You can't pretend the articulation of those goals is irrelevant, as they will steer the way in which the car repair will happen.
I cannot agree. They do not steer it; they merely set the goal. The path from the current to final state requires no value judgments.
It is possible that there are subgoals which themselves come from value judgments ("I want my car repair to be done in an ecologically sound fashion"), but these are simply additional specifications, and themselves can be completed without additional judgments.
In fact, I deal with this every day in my job as a computer programmer. My values are often not the same as our customers. Sometimes, I am incapable of even understanding the motivation behind customer requests. But I am capable just the same of completing requests as long as they are articulated coherently.
Similarly you can't pretend that scientists' philosophical beliefs concerning the axioms of science are irrelevant, because it will steer the way in which they will do research, and what questions they think they ought to answer.
So, the order in which discoveries are made will depend on the values of the scientists. That's fine. But that doesn't change the ultimate truths.
Perhaps there is an intelligent alien civilization out there. If so, it likely shares almost no values with humans--how could it, being so alien? And yet, if they have any interest in the universe around them, they will largely make the same scientific discoveries as we have. Perhaps their focus will be different, but the knowledge sets will overlap and certainly not contradict (to the extent that they are not simply mistaken).
That's your value judgement. While it can be very useful to categorise and to think that some things belong in a category and others don't really belong there, it will inevitably lead to some "No True Scotsman" fallacies.
Whereas the converse leads to the conclusion that language is incapable of describing anything at all. Neither one is tenable. In the middle, we agree that words may be flexible, but that they do mean things, and that the sets of people that call themselves "mechanics" and "someone who prefers rusty cars over cars that move" generally don't overlap.
I think you would have a much greater survival advantage if I heard much better than I do; and there is nothing wrong with my ears.
You can't prove that. The physical limitations of ears dictate certain constraints like size, and therefore collection ability.
Your definition also makes the definition of "normal hearing" dependent on the state of the environment.
Of course it does! If we somehow lived in a medium that could not transmit sound, "normal" vs. "abnormal" hearing would be completely meaningless. I have no idea if my appendix is functioning normally or not; I know that it is not infected, but for all I know it is simply idle. It appears to have very little use in the current environment, and even if it were serving its original purpose, I could not legitimately say that it is behaving normally or not.
If you do not consider it medicine to consider how the patient will feel about the result, then you may have a very narrow view of medicine.
I like words to mean things. There are many other things that we can call this; counseling, say. And when my heart stops in the emergency room, I want the doctor to concentrate on fixing the machine that is my body instead of considering how I'll feel about the matter. But this is getting too far into semantics.
- Dr. Trintignant