Prayer and power

[RandFan]

If I point to a stop-light and say "that light is not red," have I said it's green?

No, of course not. Both green and amber -- or yellow, depending upon where you're driving -- are included in the category of "not red." For that matter, "off" is also "not red," as are any of several different kinds of malfunction.

Ok, no conviction on my part, no rhetoric and no bluster, fair enough?

If I say that the light is either red or green have I not created a false dichotomy?

 

[Kopji]

You mean how would Christians resolve that? You'd have to ask a Christian. I imagine that Christians wouldn't find such evidence to be contradictory for their beliefs since they don't believe that all prayers are granted. I also imagine that their opinion about what constitutes a "negative impact" might be different from yours or mine, since they believe that God would do whatever is in the best interest of the person being prayed for, and the negative result might be for a greater good that we don't know about.

-Bri

Hi Bri,
I'm just trying to follow your points. My question is not very theoretical, it has actually happened. 'Negative impact' would be something like people who knew they were being prayed for having more medical complications.

And patients who knew they were being prayed for had a higher rate of post-operative complications like abnormal heart rhythms, perhaps because of the expectations the prayers created, the researchers suggested.

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/31/h...00&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all

My earlier point was that prayer does have an effect, but that does not say anything at all about the existence of a deity. A detremental measurable effect makes that point just as well as people getting better.

 

[Hyver]

Sorry randfan, went to work and then go sidetracked by a weekend so I couldn't finish our conversation.

Anyway, I'm going to start by restating my argument in the most clear non ambiguous way possible, and then I'm going to go over the parts which we have been in dispute about.


Premises:

1. God exists (we are working from a Christian viewpoint and so the assumption that God exists is one which we can make. I don't want to argue over whether he exists or not, I just want to talk about what we can know from our lack of evidence of God)

2. God is omnipotent and omniscient (I'm going to stick with omnipotence in the way defined by Thomas Aquinas, that is, "The ability to do all things that are possible." This definition prevents God from making square circles, round straight lines, and generally make a mess out of logic. If you happen to think that God is above logic, then by all means go ahead and skip the rest of this post because it doesn't adhere to your world view.)

3. I do not have evidence that God exists (this one is a fact.)

4. There is nothing restraining God from providing me evidence of his existence (This just hypothesizes that there are no problems with God providing evidence to me. It is probably a good place for someone to attack the argument, but I think it comes along as a part of 2 above. The only things that could restrain God are logical impossibilities because of his omnipotence. It could be that there is some sort of logical impossibility preventing God from giving me the evidence I would need, but for now I think it's a reasonable premise.)

Those are the premises, I hope we can both accept them as adequate.

The first step that I want to undertake is again the one which you seem to have so much trouble dealing with. I wish, via the law of excluded middle, to introduce a self justifying premise. Now, because the initial problem was that my original predicate was poorly defined, I am going to take great care in crafting this new predicate.

5. It is the case that God wants to provide me evidence of his existence right now without any expenditure of effort on my part, or it is not the case that God wants to provide me evidence of his existence right now without any expenditure of effort on my part.

Now, I believe this to be an adequate statement, specific enough to not be a false dichotomy. If you believe it to be a false dichotomy, then please be charitable to my argument. It is not intentions to use a fallacy to make my argument work. If you feel that statement 5 is not specific enough then suggest a replacement for 5 which would be adequately specific. If you feel that there is no such acceptable statement for 5, then please explain to my why it is that the law of excluded middle would be impossible to invoke in this instance.

Now then, if we assume the first part of 5 (It is the case that God wants to provide me evidence of his existence right now without any expenditure of effort on my part.) to be true, then we have a situation in which God does want me to know about him, he exists, is omnipotent, and there is nothing restraining him from giving me the evidence that I need to know about him, but yet I still do not have the evidence. This seems to be an absurdity.

Given that 5 is true, and that the first half of that disjunction leads to an absurdity, it follows then that the second half of the disjunction is true. It is not the case that God wants to provide me evidence of his existence right now without any expenditure of effort on my part.

Now then, I have admitted before and I will admit once again, my initial argument, while the same in spirit as this one, did not have language precise enough to reach the conclusion intact. My initial number 5 was very very poorly written. A problem which this argument might also run into is with item 4. It seems as if there might be some things which might restrain God from providing us with evidence even though he may want us to have it. One possible thing which could make this objection work would be our own free will (I know some might not agree that it exists, but if a Christian philosopher were to argue against this I feel it would not be an issue for him. The argument is set from a Christian standpoint and as a result it has to have the other baggage that comes from Christianity). An argument could probably be made that something about our free will prevents God from interacting with us properly in order to preserve our free will. I'm not sure how well it would work, but the door is certainly open for a rebuttal in that department.

