Non-Religious Argument Against Abortion

[Steven Howard]

I say yes, it is wrong to kill us. Why? Because it destroys our future (which deprives us of things of value). If something had a future like us then it would be wrong to kill them too. Fetus are among the things that have futures like us.

To paraphrase Bertrand Russell, who was talking about something else entirely, there are a number of things wrong with your argument, not the least of which is that is very odd.

This whole "future like ours" business baffles me, but even if we take it as axiomatic that it's morally wrong to kill something that has a "future like ours", and even if we properly define who "we" are and what it means for a future to be "like" ours (as opposed to a future that's "not like ours" or even a future like theirs), then you're still going to need to explain why a fetus has a "future like ours" but a sperm or an egg doesn't. So it seems to me that we can lay aside all the other stuff and focus on that.

 

[cyborg]

The things in my future are like the things in my past and I valued the things in my past so I'm likely to value the things in my future assuming they are the same kinds of things or better.

So you generalise your concept of self-value to universal value? Based on what justification?

If I didn't have a past but only had a future my future would still have a value whether I knew it or not because we know that my future is like the future of other beings which have had value.

So now we're back as to when that new being comes into existence.

We say things like, "Oh, he had such a bright future, too bad he was hit by a bus."

I could easily say something like, "Oh, he had such a dull future - maybe it was just as well he was hit by a bus."

If you don't include contradictory cases your analysis is incomplete.

We can say that generally people's future have values without describing in detail every aspect of that value.

So where we can say that generally a person's future would lack value without describing in detail every aspect of that value then killing that person would be morally fine?

I think she was mistaken.

Does your opinion have moral primacy?

 

[Stone Island]

LOL. Then what is? What you say? What's the objective measure of morality?

Laws don't make themselves. Someone (ideally, someone who democratically represents the opinions of the population) decides what should or shouldn't be illegal based on what that person, a group of people, or the population, thinks is or isn't morally right.

So...how are you deciding what's morally right or wrong? Is it morally wrong for me to abort a fetus even if I can't afford to feed it? Is it morally wrong for me to abort a fetus if having the baby means my other children will suffer?

There is no objective morality. There's only emotions driven by empathy, and those differ from person to person, culture to culture.

I get my personal morals from my empathy. Some people get theirs from their religion. Where do you get yours?

Reasoned consideration of empathy, intuition, religion, culture, history, and nature. In other words, philosophy.

It's odd that for someone who doesn't believe in objective morality you've comfortably thrown around various instances of rights language which, you may be shocked to learn, is predicated on the notion that there is an objective morality (whether we know it or not).

 

[cyborg]

No it isn't - it's predicated on the notion that we can benefit by adhering to social contracts.

That these social contracts can be dissolved as easily as they were formed is neither here nor there.

 

[Stone Island]

This whole "future like ours" business baffles me, but even if we take it as axiomatic that it's morally wrong to kill something that has a "future like ours", and even if we properly define who "we" are and what it means for a future to be "like" ours (as opposed to a future that's "not like ours" or even a future like theirs), then you're still going to need to explain why a fetus has a "future like ours" but a sperm or an egg doesn't. So it seems to me that we can lay aside all the other stuff and focus on that.

Allen Stairs writes,

One potential problem with the argument Marquis gives is that it might seem to rule out contraception: in preventing the conception of a being, one is cutting off a possible future. The essence of Marquis' reply is that contraception is different from abortion: in the case of contraception there is no particular being whose future is being cut off. He reasons as follows: there are four potential candidate "beings":

1. the sperm cell
2. the ovum
3. the sperm-ovum pair considered separately
4. the sperm-ovum combination

Neither 1) not 2) is satisfactory. A sperm alone does not determine a being. Neither does an ovum. 3) counts too many beings. This sounds a bit odd, but in fact, we can strengthen point here. On any given occasion of intercourse, there are typically millions of sperm. There is no one of them in particular that should be counted as the one whose future is being cut off. And this ties in with Marquis's point about 4). There is no determinate combination either.

In a moment we will see this that isn't quite adequate. Before we do, let us ask at a general level what we should make of Marquis's argument. We can ask two sorts of questions: (1) is it weaker than it seems, and (2) is it stronger than it seems -- perhaps unacceptably strong.


