Nope - I posted my reply before I read your later post.
However, I challenge the assertion that identical physical structures will give rise to identical consciousnesses. That's completely unclear.
In point of fact, several assumptions are being made:
1) That transportation will be virtually instantaneous
2) That the original (and replication) will not be aware of the transport process, or experience anything during it.
3) That the outcome for consciousness will be both seamless and transparent.
There's absolutely no basis for these assumptions that I'm aware of. Transportation may require minutes, or even hours of processing. It may very well be that the original will be aware - and even experience sensations - during transmission; it may also be that the replicant may experience awareness and experience sensations at some point during the re-creation process.
All of this, though, is an argument regarding the technical limitations or physical limitations of the process...which makes this less a discussion of identity than of the limits of physical law. I'd agree with what you wrote above, but it doesn't invalidate my point. IF what you wrote above were true, then the two outcomes would NOT be physically identical...there would be differences (at some level), which means my point stands.
I agree there's no basis to assume instantaneous transport is possible...that's why it's a hypothetical
Sure, we can play around with these considerations and state that the original subject will be anesthetized prior to transport; but that simply hides the question without addressing it.
Essentailly immaterial to my point, thouhg, as I stated before. We're assuming physically identical copies.
Ah-ah-ah! No moving the goalpost.
No more so than assuming the process is not as laid out in the hypothetical (i.e.-that the copy process is imperfect and this somhow relates to the nature of identity).
We're talking about full and complete replication via matter transportation here - not gradual replacement of the original's parts in-place. If you want to discuss that, Huntsman, we should start a different thread.
I'm trying to broaden the discussion, because the issue here is identity (at least, that's what I'm discussing). IF you'd rather focus on the physical probabilities and capabilties of a matter transportation system, just say so, becuase that's (to me) a relatively uninteresting questions that has nothing to say about the nature of identity.
The point is, if continuity is the deciding factor in identity, then you have to be able to account for the differences. Whether a gradual or sudden change. Why does the speed of the change matter? At what point, or what percentage of change, is it considered a "break" in continuity?
What I'm doing here is exactly what I'm talking about in my signature. I had the same view before, but you have to expand the scenrio to try and break the theory. How can you stretch the scenario to apply pressure to the theory of continuity=identity?
Nope. I disagree. "You" is not a steady-state; change happens, but you're still "you". In example, if someone becomes mentally ill, they are not "someone else". Their identity hasn't changed even if they've lost their memories and had a complete personality change.
Okay, to a degree. I would argue that, with some mental disorders, they do become differnet people. I believe their identity does change.
One can only terminate an individual identity upon death - you can't simply declare it as no longer valid for a given person.
Okay, so death is the deciding factor? What type of death?
In example, none of us are identical to the personality we had as children and/or young adults; we've all experienced great changes in personality, knowledge, experience, and so forth. Yet our identity is still unchanged - we are who we are.
Agreed.
If you make a copy of someone, the original is still "who they are", and the copy is someone else - regardless of how closely they may match the original.
Yes, because they differ post-replication. However, both have exactly identical right to the claim of being "you" pre-replication. Post-replication each version is accountable seperately for their actions. They are physically different at this point (they differ in spatial coordinates and perceptions, at the least). However, before replication, both represent the culmination of the actions and decisions taken. Trying to claim they are different (in the ongoing example, saying that only the original should be tried for murder, for example) is essentially the same as claiming that a synthetically created chemical is different from a naturally-created one, even if both are chemically and physically identical. Both will have the same properties, react similarly, etc.
I'm agreeing that they are different after the duplication, but they are both "you" as much as the other. It's jus tthat there are two "yous" from that point on, that will diverge. Different people, but only in the same sense that you are different one year from now: due to differing experience and circumstance.
Look at it another way. Let's say, for some reason, time splits into two timelines. Down one, you decide to become an astrophysicist. Down the other, you decide to become a football player. Which one is you?
They are, arguably, different people who experienced different cirumstances and made different decisions, and thus developed differently. But which one is "you"?
I view the duplication scnerio exactly the same (of course, all this assumes physically identical copies).
The basis of my view is realizing that identity is not really so much a physical thing. Continuity is a part of it, but physical structure as well. As long as the physical structure is maintained, continuity continues. And an identical physical strucutre (or two things physical created using the same processes) shoudl have the same reactions and properties (somethign that is upheld through physical law). This is why I say that the two copies should be considered identicalyl regarding any pre-duplicatin events, only being considered seperate for things happening post-duplication. In other words, assuming transporter technology, no one escapes a murder charge by transporting across the street. The person that steps out is identical to the person that steps in. The arguments about "it isn't the same "you" that was killed" sound to me much like arguments that if Niagra Falls were stopped for an hour, then restarted, it isn't Niagra Falls anymore. Or if a fire goes down to ash and is relit, that it isn't the same fire anymore. The questions pre-suppose identity, or sense of self, as something seperately existent, and assume a non-physical component. Self doesn't exist except as an illusion. an emergent property of physical processes.
To take it a step further, there's no way even theoretically possible to prove that the self that came out of one end of a tranporter is not the self that went into the initial end. Nor can it be proven that it is identical. Not even in theory can this be done (of course, not even in theory can we make an instantaneous transporter, either, but still). And that's the point, There's no way to prove, even to yourself, that it isn't the exact same. If the original is not destroyed, then the only thing that differentiates the two is location (at least initially), and again no way to prove that the "real one" is the one that stayed or the one that was sent. In fact, there's no way to prove there is a "real one" that isn't arbitrarily chosen. You've said yourself that we are different people from moment to moment, that we change with time, yet remain the same person. So why would changing with space (but not time, as in an instant duplication) be different?
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