Can theists be rational?

[JoeTheJuggler]

I'd like to steer this topic back to something I find more interesting.

Let's leave off the question of whether there is a rational argument for the existence of God. Even if you think there is such a thing, you must admit that the vast majority of theists don't require one. They believe what they believe (not only the existence of their God, but all sorts of other fantastic stories about what that God has done and does now) base strictly on faith.

I have no doubt that some--even most--of these believers can and do use rational arguments in other matters.

My question is, how and why do they use these different modes of thinking? When do they know when to accept "it's a mystery" or even "my subjective experience is enough" when it's not good enough other times? (Surely everyone who uses "subjective experience" doesn't believe that Copperfield can make the Statue of Liberty actually vanish--so at some point they do use rational thinking wrt their own subjective experience.)

 

[ponderingturtle]

It doesn't contain the conclusion in the premises. The premise in question is that the probability of a god existing are 0.0001%. Then it multiplies that by a really large number and concludes that the result is a really large number. The conclusion follows from the premises.

-Bri

And it can be used to prove god exists with a deck of cards. Deal out a deck of cards the odds of that particular arrangement are 1 in 8x10^67. The odds that god did it are 1 in 10^6, so god exists.

See easy and with all the validity of the original argument.

 

[fls]

Sorry--my reply crossed your reply.

Mostly it's not sufficient to exclude a lot of ideas that people really aren't talking about when they use the word god.

Can you give me some examples?

Second, I'm not sure what to make of "unlawful" and "force". I think they're both being used figuratively somehow, but if we're talking about making testable hypotheses, maybe not.

I don't mean for them to be used figuratively, but rather how they are used as scientific terms.

Also, how does "unlawful" differ from our ignorance? If we find some measurement or result that we can't yet explain by our current laws, does it necessarily mean it's supernatural or "God"?

Our ignorance applies equally to whether or not it is unlawful. Ignorance just means we don't know, so it could be God - i.e. it explains "God of the Gaps".

If so, "God" must keep popping into and out of existence as our science changes. (Don't laugh! There are people who honestly believe something similar to that. But I don't think that's how most people use the word "God".)

Right, for those who follow God of the Gaps, it applies. For those who dont, it doesn't.

Linda

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Why not? Subjective experience is inherently useless on an individual level?

I don't know about "useless" but it certainly doesn't constitute rational proof of anything.

When you look at this thing:

http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/~akitaoka/rotsnake.gif

your subjective experience tells you that these wheels are in motion. They're not. It would be irrational for you to depend solely on your subjective experience and believe that they are in motion. Surely, there's more to your beliefs than subjective experience.

 

[Malerin]

And it can be used to prove god exists with a deck of cards. Deal out a deck of cards the odds of that particular arrangement are 1 in 8x10^67. The odds that god did it are 1 in 10^6, so god exists.

See easy and with all the validity of the original argument.

Not quite. The power of the argument lies in the claim that life-permitting universes are extremely rare, and that a life-permitting universe is a statistically important event (maybe because we value life).

Your poker analogy doesn't fit because it regards all outcomes as equal. Let me ask you something: Suppose you were playing poker and the dealer deals himself five royal flushes in a row. Would you keep playing? I think you would be out of the game after the 2nd royal flush. But five royal flushes is the same probability as any five junk hands (Example: 2D,2C,3D,8H,10S is just as likely as 10S,JackS,QueenS,KingS,AceS).

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Can you give me some examples?

Before we knew what magnetism was, magnetism would fit your definition. Did it change from being supernatural to natural merely because we learned about it?

I don't mean for them to be used figuratively, but rather how they are used as scientific terms.

I don't think that's what most believers mean when they talk about "God". In fact, some of them are pretty emphatic that God is immaterial. . .usually.

Also, the supernatural as if inherently untestable because it is unlawful. In other words, I could run an experiment one time and get a result consistent with the God hypothesis (say a levitating mass). When I or others try to reproduce this experiment, and more conventional results obtain, you can't reject the God hypothesis because the supernatural is unlawful. It doesn't have to give you consistent results.

Our ignorance applies equally to whether or not it is unlawful. Ignorance just means we don't know, so it could be God - i.e. it explains "God of the Gaps".

Yes. So? Is that a tu quoque response to a point that I'm not making (that God couldn't do it)? I agree it would be as fallacious to say that the cause of an anomalous result can't possibly be God.*

That does nothing to make the statement that Goddidit more valid. It's still a logical leap based on ignorance.

