Some observations on the problem of evil

[Robin]

I've never used the argument that somehow our capability to understand the moral consequences of a choice vanishes if the choice was itself a greater good that came about as a result of human suffering. I don't know what the "Agnostic Defense" argument is (I still don't).

I defined it in the post you were responding to. You quoted my definition of it (twice).

So, you're saying that if you suspected that the suffering resulted in a greater good (i.e. wasn't gratuitous) by providing you the opportinity to make a moral choice, that you would no longer be able to do what you believe to be morally right?

No, I said what I said. If I knew the suffering wasn't gratuitous and didn't know what the greater good was, I would not know whether or not my actions would lead to good or bad.

Amazing! So many theists believe that an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent being that will ensure that each and every instance of suffering is individually and specifically necessary to some greater good, yet are perfectly capable of acting in a moral way! How do you explain that? Generally, when some bit of logic doesn't seem to match reality, there is a problem with the logic.

And the reality is that theists don't act as though an omnimax was individually engineering each and every instance of suffering.

How many Christians do you think seriously consider that God had each molecule of the tsunami under his personal control, ensuring that it killed and maimed just the exact right people? How many Christians do you think seriously consider that God personally ripped that man's baby away from him?

No, most Christians act as though suffering were gratuitous. As it appears to be.

But the greater good may in fact be to provide a choice. What if it is? The fact that we don't know means that we cannot eliminate that as a possibility, and therefore we are capable of making moral choices based on what we do know. Congratulations, you've answered your own question!

So we must base our moral choices on a principle which we cannot eliminate as a possibility? Really? I cannot eliminate as a possibility that George Bush is an evil shapeshifting alien from the planet Bognor planning to destroy the world. Should I try to kill him?

• no suffering - good
• suffering, but presenting a choice to another person who makes the wrong choice - better
• suffering, but presenting a choice to another person who makes the right choice - best

But that does not match our morality. If the greater good involves something that contradicts our morality like this, how do you know what is the best choice being offered? Maybe the best choice is to do nothing and trust God. Maybe, the greater good has nothing to do with us. Maybe God is calling an obstinate sinner to repentance, in which case our actions will endanger his mortal soul.

Please quote where I have assumed that we know God's motives.

See your list above.

To the contrary, I am assuming that we have no idea what God's motives are.

So we could never assume that the greater good served by suffering is the provision of choice.

We must always assume that suffering is gratuitous when it appears to be. That way we can act morally. But it involves a contradiction to God engineering each and every act of suffering individually.

 

[RandFan]

This is why I always use "evidence" instead of "logic".

Yes, but one must use logic to determine IF a premise is true. One can't escape logic to prove the correctness of a conclusion.

The correct statement, IMO, should be "logic [alone] does not prove the correctness of the conclusion."

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Yes, but one must use logic to determine IF a premise is true. One can't escape logic to prove the correctness of a conclusion.

The correct statement, IMO, should be "logic [alone] does not prove the correctness of the conclusion."

Correctly stated, an argument is valid if its conclusion logically follows from its premises, and sound if it is valid and it's premises are also true. But you cannot always use logic to determine if the premises are true. For example:

Premise: Humans have a powerful intuition that they have free will.

There is no way to use logic to demonstrate whether or not this premise is true. But if you think it is, then a logically valid argument that uses this as a premise will be sound as far as you are concerned.

 

[RandFan]

Correctly stated, an argument is valid if its conclusion logically follows from its premises, and sound if it is valid and it's premises are also true. But you cannot always use logic to determine if the premises are true. For example:

Premise: Humans have a powerful intuition that they have free will.

There is no way to use logic to demonstrate whether or not this premise is true. But if you think it is, then a logically valid argument that uses this as a premise will be sound as far as you are concerned.

Agreed,

How is the pachyderm BTW?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Agreed,

How is the pachyderm BTW?

The pachyderm is fine. He is revising for a metaphysics exam on Tuesday and rather looking forward to England winning the world cup for the first time since 1966.

