Atheist v. Agnostic: Friend or Foe?

[yy2bggggs]

You, on the other hand, do not find such an estimate reasonable. From other things you've written, it appears that you feel it ought to be a significantly lower figure for the probability of a non-intervening creator god or a pantheistic god, but are not comfortable admitting that you have, in fact, made such an assessment.
...
I’ve given you a mathematical justification for choosing a particular point estimate of 0.5 – the minimax principle. You, for some reason don’t consider this to be logical or rational. You don’t feel this is an appropriate application for that principle, but can give no reason for that. However, even if you disagree with me regarding the use of this principle, I don’t understand why you would consider using such criteria to be an arbitrary selection rather than a rational one. Perhaps you could explain to me how you feel someone might rationally arrive at an estimate, either a point or an interval estimate? How did you rationally arrive at your opinion?

"That brings me to the fourth kind of attitude towards ideas, and that is that the problem is not what is possible. That's not the problem. The problem is what is probable, what is happening. ... [The] number of things that are possible is not fully appreciated by the average individual. And it is also not clear, then, to them, how many things that are possible must not be happening. That it's impossible that everything that is possible is happening. And there is too much variety, so most likely anything that you think of that is possible isn't true. In fact that's a general principle in physics theories; no matter what a guy thinks of, it's almost always false."
(Richard Feynman, taken from "The Meaning of It All", section III, This Unscientific Age)

Does that help?

 

[fls]

I'm sorry, but your statement still isn't making any sense to me. What sample? What measured value?

The possibility that any particular idea, about which no information is given, is true, as modeled by a sample set of all possible ideas. A sample of randomly chosen ideas could provide an estimate of the proportion that are true within a particular margin of error.

I wouldn't make such an assumption in those cases because it wouldn't be useful. Why do you consider such examples appropriate analogies?

You stated that an assumption of 50/50 is useful. Why wouldn't it be useful in those situations?

In such models, a point estimate is needed to run the simulations. Minimizing the maximum error is a reasonable criteria to select the value used.

Except the 'value' you are estimating with your "minimizing the maximum error" criteria is not the proportion of matter to anti-matter, but rather the number of particles to sample in order for the characteristics of those particles to serve as a reasonable estimate of the proportion of matter to anti-matter in the universe.

I’m sorry you don’t understand/agree with this application of the minimax principle, but that doesn’t mean my choice is arbitrary. As I said before, the 50/50 number is a result of applying the minimax principle to the situation at hand. Claiming it isn’t appropriate (without providing any sort of reason as to why that would be) doesn’t make the fact that I used it an arbitrary or whimsical choice.

The only application of the minimax principle that you have offered up is the method by which one estimates sample size. You have yet to demonstrate any application of the minimax principle which addresses the issue of assumptions about the frequency of true ideas in the face of inadequate knowledge. Recognizing the situation under which the maximum variance occurs (50/50) is not even remotely the same as estimating the most likely situation your idea falls into.

I realize you haven’t chosen a single value, but it’s clear from your previous posts that you hold a strong opinion on what are and are not reasonable values. Clearly, you don't feel the entire range of [0, 1] is equally likely because if you did, you would not consider my point estimate of .5 to be silly and irrational. You consider yourself atheist, which indicates that you place that value on the low end of that interval.

My guess is that you give it an interval estimate of something like [0, .1] or perhaps [0, .01] or perhaps even less, even though you likely don’t have a specific upper endpoint in mind. Is this an accurate assessment of your feelings? If not, could you please provide me with an interval you do consider to accurately reflect your feelings on the matter?

I choose an interval of [0, 1].

Perhaps you are right. I am quite comfortable saying what I think is a reasonable estimate for the value of that number. Please keep in mind that I'm not claiming it's correct, only that it's a reasonable guess.

You, on the other hand, do not find such an estimate reasonable. From other things you've written, it appears that you feel it ought to be a significantly lower figure for the probability of a non-intervening creator god or a pantheistic god, but are not comfortable admitting that you have, in fact, made such an assessment.