Anyway, it seems as though this is a bit late, but hopefully it will act as a more accurate representation as to what I was trying to say 4 pages ago (though it's not really relevant anymore )

P.S. This really has nothing to do with the rest of what Bri is talking about. Really I haven't read enough of the conversation to join in on one side or the other. Maybe I'll get some time and post something relevant

 

[RandFan]

Sorry randfan, went to work and then go sidetracked by a weekend so I couldn't finish our conversation.

Anyway, I'm going to start by restating my argument in the most clear non ambiguous way possible, and then I'm going to go over the parts which we have been in dispute about.

Premises:

5. It is the case that God wants to provide me evidence of his existence right now without any expenditure of effort on my part, or it is not the case that God wants to provide me evidence of his existence right now without any expenditure of effort on my part.

Now, I believe this to be an adequate statement, specific enough to not be a false dichotomy. If you believe it to be a false dichotomy, then please be charitable to my argument. It is not intentions to use a fallacy to make my argument work. If you feel that statement 5 is not specific enough then suggest a replacement for 5 which would be adequately specific. If you feel that there is no such acceptable statement for 5, then please explain to my why it is that the law of excluded middle would be impossible to invoke in this instance.

Now then, if we assume the first part of 5 (It is the case that God wants to provide me evidence of his existence right now without any expenditure of effort on my part.) to be true, then we have a situation in which God does want me to know about him, he exists, is omnipotent, and there is nothing restraining him from giving me the evidence that I need to know about him, but yet I still do not have the evidence. This seems to be an absurdity.

Given that 5 is true, and that the first half of that disjunction leads to an absurdity, it follows then that the second half of the disjunction is true. It is not the case that God wants to provide me evidence of his existence right now without any expenditure of effort on my part.

Now then, I have admitted before and I will admit once again, my initial argument, while the same in spirit as this one, did not have language precise enough to reach the conclusion intact. My initial number 5 was very very poorly written. A problem which this argument might also run into is with item 4. It seems as if there might be some things which might restrain God from providing us with evidence even though he may want us to have it. One possible thing which could make this objection work would be our own free will (I know some might not agree that it exists, but if a Christian philosopher were to argue against this I feel it would not be an issue for him. The argument is set from a Christian standpoint and as a result it has to have the other baggage that comes from Christianity). An argument could probably be made that something about our free will prevents God from interacting with us properly in order to preserve our free will. I'm not sure how well it would work, but the door is certainly open for a rebuttal in that department.

Anyway, it seems as though this is a bit late, but hopefully it will act as a more accurate representation as to what I was trying to say 4 pages ago (though it's not really relevant anymore )

P.S. This really has nothing to do with the rest of what Bri is talking about. Really I haven't read enough of the conversation to join in on one side or the other. Maybe I'll get some time and post something relevant

Hi Hyver,

Thanks and I think you did a great job clarifying the argument. My hats off to you. I am approaching this from a bit of a different perspective. I'm dumping my assumptions and ego. I appreciate your patience and I apologize but I'm going to need some additional help.

Let's go back to #5 first and let's take an example from the Wikipedia article Law of Excluded Middle.

Example: Either “this is red” is true or “this is not red” is true or both “this is red” and “this is not red” is true. (See below for more about how this is derived from the primitive axioms).

We have a traffic light.

Statement: Either "the traffic light is red" is true or "the traffic light is red" is not true.
So, we come to the intersection, what are our options.

The light is red: true.
The light is green: not true.
The light is yellow (amber): not true.
No lights are on: not true.

So far so good. Anything other than the light is red is the light is not red.

A false dilemma would be to declare that the light is either red or green, correct?

Question: What if the light is broken and both the red light is on and the green light is on? In which case then both “the traffic light is red” and “the traffic light is not red” is true, correct? To remove any ambiguity we would have to say that the "traffic light is only red". Yes? No? Something else?

 

[RandFan]

1.) There is an invisible leprechaun in my room.
2.) He is capable of being both visible and invisible to me.
3.) I have never seen him and I have no evidence that he exists (a fact).
4.) That he has never shown himself to me is proof that he doesn't actively desire from me to know that he is there.

