string of outcomes is indicative of not chance, but something else.
There is no reason to assume that "fine-tuning" is indicative of something other than chance. To postulate something other than chance I don't have any other criteria like, for instance, the mind of a three card Monty dealer.

Like the probability of you existing I only have a rare event. Absent anything else there is nothing to conclude from that fact.
 
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It is somewhat beside the point whether a belief in extra terrestrial intelligent life is rational or irrational given the compelling lack of connection to "Can theists be rational?".

Once again, the connection has been made pretty clear. If you would like to continue with a discussion of whether or not it's OK to consider all beliefs for which there is no compelling evidence irrational, I'm game.

Meanwhile, others seem to still be insisting that some can be rational while others are necessarily irrational.

-Bri
 
? What? No. You've got that backwards.

Bacteria in one pond = could be bacteria in another.
Elephants != invisible elephants.

extra terrestrial intelligent life is a subset of intelligent life
invisible elephants is a subset of elephants

You like to pretend that extra terrestrial intelligent life is the same as intelligent life when it suits you.

Your questions don't obviate any of my premises. Mine obviate yours.

Wrong. They absolutely obviate the premises of an argument based on Drake's equation. In fact, I grabbed several of them straight out of Drake's equation, particularly the ones for which we have no compelling evidence.

-Bri
 
Once again, the connection has been made pretty clear.
Clear as mud. How does a creator create 300,000,000,000 galaxies? Hell, how does a creator create a planet like the earth? To explain the mechanisms of god you use magic. You offer no explanations for how this could be.

ET inteligent life? I have such an explanation of how it could be without resorting to magical explanations.
 
extra terrestrial intelligent life is a subset of intelligent life invisible elephants is a subset of elephants
I don't need to appeal to any unexplainable phenomenon to posit ET inteligent life.

You like to pretend that extra terrestrial intelligent life is the same as intelligent life when it suits you.
No, only that we know one instance of intellgient life existing. There are no "invisible elephants". You are adding an unexplainable phenomenon. You are trying to turn apples into oranges.

They absolutely obviate the premises of an argument based on Drake's equation.
Apples and oranges. Drake equation does take into account those premises. You DON'T take mine into account.

A rare event, in and of itself, is evidence of nothing.
 
Sure, you can speculate, but speculation isn't evidence.
Not the point. There's a critical epistemic difference between the god case and the life on other planet cases. Now let's go over that critical difference again.

In order for life to exist on other planets, something we know damned well happened at least once, would merely have to happen again. Do not make a straw man out of this--this is not an argument that there is life on another planet--this is an argument that there is a critical difference. And yes, there's no evidence "that it happened again", but that's not even remotely the point.

The point isn't that one leads you to two. The point is that one is greater than zero; or, alternately, is much closer to two than zero is. And in fact, compared to zero, from an epistemic perspective, one is a very big deal, given the combinatorially huge number of things that are possible, that simply from a pigeonhole perspective aren't true, and the tiny, miniscule fraction of things that are.
In all fairness I should qualified my statement by saying that there is no compelling evidence that aliens exist (just as there is no compelling evidence that a god exists).
Yes. Both extrapolate. They are exactly the same in that they both extrapolate. But there's still that critical difference.
There is no compelling evidence that what occurred on this planet has occurred elsewhere, and not even compelling evidence that it having occurred elsewhere is probable.
Correct. Both extrapolate. They are exactly the same in that they both extrapolate.

But one is on much, much firmer ground than the other, because knowing something happened a single time is a very big deal.
 
Clear as mud. How does a creator create 300,000,000,000 galaxies? Hell, how does a creator create a planet like the earth? To explain the mechanisms of god you use magic. You offer no explanations for how this could be.

ET inteligent life? I have such an explanation of how it could be without resorting to magical explanations.

We still have the same amount of compelling evidence that ET intelligent life exists as we do of a god, invisible elephants, unicorns, or teapots orbiting Jupiter, which is to say very little if any. I'm really trying, but I don't get your point.