My choice has nothing to do with the idea under consideration (it could be about unicorns or teacups orbiting Saturn if that will rid you of the idea that any of this represents some sort of prejudice against gods). It has to do with being wrong most of the time if you assume an idea has a 50/50 chance of being true.

http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124

I’ve given you a mathematical justification for choosing a particular point estimate of 0.5 – the minimax principle. You, for some reason don’t consider this to be logical or rational. You don’t feel this is an appropriate application for that principle, but can give no reason for that.

Because I understand how the minimax problem works and that it can't answer this particular question in the absence of assumptions. You seem to think that raising the issue of measurement error is relevant. I do not understand why you cannot see how different these two issues are. I am going to think on this a bit and see if I can come up with a way to explain it that finally makes sense to you. It would help if you would read the Ioannidis paper carefully (if you haven't already). It may also help if you attempt to explain to me why you think an assumption about measurement error speaks to an assumption about the probability that an idea is true.

However, even if you disagree with me regarding the use of this principle, I don’t understand why you would consider using such criteria to be an arbitrary selection rather than a rational one.

Because you are estimating someone's IQ by measuring their height.

Perhaps you could explain to me how you feel someone might rationally arrive at an estimate, either a point or an interval estimate? How did you rationally arrive at your opinion?

I would consider, out of the vast totality of ideas that humans have had, how many of them have been false. And I would also consider whether we are any good at finding true ideas, considering that it took us 10's of thousands of years to realize even a few essential truths about the universe that were not obvious on informal observation.

Linda

 

[Beth]

Linda,

First of all I want to thank you for your participation in this conversation. It is helpful in both examining my own ideas and understand other people's better.

I going to try to condense this post as it's getting too long to respond to each paragraph, particularly when several relate to the same misunderstanding.

I'm sorry, but your statement still isn't making any sense to me. What sample? What measured value?

The possibility that any particular idea, about which no information is given, is true, as modeled by a sample set of all possible ideas. A sample of randomly chosen ideas could provide an estimate of the proportion that are true within a particular margin of error.

Not at all what I was thinking of. Thank you for being more specific. I’ll try to relate this idea to our discussion now.

I wouldn't make such an assumption in those cases because it wouldn't be useful. Why do you consider such examples appropriate analogies?

You stated that an assumption of 50/50 is useful. Why wouldn't it be useful in those situations?

Because we have better ways to estimate those values and we already know that a reasonable expectation for such estimates will be very far from 50/50. We may have minimized our maximum error, but we can far more effectively minimize our average error by making use of the information we already have.

I don’t have any illusions about the disadvantages of of the minimax approach. The advantage I find useful with this approach is that it does not require any assumptions about the expected value of such an estimate.

In such models, a point estimate is needed to run the simulations. Minimizing the maximum error is a reasonable criteria to select the value used.

Except the 'value' you are estimating with your "minimizing the maximum error" criteria is not the proportion of matter to anti-matter, but rather the number of particles to sample in order for the characteristics of those particles to serve as a reasonable estimate of the proportion of matter to anti-matter in the universe.

What I was using it to estimate, as you originally asked your question, was the proportion not the number of particles to sample. The minimax principle can be used to decide upon a value for an estimated parameter in the absence of sample data. I am NOT talking about using it to compute a sample size. I think this is a major misunderstanding between us and I'm going to skip responding to the portions of your post that I think relate to this misunderstanding.

Now that you are aware that I'm not talking about mimimizing sampling error, but estimating a parameter value without prior assumptions, do you still consider the result to be an arbitrary rather than rational choice?

I choose an interval of [0, 1].

My choice has nothing to do with the idea under consideration (it could be about unicorns or teacups orbiting Saturn if that will rid you of the idea that any of this represents some sort of prejudice against gods). It has to do with being wrong most of the time if you assume an idea has a 50/50 chance of being true.

