The unsolved problem of "free will"

[Ichneumonwasp]

Cooper,

Perhaps I'm reading too much into what you were trying to say. Did you simply mean that the emergent properties of neurons working together does not fit well into a simplistic deterministic explanation?

If so, I think most would agree with you. Emergent properties arise through, for want of a better description, bottom-up causation. That is not the typical billiard-ball causation with which most people are familiar.

What we call 'evolution' is a similar phenomenon that arises from bottom-up causation of many individual organisms living and dying and breeding, etc. to create a new level (or abstraction). We don't speak of that as precisely determined, but it is causal. And, really, it is probably determined. We just don't have a very good way of figuring out (or describing) all the interconnected 'collisions' that cause the complex process to emerge.

If that is all that you are saying, then that is fine. But I still don't see any room for 'free-will' in that type of causation. There isn't any magic in those complex systems. They are simply poorly predictable.

 

[cooper1958nc]

I would say, sure, why isn't there room? Nobody knows how those emergent properties work. Determinism of the brain is a belief, not an observation. Observations of working brains show indeterminate behaviour all the time. Sure, a lot is determined, and a lot more would be determined if we could only understand. But nobody understands, or, there is some that does not appear to be determined. So the conclusion that it is all determined is based on the belief that a system made of elements that are themselves determined will remain determined. I don't know if I believe that or not.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I would say, sure, why isn't there room? Nobody knows how those emergent properties work. Determinism of the brain is a belief, not an observation. Observations of working brains show indeterminate behaviour all the time. Sure, a lot is determined, and a lot more would be determined if we could only understand. But nobody understands, or, there is some that does not appear to be determined. So the conclusion that it is all determined is based on the belief that a system made of elements that are themselves determined will remain determined. I don't know if I believe that or not.

My answer would be that we have no means to speak about how such a thing would work. Every discussion I have witnessed of libertarian freedom has ground to a halt because I have never seen anyone who could define it and not invoke magic or dualism, both of which are fraught with insoluble philosophical problems.

We have many examples of emergent properties. They do not have room for "freedom". 'Evolution' is not free. 'Water' is not free. Unless you can propose a means for an emergent property to supply freedom then there is no reason to suppose that it exists. It is a god-of-the-gaps argument. It doesn't do any good to say "there is room for it" without supplying some mechanism that could explain how there is room for it.

ETA:

OK, so what I'm hearing now is that you say there is evidence that suggest that neural function creates an emergent property that we label 'mind' and/or 'behavior' and that it is your opinion that there is room in that emergent property for free will.

Is that an accurate portrayal of your position? Is this really an opinion rather than observation based on evidence?

 

[Dancing David]

We don't observe much behaviour in proteins that would suggest they can act that way. People, on the other hand, seem to. Big diff.

What way? What diff? Kind of vauge?


Moosebytes can be very painful.
Monty Python and the Holy Grail

 

[Dancing David]

Mr. David, causality was thought to be an axiom for a long time, only to be revised at the quantum level anyway. (Before you jump on that, I make no claim that quantum indeterminacy is related to human brain action, though much smarter physicists than I have. Nor do I claim that randomness is the origin of apparent freedom of choice, for reasons expressed early in this thread. I do not exclude the possibilty of "brain weather," one of the more interesting thoughts to come from this discussion, and not yours, I might add.)

I think that causal may have a different meaning for both of us. There is a causal relationship implied in the Heisenberg Indeterminancy Principle. causality is not the same as predetination, nor is scientific determinism the same as philosophical determinism.

Why so snide? Did I say that brain weather was my idea?

Causality works well in the normal sphere of things. And without it, we are kinda adrift, it is true. But, causality does NOT seem to work well when we are doing ordinary parlance with human beings and to some extent higher animals.

And that is a claim, extraordinary or not, that might need evidence. as I stated i believe that there is the potential for free will, and I believe that it exists. But calcium channels, sodium channels and neurotransmission are causal. Where does brain activity leave causality.

There can be causes without predestination.

We treat them differently. Now the earth is easily seen as round today with minimal experimentation. Yes it WAS up to someone to prove it round, because it looks flat. But no problem they did.

As I said, no one can prove that a human is really a deterministic machine.

And again causal is not predestination.

You can believe it based on the axiom that a human is in nature and you are convinced all nature is causal. Well that's belief.

And you have no evidence that is my belief. Still snide?

But there is equal or better belief that humans don't act the way potatoes act. So who is reaching here?

So who said that they behave the same, more straw?

Unfortunately, AI science has not delivered a calculus of complex systems. I "believe" something will eventually be understood, that complex self referential systems have behaviour that is, by common account, not strictly causal, but that it does not originate from quantum effects or random effects.

If you weren't so set on argumentation you might find I agree with you.

Whatever.

If Penrose went to all that trouble to try to base apparent freedom on quantum effects, I guess he did not accept your reductio argument either. Read Penrose and tell me he is a "woo" to use your witch-hunting phrase.