Assuming that 4 is adequately and precisely stated then this is a logically valid hypothetical. But it remains a hypothetical. The truth of 4 can't be established until the truth of 1 is established. So 4 is evidence of nothing. In the end 4 is simply absence of knowledge.

 

[RandFan]

1.) There is an invisible leprechaun in my room.
2.) He is capable of being both visible and invisible to me.
3.) I have never seen him and I have no evidence that he exists (a fact).
4.) That he has never shown himself to me is proof that he doesn't actively desire from me to know that he is there.

Assuming that 4 is adequately and precisely stated then this is a logically valid hypothetical. But it remains a hypothetical. The truth of 4 can't be established until the truth of 1 is established. So 4 is evidence of nothing. In the end 4 is simply absence of knowledge.

While I agree with my conclusion that evidence of nothing is not proof of anything I am having second thoughts as to the validity of the hypothetical. If we could prove an attribute of an entity then would we not prove the existence of the entity? Isn't the argument circular?

Let's simplify it.

1. There is an invisible unicorn in my room
2. That I can't see it is proof that the unicorn is invisible.

Isn't this begging the question? How can I get to 2 unless and until I can establish 1?

God exists.
God doesn't want me to know that he/she exists.
I don't know that God exists therefore God exists.

 

[RandFan]

While I agree with my conclusion that evidence of nothing is not proof of anything I am having second thoughts as to the validity of the hypothetical. If we could prove an attribute of an entity then would we not prove the existence of the entity? Isn't the argument circular?

From wikipedia

Begging the question

• Suppose Paul does not lie when he speaks.
• Paul speaks.
• Therefore, Paul is speaking truth.

These statements are logical, but they do nothing to convince one of the truthfulness of the speaker. The problem is that in seeking to prove Paul's truthfulness, the speaker asks his audience to assume that Paul is telling the truth, so this actually proves "If Paul is not lying, then Paul is telling the truth." which is nothing more than a tautology.

It is important to note that such arguments are logically valid. That is, the conclusion does in fact follow from the premises, since it is in some way identical to the premises. All self-circular arguments have this characteristic: that the proposition to be proved is assumed at some point in the argument. This is why begging the question was classified as a Material fallacy rather than a Logical fallacy by Aristotle.

(emphasis mine). So the argument could be logically valid but circular and materially fallacious.

 

[Hyver]

I'm a touch late getting back to you again, and I'm heading out the door, but lemme see what I can say before I have to go (I'll make an effort to have more time to devote to this monday)

The traffic light:

The way I understand it (it may not be perfect, classes start on wednesday so if you want I can ask one of my philosophy professors about it if we havn't come up with anything by then) the best way to clarify this is to take your and statement (The light is red and green) and split it into to statements, 1. the light is red and 2. the light is green. we also then have the disjunction 3. the light is red or it is not the case that it is red.

To work this out in a formal proof you would assume one half of the disjunction,
3a. It is not the case that the light is red.
and then combine it with 1 to get
4. The light is red, and it is not the case that the light is red.
This is an example of A and not A, which is an example of a contradiction. it follows from the contradiction and the origional 3 that the first half of 3 is true, the light is red. Becouse of the way that excluded middle sets up it's disjunctions, they, though technicly are inclusive disjunctions (A or B, either or both can be true), are always exclusive disjunctions (A or B, but not A and B).


As for the leprichon, the argument seems to be valid. The one thing to keep in mind is that since we have no evidence about your lephricon in the end the best that it can prove assuming the truth of 3 ( 3.) I have never seen him and I have no evidence that he exists (a fact).) is an if-then statement regarding the leprichon.

If 1 and 2 then 4

in the unicorn example we would end up with a similar thing.
"If 1 then 2"
Is the strongest statement that can be made out of that argument without being circular.

Of course these If-Then statements really arn't very telling. for example using the wikipedea example of paul lieing.

If paul does not lie then he is speaking the truth.....

really great bit of information there, who would have thunk it

Anyway, I hope that makes sense, I'll be back on monday afternoon I think, have a good night sirs.

 

[Bri]

This is ignorance. It's been explained to you time and again but it is clear that you don't care about the explanations. Greater than 0% and less than 100% for a single galaxy. Considering how many galaxies there are in the universe what ever that chance, however small is much greater. It isn't simply seculation. But you revel in your ignorance.

