My theoretical framework

[AkuManiMani]

Well, I'd even state there's not even a spectrum. They're the same thing.

Well I mean that in the sense that there is a gradient of difference. For instance, matter and energy are "the same thing" but for the purposes of qualitative categorization we consider them "different".

I don't think you know what the theoretical ToE is, do you? It certainly isn't a search for God, just a search for a theory that will "unify all the fundamental interactions of nature, which are usually considered to be four in number: gravity, the strong nuclear force, the weak nuclear force, and the electromagnetic force" (Source.

It's just mathematically working out the interactions between particles. Nothing unachievable there.

I was saying that the search was comparable to the search for "God" because it assumes an ultimate. Once they discover the unifying principle of all the particles/forces we have observed or extrapolated it only reveals even more entities that have to be understood/explained/discovered that had not even been considered previously. M-theory is a very good example of this. In the search for the final unifying theory they ended up tumbling into an even bigger rabbit hole than the one they were trying to map out. Basically what I'm saying is that theoretical physicists will never be out of a job; answers just lead to even more questions.

 

[Phaedrus74]

I think that BDZ does not seek to challenge materialism so much as he is trying to challenge the (perceived) uncritical acceptance of the notions that 1) the universe is essentially (meaning in it's very essense) material and
2) that we can uncover (in the Heideggerian sense) the ultimate truth about the world

If he meant that, he certainly didn't say it very coherently.

On this we agree...

I don't agree with 1) as I think the universe is essentially material, even though I do agree with 2). It's the contention with 1), and the conclusions BDZ has drawn from it, that I fundamentally disagree with (and which I think are undermined by even the most cursory of observations).

The universe is material, but the limits of our perceptual systems means we will (may?) never exactly the precise nature of that materiality. This is uncontentious, I think, but BDZ seems to disagree, particularly with the first clause.

He's overstating his case. He's saying that because our perceptual system (and the very nature of subjectivity) necessarily distances us somewhat from the material fabric of reality, that means that the material fabric isn't there. There are obvious challenges to this, not least the fact that multiple subjects can perceive the same object in broadly similar ways, even prior to language in some respects. I think our perception of reality is a pretty decent approximation of it; BDZ seems to be less sure.

Yep, he ends up sounding like a philosophical skeptic apparently denying the validity of knowledge tout court, even though he obviously does not believe this (that all knowledge is invalid).

I think you (volatile) and I have encoutered in an other thread some people that do seem to take these notions for granted and consider them unproblematic. Unfortunately BDZ, in his OP, formulates his challenge that ontological claims like these are meaningless in terms of an ontological claim (that it is a fact that noumena are non-material). Had he formulated it as an epistmological claim (that we cannot know (for sure) that what we hold to be true is the ultimate truth) it would not have been so problematic.

I agree, but I don't think you've totally seen the forcefulness with which he makes his ontological arguments. He has argued, consistently, that "there are no objects", and has contended my claim that material objects are prior to their noumenal construction. Essentially, I think you're giving him too much credit. Your re-statement of what you think he's arguing makes sense (in the same way Wasp's restatement did). His actual argument is far less cogent, because it's far more emphatic in denying a material reality prior to conciousness.

Actually I have been following this thread quite closely and have (to my dismay) witnessed this. Maybe I am giving him too much credit but I tend to be rather charitable in my interpretations of other peoples writings.

Whether or not this is the case depends I think on whether or not BDZ is capable of more meticulously arguing his position, less broad strokes more detail.

I don't see how this follows exactly but I'm interested, could you elaborate? (Don't worry about referring to philosophical works, it's been a while since I graduated but I think I can manage)

Consciousness arises in the brain. The brain is material.

Sorry, I should have formulated more clearly, I was wondering how BDZ's position leads to a priviliged position of consciousness...

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Sorry to butt in guys, but permit me...