-Bri
 
I don't think so. I think the fine-tuning argument is simply considering the probability that the universe would be fine-tuned by chance or some other (as of yet unknown) reason as opposed to the probability that it would be fine-tuned if a god exists. I don't think it's that much of a stretch for a reasonable person to imagine that the chances would be higher if an intelligent being exists that has the power to set the constants in such a way that the universe can support life.

Just like a reasonable person imagines that the chances would be higher that the great red spot is present if an alien civilization on Jupiter exists that has the power to disturb the atmosphere in such a way as to create the great red spot.

Probably unintentional wording there, but of course alien intelligence is possible. The question is whether it is probable. In order to conclude that it is probable, you have to make assumptions for which there is no compelling evidence.

I meant not highly unlikely.

I have two problems with your analogy. First, if the red spot on Jupiter had no other known explanation and looked exactly like a giraffe in precise detail down to the nose hairs, we might try to estimate the probability of a feature like that occurring by chance or due to some other unknown explanation, and possibly surmise a higher probability that there are/were intelligent beings on Jupiter that had seen a giraffe.

We don't actually know what a fine-tuned universe looks like. We just assume that it looks like ours. Just like the great red spot on Jupiter looks exactly like an alien induced great red spot should look - right down to the nose hairs.

But your objection seems to be directed toward the nature of the arguments rather than anything that would relate to the argument being valid. Similar Bayesian arguments are made all the time and are considered perfectly acceptable. So your objection seems like special pleading to me.

What objection?

The two arguments are different, to be sure. But I'm not sure they're different in any significant way that would allow you to say that one is necessarily irrational and one rational without resorting to special pleading.

-Bri

I agree that both the great red spot argument and the fine-tuning argument are irrational.

Linda
 
We still have the same amount of compelling evidence that ET intelligent life exists as we do of a god, invisible elephants, unicorns, or teapots orbiting Jupiter, which is to say very little if any. I'm really trying, but I don't get your point.
It's really, really, really simple. You have to try very, very hard not to get it.

I'll make it as straightforward and clear as I possibly can. To not get it you will now have to close your eyes and ignore the following:
  • ET intelligent life doesn't require any unexplained phenomenon.
  • God, invisible elephants, unicorns and teapots orbiting Jupiter do.
The salient point? "unexplained phenomenon".

ET intelligent life doesn't require it. God, invisible elephants, unicorns and teapots orbiting Jupiter do.

You can open your eyes now.
 
I don't need to appeal to any unexplainable phenomenon to posit ET inteligent life.

Unexplainable or just unexplained? Of course you do, unless you can explain the mechanism by which intelligent life emerges.

No, only that we know one instance of intellgient life existing. There are no "invisible elephants".

Once again, you are equating intelligent life with extra terrestrial intelligent life when it suits you, but conveniently forgetting to do the same with the analogy. We do indeed know of instances of elephants existing. Does that mean it's OK to believe in invisible elephants?

Apples and oranges. Drake equation does take into account those premises. You DON'T take mine into account.

Do you know how intelligent life emerges? Does Drake's equation take that into account?

How does Drake's equation take it into account other than to place some variables for you to guess at? And how is that any different than the fine-tuning argument?

There are pieces to the puzzle that are entirely missing in both cases. You simply cannot come to a valid conclusion without being able to come up with a valid premise.

-Bri
 
This has been a fascinating thread for me, but I'm going to have to bow out for a bit. I really need to concentrate my mental facilities on other things. However, I decided I'd respond to one last point and shift to lurking for a while.

Thanks to all for the pleasant conversation.


Given a fair coin and excluding slight of hand. No. I would not at all be crazy. You are commiting the gamblers fallacy.

He is not committing the gamblers fallacy because he is not saying that a fair coin and slight of hand are excluded. In fact, he's trying to get you to realize they are not excluded and thus, to continue to bet at 50/50 odds is not particularly smart.