Yes, I know it's for a single galaxy, which is why I said "in the galaxy." As you know, I was talking about the belief that intelligent life exists in the galaxy.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Hi Bri,
I'm just trying to follow your points. My question is not very theoretical, it has actually happened. 'Negative impact' would be something like people who knew they were being prayed for having more medical complications.

I'm familiar with the recent study you cited, but I don't think that it conflicts with most Christian beliefs in prayer, since I doubt that most Christians believe that God grants all prayers.

My earlier point was that prayer does have an effect, but that does not say anything at all about the existence of a deity. A detremental measurable effect makes that point just as well as people getting better.

I'm still not clear on your point here.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

1.) There is an invisible leprechaun in my room.
2.) He is capable of being both visible and invisible to me.
3.) I have never seen him and I have no evidence that he exists (a fact).
4.) That he has never shown himself to me is proof that he doesn't actively desire from me to know that he is there.

Assuming that 4 is adequately and precisely stated then this is a logically valid hypothetical. But it remains a hypothetical. The truth of 4 can't be established until the truth of 1 is established. So 4 is evidence of nothing. In the end 4 is simply absence of knowledge.

#4 is evidence that if the other premises are true, the leprechaun doesn't actively desire for you to know that he is there.

If you don't accept the premises as true, then #4 isn't evidence of anything.

My point was that if a Christian believes that God exists, is omnipotent, and actively doesn't want us to know for certain of his existence, then there would be no reason for the Christian to assume that there would be evidence of prayer working. Therefore, a lack of evidence that prayer works isn't necessarily evidence that prayer doesn't work.

I thought that it was a pretty uncontroversial point.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

I assume we are talking essentially about petitionary prayer. I haven't followed the entire thread so I'm not sure of all the definitions of "rational/irrational" that have been offered. I think the concept, at its barest level, is not irrational in the sense of defying logic (though that assessment becomes more complex when you bring in specific beliefs of certain Christians about exactly what it is and how or why it works).

I haven't actually been able to nail anyone down on what they mean by "irrational" as it applies to prayer. There have been attempts to use it to mean "less rational than everything else that I label as rational." Examples of "rational" beliefs have then ranged from the Deist belief in God to the strong atheist belief that no gods exist to the belief that intelligent life exists in the galaxy. "Irrational" beliefs include the belief that prayer sometimes influences the world, the belief that God exists, and the belief in Bigfoot.

So far, the most compelling criteria by which it can be determined that the rational beliefs are rational was posted by drkitten:

However, it's fairly safe to say that a belief for which no credible empirical evidence can be cited and for which no theoretical support can be given is irrational.

The first criteria (that no credible empirical evidence can be cited) is true of prayer, but also true of many other beliefs that are considered "rational" by others on the thread. I'm still not certain what drkitten means by "theoretical support" though.

It seems that the last couple of pages are discussing not so much whether the Christian's belief in prayer is rational as whether it is warranted (whether in the way Al Plantinga means, or some other sense). I am not certain if Christian belief in prayer is warranted or not. However, I think that my disbelief in it is warranted.

I agree that disbelief in prayer is warranted. The discussion has been about whether Christian belief in prayer is irrational.

-Bri

 

[drkitten]

Ok, no conviction on my part, no rhetoric and no bluster, fair enough?

If I say that the light is either red or green have I not created a false dichotomy?

You have. But if you state that the light is either red or not red, you have not.

The original statement of Hyver's to which you objected was :

5. God does want me to know about him, or God does not want me to know about him.

You claimed that is a false dichotomy (actually, you used the term "false disjunction"). This is untrue, as above. The light is either red or not-red; we can argue later about what type of not-red it might be.

 

[drkitten]

I haven't actually been able to nail anyone down on what they mean by "irrational" as it applies to prayer.

I already gave it to you. In simpler terms, a belief is rational if there is "reason" to believe it.

A believe is irrational if there is no (intellect-based) reason to believe it.

The first criteria (that no credible empirical evidence can be cited) is true of prayer, but also true of many other beliefs that are considered "rational" by others on the thread.

Really? Name these "many," then. Please.

I'm still not certain what drkitten means by "theoretical support" though.

A reason to believe that is based on deduction from principles otherwise rationally believed true.

I agree that disbelief in prayer is warranted. The discussion has been about whether Christian belief in prayer is irrational.

You have not presented a reason to believe. Ergo, it's irrational.

 

[Bri]

Uniformitarianism.

"If it happened this way once, it's likely to happen this way again."

Arguably the most fundamental and well-established scientific argument in existence.