He has also just become the proud owner of a specimen of the rarest, most ancient and probably the oddest tree in the world (the wollemi pine is adapted to permanent twilight, grows one cone on each branch, then the branch falls off - and is practically immortal because it keeps sending up new trunks from the same root system - one of them has more than twenty), and keeps enthusiatically telling people about it, only to be met with blank looks - until he tells them he paid £300 for it, at which point the blank looks are replaced with looks of bemused incomprehension.

Yourself?

 

[chriswl]

I beg to differ. Just because the coma victim can't communicate doesn't mean that his plight cannot affect or inspire others. Perhaps he has a young family member who visits him and decides to find a cure in order to help him. I would say the family member was inspired by his situation, if not by him directly. Therefore, the coma may have been for a greater good.

I'm getting bored with having to spell everything out to you. The actual suffering or lack of suffering any particular coma patient has no effect on the assumption of those around him that he may be suferring and thus no effect on their actions.

But I don't know why I'm bothering to try to come up with a water-tight case like this. The idea that the existence of an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God requires that all suffering is for the greater good is in itself a reductio ad absurdum for the idea of an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God. There is no plausible mechanism by which all the suffering in the world could lead to a greater good. The whole point of the PoE argument is that you have to try to find a way, not just say "but maybe it all works out anyway, somehow, there solved it!"

There is a difference between the statement "the moon is not made of green cheese" and "it is impossible that the moon is made of green cheese." The former is perhaps an opinion, but the latter is stated as fact.

If the moon is not made of green cheese then it is impossible that the moon is made of green cheese. Both statements are opinions, the question is are they correct opinions (i.e. are they facts)? If opinion 1 is true then so is opinion 2.

They have, and quite successfully. You should do a bit of reading on the subject.

I have. There is a great deal of sophistry from theologians and apologists but no good arguments. If you know of a good argument I am genuinely interested to hear it. Give me your best one.

The problem with the PoE is that a defense of it bears the burden of proof since it makes a positive claim. In order to prove the PoE you must show that an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent God is impossible.

It is slowly dawning on me that you don't understand what this is about at all. Theists make the positive claim that there is an omnibenevolent, omnnipotent God. The PoE argument says: hang on, this doesn't make sense. Why would there be so much suffering in a world created by such a God? The theists have to answer this, the ball is in their court.

 

[RandFan]

The pachyderm is fine. He is revising for a metaphysics exam on Tuesday and rather looking forward to England winning the world cup for the first time since 1966.

He has also just become the proud owner of a specimen of the rarest, most ancient and probably the oddest tree in the world (the wollemi pine is adapted to permanent twilight, grows one cone on each branch, then the branch falls off - and is practically immortal because it keeps sending up new trunks from the same root system - one of them has more than twenty), and keeps enthusiatically telling people about it, only to be met with blank looks - until he tells them he paid £300 for it, at which point the blank looks are replaced with looks of bemused incomprehension.

Yourself?

Good, I've had to put sever restrictions on my use of JREF to make certain I meet my financial responsibilities but over all I'm doing well.

The tree sounds cool. I had never heard of it.

RandFan

 

[Bri]

A minor point, but if you're going to accuse someone of misquoting you, don't post the exact same quote that they quoted as evidence.

Read my quote. Read your representation of it. Different huh? That is why I reposted my quote.

I wanted to ensure we were debating my quote and not your misrepresentation.

Then you should have accused me of misrepresenting your post, not of misquoting it.

-Bri

 

[chriswl]

The pachyderm is fine. He is revising for a metaphysics exam on Tuesday and rather looking forward to England winning the world cup for the first time since 1966.

I'm afraid I lost hope the moment Rooney got injured. Sure, we still have some chance but no more so than many other teams. With Rooney fit I really thought this was our year. Well I guess there's South Africa 2010...

 

[Bri]

If I knew the suffering wasn't gratuitous and didn't know what the greater good was, I would not know whether or not my actions would lead to good or bad.

If we're assuming an omnibenevolent God (as the Problem of Evil requires) then whatever the greater good was, it would have to be so regardless of your decision. Otherwise, it wouldn't have been the greater good, would it? I gave you a specific example of a greater good as a result of suffering which would be unaffected by your decision to help the sufferer.