I think that BDZ does not seek to challenge materialism so much as he is trying to challenge the (perceived) uncritical acceptance of the notions that 1) the universe is essentially (meaning in it's very essense) material and
2) that we can uncover (in the Heideggerian sense) the ultimate truth about the world

I think you (volatile) and I have encoutered in an other thread some people that do seem to take these notions for granted and consider them unproblematic. Unfortunately BDZ, in his OP, formulates his challenge that ontological claims like these are meaningless in terms of an ontological claim (that it is a fact that noumena are non-material). Had he formulated it as an epistmological claim (that we cannot know (for sure) that what we hold to be true is the ultimate truth) it would not have been so problematic.

In the end I still believe his (ontological) position to be similar (if not the same) as Kant's transcendental idealism. From this follow (quite understandably) his epistemological anti-realism (in the sense that there maybe a shared objective reality but that this reality is essentially inaccessible for conscious inspection) and his instrumentalist philosophy of science (in the sense that science can aspire to no more than successfully predicting what will be perceived under given (perceived) circumstances).

Tha's my take on it as well. In fact, I told him that it sounded to me like Kant with a twist.

And doubly agreed about framing the initial paragraph as an epistemic claim -- I tried to warn him about the problems people would have reading it. He was trying to make a point, though, by leaving it as is, so I think we should give him a break there.

 

[Darat]

...snip...

...snip... answers just lead to even more questions.

You do recognise that is just an opinion of yours? By that I mean you aren't making an actual claim about the nature of reality are you?

 

[Phaedrus74]

Tha's my take on it as well. In fact, I told him that it sounded to me like Kant with a twist.

And doubly agreed about framing the initial paragraph as an epistemic claim -- I tried to warn him about the problems people would have reading it. He was trying to make a point, though, by leaving it as is, so I think we should give him a break there.

Depends on whether we want him to learn something, he seems genuinely interested but he needs to be aware that most people will not take him seriously if he doesn't formulate more carefully and that the whole point he was trying to make gets swamped in semantic quibbling and mutual misunderstandings.....

His second formulation (in response to schlitt) does much to mitigate this problem, but I am afraid it maybe too late to salvage the discussion.

 

[Darat]

....snip... that the whole point he was trying to make gets swamped in semantic quibbling and mutual misunderstandings.....

...snip...

I thought that was the point of the opening post? I.e. to make it read like (I hate to use the word but it's already been used in this thread) "woo"?

 

[volatile]

Yep, he ends up sounding like a philosophical skeptic apparently denying the validity of knowledge tout court, even though he obviously does not believe this (that all knowledge is invalid).

I think you're reading what you think he should be saying than what he really is... Maybe I'm being too harsh, I dunno!

Whether or not this is the case depends I think on whether or not BDZ is capable of more meticulously arguing his position, less broad strokes more detail.

Indeed. I'd like him to particularly address the clarifications Schlitt and I have been asking him to make on the nature of reality prior to consciousness.

Sorry, I should have formulated more clearly, I was wondering how BDZ's position leads to a priviliged position of consciousness...

Well, it seems to me that his position is quasi-dualist in the same way it's quasi-solipsist. If he's asserting that the world is made (only) in consciousness, then this seems to me to imply that consciousness is privileged. If he's arguing that materialism is "naive" because it denies the nuances of phenomenal perception, it seems to me that this requires a separation of consciousness from the material world.

Consciousness is the product of the material brain. Thus, if the strongest contentions BDZ is making are true (that the world is an entirely subjective construct, all the way down), to maintain that nothing is really material is to also remove consciousness from materiality.

In other words - what produces phenomenal experience in the first place? Either consciousness itself is the result of material processes, or it isn't.

 

[Phaedrus74]

I thought that was the point of the opening post? I.e. to make it read like (I hate to use the word but it's already been used in this thread) "woo"?