Ah, your prejudice is against point estimates then. Okay. Yes, any point estimate of the proportion has a probability equal to zero. Let’s switch to interval estimates then. Perhaps I can communicate my confusion with your position more clearly.

You chose the interval [0,1]. Do you consider the probability of the interval [0, .5) to be equal to that of the interval (.5, 1]? My sense is that you do NOT give them equal probabilities. That is why I keep asking about how you estimate that value. To me, your denial that you have such a value is inconsistent with finding .5 to be an irrational arbitrary choice for a point estimate. If you find the probabilities of the two intervals equal, then .5 is a very reasonable and rational choice for an estimate of that value. OTOH, if you find one interval to have greater probability than the other, then you are assessing and making an estimate of the value of that probability.

You seem to think that raising the issue of measurement error is relevant.

I'm sorry. I guess I was using a bit of technical jargon. Sometimes I forget how much of my vocabulary is influenced by the training. This is measurement error in the sense that any probability falls into a larger class of mathematic constructs termed measures. It has nothing to do with measurement error in the sense of taking a sample and making a determination of the maximum error of any statistics computed from that sample. (Though that definition could be considered to fall out of the one I was using.) Instead, it has to do with making a point estimate for a parameter from a theoretical distribution without any prior knowledge of the value of that parameter other than it’s range.

I do not understand why you cannot see how different these two issues are. I am going to think on this a bit and see if I can come up with a way to explain it that finally makes sense to you. It would help if you would read the Ioannidis paper carefully (if you haven't already). It may also help if you attempt to explain to me why you think an assumption about measurement error speaks to an assumption about the probability that an idea is true.

I hope my explanation above clears that up.

However, even if you disagree with me regarding the use of this principle, I don’t understand why you would consider using such criteria to be an arbitrary selection rather than a rational one.

Because you are estimating someone's IQ by measuring their height.

While estimating someone’s IQ by measuring their height would not be accurate enough to be useful, a slight correlation could be expected because malnourished children are stunted in both physical and mental development. It would not be a random choice – which is what I thought you were meaning as arbitrary. Are you meaning instead a choice which has a large average deviation from the true value?

Perhaps you could explain to me how you feel someone might rationally arrive at an estimate, either a point or an interval estimate? How did you rationally arrive at your opinion?

I would consider, out of the vast totality of ideas that humans have had, how many of them have been false. And I would also consider whether we are any good at finding true ideas, considering that it took us 10's of thousands of years to realize even a few essential truths about the universe that were not obvious on informal observation.

Thank you for answering my last question here. This answers my question regarding how you are setting an approximate value that I keep asking for earlier. Your consideration of the number of true ideas to false ideas is, I agree, a rational approach to making a preliminary estimation of that probability. You have to assume that the hypothesis in question is simply a random selection from that population and has not been subjected to selection bias - i.e. it is no more or less likely to be true than any other randomly chosen idea. While that's not an assumption I'm willing to make, if you're willing to acknowledge that assumption, I won't quarrel with it.

I have no problems with this approach as a rational one, I simply don't see it as the ONLY rational approach to the question. Incidently, I feel that that are also rational theistic arguments as well.

Do you feel your approach is the only rational approach, or can you provide me with an answer to the question immediately preceding this one that gives a result different from the one you like best?

 

[fls]

Not at all what I was thinking of. Thank you for being more specific. I’ll try to relate this idea to our discussion now.

Yes. I realized that it was not at all what you were thinking of (that formed the basis of my point). I'll try to explain what I'm getting at. There are various ways to handle uncertainty. But we don't want to consider every possible way to deal with it, but rather those particular methods that allow us to be right most of the time. Your mention of minimax in relation to error is an example of a situation where one can use an assumption of 50/50 to maximize the possibility that you will be correct if you allow your measurement of a sample to serve as an estimate of a population parameter. I didn't really think that that was what you were trying to do, though (and you have confirmed this), so my question was, "in what way does this choice of technique, which does serve its purpose well when answering a different question, have any relevance when it comes to answering this (what assumptions can we make about the possibility of undetermined ideas that allows us to be right most of the time?) question?"