As I see it, the relevance to the question we've been discussing is that it becomes, as Bri puts it, "special pleading" to insist that in this situation, where we most certainly do NOT know the cause of those physical constants needing to be constrained in the way they appear to need to be, we discard the possibility of slight of hand.
 
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B=0, C=0.325. You are presumably working with a fair coin that has heads on one side, right? (And may or may not have heads on both?)

The thing is, E is the result of some test. E' is also the result of the same kind of test--it is some actual result, with a value distinct from E. E' doesn't mean lack of E, but rather, presence of something not E; E means the test went one way--E' means it didn't go that way.

Yes, I think it goes in our background knowledge that E was a result of two coin tosses, so ~E is a different result of two coin tosses. But what if E isn't the result of a test?

H = Bob is going to die
E = Bob is playing in the street.

Pr(E/H) may not be very surprising, but what is Pr(~E/H)? Given that Bob is going to die, it's not obvious what Pr(~E) should be. ~E just says Bob's not playing in the street. If Bob's not playing in the street, maybe he's playing Russian Roulette? Maybe he's doing handstands around a live wire or standing under a piano that's about to drop on his head. Bob could be suicidal and 90%of what he does (~E) is life-threatening. If I don't know what ~E is, my lack of knowledge is going to translate into an agnostic value for Pr(~E/H).
 
In order for life to exist on other planets, something we know damned well happened at least once, would merely have to happen again. Do not make a straw man out of this--this is not an argument that there is life on another planet--this is an argument that there is a critical difference. And yes, there's no evidence "that it happened again", but that's not even remotely the point.

Of course that's the point. Without evidence, the most you can say is that it's possible. Which doesn't get you any farther than to say that it's possible that a god exists.

The point isn't that one leads you to two.

One doesn't lead you to two though. One leads you to the possibility of two. There is no more reason to assume that two is probable than to assume that a god is probable.

But one is on much, much firmer ground than the other, because knowing something happened a single time is a very big deal.

We know that teapots and elephants happened at least once. But these don't provide any compelling evidence that there are teapots orbiting Jupiter or invisible elephants.

-Bri
 
He is not committing the gamblers fallacy because he is not saying that a fair coin and slight of hand are excluded.
In context of the discussion he can only be commiting the gamblers fallacy. There is nothing about a rare event that in and of itself proves anything. Malerin would like to add tje intent of a concious mind but that is begging the question because it is the intent of a concious mind that the rare event is supposed to prove.

As I see it, the relevance to the question we've been discussing is that it becomes, as Bri puts it, "special pleading"...
The special pleading is on the part of Bri you and Malerin.

There is nothing to conclude from a rare event. I keep telling you that the probability of you existing is one of the rarest events in the unverse yet you don't conlcude anything from that fact.

You only want to conclude something from the "fine-tuning" argument. There is nothing to conclude.
 
Unexplainable or just unexplained? Of course you do, unless you can explain the mechanism by which intelligent life emerges.
We know it's not impossible. We emerged. Do you know that a being capable of creating 300,000,000,000 galaxies is possible beyond not being defined as impossible?

We do indeed know of instances of elephants existing. Does that mean it's OK to believe in invisible elephants?
We know that inteligent life is possible. Look in the mirror. Do you know if invisible elephants are possible beyong not being defined as impossible?

Do you know how intelligent life emerges? Does Drake's equation take that into account?
Only that it is possible. Do you know if a being is capable of creating 300,000,000,000 galaxies is possible beyond not being defined as impossible?


There are pieces to the puzzle that are entirely missing in both cases. You simply cannot come to a valid conclusion without being able to come up with a valid premise.
  • One is based on something we know has happened.
  • One is based on something we don't know if it could happen.
There is a huge difference between something that isn't defined as impossible and possible. You think the two are the same. They are not.

One is possible because we understand the mechanisms that give rise to the possibility. The other is simply stating that we don't have a reason to assume impossibility. And FTR: We are being very generous when it comes to god. There are reasons to assume impossibility but for the sake of argument I've let that slide.
 