That was his intention, I agree, but instead of meaningful debates on the apparent woo-ness of the initial post the discussion devolved (after about 2 pages I think) into something along the lines of:

1- "My skippy-ball is purple!"
2- "That's not purple, it's lilac!"
1- "No it's purple, see!"
3- "Since lilac is related to purple, maybe you agree?"
1- "I still say it's purple..But it might appear lilac if you are colorblind. LOL!"
4- "You are all mad, it's obviously turqoise!"
1/2- "BURN THE HERETIC!"

And so on, and so forth...
Amusing, for some time, but I doubt this is what BDZ intended (I might be wrong though )

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

If he's asserting that the world is made (only) in consciousness, then this seems to me to imply that consciousness is privileged. If he's arguing that materialism is "naive" because it denies the nuances of phenomenal perception, it seems to me that this requires a separation of consciousness from the material world.

He is not asserting that the world is made only in consciousness. He is saying that 'your world' is made only in consciousness. But, of course, some of 'your world' is shared with others who create their own worlds in their consciousness and it all relates to what is really out there.

His argument that materialism is 'naive' consists only in the realization that what we perceive as material has a potential other basis that Kant called noumenal. We can't access 'what things are in themselves' because we are stuck in our own perceptual matrix.

Nothing woo there, nothing all that strange. Just a different way of approaching things. It is also tied to a strict monism, so there is no actual dualism like some other 'idealists' who have visited here spout (but don't recognize).

But, it wasn't stated all that clearly. Intentionally, I think.

 

[Phaedrus74]

I think you're reading what you think he should be saying than what he really is... Maybe I'm being too harsh, I dunno!

Actually he has said as much about the validity of knowledge in other posts, which is why his position reminded me of the philosophical pradoxes I so enjoyed in college (and which have pretty much caused me to apply the principle of charity under all circumstances (much to the chagrin of my girlfriend ))

Indeed. I'd like him to particularly address the clarifications Schlitt and I have been asking him to make on the nature of reality prior to consciousness.

I would think that would be impossible to answer given his position, but I am very curious...

Well, it seems to me that his position is quasi-dualist in the same way it's quasi-solipsist. If he's asserting that the world is made (only) in consciousness, then this seems to me to imply that consciousness is privileged.

Yes, but only to the extent that we (humans) live in a world and my dog (for instance) doesn't. I forget the precise terms (due to Husserl?) but "Weltarm" and "Weltlos" come to mind (regarding respectively my dog and a rock).

If he's arguing that materialism is "naive" because it denies the nuances of phenomenal perception, it seems to me that this requires a separation of consciousness from the material world.

I think this is precisely what he argues for, the chasm between our minds and our noumenal environment.

Consciousness is the product of the material brain. Thus, if the strongest contentions BDZ is making are true (that the world is an entirely subjective construct, all the way down), to maintain that nothing is really material is to also remove consciousness from materiality.

I don't think this is what he's trying to say (although he does seem to forget the intersubjective aspects of existence). I think what he means is that, granted your brain is the seat of consciousness and the brain is what we would refer to a material object. In the noumenal environment however your brain matter correspond sto something different entirely (and essentially unknowable). In other words reductionism still holds but the stuff that makes up the noumenal cannot be positively identified as matter.
We can name it matter but we cannot identify it as matter without getting caught up in circularity...

In other words - what produces phenomenal experience in the first place? Either consciousness itself is the result of material processes, or it isn't.

BDZ might say that consciousness is the result of noumenal processes (if this makes sense) that we name material....

I think you have already correctly identified his position as essentially uncontentious, you keep getting hung up on his denial of the material essence of the noumenal (IMHO).

[Clarification: I am willfully ignoring his more nonsensical statements that objects don't exist and such, this amounts to philosophical skepticism and that's an affliction that can only be cured not disproven. (Again: maybe I'm being too charitable)]

 

[volatile]

He is not asserting that the world is made only in consciousness. He is saying that 'your world' is made only in consciousness. But, of course, some of 'your world' is shared with others who create their own worlds in their consciousness and it all relates to what is really out there.