You made a woo like statement.
" So if someone is to claim that despite the internal observation of apparent freedom of action, and despite the objective inability to determine the antecedent "causes", one is nonetheless convinced because of some classical worldview or belief in a billiard ball universe, that the brain has to be causal, then it would seem they need to marshal the evidence. "


internal observation of apparent freedom of action: which could be illusion and is therefore an unsupported assertion. I agree with you that free will appears to exist. But i have found that my evidence is a personal belief. I also use the word 'mind' that does not mean a mind exists.

despite the objective inability to determine the antecedent "causes" : do you deny the way that neurons function? Or do you doubt that neurons exist. I believe that a cascade of 'voters' in the chaotic reverberating network can cause the appearance of free will. I also stated in this thread that I feel there is evidence for free will. But others have stated that my claims are claims. So until I show that beating an addiction or fighting compulsion is not just a behavioral chain of consequences i am agnostic.
Continue with your unsupported assertion, argument by populism and appeal to authority.


You still have yet to present any evidence that causality does not apply. If you beleive that HIP destroys causality, we will have to ask Ziggy or one of the physics people.

 

[Dancing David]

I would say, sure, why isn't there room?

There being room and having evidence are two different things.
I believe in free will but I can't demonstrate it.

Nobody knows how those emergent properties work. Determinism of the brain is a belief, not an observation.

causal in not predestined.

Observations of working brains show indeterminate behaviour all the time.

Really? Where?

Sure, a lot is determined, and a lot more would be determined if we could only understand. But nobody understands, or, there is some that does not appear to be determined. So the conclusion that it is all determined is based on the belief that a system made of elements that are themselves determined will remain determined. I don't know if I believe that or not.

Again causal in not predestined.

 

[Mercutio]

If Penrose went to all that trouble to try to base apparent freedom on quantum effects, I guess he did not accept your reductio argument either. Read Penrose and tell me he is a "woo" to use your witch-hunting phrase.

I have read Penrose. It was tough going for a while, trying to figure out where the evidence was for these microtubules, and his asserted function. I hypothesized, on another thread, that
Penrose : Microtubules :: Descartes : Pineal Gland
that is, Penrose does some serious hand-waving rather than presenting evidence, but considers microtubules to be the link between mind and body. I really hope I have that dreadfully wrong, but so far none have corrected me.

 

[Robin]

I have read Penrose. It was tough going for a while, trying to figure out where the evidence was for these microtubules, and his asserted function. I hypothesized, on another thread, that
Penrose : Microtubules :: Descartes : Pineal Gland

Kepler:: Harmonices Mundi :: Wolfram :: NKS etc...

 

[Mercutio]

Maybe we need a new "analogies challenge" thread...

 

[cooper1958nc]

I was snide because I thought you were being dogmatic. What other defence?

"Predestined" is not the same as "determined" either. I used determined and causal to mean the same. I exclude quantum effects and randomness from this analysis on grounds stated above. These may in fact be "causal" or not, but I don't believe these are effects that lead directly to brain phenomena. Others differ as we have seen. Predestination is a religious notion in which I have no interest.

Yes working brains show indeterminate behaviour. You can't predict much of what people do. It is neither completely predictable nor completely random. "Meaning" lies between these poles. Ordinary language, supported by observation of hundreds of millions, agrees. So? Does that make it correct? No, of course not. But it shifts the burden of proof I think to those who would deny that freedom of choice is an illusion. It may be, but it would require evidence to prove it.

As to Penrose, I don't accept his theory, but he is a serious physicist. If the issue were as clear as some of the contributors to this thread assert, why would he bother with trying to explain freedom via quantum effects in the brain?

 

[cooper1958nc]

Above should read "those who ASSERT freedom of choice is an illusion."

 

[Dancing David]

Well here is the rub. I state "free will exists" then it is up to me to demonstrate that it does.

I feel that the acts of the brain are causal, I also believe that the following acts demonstrate free will:

1. Beating an addiction.
2. Enduring negative situations that have no short term pay off, grad school for example.
3. Heroic altruism.
4. Cognitive behavioral therapy.
5. Desensitization.

These are things that I feel demonstrate the potential for free will. I am still pondering the radical behaviorist stance, I am somewhat of a methodologist, but I believe behaviorism to be the only successful path.

The problem is that since i am the one who holds the belief and makes the claim, it would be my burden to prove it. Regardless of what common language and common sense may hold to be true.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Yes working brains show indeterminate behaviour.

We have no such evidence. Causality is bottom-up, but we have to date only evidence of causality with brain function. We are highly ignorant of brain function, however. There is no evidence to support the assertion that brains show indeterminate behavior.

You can't predict much of what people do.

Already dealt with. Our inability to predict does not translate into an absolute indeterminacy. We are limited creatures and we have limited prediction ability.

But it shifts the burden of proof I think to those who would deny that freedom of choice is an illusion. It may be, but it would require evidence to prove it.

No. Burden of proof cannot be laid on anyone to prove a negative. We do not prove negatives.

