Are free will and determinism compatible?

[AtaraX]

But surely when we talk about free will we mean the freedom to act (or to attempt to act, we are talking about freedom of will not necessarily of action) in accordance with our "dispositions" as Hume put it. To choose something not in accordance with our "dispositions" is not the kind of thing we want the freedom to do - it wouldn't really count as freedom. In fact it couldn't be a choice at all. Our dispositions are, by definition, those things that we would choose so, tautologically, all our choices are in accordance with our dispositions.

I make exactly the choices I am disposed to make - that's free will. I can make only the choices I am disposed to make - that's determinism. These statements are compatible - that's compatibilism.

Well Put

 

[AtaraX]

This is a somewhat pithy observation, but it has kept me amused thinking about it:

As I see it, one of the things that makes us uncomfortable about the possibility of free will in a completely mechanistic universe (say one governed by Newtonian mechanics) is the feeling that the fact that our future (and past) actions could then be perfectly calculated by some "uber-being" (or even another human), and this, it seems, is in direct conflict with that instantaneous freedom we feel.

I agree that this worry of a super being is the concern. But if we being the super being into a concrete example this fear can be dispelled, I believe. Imagine you see a painter, painting a tall building knock over a bucket of paint from the vantage point of another building. You see a pedestrian walk into the path of the falling paint below.

Do you as the observer do you think the pedestrian has no free will because he walked into the path of the falling paint? As the now paint-covered pedestrian would you feel your free will had been compromised?

My answer is no so I am a compatiblist.

 

[H'ethetheth]

This is how I like to look at it: the uberbeing's predictions would only be accurate if it kept them to itself. If it acts on that information in ways that change the universe at all then it has invalidated its predictions because it hasn't included its own behaviour in the predictions - they are predictions of the universe outside of itself.

Instead of an "uberbeing" I usually think of a scientist with vastly powerful computer. In predicting the entire future of the world he would actually be predicting the world outside his laboratory, assuming no interaction with it on his part. The scientist could attempt to get round the problem of his inability to act on the predictions without invalidating them by getting the computer to include the scientist in its predictions. But the computer couldn't then include the effect of telling the scientist the results of the calculation in its predictions because it would need to know what those results were to calculate the effect they would have on the scientist's behaviour but it wouldn't know the results until it has worked out the scientist's response.

If the computer could predict literally everything in the universe including itself then there would be no problem. But it would then have to predict itself predicting itself, predicting itself... to an infinite regress.

So basically, even in a completely deterministic universe, you can never predict with complete, guaranteed accuracy what your own future choices will be because your hearing the prediction introduces something new that was not taken into account in the prediction itself and risks invalidating it.

Come to think of it, this could be a definition of free will - our ability to act contrary to our predictions of our own behaviour, however accurate those predictions may be.

Heh! Nice post. The words "don't" and "panic" spring to mind in large friendly letters.

 

[Dave1001]

This is how I like to look at it: the uberbeing's predictions would only be accurate if it kept them to itself. If it acts on that information in ways that change the universe at all then it has invalidated its predictions because it hasn't included its own behaviour in the predictions - they are predictions of the universe outside of itself.

Not necessarily. For example, let's posit one thing about the uberbeing: it will at some point cease to exist if it doesn't make the most perfect attempt it can to maintain its existence. By the way, that's the position, more or less, that I think we self-reflective parts of the universe apparently are in. Even if the history of the universe is predetermined, part of it's predetermination is that as we understand the universe better, we will either use that knowledge to try to persist, or we will in effect commit suicide. That can all be incorporated into a prediction mechanism.

Instead of an "uberbeing" I usually think of a scientist with vastly powerful computer. In predicting the entire future of the world he would actually be predicting the world outside his laboratory, assuming no interaction with it on his part. The scientist could attempt to get round the problem of his inability to act on the predictions without invalidating them by getting the computer to include the scientist in its predictions. But the computer couldn't then include the effect of telling the scientist the results of the calculation in its predictions because it would need to know what those results were to calculate the effect they would have on the scientist's behaviour but it wouldn't know the results until it has worked out the scientist's response.