Because we have better ways to estimate those values and we already know that a reasonable expectation for such estimates will be very far from 50/50. We may have minimized our maximum error, but we can far more effectively minimize our average error by making use of the information we already have.

Exactly. We recognize that there are situations where assuming 50/50 does not minimize the possibility that we will be wrong.

I don’t have any illusions about the disadvantages of of the minimax approach. The advantage I find useful with this approach is that it does not require any assumptions about the expected value of such an estimate.

Sure, without assumptions, the value is undetermined. But that is contradicted by your choice of a specific value throughout this discussion.

Now that you are aware that I'm not talking about mimimizing sampling error, but estimating a parameter value without prior assumptions, do you still consider the result to be an arbitrary rather than rational choice?

I was aware all along that you were not talking about minimizing sampling error. I'm asking you to clarify the apparent contradiction between your choice of a value and your claim that you used a technique which would otherwise leave the value undetermined.

Ah, your prejudice is against point estimates then. Okay. Yes, any point estimate of the proportion has a probability equal to zero.

Oh, puhleeze.

Let’s switch to interval estimates then. Perhaps I can communicate my confusion with your position more clearly.

You chose the interval [0,1]. Do you consider the probability of the interval [0, .5) to be equal to that of the interval (.5, 1]? My sense is that you do NOT give them equal probabilities. That is why I keep asking about how you estimate that value. To me, your denial that you have such a value is inconsistent with finding .5 to be an irrational arbitrary choice for a point estimate. If you find the probabilities of the two intervals equal, then .5 is a very reasonable and rational choice for an estimate of that value. OTOH, if you find one interval to have greater probability than the other, then you are assessing and making an estimate of the value of that probability.

Was this supposed to make sense? The probability of any interval is wholly dependent upon defining whatever it is that you're talking about. If you are talking about a uniform distribution, then by definition the probability of each interval is the same.

I'm sorry. I guess I was using a bit of technical jargon. Sometimes I forget how much of my vocabulary is influenced by the training. This is measurement error in the sense that any probability falls into a larger class of mathematic constructs termed measures. It has nothing to do with measurement error in the sense of taking a sample and making a determination of the maximum error of any statistics computed from that sample. (Though that definition could be considered to fall out of the one I was using.) Instead, it has to do with making a point estimate for a parameter from a theoretical distribution without any prior knowledge of the value of that parameter other than it’s range.

Your choice of 50/50 shows that you have either made a measure or some assumptions.

I hope my explanation above clears that up.

Nope.

Thank you for answering my last question here. This answers my question regarding how you are setting an approximate value that I keep asking for earlier. Your consideration of the number of true ideas to false ideas is, I agree, a rational approach to making a preliminary estimation of that probability. You have to assume that the hypothesis in question is simply a random selection from that population and has not been subjected to selection bias - i.e. it is no more or less likely to be true than any other randomly chosen idea. While that's not an assumption I'm willing to make, if you're willing to acknowledge that assumption, I won't quarrel with it.

I actually would prefer a random selection from a selected population (i.e. I wouldn't make that assumption, so no worries).

I have no problems with this approach as a rational one, I simply don't see it as the ONLY rational approach to the question. Incidently, I feel that that are also rational theistic arguments as well.

I don't see it as the only rational approach, either.

Do you feel your approach is the only rational approach, or can you provide me with an answer to the question immediately preceding this one that gives a result different from the one you like best?

Can you restate what question you are referring to?

Linda

 

[Eos of the Eons]

Why even bother with gods anymore? We know why droughts happen, and that praying won't do a darn thing. We know why fires whip through areas. We know why typhoons, floods, and other NATURAL disasters happen. It's not to pick on us or make us rethink our naughty gutter thoughts earlier in the day.