Emphasis mine. I can agree that if something has happened many times one way, that it's likely to happen that way again under similar circumstances, but only once? That seems like a fallacy to me. I couldn't find any references to uniformatarianism that defined it as you have here. Can you post a reference?

I never claimed that belief in Bigfoot is rational. I claimed that belief in Galadriel is MORE irrational than belief in Bigfoot.

I thought you were attempting to provide a criteria by which belief in one thing for which there is no empirical evidence could be labeled "irrational" while another is labeled "rational" (i.e. that there is "theoretical support" for one). Since having theoretical support can't be used to distinguish between two beliefs for which there is no empirical evidence, can you provide a criteria by which we can distinguish, say, belief in Bigfoot from belief in intelligent life elsewhere in the galaxy?

It's theoretically possible that I might have flown to Monte Carlo last weekend and won fifty billion Euros. It violates no law of physics. It is immensely implausible, to the point where any rational observer would dismiss it out of hand without further supporting evidence.

And yet, if someone had reason to believe it, such a belief might be rational. For example, your mother or best friend might have reason to believe that you're telling the truth (for example, the fact that you've never lied to them before) even if you can't immediately provide supporting evidence, particularly if you had a reason for not being able to provide the evidence (for example, you cannot get access to the money until working out taxes with the IRS). So would your mother or best friend be irrational for believing you until you provided the evidence?

Yes, if you're looking for a single criterion by which to label all beliefs as rational or irrational, you will fail to find one. Similarly, if you are looking for a single criterion to distinguish a good job application from a poor one, you will fail to find one. That's because beliefs, like job applications, can fail in a number of different ways.

I'm not necessarily looking for a single criterion. A set of criteria would work also. The fact that a set of criteria cannot be developed for job applications seems to suggest that distinguishing between similar job applications might be based on some amount of speculation. It would also seem to be the case that such a decision couldn't be called "irrational" regardless of which applicant is chosen.

However, it's fairly safe to say that a belief for which no credible empirical evidence can be cited and for which no theoretical support can be given is irrational.

I think it's fair to say that we're discussing beliefs for which there is very little or no empirical evidence. There is little if any empirical evidence that prayer works, that intelligent life exists elsewhere in the galaxy, or that Bigfoot exists.

So, I guess I'm still not sure what constitutes the threshold of "theoretical support" necessary to declare a belief rational since the only examples provided of beliefs with no empirical evidence but with "theoretical support" are Bigfoot and ET's, and only one of those is considered rational. What sort of theoretical support does belief in the existence of intelligent life elsewhere in our galaxy have that belief in the existence of Bigfoot doesn't have?

Er, no, although it wouldn't surprise me if all the theories which which you are familiar are the well-founded ones. Read some of the cutting-edge journals and see some of the wild speculations that scientists feel free to indulge in in exactly those cases where there is little experimental evidence. Physics is a good discipline for that.

An example of an ill-founded scientific theory -- as I said, it's really little more than a hypothesis -- is the idea (popularized by Arthur C. Clarke, among others) that there is life on Europa. There's no "firm evidentiary basis" for Dr. Greenberg's speculations, and he would no doubt be among the first to admit that. As a working theory, he's perfectly free to speculate about what kind of life it might be, and more importantly, about what traces it might leave so that we can find it. But I don't think I would characterize anyone as irrational who didn't believe in Europan life, despite Dr. Greenberg.

Do you think the belief that Europan life does exist is irrational since it's based on "ill-founded" theory?

No.

Scientific theories are only refuted when new evidence comes along. It is rational to reject an old belief in favor of new evidence, almost by definition.

I agree. But let's say that someone is of the opinion that evidence exists that would refute the current "well-founded" theory and spends time searching for it. Is this belief irrational?

One of the major intellectual hurdles to the acceptance of Darwin's theory of evolution was the lack of evidence for the process of heritance and genetic variability. The rediscovery of Gregor Mendel's experiments filled in that hole. It would have been rational for one of Darwin's contemporaries to reject Darwin's theories on the basis that the evidence just wasn't there.... not so today.

I agree that it would have been rational for one of Darwin's contemporaries to reject Darwin's theories on the basis that the evidence just wasn't there. The more relevant question is would it have been irrational for one of Darwin's contemporaries (or Darwin himself) to be of the opinion that Darwin's theories were correct before Mendel's experiments provided the necessary evidence?