Once again, I think the computer could more or less do that if the two choice options for the scientist ended up being more likely to lead to cessation of existence, and less likely to lead to cessation of existence. Either the scientist is suicidal or they are not. An alternative is the scientist programming into the computer his social aesthetics. Given the relative incomplexity of our brains compared to the vastness of the universe's resources, our social aesthetics and the premium we place on survival can probably be completely incorporated into a computer much smaller than the universe. Of course, we're ignoring the possibilty that humans have built in randomness generators.

If the computer could predict literally everything in the universe including itself then there would be no problem. But it would then have to predict itself predicting itself, predicting itself... to an infinite regress.

So basically, even in a completely deterministic universe, you can never predict with complete, guaranteed accuracy what your own future choices will be because your hearing the prediction introduces something new that was not taken into account in the prediction itself and risks invalidating it.

Not necessarily, as I've written in this post. If the computer can factor in your inevitable responses it can keep going.

Come to think of it, this could be a definition of free will - our ability to act contrary to our predictions of our own behaviour, however accurate those predictions may be.

I disagree, because otherwise free will exists outside of what we consider to be conscious, or even sentient entities. For example, the long term weather is unpredictable with current technology, and it could be those same type of chaotic and complex forces which might make our reaction to what we are told is our predicted behavior unpredictable with current technology, even if it's predetermined.

 

[Upchurch]

Someone once asked, "And how often do you randomly run red lights?".

It was just an example and once this weekend, if you count stop signs.

And do you honestly want to pull from the collective works of Franko?

 

[chriswl]

Not necessarily. For example, let's posit one thing about the uberbeing: it will at some point cease to exist if it doesn't make the most perfect attempt it can to maintain its existence.

Yikes! Is this some kind of theology? I'm assuming a material, deterministic universe. How can anything "cease to exist"?

An alternative is the scientist programming into the computer his social aesthetics. Given the relative incomplexity of our brains compared to the vastness of the universe's resources, our social aesthetics and the premium we place on survival can probably be completely incorporated into a computer much smaller than the universe. Of course, we're ignoring the possibilty that humans have built in randomness generators.

Yes I'm assuming, for the sake of argument, that the computer could actually be built and be of a manageable size, even though I'm sure you could never really build such a thing. The computer could certainly model the scientists behaviour perfectly. And I'm assuming determinism, so no randomness.

Not necessarily, as I've written in this post. If the computer can factor in your inevitable responses it can keep going.

It can figure out your inevitable responses but it still has a problem. It figures out your responses to being told its predictions about future of the universe. But how did it come up with these predictions in the first place, given that you are part of that universe? It can't predict the future of the universe in which you are told the future of the universe unless it first knows what that future is. It needs to know what the predictions are that it will be telling you to do the calculations in the first place, but this is precisely what it has yet to calculate.

I overstated my case when I said that predictions are only accurate if you don't act on them. Clearly there are lots of cases where you can receive a prediction and then act on it but your actions do not cause any changes that would invalidate that prediction. If I knew next week's lottery numbers then my buying a lottery ticket with those numbers is not going to change the outcome of the draw (or is it - maybe the lottery balls are a chaotic system and my walking to the shops to purchase a ticket is like the butterfly effect?). But how would the computer ensure its predictions were such that this was always the case?

I disagree, because otherwise free will exists outside of what we consider to be conscious, or even sentient entities. For example, the long term weather is unpredictable with current technology, and it could be those same type of chaotic and complex forces which might make our reaction to what we are told is our predicted behavior unpredictable with current technology, even if it's predetermined.

The weather doesn't make predictions of its own behaviour, therefore defining free will as "our ability to act contrary to our predictions of our own behaviour, however accurate those predictions may be" it doesn't make it applicable to the weather.