And the reality is that theists don't act as though an omnimax was individually engineering each and every instance of suffering.

How would you expect them to act? There would be no difference in their actions whether they believed in such an omnimax being or not. A person's good actions would increase good in the world, and bad actions would decrease it regardless of any greater good accomplished by God.

How many Christians do you think seriously consider that God had each molecule of the tsunami under his personal control, ensuring that it killed and maimed just the exact right people? How many Christians do you think seriously consider that God personally ripped that man's baby away from him?

Few Christians discount the possibility that natural disasters serve a greater purpose. In fact (although he may not have been Christian) if the tsunami victim you describe was a theist, I would guess that he probably didn't discount the possibility that his child's death may have served a greater purpose.

No, most Christians act as though suffering were gratuitous. As it appears to be.

Again, what would be the difference in how a Christian (or anyone for that matter) acted if it were or weren't gratuitous? I don't understand.

So we must base our moral choices on a principle which we cannot eliminate as a possibility? Really? I cannot eliminate as a possibility that George Bush is an evil shapeshifting alien from the planet Bognor planning to destroy the world. Should I try to kill him?

Again, whether or not suffering always results in a greater good has no bearing whatsoever on what is the morally right or wrong reaction to that suffering. Your argument that we must somehow take no action to help those who suffer because it might interfere with the greater good is absurd. If God is omnibenevolent, then he must assure that any good actions that you take to alleviate suffering results in good and any bad actions that you take (or inaction) do not result in good.

• no suffering - good
• suffering, but presenting a choice to another person who makes the wrong choice - better
• suffering, but presenting a choice to another person who makes the right choice - best

But that does not match our morality.

Yes, it most certainly does match our morality. Human beings are required to weigh the forseeable bad and the forseeable good consequences of any action to determine what is morally right or wrong. If the forseeable bad outweighs the good, it is wrong. If the forseeable good outweighs the bad, it is right. The only difference is that human beings aren't omniscient, and therefore cannot know or take into account every variable as God can. Therefore, humans must do our best to make a reasonable estimate of the immediate results of a particular action. If we were omniscient, and knew that the choice was a greater good than not having any human suffering, we would have to act according to the list above.

If the greater good involves something that contradicts our morality like this, how do you know what is the best choice being offered? Maybe the best choice is to do nothing and trust God.

If you are defining God as omnibenevolent (as the Problem of Evil demands) then any greater good that results from human suffering must be independent of our moral choices to alleviate the suffering. Doing nothing isn't going to be the morally right option whether an omnibenevolent God exists or not.

Maybe, the greater good has nothing to do with us.

Sure, it is possible that the greater good has nothing to do with us.

Maybe God is calling an obstinate sinner to repentance, in which case our actions will endanger his mortal soul.

No idea what you mean by this.

See your list above.

That list doesn't assume that we know God's motives, other than that his motives must serve the greater good if he is omnibenevolent (a condition of the Problem of Evil). That list was simply an example of how human suffering might accomplish a greater good without interfering with our ability to make a moral to alleviate the suffering. In other words, God could easily arrange it so that any aid to the sufferer does not negate the greater good accomplished. As you can see from the list, a greater good is accomplished by the suffering (compared to the good accomplished without the suffering) regardless of the choice made, but the greatest good is accomplished by the correct choice being made.

So we could never assume that the greater good served by suffering is the provision of choice.

Of course not. That was simply an example. But we could assume that we must act in a morally right way regardless of what God does. In other words, we need not worry about second-guessing an omnibenevolent God whether we believe he exists or not.

We must always assume that suffering is gratuitous when it appears to be. That way we can act morally. But it involves a contradiction to God engineering each and every act of suffering individually.

We do not need to ever assume that suffering is gratuitous in order to act to alleviate it.

-Bri

 

[rocketdodger]

How can you give an example of something that you can't imagine?

-Elliot

I have given an example of something that we can imagine, and proceeded to define whatever else "there is" as what we can't imagine. Again, my example:

In metaphysics there are three possibilities for how a thing comes to be-

1) Because of something else,
2) Because of itself,
3) Because of nothing.