The "plum pudding model" of the atom was rejected when Rutherford ran his experiments. It was not irrational to believe in the plum pudding model beforehand, because we didn't know any better. Learning that the atomic nucleus exists makes belief in the plum pudding model irrational.

I agree that it was not irrational to believe in the plum pudding model before Rutherford's experiments. The more relevant question is would someone have been irrational to believe that the "plum pudding model" was inaccurate despite the "well-founded" theory of the "plum pudding model" before Rutherford's experiments proved it? Suppose Rutheford himself believed that the current model was inaccurate, which lead him to look for the evidence to support his opinion? Would you say that Rutheford held an irrational belief?

Er, no. Quantum theory has not contradicted causation.

Sorry, I probably meant determinism (the theory that every state of affairs is entirely the result of prior causes). Doesn't quantum theory now refute what was before assumed to be true? Would the belief that there are undetermined events have been irrational before quantum theory was "well-founded?"

-Bri

 

[I less than three logic]

(for example, the fact that you've never lied to them before)

Now this is irrational. Not once, ever? Really? Not even when she asks how she looks, or if everything is alright?

 

[Bri]

I already gave it to you. In simpler terms, a belief is rational if there is "reason" to believe it.

A believe is irrational if there is no (intellect-based) reason to believe it.

Christians have reason to believe in Christianity. I'm not sure what you mean by "intellect-based" though.

Really? Name these "many," then. Please.

Some beliefs labeled on this thread as "rational" despite a lack of empirical evidence:

• belief in the Diest view of God.
• belief that intelligent life exists elsewhere in the galaxy.
• belief that no gods exist.

I'm sure there were others.

A reason to believe that is based on deduction from principles otherwise rationally believed true.

Christianity is based on principles otherwise rationally believed true, so that definition doesn't seem to work without applying circular logic (that belief in Christianity is based on irrational principles which are irrational because they are based on other irrational principles).

I think I'm asking what defines a principle as being "rationally" believed true.

You have not presented a reason to believe. Ergo, it's irrational.

Most Christians probably have reasons to believe, although likely not reason enough for you or I to believe. However, the fact that one might rationally not be convinced by the reasons held for belief that intelligent life exists elsewhere in the galaxy doesn't make such a belief irrational.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Now this is irrational. Not once, ever? Really? Not even when she asks how she looks, or if everything is alright?

Maybe drkitten's mother always looks nice and drkitten is especially well-adjusted. I've seen no evidence to the contrary!

Since this was presumably a hypothetical example, let's say that drkitten's mother has no reason to believe that drkitten has ever lied to her. Is it irrational for her to believe that he is telling the truth in this instance?

-Bri

 

[I less than three logic]

Maybe drkitten's mother always looks nice and drkitten is especially well-adjusted. I've seen no evidence to the contrary!

Since this was presumably a hypothetical example, let's say that drkitten's mother has no reason to believe that drkitten has ever lied to her. Is it irrational for her to believe that he is telling the truth in this instance?

-Bri

Wow, no sense of humor whatsoever?

Based solely on the belief that she has never lied to her, I’d still say it is irrational to believe such a claim without at least some evidence other than just her word. Does her mother have reason to believe she has the means to up and fly to Monte Carlo for a weekend? Does her mother have reason to believe this is something DrK might do, or is it completely out of character for her? Does her mother believe DrK was scheduled to work that weekend or that she had it off? If she believes she was scheduled to work, does the claim still coincide with her mother’s belief of DrK’s character? So many factors to consider than simply the belief that she has never been lied to.

 

[Bri]

Wow, no sense of humor whatsoever?

Sorry, it wasn't a lack of sense of humor -- just a lack of use of smilies. I was joking myself (the first paragraph anyway).

Based solely on the belief that she has never lied to her, I’d still say it is irrational to believe such a claim without at least some evidence other than just her word.

Is it irrational for drkitten's mother to believe that drkitten hasn't lied to her without evidence to the contrary?

Does her mother have reason to believe she has the means to up and fly to Monte Carlo for a weekend? Does her mother have reason to believe this is something DrK might do, or is it completely out of character for her? Does her mother believe DrK was scheduled to work that weekend or that she had it off? If she believes she was scheduled to work, does the claim still coincide with her mother’s belief of DrK’s character? So many factors to consider than simply the belief that she has never been lied to.

I agree, which is pretty much my point. I wouldn't necessarily say that drkitten's mother's belief is irrational without more evidence that drkitten is lying despite the lack of evidence that drkitten is telling the truth.

-Bri