The problem is if the ONLY definition of "God" is that it is other than what our physical laws tell us, it really is an untestable idea.

*On the other hand, assuming that the universe does follow rules (that is assuming "GodDidn'tDoIt") has provided a long history of productive science. The science didn't come from ignorance, though. It came from not stopping at ignorance because you're content with GodDidIt.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Not quite. The power of the argument lies in the claim that life-permitting universes are extremely rare, and that a life-permitting universe is a statistically important event (maybe because we value life).

Your poker analogy doesn't fit because it regards all outcomes as equal.

The problem with cj's argument is still that it's circular.

How about this modification of the turtle's analogy:

We know that the probability of dealing that particular 5 card hand is 1 in 8x10^67.

I'll deal 5 card hands 10 gazillion jillion times, and calculate that I'm virtually certain to deal that particular low probability hand at least once.

Therefore that hand exists. (Or even, those 5 cards exist.)

The problem is, the existence of that hand (really the existence of those cards in the deck) is assumed in the premise, the statement about the probability of that hand. If there's no evidence that those cards exist in the deck, then you can't make the statement that there is any probability for getting that hand.

ETA: If the question is "does 'tails' exist" and my first premise is that tossing this coin has a 1:2 probability of getting "tails", the argument is circular. I am assuming the existence of "tails". It might be a double headed coin (that is a tail-less coin), so assuming ANY probability of getting "tails" assumes the existence of "tails".

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Can you give me some examples?

Another one: there was a time when all experimental evidence about combustion supported the idea of phlogiston. That is, things that can burn had something in them. When you burn them you get two results: 1, the thing is lighter than it was before, and 2, once it's burned and presumably given up its phlogiston, you can't burn it again.

Then someone figured out how to isolate what we now know is hydrogen gas. When you burn it, prediction 1 doesn't happen. It got heavier.

It would be irrational to say since this doesn't fit the "law" of phlogiston, that it must be a supernatural event. It's better to tweak the law (or abandon it).

I can't give examples except from history, because I don't know which parts of our currently accepted laws will prove inadequate to explain some future measurement. I'm quite certain they will, though. There are still plenty of gaps in our knowledge, and some of them will likely only be filled by trashing or modifying what we once thought was pretty certain.

 

[Malerin]

The problem with cj's argument is still that it's circular.

I don't see the circulariry. Are you thinking of the problem of prior evidence?

How about this modification of the turtle's analogy:

We know that the probability of dealing that particular 5 card hand is 1 in 8x10^67.

I'll deal 5 card hands 10 gazillion jillion times, and calculate that I'm virtually certain to deal that particular low probability hand at least once.

Right, and if the universe has oscillated a bazillion times (or there are a gazillion universes), the argument becomes irrelevant- eventually, a life-permitting universe will show up. Proponents of the argument would claim that current cosmology doesn't favor an oscillating universe model (Big Bang, Big Crunch, Big Bang), and it's unknown how many actual universes there really are.

Therefore that hand exists. (Or even, those 5 cards exist.)

The problem is, the existence of that hand (really the existence of those cards in the deck) is assumed in the premise, the statement about the probability of that hand. If there's no evidence that those cards exist in the deck, then you can't make the statement that there is any probability for getting that hand.

I think you're talking about the problem of prior evidence, which is evidence that we already know being used to support a new theory (it's not really a problem, but in Bayesian calculus requires you to do Pr(E) a little differently). For example, Mercury's eccentric orbit was known long before relatavity theory. However, the fact that Einstein's theory was able to predict Mercury's eccentric orbit was one of the most powerful pieces of confirming evidence for relatavity.

In the same way, the fact that we're in a life-permitting universe doesn't mean it can't be used as evidence, esp. if we can construct models of how the universe might have been if some of the constants were off by just a tiny bit.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I don't see the circulariry. Are you thinking of the problem of prior evidence?

No. Circular reasoning.

The question is, "Does God exist?" (not, "Does a life-containing universe exist?" or even "What is the probability of a life containing universe"?).

cj's conclusion is that God exists.

That conclusion is contained or assumed in this premise:

Let us assume the existence of a deity is one in a million.

 

[Bri]

Do you think any people worship the Tooth Fairy or the FSM? Really?

I don't presume to know what people worship so I can't say.

The "not" is from propositional logic (or boolean algebra). Think of it as a proposition "p" which might, in a full sentence be "God exists". "Not p" means "God does not exist".