On the first point, recall that Thomson argues that even if the fetus is a person, it may still be acceptable to perform abortions in certain cases: at least (Thomson) in the cases of rape and threat to the mother's life. but also in the case in which the mother's future prospects are severely threatened, even if her life itself is not. Now Thomson talks of personhood rather than valuable futures. But persons are paradigms of the sort of being that has a potentially valuable future of the kind that Marquis is considering. And in any case, there is no reason to think that Thomson would disagree with Marquis about why killing is an evil. But she would probably insist nonetheless: abortion is still justified in some cases. If her arguments are good, they bear on Marquis notwithstanding.


Turning to the second point, just how rich must a being's potential future be before Marquis's argument kicks in? Marquis himself points out that it may apply to some higher mammals. But consider the family cat. In the normal course of things, a cat has the capacity for a life filled with its own brand of happiness and pleasure. And just as the pain of an animal is an evil, other things being equal, so is its happiness and pleasure a good. So Marquis would seem to give us a strong reason for not killing animals with the capacities of cats or even cows. Marquis, in other words, may make a case for a rather extensive vegetarianism without having meant to.


While this might be so, it is not exactly a criticism of Marquis to point it out. After all, many people believe that we should, indeed, not kill animals except for very good reasons. Perhaps they are right, and perhaps Marquis provides a means of saying why.


Another problem is more difficult. Return to birth control. Marquis clearly had barrier methods in mind. But think abut the IUD. The IUD prevents pregnancy not by preventing conception but by preventing implantation. Does Marquis's view imply that the use of the IUD is immoral?


Many of us would find that hard to accept. A newly-fertilized ovum simply seems too unlike the sort of being from which Marquis's argument starts: a full-fledged human. (Remember: Marquis begins by asking what is wrong with killing in the "typical" case.) And in fact, in what looks like a throw-away line, Marquis allows that this point might be correct,. He says that "morally permissible abortions will be rare indeed unless, perhaps, they occur so early in pregnancy that a fetus is not yet definitely an individual." Many people would think that the stage at which the IUD does its work is a good example. At that stage of pregnancy, it might be thought, we really don't have something that should be thought of as an individual in the sense of a definite being. But if this is right, then we have to ask: at what stage do we have a definite individual -- a definite being?

Which, I've already admitted, is the problem. But in the typical case, I still think Marquis's argument is strong.

 

[Stone Island]

No it isn't - it's predicated on the notion that we can benefit by adhering to social contracts.

That these social contracts can be dissolved as easily as they were formed is neither here nor there.

Is this what you believe or a claim about what the people who formed our social contract believed? Or is it a claim about all social contract theorists?

 

[Steven Howard]

Allen Stairs writes,

See, this is why people hate philosophers. "Just because I can't define my terms and I admit that there are exceptions to the statements I previously stated as absolutes, doesn't mean there's anything wrong with my argument."

 

[Stone Island]

So you generalise your concept of self-value to universal value? Based on what justification?



So now we're back as to when that new being comes into existence.



I could easily say something like, "Oh, he had such a dull future - maybe it was just as well he was hit by a bus."

If you don't include contradictory cases your analysis is incomplete.



So where we can say that generally a person's future would lack value without describing in detail every aspect of that value then killing that person would be morally fine?



Does your opinion have moral primacy?

People behave as if they believed their futures to have a value. People who are dying of cancer bemoan their fate. People try to avoid getting hit by buses. We can and do distinguish between the suicide and someone who places themselves in harms way (race car driver, sky diver, police officer, fireman, soldier). Even the suicide doesn't believe they are throwing away something of value, they deny the value of their future. I would suppose that in some cases they are even right.

In normal cases, I don't think you would say that. Even someone who has wasted their life, even in their own mind, might still turn things around and derive something of value from their remaining days.

 

[cyborg]

Is this what you believe or a claim about what the people who formed our social contract believed? Or is it a claim about all social contract theorists?

I'm saying that's the way it is - irrelevant of what anyone believes about it.

It is as easy as not being "moral" and believing it is "moral" to contradict any pretence of an objective system. It doesn't take much: I just refuse to acknowledge the formal and informal social contracts we all adhere to.

If I choose to abort a baby and you say it's wrong and I say I don't care what argument do you have?

 

[Stone Island]

See, this is why people hate philosophers. "Just because I can't define my terms and I admit that there are exceptions to the statements I previously stated as absolutes, doesn't mean there's anything wrong with my argument."

This is why I love philosophers and philosophy. While I'm not so concerned about being right, I'm very interested in being less wrong.

 

[cyborg]

People behave as if they believed their futures to have a value.

No - some people behave that way. Other people don't.

Stop engaging in hasty generalisation.

Even someone who has wasted their life, even in their own mind, might still turn things around and derive something of value from their remaining days.

And they might not.

