Kevin, think back to our discussion about eliminativism. You stated that anything worthy of the label "physicalism" must be able to claim that all mental terms can be replaced by physical ones.
Correct. It mght not be a useful level of discussion, but you could do it.
If that is the case then the very word "mind" is useless.
Absolutely not. It still refers to
exactly the same set of things that it always referred to...
unless you happen to have decided covertly in advance that "mind"
must mean "immaterial mind".
If you have made that covert assumption, then referring to a mind which is physical would be a contradiction in terms. However, that covert assumption has no basis in logic or evidence, and the fact that you keep sneaking about with it rather than shouting it from the rooftops makes me suspect strongly that on some level you know this assumption to be comforting nonsense.
Yor silly claims about "physical minds are incoherent!" are just a way of hiding your covert assumption behind a layer of obfuscation. Physical minds are
only incoherent if you decide for yourself that the only definition of mind allowed is your own, and your own definition says (mind = spooky woowoo stuff).
It's not theoretically needed at all. The reason I deny the possibility of "purely physical minds" is because upon YOUR definition of what physicalism is, the word "mind" doesn't mean anything at all. So when you say
"purely physical minds"
you might just as well be saying
"purely physical green fairy gidgets"
Eaxctly. You are using
my definition of physicalism with
your definition of mind, and then claiming I have contradicted myself!
If I had contradicted myself that would be a philosophical problem. Instead, you have contradicted me. That is not a philosophical problem, or at least not a problem with my position.
I am objecting on the grounds that what you are saying when you say "purely physical minds" SOUNDS like you are trying to give a physical definition of a mind - but you aren't - you are giving a purely physical description of a brain process and simply calling it a mind.
Unless you can prove that a mind
is not a brain process, and you can't, then you are just going to have to live with that as a possible definition of "mind".
Covertly assuming your definition of mind to be true is not proof that minds are or are not anything at all, by the way. You can't dictate reality by covertly assuming that words have wacky definitions.
So I am objecting on exactly the same grounds that YOU would object to the phrase "purely physical fairy gidgets." There aren't any fairy gidgets, and according to your worldview there aren't any minds either.
I would object to such a phrase if and only if you had previously defined fairy gidgets to be non-physical.
If you had said that fairy gidgets might or might not be physical, then I would have no objection to talk of purely physical fairy gidgets, as distinct from partially or completely immaterial fairy gidgets.
I am denying it is possible that the word "mind", as it is being used by YOU, has no meaning apart from "brain process". Therefore the phrase "purely physical mind" has no meaning either. Get it?
It has a perfectly good meaning. It picks out minds which have no immaterial component, as opposed to theoretical minds with an immaterial component.
This gets your panties knotted because you cannot admit that minds without immaterial components can exist, because if you did so you could no longer say exiting things like "materialists think we have no minds!". You would have to say "materialists think that it turns out our minds are brain processes!', which sounds profoundly boring and obvious.
All you are really claiming is "there are purely physical brain processes". Which we all agree with. It justs sounds like you are saying something else, which is why I am objecting.
I'm claiming a bit more than that. I'm claiming it's
possible that all a mind is, is a set of purely physical brain processes. You are claiming that this is not possible.
Your only argument, however, is to covertly assume a wacky definition of mind, and then insist that everybody else is using this definition of mind all the time whether they like it or not.
You make this look like an argument by deliberately taking other people's steps out of order. The actual materialist argument is something like this:
1. A mind is that thing over there, doing that stuff.
2. Is it purely physical or not? Well, it turns out it probably is.
3. Therefore minds are probably purely physical.
Your straw man version is:
1. If minds exist at all they are purely physical because I, a straw man, just say so.
2. A mind is an immaterial spooky thing, because Geoff assumes it to be.
3. Oh no! A contradiction! Materialists say minds don't exist!
)
) Afterwards, you can think about it.