See, I think you're extrapolating his nonsense into a sensible idea. I'll say it again - what you're saying is what I've been saying all onlg. But if you read BDZ' posts, he repeatedly says things like "there are no objects" and other such firm, unequivocal statements that contradict your rather sensible suggestion that boils down to "subjectivity exists".

I don't see anything approaching the sense of your second sentence, that consciousness relates to what is really out there, in his posts. Indeed, the contrary - he seems to deny there is anything really out there at all. I, as a materialist, claim that, although I accept that my perception is phenomenal, reality is materially and ontologically prior to consciousness. There is a spoon. I think you agree with this. BDZ seems not to.

His argument that materialism is 'naive' consists only in the realization that what we perceive as material has a potential other basis that Kant called noumenal. We can't access 'what things are in themselves' because we are stuck in our own perceptual matrix.

I am perfectly aware of Kant's noumena, and I broadly agree with the concept. But BDZ is pushing it way too far.

Nothing woo there, nothing all that strange. Just a different way of approaching things. It is also tied to a strict monism, so there is no actual dualism like some other 'idealists' who have visited here spout (but don't recognize).

But, it wasn't stated all that clearly. Intentionally, I think.

There's nothing woo in Kantian noumena, or in phenomenology. But when these tow sensible concepts are pushed beyond reason. The untenable part of BDZ's philosophy is the rejection of a material priority to consciousness. Kant doesn't deny this, phenomenology (even "auto-"phenomenology) doesn't deny this, but BDZ does.

At least, that's the way I read it. If it's intentionally vague, then that's his problem. I think you're giving him too much credit, personally.

 

[Piggy]

Depends on whether we want him to learn something, he seems genuinely interested but he needs to be aware that most people will not take him seriously if he doesn't formulate more carefully and that the whole point he was trying to make gets swamped in semantic quibbling and mutual misunderstandings.....

His second formulation (in response to schlitt) does much to mitigate this problem, but I am afraid it maybe too late to salvage the discussion.

<English teacher mode>

I think there are lessons on all sides.

For BDZ, the lesson that linguistic framing matters. You can't expect people to understand what you mean just b/c you mean it. You have to attune your language to each audience. It's not "making an exception" or being condescending to do so.

For volatile, the lesson that once you do start getting at what a person intends, there's no point in rehashing "but you SAID...".

Mis dos centavos.

</English teacher mode>

 

[volatile]

I would think that would be impossible to answer given his position, but I am very curious...

I see what you mean. But then he's dug himself into a hole he can never escape from.

His claim is stronger than "subjectivity exists", you see. He says that it is "naive" to claim that there is a real object-in-the-world prior to consciousness. But the pragmatic, materialist approach says that there must be a material object in some sense in order for several people to perceive the same spoon. BDZ' "framework", such that it is, does not (and you're right, might not be able to, by definition) address these questions.

As such, I find it wholly unconvincing.

I think this is precisely what he argues for, the chasm between our minds and our noumenal environment.

And that's where his argument falls down. There cannot be a chasm between our minds and the noumenal environment because the noumenal environment is a product of our minds. Noumenal environments is what our minds do, almost by definition.

I don't think this is what he's trying to say (although he does seem to forget the intersubjective aspects of existence).

This forgetfulness is at the heart of my disagreement with him. It's a shame if it really is "forgetful". I think it's bordering on evasive, given the number of times I, and others, have asked him about it.

I think what he means is that, granted your brain is the seat of consciousness and the brain is what we would refer to a material object.

He can't mean that, because he denies materialism. He can't see the brain as a material object if he denies the existence of matter. Again, I think you're giving him too much credit by trying to make his poor argument into a good one. Yours is a good one. It does not resemble BDZ', though.

