THE question? You still somehow imagine you can control a conversation with me with cheap Dale Carnegie "How to Win Friends and Influence People" tactics? LOL
Well, at least I was clear about that much. I was beginning to think I was being too cryptic or something...
Of course not. Skepticism is the eschewing of non-trivial (which is to say, not true-by-definition) certainty. Nothing more; nothing LESS. Even recognizing true-by-definition certainty still involves the recognition of stipulations as stipulations only. Certainty is entirely a construct of language. To not eschew certainty is to not be a skeptic. It really is that easy.
I do. I do not vote because I recognize that the party whip, both as an office and as a institution does not permit the "representatives" to represent their constituencies. I do not lend legitimacy to a system that fails to do what it claims to do - thereby exhibiting a failure of internal consistency and a betrayal of its mandate. WTH? Why are we talking politics here? LOL!
About "logical systems" that do not have a strict, dogmatic true-false dichotomy. The most practical, everyday application of logic is in terms of computer programming. In coding, a conditional often has a value referred to "true" or "false," but in no way do these designations have the same kind of meanings as they do in natural discourse, despite a rather superficial attempt to make it seem so (we can forgive them that; after all, they started with only classical logic to work with. By then, the biases were already very well-established). They are merely contradictory, alternative values. There is no reason, in principle why one could not have any number of possible values, and we can make up natural discourse meanings to supervene on them all, if we wish.
Also in computer programming multi-state "case" statements represent multi-value logic, simply because true and false are simply not enough options for the conditional. I posit that this is the case with reality as well, although it hasn't been recognized as such throughout our dogma-driven history.
One can make a coherent, if somewhat subtle, argument that the attempt to assign truth values (in the sense that one is absolutely confident in the relationship between the proposition and the state it which it refers) to propositions is, itself, a serious error. Fortunately, we have a tool that allows us to combat this unfortunate tendency - skepticism. When one considers truth-values in natural discourse with some degree of care, one begins to see that the assignment of truth-values to a proposition is an attempt to shoehorn reality into a proposition by sheer force of will, as if, in some way, we are imposing our will on reality. This, of course, is controversial and represents an attempt to do real philosophical work. (I fully expect Darat to move the thread to - I don't know, what? sports? - because of this. My apologies to all).
But, I'm sure that point is too subtle, relying, as it does, on the understanding (or misunderstanding) of a relationship between a proposition, he/she/it who applies it, and that to which it is "applied." However, studies and work on multi-value logics is a well-established field (set of fields, actually) of study. For your amusement:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-manyvalued/. Enjoy.
Of course, it's easily seen that, while I attempt to discuss the issue, you, once again, refuse to actually take part in positive work. So again, try, if you can, to imagine a case where not-true does not equal false. At least try. I'm giving you the benefit of (hehehe) the doubt here. C'mon, Claus. The grey matter hasn't hardened yet, has it? We're never too old to learn. Try...