In that case, "not god" doesn't fit the definition I proposed of "god" does it? Or does the fact that you capitalize "God" indicate that you're using a different definition?

I think you're stuck on an ambiguity of the use of the term "probability". You can't talk about it as a non-statistical term (starting with the premise that p is a very low probability event) and then switch to using it mathematically to come to the conclusion that p is a very high probability event.

I think I see what you're objecting to. The premise is that the probability of a diety exists without regard to other circumstances is 0.0001%. The argument is that in light of certain circumstances (in this case the fact that the universe is inhabitable) the probability becomes high.

I could write a similar argument with the premise that a 6-sided die has the probability of 1/6 that it will land on the "1" [under normal circumstances], but that the same die will land on the "1" with a higher probability if I embed a magnet into the die and roll it on a steel table.

-Bri

 

[fls]

Before we knew what magnetism was, magnetism would fit your definition. Did it change from being supernatural to natural merely because we learned about it?

Lightning was attributed to gods.

It's not about whether or not we know the laws that govern a particular force, it's whether or not we suspect them to be constrained by laws.

I don't think that's what most believers mean when they talk about "God". In fact, some of them are pretty emphatic that God is immaterial. . .usually.

I realize that is what they say, but the consequences of God's acts are meant to be material - creation, directing events, revelations, etc.

Also, the supernatural as if inherently untestable because it is unlawful. In other words, I could run an experiment one time and get a result consistent with the God hypothesis (say a levitating mass). When I or others try to reproduce this experiment, and more conventional results obtain, you can't reject the God hypothesis because the supernatural is unlawful. It doesn't have to give you consistent results.

And that describes how people speak about the evidence for gods - in terms of nonreproducible events such as miracles.

Those things that are consistent and reproducible have now been subsumed under Science - the variety of life, the movement of the heavenly bodies, the creation of stars.

Yes. So? Is that a tu quoque response to a point that I'm not making (that God couldn't do it)? I agree it would be as fallacious to say that the cause of an anomalous result can't possibly be God.*

That does nothing to make the statement that Goddidit more valid. It's still a logical leap based on ignorance.

I'm not speaking to the validity of the idea of gods. I'm looking for a definition that covers just what it is that people think of when they talk about gods - necessary features. When these features are lacking, people don't consider the idea "God". I think you have been focussing on whether, when these features are present, is it always considered "God". I think it can make some distinctions on that account, but examples would be helpful to fine-tune it. Adding "capricious" to the definition may eliminate non-god examples.

The problem is if the ONLY definition of "God" is that it is other than what our physical laws tell us, it really is an untestable idea.

I meant testable in the sense that it can tell us what God isn't.

Linda

 

[Malerin]

No. Circular reasoning.

The question is, "Does God exist?" (not, "Does a life-containing universe exist?" or even "What is the probability of a life containing universe"?).

cj's conclusion is that God exists.

That conclusion is contained or assumed in this premise:

As other people have pointed out to you, that's not assuming existence, that's assuming the possibility of existence. Two very different things.

And CJ was low-balling his own argument. The possibility that God exists is normally given a .5 value.

 

[fls]

It would be irrational to say since this doesn't fit the "law" of phlogiston, that it must be a supernatural event. It's better to tweak the law (or abandon it).

But that's not what I am saying. I'm not saying that unexpected results are supernatural. Or that results that contradict our current understanding are supernatural. We don't really consider anomalies to be evidence that something isn't lawful, only evidence that our laws are incomplete. As you mentioned in your previous post, the underlying assumption of naturalism has proven itself highly productive. We don't abandon it for relatively trivial reasons.

Linda

 

[Kthulhut Fhtagn]

I don't know about "useless" but it certainly doesn't constitute rational proof of anything.

When you look at this thing:

http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/~akitaoka/rotsnake.gif

your subjective experience tells you that these wheels are in motion. They're not. It would be irrational for you to depend solely on your subjective experience and believe that they are in motion. Surely, there's more to your beliefs than subjective experience.

I'd say for an individual it does if they, nor anyone else, cannot rationally explain away their experience. Their subjective experience certainly isn't a valid reason for you to believe, however, but if an individual comes up to me and states they believe in any number of gods based solely on their belief in first-hand personal experiences it's a good enough reason for me. I'd enquire as to why I should take their subjective experience over the one of other religions, assuming they are positing a specific religious experience with a specific set of deities, as evidence of the existence of any god but I'd also have to realize I'm on the outside looking in as it were. I've never had a personal experience with any divine creator-controllers save my own experience with visiting my wrath upon the sinful little city of sims.