Clearly, all things we know of, both in the real and abstract world, are instances of 1). 2) and 3) are nonsense to us, it is impossible to imagine how something could exist either because of itself or nothing at all, because our logic is based upon the axiom that everything exists via 1).

But, does 1) account for everything? It also is nonsense, when viewed from the position of our current logic, that everything must come from something else. Thus, there must be some other way to account for a thing's being (which might fit into 2) or 3)). However, we can't imagine what that way is.

So here we have evidence of something that we cannot imagine, but that is all we have, and furthermore our logic as it is doesn't seem to be capable of allowing us to understand it even if we have an infinite amount of data. Such a thing is what I call "beyond our logic."

 

[rocketdodger]

Incidentally, this has alot to do with the topic of free will as well.

For free will to exist, at some level at least part of our choices must come from somewhere other than pre-existing entities. If they didn't, they would not be free choices.

 

[Bri]

I'm getting bored with having to spell everything out to you. The actual suffering or lack of suffering any particular coma patient has no effect on the assumption of those around him that he may be suferring and thus no effect on their actions.

The question here is whether the coma might be for a greater good. The fact that a person is in a coma may very well affect the actions of others and the coma may therefore result in a greater good, as much as you'd like to deny it.

But I don't know why I'm bothering to try to come up with a water-tight case like this.

Not only would you have to come up with a water-tight case to prove your point (which was that not all suffering can possibly be for a greater good), but you'd actually have to demonstrate a real-life example. I'm guessing that you can't even come up with a hypothetical example, must less a real example in which a person's suffering could not possibly have served a greater good. But since you said that there are "countless" examples, you shouldn't have a problem coming up with one.

The idea that the existence of an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God requires that all suffering is for the greater good is in itself a reductio ad absurdum for the idea of an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God. There is no plausible mechanism by which all the suffering in the world could lead to a greater good. The whole point of the PoE argument is that you have to try to find a way, not just say "but maybe it all works out anyway, somehow, there solved it!"

The PoE attempts to disprove the possibility of an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God by suggesting that under no circumstances could an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God allow suffering. The argument is simply wrong if all suffering results in a greater good. If you wish to defend against this particular objection to the PoE, you would have to show that not all suffering can possibly result in a greater good. I would accept an example of suffering that cannot possibly result in a greater good as proof that the "greater good" objection is wrong.

If the moon is not made of green cheese then it is impossible that the moon is made of green cheese. Both statements are opinions, the question is are they correct opinions (i.e. are they facts)? If opinion 1 is true then so is opinion 2.

The statement "It is impossible that the moon is made of green cheese" is not merely an opinion, but a statement that in fact, the moon cannot possibly be made of green cheese. You've previously stated that, even though the evidence indicates that the moon is probably not made of green cheese, it is possible that the moon actually is made of green cheese. So, the statement "The moon is not made of green cheese" is probably true, but the statement "It is impossible that the moon is made of green cheese" is absolutely false.

It is slowly dawning on me that you don't understand what this is about at all. Theists make the positive claim that there is an omnibenevolent, omnnipotent God. The PoE argument says: hang on, this doesn't make sense. Why would there be so much suffering in a world created by such a God? The theists have to answer this, the ball is in their court.

Of course theists make a positive claim that an omnibenevolent, omnnipotent God exists, and of course it is up to them to prove their claim. However, the PoE doesn't simply discount the theist claim for lack of evidence, but actually makes its own positive claim: that it is impossible that an omnibenevolent, omnnipotent God exists. It is likewise up to those who promote the PoE to prove the claim an omnibenevolent, omniscient God cannot possibly exist.

The theists have many answers to why there would be so much suffering in a world created by such a God, one of which is that the suffering is for the greater good and therefore isn't evil at all. The ball would now be in your court to prove otherwise if you wish to promote the PoE.

There is a great deal of sophistry from theologians and apologists but no good arguments. If you know of a good argument I am genuinely interested to hear it. Give me your best one.

The "greater good" objection seems to be working pretty well. Prove it wrong. Otherwise admit that an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God might exist and move on.

