If you're doubting its nature or "appearance" then you are looking at the wrong thing. Look at the aspects of existence that are impervious to doubt. Or do you think there are no such aspects?
I can take the certain knowledge that thought exists as far as ...... the certain knowledge that thought exists. It doesn't help. I can't build on that. That is why Descartes had to invoke God. Every one of my thoughts may be completely wrong, so knowing that thought exists helps in no way, shape or form. At some point I must make a leap and choose a metaphysical position. I can choose idealism or I can choose some form of materialism. I have no idea what is out there and I don't particularly care (actually I do care, but I have no hope of ever knowing with certainty). But there certainly appears to be something out there. It follows rules. I want to understand those rules. I am part of what is out there. I follow the same rules. What I have seen is that overindulgence in our own way of thinking leads down a primrose path to circularity. I don't want to trod that path any longer. I don't pretend to answer for anyone else, though.
I don't think this is possible, if you are using the same meaning of the word "feeling" as I. All the headway you will achieve is into nervous system function.
That's fine with me. I think it will be helpful.
Argument from ignorance? Its not that I am unimpressed with how far neuroscience has got understanding cognition. I just think that it is inconceivable that physical descriptions can explain quality, however sophisticated the description is. I don't have to be an expert in systems or cognitive neuroscience to say that. I just have to recognise the fundamental characteristic of physical descriptions (which I believe is mathematical) and how that cannot penetrate the nature of quality.
I'm not making an argument so how can it be an argument from ignorance? I was pointing to a pathway and saying that I think it looks interesting and seems worth the effort.
RE: descriptions -- no one is saying that the description is going to tell us precisely what experiences are like. We are only looking at the rules of the game and trying to understand them, to understand how the experiences are possible given the natural constraints. The internal experiences will remain internal experiences. But that does not mean that they do not have natural causes.
If its only a correlation then you are still left with the "hard problem of consciousness" and the nature of quality is still an open debate.
Who ever said it wasn't open to debate? My big beef with Geoff was because he said it was impossible ever to account for consciousness by natural means.
So the question is, a correlation between what kinds of things? If its a correlation between the physical brain and qualitative experience then I can't see a conceivable way by which a supposed causal link can be established.
That's fine. I'm not asking you to see the causal link. I don't see precisely how it works either. But I think it's worth a look to see if we can figure it out. I think it is far too early to say that it is impossible.
For in order for the link to be established you would have to define each side of the causal chain in physical terms, which would mean re-defining quality as something it is not, ie, quantitative.
Well, I don't agree with your definition of qualitative as something that cannot even in theory be explained by natural means. If it is impossible to explain "quality" by any means other than "it's unexplainable" then I see no utility in even discussing it. We are fooled by many different things, especially our own modes of thinking. Perhaps we are fooled by the methods we have used to think about "quality".
I don't deny there is an interesting correlation. But when investigating this correlation from the perspective of philosophy, I believe you have to look at alternative views. Your view assumes that physical reality is independent of experience (how I define objective), but a clue may lie in the fact that the brain processes that you suppose cause experience are actually experienced too! I thinks its only when you assume that observed physical processes are objective that you create the problem here described.
Why is that a problem? Actions may be described by third person account or by first person experience. Brains doing what they do are simply actions. It's a very special type of action, but it is the quintessence of action, nearly constant action. That we expereience through this action is kind of interesting I think. That we can look at neurons firing simply means that we can describe the process from the outside. But that description will not be the experiences we are having. The best it can do is explain why we experience. I think that is worth investigating.