 

[Darth Rotor]

"Necessarily"? Or simply circularly?

Read this excellent thread for a discussion of circularity in the concept of "will".

Necessarily.

Human beings in their form as "life forms on earth" are finite beings in capability. That position is consistent with various theist doctrines, and with non theist positions in the limitations of humans.

Finite, have or has bounds. Human exercise of any capacity is finite.

That is what I meant.

DR

 

[Mercutio]

Necessarily.

Human beings in their form as "life forms on earth" are finite beings in capability. That position is consistent with various theist doctrines, and with non theist positions in the limitations of humans.

Finite, have or has bounds. Human exercise of any capacity is finite.

That is what I meant.

DR

Fair enough. Now, why I asked: You had said I would add to that that human exercise of free will, or of will, is necessarily bounded by the set of inherent human limitations. My question was how you were defining those "inherent human limitations" (which seems not to have been your point at all); some here have defined human limitations as causal--"we cannot do anything that we do not first possess the ability to do." That, of course, is circular reasoning, and deserves objection. It seems that your point is much more general. Thank you for clarifying.

 

[Darth Rotor]

Fair enough. Now, why I asked: You had said I would add to that that human exercise of free will, or of will, is necessarily bounded by the set of inherent human limitations. My question was how you were defining those "inherent human limitations" (which seems not to have been your point at all); some here have defined human limitations as causal--"we cannot do anything that we do not first possess the ability to do." That, of course, is circular reasoning, and deserves objection. It seems that your point is much more general. Thank you for clarifying.

Yes.

Pleased to be occasionally clear, even if it takes two (or three) tries.

DR

 

[RandFan]

Do you think that's what makes people uncomfortable? I think people simply want to know that their actions were "decided by them," not by purely deterministic and random processes. They are concerned about personal responsibility: How is it my responsibility for murder when it was all predetermined? Who will be the first murderer to use materialism as a defense?

~~ Paul

When I first thought about the notion of no free will it caused me some unease but in the end, what does it matter? You seem to make decisions and you live your life as though you make decisions and if you don't have free will it really can't possibly change one damn thing. You can't very easily choose to not have free will if you do have free will and you obviously can't do anything about it if you don't have free will.

I don't get the hand wringing at all. Stay home from work tomorrow or flip a coin to help make your decisions thus demonstrating that you are overriding your internal decision making processes. These things just might reinforce the idea that you truly do have free will. It's BS of course but hey, if it makes you feel better, or, on the other hand, don't... The choice is yours.

Oh, and check out what Pinker and Dennett say about free will. There seems to be some room for it in materialism.

 

[Art Vandelay]

Well, Quantum Mechanics invalidates this definition of determinism.

You are making the very common mistake of confusing a particular interpretation of QM with QM itself. There is no way to use QM to disprove determinism.

 

[Tricky]

When I first thought about the notion of no free will it caused me some unease but in the end, what does it matter? You seem to make decisions and you live your life as though you make decisions and if you don't have free will it really can't possibly change one damn thing. You can't very easily choose to not have free will if you do have free will and you obviously can't do anything about it if you don't have free will.

I don't get the hand wringing at all. Stay home from work tomorrow or flip a coin to help make your decisions thus demonstrating that you are overriding your internal decision making processes. These things just might reinforce the idea that you truly do have free will. It's BS of course but hey, if it makes you feel better, or, on the other hand, don't... The choice is yours.

My feeling exactly. Either we have free will or we have the illusion of free will. If you can't tell the difference, then it doesn't make any difference.

 

[Mercutio]

My feeling exactly. Either we have free will or we have the illusion of free will. If you can't tell the difference, then it doesn't make any difference.

What a load of tripe.

If we, because we cannot tell a difference, assume that we do have free will, we reject a library full of useful, empirically demonstrable, causal connections between our environments and our actions.

There is enough difference between a sunrise and the illusion of a sunrise to put a man on the moon. The former leads to a maddening set of calculations, the latter to a few simple laws of motion.