Why do I care?

 

[Stone Island]

No - some people behave that way. Other people don't.

Stop engaging in hasty generalisation.



And they might not.

Why do I care?

Who behaves as if their future doesn't have a value while knowing that it does? Who behaves as if their future does have a value while thinking that it does not?

 

[Stone Island]

Why do I care?

Everything else equal, it's wrong to deprive someone of something of value. In so far as it is wrong to deprive you of something of value it is wrong to deprive things like you of something of value.

 

[cyborg]

Who behaves as if their future doesn't have a value while knowing that it does? Who behaves as if their future does have a value while thinking that it does not?

People do. They're weird. Have you ever met any?

 

[sthomson]

While I'm not so concerned about being right, I'm very interested in being less wrong.

The reason I asked if you were an Objectivist is because of statements like this. Perhaps the fact that you're a lawyer helps Personally, I'm not that interested in philosophy, as I am in practicalities. Let's say that you convince me that abortion is as bad as murder. Heck, according to your OP, it's even worse than murder - we're robbing each baby of an entire lifetime of potential future experience! What should we do about it then, as a moral society? Should we jail parents who chose to have abortions, and the doctors who perform such procedures? What about IFV - those discarded embryos are potential humans too! If a woman miscarries (perhaps she is in an at-fault car accident) is that manslaughter?

 

[cyborg]

Everything else equal, it's wrong to deprive someone of something of value.

Why?

In so far as it is wrong to deprive you of something of value it is wrong to deprive things like you of something of value.

I deprive you of my money.

Money has value to both of us I presume?

Am I morally wrong?

 

[Steven Howard]

Correct me if I'm wrong here, but it seems to me that the Marquis/Stairs/Stone Island argument, stripped of all its high-falutin' hand-waving, basically boils down to:


1. It's wrong to kill people;

and

2. At some point between* conception and birth, a fetus should be considered a "person" for purposes of (1), above. (*Inclusive between: includes the end points.)


You know what, guys? We already knew that. Everybody who has an opinion about abortion agrees with both of those statements. The tricky part -- the thing people fight about, and the reason it's a political and philosophical issue at all -- is drawing the line of exactly where that "some point" is. That's the part we haven't really come to an agreement on. But that's exactly where Marquis and company fall down. They bring nothing to the table but "seems" and "perhaps" and "probably."

That's another reason people hate philosophers. The way they can take something everybody already knows and just make it sound confusing and esoteric.

 

[Stone Island]

See, this is why people hate philosophers. "Just because I can't define my terms and I admit that there are exceptions to the statements I previously stated as absolutes, doesn't mean there's anything wrong with my argument."

Part of philosophy is charity. I want to make your argument as strong as possible, while imputing to you nothing but the best motives, before I argue against it. I haven't seen a lot that here. I've seen a lot of almost intentional misreadings and strawman arguments.

 

[Rasmus]

I don't think any of what you said makes any sense and I don't think it has anything to do with anything that I said. Are you saying people ought not be responsible for their actions? Perhaps I'm wrong. Maybe you can explain it to me.

You are wrong.

I am asking you what the basis is to decide what is and isn't a "consequence" of an action that should just be "accepted" vs. those that we can try to change/undo/reverse/etc.

If you want to make the argument you have to deliver independent criteria by which one can decide what the consequences are that have to be accepted.

One *can* have a broken arm fixed just like one *can* have a pregnancy terminated. You claim that responsibility should be a factor. Why just in one case and not the other?

(That you think a human life is at stake in one case is not relevant here, since that is an entirely different argument. You can make that argument, but then it has to do with the life and no longer with consequences or responsibility.)

 

[Stone Island]

Correct me if I'm wrong here, but it seems to me that the Marquis/Stairs/Stone Island argument, stripped of all its high-falutin' hand-waving, basically boils down to:


1. It's wrong to kill people;

and

2. At some point between* conception and birth, a fetus should be considered a "person" for purposes of (1), above. (*Inclusive between: includes the end points.)


You know what, guys? We already knew that. Everybody who has an opinion about abortion agrees with both of those statements. The tricky part -- the thing people fight about, and the reason it's a political and philosophical issue at all -- is drawing the line of exactly where that "some point" is. That's the part we haven't really come to an agreement on. But that's exactly where Marquis and company fall down. They bring nothing to the table but "seems" and "perhaps" and "probably."

That's another reason people hate philosophers. The way they can take something everybody already knows and just make it sound confusing and esoteric.

Uh, no. You've presented a strawman. That's not the argument at all!