-Bri

 

[rocketdodger]

The "greater good" objection seems to be working pretty well. Prove it wrong. Otherwise admit that an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God might exist and move on.

How about this:

God is omnipotent and thus can do anything that is logically possible.
God is omnibenevolent and thus must do good when it is able to.
Therefore, god cannot not do good when it is able to.
Therefore, god cannot be omnipotent.

The only solution to this paradox is the same cop-out used with the paradox of the stone -- god cannot do anything that is not in it's nature to do, while still remaining quasi-omnipotent.

Well guess what, I have just developed the ultimate argument for theism that cannot be defeated -- god can do anything logically possible except those things that would corner theism into a paradox or logical contradiction. BOOOM EAT IT ATHEISTS!!!

 

[ExitDose]

eh?

What exactly is it you do not understand?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What exactly is it you do not understand?

What on earth you are talking about. It's simple: Before you roll a dice, you do not know the outcome of the roll. I can think of few more basic facts regarding probability. Your reply to this was:

"There is no outcome of the diceroll until it's rolled in a truly probabilistic scenario. Otherwise it would cease to be probabilistic. You would still be all knowing as there would be no correct answer."

I have got not the first clue what this paragraph is supposed to mean. None. Sounds like the sort of thing a politician would say. It is utterly meaningless.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

How about this:

God is omnipotent and thus can do anything that is logically possible.
God is omnibenevolent and thus must do good when it is able to.
Therefore, god cannot not do good when it is able to.
Therefore, god cannot be omnipotent.

So God cannot be omnipotent because he is restricted to "doing good" at all times. Personally, I have argued that "good" and "bad" are nearly always human-context-dependent. In other words, what is good for one person isn't neccesarily good for others. Also, what someone thinks is good might be bad. You might think it is good to win the lottery, but if I think of what has happened to most of the people I know who inherited lots of money its not always good. One person in particular whose father owns a chain of italian restaurants has always known a fortune is coming his way when his dad dies, and the result is that he has sat on his backside doing nothing at all for most of his life - it has been a curse, not a blessing. So who is to say what is good? That is why I restricted "greater good" to "holding reality together" or "making sure life continues". God surely sits outside most of human decision-making and most of human attribution of what is and is not "good".

The only solution to this paradox is the same cop-out used with the paradox of the stone -- god cannot do anything that is not in it's nature to do, while still remaining quasi-omnipotent.

There is no cop-out here - you've already accepted why God can't make a stone so heavy that he himself cannot lift it - because to do so would require God being illogical.

 

[ExitDose]

What on earth you are talking about. It's simple: Before you roll a dice, you do not know the outcome of the roll. I can think of few more basic facts regarding probability. Your reply to this was:

"There is no outcome of the diceroll until it's rolled in a truly probabilistic scenario. Otherwise it would cease to be probabilistic. You would still be all knowing as there would be no correct answer."

I have got not the first clue what this paragraph is supposed to mean. None. Sounds like the sort of thing a politician would say. It is meaningless.

I stated that there are no correct answers before the probabilistic event occurs, nor after. Beforehand every answer that is statistically possible is correct. Therefore if you have all possible information leading up to the event and what is possible afterwards you have all existant information.

The fault in your logic was that it implies that there is some knowable quantity of information that would exist prior to the event and afterward, when this really just describes a determined event as opposed to a probabilistic event(your diceroll for example). It implies that if we were to replay this diceroll(in a loop) that it would repeat the correct answer, but in a truly probabilistic event, if we were to replay it in a loop, we should see that: 1/6th of the time we get a 1, 1/6th a 2, etc. There is no knowable outcome because none exists, there are only probable outcomes. An omniscient entity would have perfect information about all of these outcomes and would remain correct before and after. This would not create new information, so it does not invalidate omniscience.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

ExitDose,

You seem to be making something dead simple sound really complicated.

Geoff's simple, easily understood, prima facie CORRECT claim was:

Before you roll a dice, you cannot know the outcome of the roll.

I stated that there are no correct answers before the probabilistic event occurs, nor after.

What???

