The unsolved problem of "free will"

[Robin]

Any influence not in congruence with natural law is supernatural.

Similarly I don't see where anybody has suggested any influence not in congruence with natural law.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Similarly I don't see where anybody has suggested any influence not in congruence with natural law.

Those who assume the "I" is more than a convenient way of refering to a part of the process in the brain and furthermore assume that this "I" process in the midst of processing can suddenly stop and make "free-will" decisions.

Those people.

 

[Robin]

Those who assume the "I" is more than a convenient way of refering to a part of the process in the brain and furthermore assume that this "I" process in the midst of processing can suddenly stop and make "free-will" decisions.

Those people.

Can you be more specific? Quote the part where someone has assumed that "I" is something else than a convenient way to refer to a part of the process in the brain.

And again - what is preventing a physical process from stopping and making decisions?

 

[DanishDynamite]

Can you be more specific? Quote the part where someone has assumed that "I" is something else than a convenient way to refer to a part of the process in the brain.

See any poster I've disagreed with. I seem to recall a poster called andyandy.

And again - what is preventing a physical process from stopping and making decisions?

Nothing.

Seriously, you seem to not understand. Please tell me if you understand or not.

 

[Robin]

See any poster I've disagreed with. I seem to recall a poster called andyandy.

Andyandy only posted once and you responded once. The area of disagreement you had with him does not appear to touch on the supernatural at all.

Seriously, you seem to not understand. Please tell me if you understand or not.

Seriously, you do not seem to be making sense.

OK, here is the exchange:

Similarly I don't see where anybody has suggested any influence not in congruence with natural law.

Those who assume the "I" is more than a convenient way of refering to a part of the process in the brain and furthermore assume that this "I" process in the midst of processing can suddenly stop and make "free-will" decisions.

Those people.

So if I understand so far, anybody who suggests that a process can stop and make a decision is suggesting something not in congruence with natural law and therefore supernatural.

Right?

So I ask:

And again - what is preventing a physical process from stopping and making decisions?

And you respond:

Nothing

So apparently you are one of "those people" who assume that the "I" process can stop and make a decision.

So according to your previous claim you are suggesting something not in congruence with natural law and therefore supernatural.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Robin, you still appear very confused regarding my view.

I appologize. Must be my mistake.

Once again here is the view I'm proposing:

The concept of whether someone has "free will" hinges, in my understanding, on the idea that there must be at least one someone who has this ability.

Correct so far?

 

[Robin]

Robin, you still appear very confused regarding my view.

I appologize. Must be my mistake.

Once again here is the view I'm proposing:

The concept of whether someone has "free will" hinges, in my understanding, on the idea that there must be at least one someone who has this ability.

Correct so far?

Yes.

 

[The Atheist]

Nice to see we at least have one thing in common.

I'm sure that we actually have lots in common (and I'm sure as hell not going to mention a couple of them in this thread). I could say the same about almost everyone I've had a violent disagreement with in here!

Thing is, that's why this thread still has legs - free will threads are always good for a laugh, because it's the last bastion of everything supernatural. In my Colonial ignorance, I explain that we are but movable rocks, with as little real free will as the gravel on the road outside. It isn't a popular view, and if I'm reading you right, I think we aren't far apart there.

Seriously, anyone who agrees that our "I" is a physical process should also be able to see that a physical process isn't imbued with some supernatural ability to suddenly stop its process and "make a decision". Like any other physical process, it will just run its course.

Does anyone here understand the point I'm making? Anyone at all?

Yeah, I do.

I had the same trouble a couple of weeks back. (where the &^%$#@# was Mercutio then?){Trusting that cartoon profanity is allowed?}

A couple of n00bs who I think have since gone away, got highly sniffy because when they claimed that emotion, reason and love were "above" physical process - that in some way, humans had evolved an extra "consciousness" (your "I") which enabled us to transcend simple electro-chemical processes - I told them that that was straight-out paranormality and they were none too pleased.

What I don't get is what you and Robin disagree on. I'll stand to be corrected, but you appear to be on the same side here, just maybe going in different directions. Neither of you appears to be suggesting that we are more than the sum of our parts. Are you both just guilty of mis-reading each other? (Or am I mis-reading you both?)

To be on the safe side, I'll check Robin's side as well, with his nice analogy on one of my pet subjects - the weather.

Note the difference. In order to model the weather we can do so with an entirely deterministic system. The unreliability of weather prediction stems from the fact that no model could be sufficiently fine grained to capture the complexity.

I disagree. Unless you build a prediction system which is able to take account of quantum effects, that statement is false.

Given that the enormous majority of energy input into weather systems is from the sun, it's not the complexity, it's the unknowns.