We know that if we are to live together that we should treat others as we wish to be treated. That drugs make people forget about that, and that some people are just born selfish.

We know this world will never be perfect.

I don't pray for anything, I work for it.

So why bother with gods at all? Why tell people to pray or go to hell? Why not worry more about life while we are living it rather than the death that won't matter?

I just don't get it. That is why I guess I'm an atheist, but I feel that word doesn't define how I feel. I don't believe because I don't get why people bother. I suppose they must get something out of being told that if they pray or something that some being will hold them in high esteem, though I don't know why that matters.

I'm a humanist. Not an atheist. Agnosticism is even weirder to me. You either believe and pray, or you don't.

I'll tell ardent believers that I'm agnostic so they don't bug me, but I'm lying. Heck, they are lying to me about some mystical hell, so I can lie back. If we're gonna play fantasy, then I'll make up stuff up too. Heck, they better not poo poo my belief in unicorns then!

Such a mess, with so many religions, all vying for you undying commitment. As a person who never had a religious background, I don't know why people get away with the things they do in the name of crazy beliefs.

I just shake my head and wonder why people get to judge me. Well, your religion ain't perfect compared to others. Why do you figure you get to say it is? Why the tunnel vision? Why the denunciation of other fellow humans that are just different in one small way?

Why make life hell over one stupid thing? Wake up and let's all just get along. We're all HUMAN. We have knowledge unlike any before. Lay down all this nuttery and let's just get on with living.

 

[DC]

I think the definitions are so hopelessly muddled right now, with substantial numbers of people claiming that "their" definition is correct, that in a sense the distinction doesn't matter. No matter what you call yourself, you're going to need to explain which definition you're using anyway.

very very true.

i see it that way.
Agnostics do not claim there is no God, they will correctly say, they dont know.
Atheists will claim there is no God.


I was born as an Agnostic like everyone else, then i was learned some theisms. and ended up as an Atheist because all those religions didnt make sence to me.

but as an Atheist i must admit, the most rational position is the agnostic position.

Atheists are like theists. they claim something they cannot know.
so i am a beliver, i belive there is no god. but cant prove it.

 

[Dysphemist]

We know... that some people are just born selfish.

No one is born selfish.

 

[DC]

No one is born selfish.

isnt every baby very selfish? isnt it until much later it learns sharing?

 

[fls]

Beth,

The discussion gets confusing as it gets broken up into bits pieces, so I'm going to regroup.

The question is...what strategy allows us to be right most of the time? what should we assume to be the possibility that an idea is true?

You suggest that a reasonable assumption is a probability of 50/50, and that the strategy you used to come up with that number is minimax. Now, I have criticized the idea that minimax really gives you a result that is 50/50 under circumstances that are relevant to the question or that it gives you a specific value prior to making specifications or measurements. However, those details aren't critical to answering the question. Regardless of what number you arrive at, what we really want to know is whether it performs as intended...does its use allow us to be right most of the time?

The problem is that your number fails miserably. As demonstrated in the Ioannidis paper, an assumption of 50/50 means that we will be wrong most of the time. We don't want to be right one time in a thousand or even one time in ten. We want to be right more than half the time. So even if it were true that minimax can help you choose a value that minimizes the maximum error in the absence of constraints, that maximum error is far too large to serve as a guide in a way that is even remotely useful.

My complaint isn't that it doesn't match what probability I wish to assign to the existence of gods or that it's not what the specific technique that I would choose to use. My complaint is that it's useless for the purpose of trying not to be wrong most of the time.

Linda

 

[calebprime]

No one is born selfish.

isnt every baby very selfish? isnt it until much later it learns sharing?

"Selfish" needs to be defined, a little.

Self-absorbed? Greedy? Oblivious to others? Manipulative? Bullying? Incapable of empathy? Noncomformist? Solipsistic? Aware of, but uninterested in the thoughts and feelings of others?

Babies are many of these things, but you start to see a sense of basic fairness in the way toddlers play with each other.