It's perfectly rational to assume that something that appears to be moving is moving. As I said no one will suspend judgement while they attempt to reason out whether or not that train that appears to be moving at that at is really moving or not. To demand that they really do suspend judgement while they reason out whether the train is actually moving and simply continue to stand on the tracks is irrational, even if the train only appears to be moving to me and everyone else says the train is stationary I'm still stepping off the tracks.

 

[The Atheist]

We make decisions based on incomplete data all the time, no one suspends judgement while they wait to reason out whether or not eating when their starving to death will really save their life. Likewise I wouldn't expect a theist to suspend belief until the existence of gods were proven to be absolutely true...nor would I expect atheists to suspend disbelief until the existence of gods were proven to be absolutely untrue.

Oh dear god, another person to whom solipsism is the only possible answer to agnosticism.

Marvellous. Jesus, I wish they'd teach this stuff at primary school where it belongs.

Absolute proof is a pipe-dream used only by those desperately seeking rationality in the irrational.

Again I have to ask why they can't be rational? Rationality and truth are not the same thing. Not by a long shot.

Nobody's said they are yet, so thanks for pre-empting it.

These are a lot of words simply to quote yourself.

Hell, it's worth quoting.

Again I must ask why they are inherently irrational.

Because they believe irrational things.

Not in the least actually. While I consider myself an empiricist-rationalist I still have met numerous rationalists who toss out empirical knowledge and inductive reasoning entirely. I know many rationalists who believe that one can deduce all knowledge using foundational principles. I consider it far too skeptical to toss out empirical evidence, of course, but reason doesn't necessarily require empirical evidence.

Disagree, but you're welcome to think that way. That you know people whose self-description seems incorrect proves nothing. I know theists who are agnostic, atheists who are spiritualists and agnostics who believe in bigfoot.

Emphasis mine. The existence of the Calvinist-Rationalist I'm currently debating with refutes your statement.

Sure, if you accept some wishy-washy agnostic position as being rational, I'm sure you could see rationalism in a Calvinist.

You're just continuing Darat's feeble argument.

 

[Malerin]

Today's rationality is tomorrow's folly. Wasn't it just a few decades ago that biologists assumed the sea-floor was pretty much barren of life?
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24863421/

 

[Kthulhut Fhtagn]

Oh dear god, another person to whom solipsism is the only possible answer to agnosticism.

Nice strawman, does it come in factual?

Marvellous. Jesus, I wish they'd teach this stuff at primary school where it belongs.

Absolute proof is a pipe-dream used only by those desperately seeking rationality in the irrational.

I agree, what made you think I believed otherwise?

Nobody's said they are yet, so thanks for pre-empting it.

You certainly seem to be suggesting they aren't seperate.

Because they believe irrational things.

But why can't belief in these things ever be rational? Please give me an actual reason and not mere hand-waving.

Disagree, but you're welcome to think that way. That you know people whose self-description seems incorrect proves nothing. I know theists who are agnostic, atheists who are spiritualists and agnostics who believe in bigfoot.

I'm simply stating that evidence is not a requirement for reason, they certainly do seem to work better together but by no means is reason tied up and shackled to the ground by empiricism.

Sure, if you accept some wishy-washy agnostic position as being rational, I'm sure you could see rationalism in a Calvinist.

Do I accept the position that gods, souls, and the afterlife are unknowable? I certainly do. I think you're confusing rationality with the philosophical position of rationalism.

You're just continuing Darat's feeble argument.

I don't care.

 

[Folly]

As other people have pointed out to you, that's not assuming existence, that's assuming the possibility of existence. Two very different things.

And CJ was low-balling his own argument. The possibility that God exists is normally given a .5 value.

Joe is right. The argument says a god can exist in a universe, and if it does, it is more likely that the universe contains life. Universe has life, therefore it's more likely to have a god.

Very silly. I just got a really good poker hand. I twitched my head to the left just before it was dealt. Two possibilities, the twitch helped or not. If the twitch helped, it's much more likely I got the good hand. I got the good hand, therefore it's much more likely that the twitch helped.

 

[fls]

And CJ was low-balling his own argument. The possibility that God exists is normally given a .5 value.

Well, not by anybody with more than half of a brain.

As demonstrated in this paper, our capacity to be wrong is directly related to the extent to which we let ourselves be guided by whim.

http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124

Linda