In order to model biological evolution we would have to deliberately introduce randomness (or pseudo-randomness) into the model. Thus the unreliability of any evolutionary model would be inherent and would exist no matter how fine-grained you could make the model.

The problem here is that the two issues are identical, again, primarily due to the energy source, since the vast majority of energy input into evolution has been from the sun. This time, it makes you right to say "it can't be done". (I don't doubt that even things like viral mutation and asteroid hits could/will be built in to a clever enough model.)

I am not sure how I could make this possible distinction more clear.

The evidence I gave that the mind might be more like the second type of system is that the weather does not learn.[/QUOTE]

But only useful for identifying the difference between "live" and "not live", which is the essential difference between a weather system and a brain. They are both 100% natural phenomena, in my view.

 

[Robin]

The problem here is that the two issues are identical, again, primarily due to the energy source, since the vast majority of energy input into evolution has been from the sun.

So let me get this straight. You are saying that there is no difference whatsoever between a a non-periodic, deterministic system of equations, sensitively dependent on initial conditions and an evolutionary algorithm?

If that is what you are saying then we should probably stop right now. Please clarify.

 

[Robin]

Robin, you still appear very confused regarding my view.

I appologize. Must be my mistake.

Once again here is the view I'm proposing:

The concept of whether someone has "free will" hinges, in my understanding, on the idea that there must be at least one someone who has this ability.

Correct so far?

Just to check, I have agreed, correct so far. I assume there is more and that you are just otherwise employed at the moment.

 

[The Atheist]

So let me get this straight. You are saying that there is no difference whatsoever between a a non-periodic, deterministic system of equations, sensitively dependent on initial conditions and an evolutionary algorithm?

Nope, nothing of the kind. I was talking about models to predict weather and evolution and said that they both contain elements of indeterminacy and therefore are both virtually and equally impossible to predict.

If you want to argue that your definitions of the form of modelling are ideal, as it seems you're noting above - that's a different question entirely.

 

[Dancing David]

See any poster I've disagreed with. I seem to recall a poster called andyandy.

Nothing.

Seriously, you seem to not understand. Please tell me if you understand or not.

A physical process can make value judgements and a decision without it stopping.

 

[Dancing David]

Robin, you still appear very confused regarding my view.

I appologize. Must be my mistake.

Once again here is the view I'm proposing:

The concept of whether someone has "free will" hinges, in my understanding, on the idea that there must be at least one someone who has this ability.

Correct so far?

That ability could/might exist in an organic computer.

 

[Taffer]

Allow me to jump in, if you will, without ready the thread at all. Stop me if this has be done to death.

My concept of "free will" can be boiled down to "the ability to make a different choice if the exact same situation arose, down to the quantum level". Basically, put a person in a box which controls all variables possible. Get them to make a choice. Go back in time (or make the variables identical). Get them to make the same choice. If they can make a different choice, free will. If not, not. As a materialistic determanist, obviously the question of quantum uncertainty arises. However, to me, when including "all possible variables" in your room-experiment, one would assume the same quantum states as well. Further, it would seem that such quantum states would have the effect to change (or not) a possible choice in a determanistic way, the only difference being that you cannot predict which state will arise in advance.

Basically, I see no problem of quantum uncertainty in the matter of free will.

 

[Robin]

Nope, nothing of the kind. I was talking about models to predict weather and evolution and said that they both contain elements of indeterminacy and therefore are both virtually and equally impossible to predict.

If you want to argue that your definitions of the form of modelling are ideal, as it seems you're noting above - that's a different question entirely.

You appear to have missed the point then. Let me recap:

DanishDynamite asked if it was relevant to discuss whether the weather had free will.

I said that it was not clear that weather and the brain operated under the same physical principle.

DanishDynamite asked me how they might differ.

I suggested two possible options.

I never said or implied that the models were ideal, they were, as I made clear, suggestions about how two physical systems might differ.

Here is the point you didn't appreciate about evolution, the indeterminacy is not incidental, it is one of the key features of the system, it is what makes it work. Run a set of physical equations with no randomness and you will get a valid model of how the real system behaves. Run a genetic algorithm without randomness and it will simply do nothing. And by the way, weather models do predict the weather with reasonable accuracy, it is just that the small errors in the original variables start to diverge so the models are only accurate for a few days.

But that is a side issue anyway.

I stand by my original point that it is not clear that the weather and the brain operate under the same physical principle.

If they did not then any conclusion drawn from the weather would not necessarily apply to the working of the brain.

So it would only be relevant to discuss whether the weather had free will if you were reasonably certain that the same physical principle was at work.

I don't see how anybody could even disagree with the above three paragraphs.