My son wasn't really capable of having a 2-way conversation 'til around the age of 8, but he wasn't cruel, manipulative, or greedy.

Composers are self-absorbed without necessarily being greedy or manipulative.

 

[Beth]

Agnosticism is even weirder to me. You either believe and pray, or you don't.

I don't believe but I still pray. How do you classify that as anything but agnostic? I find prayer helpful, as do many people. God is not required in order to benefit from the activity.

Linda: I am reflecting on the things you have written. I'll likely engage with you again on the subject later as I find your comments and questions helpful to my thinking process. It may be in a different thread as I'll likely mull things over for a while.

 

[Ordover]

They way I see is this:

Athiests often present themselves as wanting to convnce "believers" that they have no foundation to believe in God, and should stop doing so.

Agnostits mostly feel that while they, personally, have not seen convincing evidence of the existence of God, if someone else feels there is convincing evidence that a God or God exists, they should go ahead and believe what they want, "an it harm none."

 

[Uncle Otto]

from Dictator C------

"Atheists are like theists. they claim something they cannot know.
so i am a beliver, i belive there is no god. but cant prove it. "

I am an atheist. I have never met another atheist who ever made the claim that they knew something that they did not know. Not one. And I've met more than a few. Not to say there can't be any someplace---I've just never encountered any of them if there are.

IMO, and in my actual life experiences, those who, as adults at least, identify themselves as agnostics are:

a) People who have not bothered to do any research into the history and actual meanings of the terms---"atheist or agnostic"------ or---

b) They are in denial about their own atheism, and use the term "agnostic" to make it more socially acceptable for themselves in their day to day lives, to sugar-coat their lack of belief in order to mollify others----or----

c) Both a and b apply, because in order to truthfully identify as either an atheist or an agnostic, one certainly need not be well read in the literature on the subject, nor be in willful denial. Anyone can claim to be either without having done their homework on the subject.

I have an acquaintance who does this all the time. He will tell you straight up that he doesn't believe in anything like a god, yet he refuses to admit he's an atheist unless you drag it out of him. It's like there is a complete disconnect between actually being an atheist, and using the most basic, simple word that describes it in front of somebody else.

You are making the common error of assuming that all atheists make the positive statement that "there is no such thing as god", when that is not the case. Unless you had attached some other meaning to your statement that I missed somehow.

And you were born not only agnostic, but atheistic too. No newborn infant ever entertained a belief in anything, much less an abstract concept like "god". They had to learn all that later on in life from other people. They were born "without theism". Which makes all infants atheistic.

This thread, like many others I've seen about the exact same thing, at other message boards, and in print will, sadly, probably go nowhere. Too many will not agree on the meaning of two very simple terms in order to keep differentiating themselves from one another. And above all---to distance themselves from the oft maligned label of "atheist".

And in that respect, I regret that Huxley ever coined the word "agnostic". It has done nothing to advance the causes of secularism of any stripe, and has instead caused nothing but confusion among those who are theistic, and both confusion and division among those who are not. It has become about as meaningful a term now as "spiritual". In order for anyone to come up with a universally accepted definition of "agnosticism", there must firstly be in place an equally accepted definition of "atheism", which even a cursory reading of this thread indicates doesn't exist yet either.

To re-quote part of your post-----

"i belive there is no god."

You are an atheist by your own description, and saying you are also an agnostic doesn't change that fact. I will hazard a guess here and say that at least a large majority of those who openly identify as agnostic, are also definitely atheistic. They just don't want to use the other "a" word out loud, for fear of possible negative reactions from others, at least within society at large in the U.S.

I'd say this was just my 2¢ worth again, but I seem to have run out of pennies.

 

[Beth]

Beth,

The discussion gets confusing as it gets broken up into bits pieces, so I'm going to regroup.

The question is...what strategy allows us to be right most of the time? what should we assume to be the possibility that an idea is true?