What are you talking about? What has this sentence got to do with my claim? Answer: nothing. Before you roll a dice, you cannot know the outcome of the roll. Who said anything about "answers"? Not me. Do you think a 6-sided-die is "a question"?? You have introduced the concept of "correct answers" and then seem to be claiming that this has something important to do with my claim. It doesn't.

Beforehand every answer that is statistically possible is correct.

WTF??? "correct"? What are you talking about? Beforehand, no dice has been rolled. Period. There are no "answers" and nothing to be "correct". If there is no question, then there is no answer.

Therefore if you have all possible information leading up to the event and what is possible afterwards you have all existant information.

So what?

The fault in your logic was that it implies that there is some knowable quantity of information that would exist prior to the event and afterward, when this really just describes a determined event as opposed to a probabilistic event(your diceroll for example). It implies that if we were to replay this diceroll(in a loop) that it would repeat the correct answer......

I still do not have the first clue what you are talking about. Where did this concept of "correct answer" come from? I have not implied any of the things you claim I have because I did not say any of the things you are claiming I have said. There is no problem with my logic. Before you roll a dice, you cannot know the outcome of the roll.

, but in a truly probabilistic event, if we were to replay it in a loop, we should see that: 1/6th of the time we get a 1, 1/6th a 2, etc. There is no knowable outcome because none exists, there are only probable outcomes. An omniscient entity would have perfect information about all of these outcomes and would remain correct before and after.

Why? What does "perfect information about all these outcomes" mean?

This would not create new information, so it does not invalidate omniscience.

"New information"????

What are you talking about?

I am sorry, ExitDose, I am sure you think that what you are saying is relevant, but I fail to see how. All I see is meaningless garbage.

Want to try again, from the begining? This time, don't introduce a whole load of concepts that have nothing to do with what I claimed and don't attribute to me anything I never actually said. My entire conversation with you in this thread has resulted in absolutely nothing I can comprehend. I still do not have a clue what you are trying to say, why you are saying it or what it has got to do with the claim that before you roll a dice you cannot know it's outcome, or what any of that has got to do with the fact that God cannot know the outcome of a human free-will decision before that decision is made.

Are you, for example, making a hidden assumption that hard determinism is true and not telling anybody about it? This might make what you are saying sound a little more relevant, but since I reject hard determinism, it wouldn't actually make any difference to anything I've said.

Sorry if this post is a bit rude, but I am finding talking to you rather frustrating. There appears to be some sort of major communication problem. You think you are saying something relevant. I'm not receiving it. I can't even attack it for being wrong, because I still don't understand what you are talking about, or why.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

ExitDose,

Let's rewind to the start of our interaction in this thread, and I'll seperate the lines so you can tell me at which point you disagree:

Geoff posted:

Statement 1:

The point is that if humans have free will then determinism must be false and it logically follows that it is not possible even for an omniscient being to know the future.

Statement 2:

Just as even an omnipotent being cannot create a stone that is so heavy that even He cannot lift it, an omniscient being cannot know things which are logically unknowable - and that includes the future if determinism is not true.

Statement 3:

This is one of the biggest contradictions in mainstream theology. The claim that humans have free will (which is an essential Christian claim) and the claim that God has perfect knowledge of the future (which is not an essential Christian claim but is believed by the vast majority of Christians anyway) are logically incompatible. One of them must be false.

ExitDose replied:

I fail to see how this follows logically.

Exactly what doesn't follow from what?

That a deity may not know the final outcome would not preclude his knowing all possible outcomes. It would still know the final outcome.

At this point you are actually contradicting yourself, quite clearly:

"That a deity may not know the final outcome would not preclude his knowing all possible outcomes. It would still know the final outcome."

Either it knows the final outcome, or it doesn't. Both cannot be true. In addition to this, knowing that the outcome is going to be somewhere between 1 and 6 is not the same as knowing it is going to be 6. Knowing "all possible outcomes" is plainly not the same as knowing "which outcome will manifest".

When replying to this post, please make it very clear exactly which of my statements you don't agree with, and why, and try to avoid contradicting yourself in your response.