 

[Robin]

Allow me to jump in, if you will, without ready the thread at all. Stop me if this has be done to death.

My concept of "free will" can be boiled down to "the ability to make a different choice if the exact same situation arose, down to the quantum level".

No, it requires one more thing. "the ability to make a different choice if the exact same situation arose, and the difference between the choices is not arbitrary"

Any arbitrary component in the choice process would be neither "free", nor "will".

That appears to be the tricky part of the deal, and I am not sure that quantum helps much here.

What we are looking at is a process that is not deterministic and also not arbitrary. I am not sure if that is possible, I am not sure how it would be even defined.

(Incidentally, I think cyborg actually made this point on page 1)

 

[Belz...]

What we are looking at is a process that is not deterministic and also not arbitrary. I am not sure if that is possible

I'm sure it's not.

Random is not free. Deterministic is not free.

 

[Robin]

Thing is, that's why this thread still has legs - free will threads are always good for a laugh, because it's the last bastion of everything supernatural...
...
A couple of n00bs who I think have since gone away, got highly sniffy because when they claimed that emotion, reason and love were "above" physical process...
...
...
But only useful for identifying the difference between "live" and "not live", which is the essential difference between a weather system and a brain. They are both 100% natural phenomena, in my view.

OK, let's dispose of the straw man. Nobody in the thread, as far as I am aware, has suggested that the brain is anything other than 100% natural.

So comments like this are completely irrelevant.

But not all physical systems are the same.

To suggest that the essential difference between the weather system and a brain are "live" and "not live" (whatever it is that you think those categories mean) requires you to explain and show evidence.

I had provided the example of differing physical principles as evolution and the weather. The weather does not operate by random mutation and natural selection, so the basic physical principle is different.

By analogue I suggested that perhaps brains and weather systems also work according to different physical principles. Brains and weather systems do not appear, at first glance, to have much in common.

 

[Robin]

I'm sure it's not.

Random is not free. Deterministic is not free.

I agree. It is just that I cannot actually prove that something cannot be both non-deterministic and non-arbitrary, or that there is no middle way between order and disorder.

I strongly suspect it to be the case.

From years of discussion here it would seem that the definition of "supernatural" is "non-deterministic AND non-arbitrary".

 

[The Atheist]

OK, let's dispose of the straw man. Nobody in the thread, as far as I am aware, has suggested that the brain is anything other than 100% natural.

In case you didn't notice, that was a simple anecdotal aside and nothing to do with the discussion in hand, beyond staking my claim as a [insert label here]

But not all physical systems are the same.

No, of course they're not, but they all respond to the same physical laws. As far as I can see, nothing's outside of science and maths, but you seem to be suggesting that something is?

To suggest that the essential difference between the weather system and a brain are "live" and "not live" (whatever it is that you think those categories mean) requires you to explain and show evidence.

Are you serious?

Let me see. Find a dead guy. Cut out his brain. Is there now a difference between a weather system and the brain? (Other than a slightly different composition) They are both conglomerations of matter which are only subject to external influences.

By analogue I suggested that perhaps brains and weather systems also work according to different physical principles. Brains and weather systems do not appear, at first glance, to have much in common.

Can you give me a rundown on how they differ - apart from a brain [a live one] being attached to a body, which allows it to choose things like location and energy input that a weather system can't.

Basically, I see no problem of quantum uncertainty in the matter of free will.

Me neither, although I didn't like your analogy.

I could think of a couple of posters who would change their choices simply through being contrarian!

Here is the point you didn't appreciate about evolution, the indeterminacy is not incidental, it is one of the key features of the system, it is what makes it work.

No, it's what has made it work in the way that it has.

Run a set of physical equations with no randomness and you will get a valid model of how the real system behaves. Run a genetic algorithm without randomness and it will simply do nothing. And by the way, weather models do predict the weather with reasonable accuracy, it is just that the small errors in the original variables start to diverge so the models are only accurate for a few days.

Nope. Weather predictions are only ever approximate, for the simple reason that a difference of a kilometre makes little difference with a weather system hundreds of kilometres wide.

I stand by my original point that it is not clear that the weather and the brain operate under the same physical principle.

As above, it's less clear to me how they differ.

If they did not then any conclusion drawn from the weather would not necessarily apply to the working of the brain.

Disagree. I'm quite sure there are some conclusions which do apply to both, the chief among them being that all natural phenomena obey natural laws.

So it would only be relevant to discuss whether the weather had free will if you were reasonably certain that the same physical principle was at work.

Well, I think they both have an identical amount of "free will" in the biblical sense. If your "free will" means "able to choose between alternatives", then they don't.

I don't see how anybody could even disagree with the above three paragraphs.

Oops. Looks like I disagreed with all three.