If we assume (because we "can't tell the difference") that we have free will, then we accept that we cannot predict our behavior from knowledge about our environment. We accept that we cannot change things for the better. Hey, though, on the plus side, we can blame people for what they do wrong. As long as we are on the winning side, it's all good.

An assumption (oh, hell, let's admit that it is more than this; we have a century of science to back us up) that our behavior is determined, though, allows us to bring science to bear on the big problems of our time. Advertisers already know that we can be predictably manipulated; shall we simply ignore what they know? Or might it be a nice idea to have someone other than Nike or Phillip Morris benefit from the unthinkable assumption that we might, like with geocentrism and special creation, be once more deluding ourselves?

 

[hammegk]

What a load of tripe.

Sure, but what does your pre-programming & current inputs say isn't?

 

[Art Vandelay]

If we assume (because we "can't tell the difference") that we have free will, then we accept that we cannot predict our behavior from knowledge about our environment. We accept that we cannot change things for the better.

How so? Either the assumption that we have free will is correct, or it's not. If it is, then what's the problem? How can assuming something that turns out to be right cause problems? And if it's not correct, then we had no choice in the matter, anyway, so why worry about it?

 

[Mercutio]

And if it's not correct, then we had no choice in the matter, anyway, so why worry about it?

Truth may not be decided by popular opinion, but policy often is.

 

[RandFan]

What a load of tripe.

If we, because we cannot tell a difference, assume that we do have free will, we reject a library full of useful, empirically demonstrable, causal connections between our environments and our actions.

There is enough difference between a sunrise and the illusion of a sunrise to put a man on the moon. The former leads to a maddening set of calculations, the latter to a few simple laws of motion.

If we assume (because we "can't tell the difference") that we have free will, then we accept that we cannot predict our behavior from knowledge about our environment. We accept that we cannot change things for the better. Hey, though, on the plus side, we can blame people for what they do wrong. As long as we are on the winning side, it's all good.

An assumption (oh, hell, let's admit that it is more than this; we have a century of science to back us up) that our behavior is determined, though, allows us to bring science to bear on the big problems of our time. Advertisers already know that we can be predictably manipulated; shall we simply ignore what they know? Or might it be a nice idea to have someone other than Nike or Phillip Morris benefit from the unthinkable assumption that we might, like with geocentrism and special creation, be once more deluding ourselves?

I can't speak for Tricky. I largely agree with you however my point wasn't that we can't possibly know but that in the end there is no appreciable difference. Tricky is right, why get bent out of shape about something we can't possibly change? If you are right Mercutio then we will believe or not believe and there is no choice on our part. Tripe?

ETA: Though it is only rhetorical I think the JREF poster who goes by the user name President Bush has an interesting point. You debate as if any of us has a choice.

For the record, I agree with you and not PB.

 

[President Bush]

that our behavior is determined, though, allows us to bring science to bear on the big problems of our time.

Illustrate?

 

[chriswl]

You are making the very common mistake of confusing a particular interpretation of QM with QM itself. There is no way to use QM to disprove determinism.

Really? I would define a deterministic world as one that we can in principle predict. Doesn't QM flatly contradict this? The uncertainty principle isn't merely an "interpretation" of QM, is it?

 

[RandFan]

Really? I would define a deterministic world as one that we can in principle predict. Doesn't QM flatly contradict this? The uncertainty principle isn't merely an "interpretation" of QM, is it?

I think you are making the classical error of applying QM to events above both the subatomic and atomic levels. If we couldn't make such predictions then there wouldn't be any point to science. The problem with such predictions (like predicting human behavior) doesn't have anything to do with QM but the sheer large number of variables and our inability to quantify every single one and to understand the relationship of every single variable to every other variable. Complex and dynamic systems are very sensitive to what may seem trivial events. I think the explanation of the problem lies with Chaos Theory and not QM. FWIW, Chaos Theory is a bit of a misnomer.