In the noumenal environment however your brain matter correspond sto something different entirely (and essentially unknowable). In other words reductionism still holds but the stuff that makes up the noumenal cannot be positively identified as matter.
We can name it matter but we cannot identify it as matter without getting caught up in circularity...

That's a semantic argument, not a threat to materialism, principally because there must still be a) a material catalyst for noumena and b) a material brain to process the catalyst into cognition.

If this "framework" is supposed to run counter to materialism, it's not doing a very good job.

BDZ might say that consciousness is the result of noumenal processes (if this makes sense) that we name material....

That's upside down. Noumea are the objects of cognition.

I think you have already correctly identified his position as essentially uncontentious, you keep getting hung up on his denial of the material essence of the noumenal (IMHO).

But if his position was the uncontentious one I posited, it wouldn't be a position at all. It would virtually be materialism, in fact.

[Clarification: I am willfully ignoring his more nonsensical statements that objects don't exist and such, this amounts to philosophical skepticism and that's an affliction that can only be cured not disproven. (Again: maybe I'm being too charitable)]

Yes, you are. I don't think you can ignore the terrible parts of his argument, because those are really the only original bits. Everything else is Kant + Merleau Ponty.

 

[Piggy]

That's not a challenge to materialism, that's semantics. Materialism does not rely on the ability of subjects to be able to perceive the material, for starters. Of course the object-in-the-world and our perception of it are not identical, but that does not negate materialism. That reality is (might be?) quantum in nature is also not a problem, because quantum particles are material.

This "framework" also negates the fundamental problem of what the apparatus that produces consciousness is. Consciousness itself arises out of a material process, so to give it some privileged position outside of or beyond the material world is silly.

Oh, don't get me wrong, I'm not defending the position.

I think BDZ's key error here is making unfounded assumptions from QM to different levels of organization.

As for it not being a challenge to materialism, I got no dog in that race. Philosophical isms are moot to me.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

See, I think you're extrapolating his nonsense into a sensible idea. I'll say it again - what you're saying is what I've been saying all onlg. But if you read BDZ' posts, he repeatedly says things like "there are no objects" and other such firm, unequivocal statements that contradict your rather sensible suggestion that boils down to "subjectivity exists".

I don't see anything approaching the sense of your second sentence, that consciousness relates to what is really out there, in his posts. Indeed, the contrary - he seems to deny there is anything really out there at all. I, as a materialist, claim that, although I accept that my perception is phenomenal, reality is materially and ontologically prior to consciousness. There is a spoon. I think you agree with this. BDZ seems not to.

I base what I am saying, in part, on the way he has interacted with stated idealists who clearly (at least to my eyes) believe in some form of dualism in the past. I have seen him try to ferret out their unstated dualist underpinnings before, so I think he is approaching this from a strictly monistic stance. But language gets in the way.

Plus, I think he is also trying to push the second idea that this monism is really just an illusion in the grand scheme -- which may or may not be the case (hence the push toward nothing being really real out there). This account leaves out the fact that there is, therefore, nothing really real in here either if all is illusion, but I think he would agree to that statement too. There is, therefore, nothing priveleged in consciousness because it is just as much illusion as everything else. To which the lama would probably reply, "But who just thought that thought?"

Or, as Robin and Pixy observed -- everything he says boils down to materialism (in the sense of a monism), but he approaches it from Kant's viewpoint. Then add the Buddhist doctrine that the whole thing is just a big show and I think it makes more sense. Hence, Kant with a twist.

But, with all that said, I can't help but think that some of these discussions are motivated, in part, by the sludge of wickedness that philosophy has thrown onto the word 'matter'. It's just a label for what's out there, after all. I'm not really sure why 'noumena' is any better word than 'matter'.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

The problem with forum discussions? I can spot at least five.

1) Meanings. What I mean with a word is not necessarily the same as what you mean with it.

2) Contexts. Most strawmans come from taking phrases out of their contexts and argue against them (we tend to pick-up ONLY those which opposes our own beliefs).