I think the regrouping is helpful. To clarify something, in reviewing what we've been discussing, I found this (Minimax criterion in statistical decision theory) wikipedia definition of minimax to be the one I've been using.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimax#Minimax_criterion_in_statistical_decision_theory

Is this the one that you've been thinking of?

ETA: I think the one immediately below it, the Bayes estimator in the presence of a prior distribution Π" is the one you are advocating. Both are acceptable rational approaches. The choice of which one is best is not a given, but dependent on the preferences you have regarding loss - i.e. the cost of an error.

Your choice requires the specification of a distribution for the parameter itself. My choice requires the specification of a loss function for the range of parameter values, but does not require an assumption regarding the distribution of the parameter itself. I find the uniform distribution to be adequate for the loss function.

What I think is most likely is that we have each chosen a 'rational' approach based on the outcome we currently prefer. I know I have. I don't deny it or pretend otherwise. I just don't see your choice as being higher on the rational/arbitrary scale than mine. I feel the same way about rational arguments for theism. I could choose any of three and feel I was making rational choice. My preference was known to me before I had a word for it. I gather that for many many people of all persuations, that is true. Many of the atheists posting here have indicated they knew they were an atheist before they were an adolescent.

Choices formed in childhood based on strong innate feelings about the matter indicate to me that our attitudes about the matter are typically formed first and our reasoning to justify the why's of it later.

Thanks for the conversation. It's been quite illuminating for me. I am interested in what other choices you find rational and why if you would care to tell about them.


Beth

 

[fls]

What I think is most likely is that we have each chosen a 'rational' approach based on the outcome we currently prefer. I know I have. I don't deny it or pretend otherwise. I just don't see your choice as being higher on the rational/arbitrary scale than mine.

That makes it clearer, since I do not know what you consider rational, then. As I mentioned earlier, I consider it rational to make a choice based on whether or not you will be wrong most of the time.

I am interested in what other choices you find rational and why if you would care to tell about them.

I doubt they would be of interest to you since we are looking for different outcomes.

Linda

 

[Eos of the Eons]

No one is born selfish.

Yeah, they can be.

Is not bothering with religion the same as being agnostic? Seems I'm agnostic then. I don't bother with saying there isn't gods. I just don't bother believing in any of them. I also don't care to think there are any since there is no logical reason for any to exist, and no way that they could.

Now I'm confused. Someone tell me what I am.

 

[fls]

That makes it clearer, since I do not know what you consider rational, then. As I mentioned earlier, I consider it rational to make a choice based on whether or not you will be wrong most of the time.

I doubt they would be of interest to you since we are looking for different outcomes.

Linda

Also, to bring this back to what we were talking about earlier, I think this could serve as a way to distinguish our beliefs. And it does fit with how agnostics commonly present their beliefs.

Linda

 

[Beth]

That makes it clearer, since I do not know what you consider rational, then. As I mentioned earlier, I consider it rational to make a choice based on whether or not you will be wrong most of the time.

As do I.

I doubt they would be of interest to you since we are looking for different outcomes.

I interpret that as a polite fiction meaning you don't want to answer that question. That's okay. You're not obliged to share anything you don't feel comfortable discussing. I am free to draw my own conclusions regarding your reasons for deciding which questions you choose to answer and which ones you do not.

You chose the interval [0,1]. Do you consider the probability of the interval [0, .5) to be equal to that of the interval (.5, 1]?

Was this supposed to make sense? The probability of any interval is wholly dependent upon defining whatever it is that you're talking about. If you are talking about a uniform distribution, then by definition the probability of each interval is the same.

Yes, it was supposed to make sense. I was asking how you personally would assess the probabilities of those two intervals. Yes, you have to have a probability distribution in mind. The idea was that it would allow me to get a rough assessment of the sort of distribution you have in your mind for the probabilities we have been discussing. I an still interested in knowing what that is, if you would choose to answer the question this time. Is it similar to the distribution for people being struck by lightning or drinking water? If you can't tell me the prior distribution you assigning for the Bayesian approach to such questions, a simple statement of what you think P [0, .5) is equal to would be of help.