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I haven’t heard any valid reasons to reject the argument.

How about a contradiction that a friend of mine pointed out? The argument hinges on two different values of P(B) (the probability of an inhabitable universe). I'll quote my friend:

A = God exists
A' = God does not exist
B = Universe is inhabitable
A | B means A given B.

P(A ) = 0.000001
P(A') = 0.999999
P(B | A ) = 0.000001
P(B | A') = 10^-(billion billion billion + 3)

P(A | B) = P(B | A) X P(A) / (P(B | A) X P(A) + P(B | A') x P(A')) = ~1.
(See in the wiki article under alternative formulations.)

Then there is an epiphany that P(B) = 1, and the poster concludes that God must exist, since
P(A) = P(A | B) x P(B).

The trouble is that according to the given data:
P(A | B) = P(B | A) x P(A) / P(B)
P(B) = P(B | A) X P(A) + P(B | A') x P(A') = ~10^-12
But we know that P(B) does equal 1.


Notice that
P(A | B) = P(B | A) x P(A) / P(B) = 10^-12 if P(B) = 1.
Basically even though we know P(B)=1, and this knowledge is what makes the argument give you a near certainty of God's existence, the argument itself puts that value at about 10^-12.


A valid reason to reject the argument for a creator but not for Intelligent E.T. life would apply to one but not the other.
The Drake Equation is NOT an argument for the existence of ET intelligence. If someone is misusing the Drake Equation to claim that ET intelligence exists, I agree it is an invalid argument. (And if that's the support for the God argument, it's a "tu quoque" fallacy.)

If someone is using the Drake Equation to help refute an argument that ET intelligence does not exist, it is a valid use. If the Drake Equation is used-- as it was designed-- to help us think of where we'd need to look to find the evidence that might resolve the question, it's also valid. It's basically a tool to tell us what information we'd need (but don't have) to answer the question about how many planets with intelligent life there might be. (We do know there is at least 1, so this is very unlike an argument for the existence of something whose existence is unknown.)
 
But one is on much, much firmer ground than the other, because knowing something happened a single time is a very big deal.

It depends. Knowing the outcome of a single coin toss is little better than no coin toss at all. It can eliminate some hypotheses (Loaded completely to land X, or two-X'd), but one toss doesn't help you at all when trying to determine whether it's fair or not.

Edit: actually a single-coin toss provides some confirming evidence.
Edit 2: A single coin toss doesn't provide any evidence for the hypothesis "The coin is fair".

Knowing that life occurred on Earth doesn't help us with respect to ET life because we don't know if there is something unique (or a combination of unique events) about Earth that isn't found on any other planet in the universe. And even if Earth is habitable for life, we don't know if the odds of life emerging from some primoridal soup on a planet like ours is 1/10, 1/100 or 1/10E20. Speculating on ET life is like trying to prove a coin is loaded fair by tossing it once.
 
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I meant not highly unlikely.

I'm not sure what "not highly unlikely" means, but I'm pretty sure it doesn't mean "likely."

We don't actually know what a fine-tuned universe looks like. We just assume that it looks like ours. Just like the great red spot on Jupiter looks exactly like an alien induced great red spot should look - right down to the nose hairs.

I don't know what you mean, but you need to read the article if you haven't already. There is evidence that if the universal constants varied much from what they are, the universe wouldn't support life.

What objection?

Your objection to the notion that there's not a valid difference between the two arguments that doesn't require special pleading.

I agree that both the great red spot argument and the fine-tuning argument are irrational.

It would not be irrational to surmise that lacking any other reasonable explanation, a spot on Jupiter that looked exactly like a giraffe was probably made by an intelligent being that had seen a giraffe. It also wouldn't be irrational to conclude that if a building was found in a photograph of Jupiter taken by a probe that an intelligent being may have built it.

-Bri
 

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