3) The nature of the JREF forum. Woos continually expose their beliefs in "supernatural stuff" (souls, mental powers, immaterial beings, black magic, etc). This pre-disposes members to treat like "woo" anything that is not what they believe.

4) Inability to keep track of everything that have been said in a thread.

5) Emotions. The old "I'm right and you are an idiot"

6) Ego. You will like some people, and dislike others. This imposes a big amount of bias, just for a start.

I started this thread as an experiment. The wording was chosen on purpose. Ichneumonwasp warned me against this, but I wanted simply to see how far people in this forum is influenced by posts that are a direct assault to what most (skeptics) believe.

This has been difficult, as expected. It is not nice at all to come to a forum and being bombarded with angry words coming from people that seriously believe you are an idiot. But still, I have learned a lot on how to express some ideas, and about how deeply biased we all are.

I don't believe any of us are idiots, of course, we all share this love for knowledge and love to argue. But when language cant explain (specially accounting the forum limitations I just cited), there is a point in which no more arguing is required. People have made up their minds.

I have never said most of the things some of you seriously believe I have said. What I did said is in the different contexts and it is obviously difficult to understand. If this is a problem of my inability to express myself, or a problem of some of you because of the problems I just cited, its irrelevant.

My point is. I'm done. I just want something to be CLEAR I'm a realist in the sense that I believe that what is real is real without us. I believe that our phenomenal world (consciousness, subjectivity) is an illusion based on elements from reality (the noumena I have been talking about). I believe that it is irrelevant if we call that reality "material" or "noumenal".

Such are my believes and if you don't share them its fine. Believe whatever you want and be happy.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

<

Mis dos centavos.

Could we make that dos cervezas instead?

 

[volatile]

For volatile, the lesson that once you do start getting at what a person intends, there's no point in rehashing "but you SAID...".

Thanks for the pedagogical interjection, Piggy! But again, I'm not a mind reader.

If he states his argument as "there are no objects", and then persists in this even when challenged, I can't reasonably conclude that he didn't mean it, can I?

I think Phaedrus and Wasp are summarising what they think he should have said, rather than what he actually did say. There is a kernel of sense in BDZ' argument, I have never disputed that. That's what Phaedrus and Wasp are sketching - the fairly uncontentious basis from which BDZ' framework sprouts. As I said, I have no problems with the suggestion that our perception of the world is different from the "real" world. Nevertheless, it seems to me that BDZ is pushing this rather trite observations to some pretty unsolid contentions.

I can only read what he's written, basically. If he didn't mean to say what he actually said, then let him clarify. I'm still waiting, as are we all.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

He is not asserting that the world is made only in consciousness. He is saying that 'your world'is made only in consciousness. But, of course, some of 'your world' is shared with others who create their own worlds in their consciousness and it all relates to what is really out there.

His argument that materialism is 'naive' consists only in the realization that what we perceive as material has a potential other basis that Kant called noumenal. We can't access 'what things are in themselves' because we are stuck in our own perceptual matrix.

Nothing woo there, nothing all that strange. Just a different way of approaching things. It is also tied to a strict monism, so there is no actual dualism like some other 'idealists' who have visited here spout (but don't recognize).

But, it wasn't stated all that clearly. Intentionally, I think.

Indeed, thanks for your clarifications. I used bolds on what I believe are key points. I believed that the task of starting woo to show that it was not woo after all was reachable. But it was a formidable task, and I'm tired by now.

 

[Darat]

...snip...

But, with all that said, I can't help but think that some of these discussions are motivated, in part, by the sludge of wickedness that philosophy has thrown onto the word 'matter'. It's just a label for what's out there, after all. I'm not really sure why 'noumena' is any better word than 'matter'.

That's why I use "stuff", sure it doesn't sound as hifalutin as something like "noumena" but I think it helps you (who doesn't exist) keep your feet (nasty assumed dualistic language creeping in) on the ground (stuff).