I think it is proper to say that the burden of argument is placed before those who would assert that freedom of choice is an illusion. That is precisely what we have provided -- the arguments supporting the idea. All we can do is supply the evidence that demonstrates illusion. We cannot prove that the illusion holds in each and every case. That is not possible.

ETA

Let me add that I think it is also proper to ask for evidence to support the illusion, as Mercutio has done. So, I would agree with burden of argument and burden of evidence but not burden of proof.

 

[Mercutio]

Yes working brains show indeterminate behaviour. You can't predict much of what people do. It is neither completely predictable nor completely random. "Meaning" lies between these poles. Ordinary language, supported by observation of hundreds of millions, agrees. So? Does that make it correct? No, of course not. But it shifts the burden of proof I think to those who would deny that freedom of choice is an illusion. It may be, but it would require evidence to prove it.

Again and again we see evidence that people are unaware of very real influences on their behavior; ordinary language is not useful here.

As to Penrose, I don't accept his theory, but he is a serious physicist. If the issue were as clear as some of the contributors to this thread assert, why would he bother with trying to explain freedom via quantum effects in the brain?

As a physicist, he is out of his field when examining this problem. It is a problem with experts. Great knowledge in one area, and great confidence in one's skills in that area, do not transfer equally to another area. Hell, look at Sheldrake's theories for another example. Or cold fusion. Or Targ and Puthoff.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Not to pick on this post, but I have seen several after it that simply accept what is essentially a claimed independence of the brain. I think it is very very important to note that a brain-body split is artificial, and that (unless you are quite successfully hiding the biggest secret in all of neuroscience from us) your brain has never done anything at all without the rest of your body. If I may for just a little bit longer keep them separate, your brain has been fed information from your body, it has expressed through your body, and it is inseperable from your body. There is processing that takes place at the level of sensory and intermediate neurons (the easiest example is the perceptual fields in the retina, but that is not at all the only example) that shape what your brain does, and sub and super-threshold events that require interaction between neural and non-neural cells for virtually everything you do.

That is certainly true, but I think we can all agree that the brain is the "central processor" of the human body and that there is general agreement as to which bit of the human body is the brain. The rest is just interface.

So it is not for arbitrary reasons that we Behaviorist types do not talk about "what my brain does", but rather "what I do", and not "what your brain does" but "what you do". You and I are whole organisms, not meat puppets with brain controllers. The brain/body split is a modern version of Descarte's mind/body split, and it is every bit (ok, not quite) as misleading.

In what sense are we not meat puppets with brain controllers?

Go ahead, try it... for every time you want to say "my brain does..." or "my mind does...", substitute "I...". It works. And it is consistent with both the psychological and neurological literature. And it keeps the discussion at the appropriate level of explanation, rather than behind some mentalistic or neurological curtain.

Of course it works, just as assuming the Earth was the center of the Universe worked until we looked closer.

And yes, there is actually a reasonable answer for what "I" means... I may try to type it tonight, but the tequila is starting to work...

M

Looking forward to this.

 

[DanishDynamite]

I was simplifying. I did not literally mean that the glass or metal that the bulb is made out of magically produces light and you know it. It takes energy and converts it into visible light via the process you stated.

Would you prefer I say that the origin of the output of the brain is the mental processes occurring within the brain?

Yes, very much so, as that is agreed upon by almost everyone.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Nah again. That's all reductio argument. Nerve physiology shows how single nerves work. When you get enough connected, other properties may arise. We have evolved to treat ordinary objects "causally." Like Newtonian physics it works well, so the organisms that evolved to work it, lived. Equally, we can't predict where electrons go. We did not evolve to predict electrons. Equally again, we don't treat living people like potatoes. We treat them as if they had freedom of action. Why? Organisms that did that succeeded. In the face of that, we have no reason, other than an ill founded "belief" in causality's extent, to think that just because individual nerves behave causally, that the brain always does.

May I suggest using the phrase "as not 100% predictable" instead of the bolded part?

Seriously, when the "I" is known to be just a process, then it makes little sense to ascribe this process with abilities beyond its process.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Would anyone find it meaningful to discuss whether "The Weather" could be said to have free will or not? Why or why not?

 

[Robin]

Would anyone find it meaningful to discuss whether "The Weather" could be said to have free will or not? Why or why not?

It is not clear that weather and the human brain work on the same principle. Would it be meaningful to discuss whether or not biological evolution could be said to have free will?

It really begs the question of whether we have a good working definition of what we mean by free will. For example I would say that "will" implies that an intention is formed and I don't think that anything that does not have subjective experience could be termed as having an intention.

 

[DanishDynamite]

It is not clear that weather and the human brain work on the same principle. Would it be meaningful to discuss whether or not biological evolution could be said to have free will?

What principle does the brain work by? How does it differ from the principle by which the weather works? And why does this difference, if any, matter in regard to this discussion?

It really begs the question of whether we have a good working definition of what we mean by free will. For example I would say that "will" implies that an intention is formed and I don't think that anything that does not have subjective experience could be termed as having an intention.

Please provide some evidence that "intention" is more than a word we use describe a subset of the process which constitutes "I".