Also, in the same post:

I have no problems with this approach as a rational one, I simply don't see it as the ONLY rational approach to the question. Incidently, I feel that that are also rational theistic arguments as well.

I don't see it as the only rational approach, either.
Linda

Based on this conversation, I now think that you see the Bayesian approach as rational and the minimax approach as not rational. I think I could understand your position better if you could tell me what other approaches you find rational, specifically, what approaches that lead to outcomes other than atheistism do you see as rational? You don't have to specify anything, but if you decide not to answer the question this time, I'll assume that you don't really consider anything other than atheism to be a rational position.

Also, to bring this back to what we were talking about earlier, I think this could serve as a way to distinguish our beliefs. And it does fit with how agnostics commonly present their beliefs.

Linda

Yes, It at least distinguishes fairly well between yours and mine. I'm not sure how representative we are of the two groups. Thanks again for a pleasant conversation. I am hopeful that I understand your position better now and you mine.

 

[Uncle Otto]

from Eos-------

Is not bothering with religion the same as being agnostic?

No. Lots of people who never bother themselves with religion are still theistic. Unless of course you are an agnostic theist.

I don't bother with saying there isn't gods. I just don't bother believing in any of them. I also don't care to think there are any since there is no logical reason for any to exist, and no way that they could.

Now I'm confused. Someone tell me what I am.

You are an atheist.

 

[fls]

As do I.

Damn. It finally all made sense and now you've gone and spoilt it.

I interpret that as a polite fiction meaning you don't want to answer that question.

No, I meant it. But I misunderstood what you had said.

That's okay. You're not obliged to share anything you don't feel comfortable discussing.

I don't really care whether or not we discuss other stuff. I just didn't want to get sidetracked from the main discussion by a red herring (since whether or not there are other reasonable approaches doesn't really speak to whether or not your approach is reasonable).

I am free to draw my own conclusions regarding your reasons for deciding which questions you choose to answer and which ones you do not.

What an odd thing to say.

[/QUOTE]Yes, it was supposed to make sense. I was asking how you personally would assess the probabilities of those two intervals. Yes, you have to have a probability distribution in mind. The idea was that it would allow me to get a rough assessment of the sort of distribution you have in your mind for the probabilities we have been discussing. I an still interested in knowing what that is, if you would choose to answer the question this time. Is it similar to the distribution for people being struck by lightning or drinking water? If you can't tell me the prior distribution you assigning for the Bayesian approach to such questions, a simple statement of what you think P [0, .5) is equal to would be of help.[/QUOTE]

The frequency of true ideas in amongst all possible ideas? I suspect the ratio is something like one in a thousand, although I haven't put any real work into estimating it; I could easily be off by several orders of magnitude. But considering that those ideas that represent a much better ratio (maybe even as high as 50/50) would be excluded as the product of science (i.e. a different form of discovery), there's not going to be much to work with.

Also, in the same post:
Based on this conversation, I now think that you see the Bayesian approach as rational and the minimax approach as not rational. I think I could understand your position better if you could tell me what other approaches you find rational, specifically, what approaches that lead to outcomes other than atheistism do you see as rational? You don't have to specify anything, but if you decide not to answer the question this time, I'll assume that you don't really consider anything other than atheism to be a rational position.

I don't see atheism as the only rational outcome. For example, I think that theism can be rational, as well. It isn't belief that defines the position as rational, but rather the approach. I think that rational positions that don't involve belief in gods seem to be described as atheism or agnosticism according to the preference of the individual.

Whether or not an approach is rational depends upon whether it gets you where you want to go - whether that's an effective way to get to the truth or a way to maximize happiness. Overall, I think it's more important to figure out what you are looking for, than to specify a position a priori.

Yes, It at least distinguishes fairly well between yours and mine.

Except that now you've gone and denied it, so we're back at square one.

Linda