The relationship between science and materialism

[UndercoverElephant]

One word: supervenience.

And when you explain to me what a stupid, incoherent concept that is, be sure also to expalin why so many philosophers take it seriously. Otherwise, not being a philosopher myself, I might just assume the experts know what they are talking about.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#2

This is what supervenience is with respect to this debate:

In attempting to answer the completeness question, it has become customary since Davidson 1970 to look to the notion of supervenience. (The notion of supervenience is historically associated with meta-ethics, but it has received extensive discussion in the general metaphysics and logic literature. For a survey, see Kim 1993.)

The idea of supervenience might be introduced via an example due to David Lewis of a dot-matrix picture:

A dot-matrix picture has global properties -- it is symmetrical, it is cluttered, and whatnot -- and yet all there is to the picture is dots and non-dots at each point of the matrix. The global properties are nothing but patterns in the dots. They supervene: no two pictures could differ in their global properties without differing, somewhere, in whether there is or there isn't a dot (1986, p. 14).

Lewis's example gives us one way to introduce the basic idea of physicalism. The basic idea is that the physical features of the world are like the dots in the picture, and the psychological or biological or social features of the world are like the global properties of the picture. Just as the global features of the picture are nothing but a pattern in the dots, so too the psychological, the biological and the social features of the world are nothing but a pattern in the physical features of the world. To use the language of supervenience, just as the global features of the picture supervene on the dots, so too everything supervenes on the physical, if physicalism is true.

It lists four problems with this position. The first three aren't that important to me but....

4. The necessary beings problem

(Cf. Jackson 1998) Imagine a necessary being -- that is, a being which exists in all possible worlds -- which is essentially nonphysical. If such a non-physical being exists, it is natural to suppose that physicalism is false. But if physicalism is defined according to (2), the existence of such a being is compatible with physicalism. For consider: if the actual world is wholly physical, apart from the necessary non-physical being, any minimal physical duplicate of the actual world is a duplicate simpliciter. Since the non-physical being exists in all possible worlds, it exists at all worlds which are minimal physical duplicates of the actual world. So we seem to face a problem: the existence of the non-physical necessary being entails that physicalism is false, but the definition of physicalism permits it to be true in this case.

This problem is not so easily answered as the previous three. Lying behind the problem is a deeper issue about the correct interpretation of necessity and possibility......

Remember in a previous discussion you ended up not understanding the difference between neccesary and sufficient? Well, here's the same problem all over again - and the experts are agreeing.

.... -- the modal notions one uses to formulate supervenience. On one way of interpreting these notions, the existence of a necessary being of this sort is incoherent. A reason is that it would violate David Hume's famous dictum that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences -- the being is distinct from the physical world and yet is necessitated by it. On another way of interpreting these notions, however, there is nothing incoherent in the idea of such a being. The correct way to think about modal notions, however, is a topic that is well beyond the scope of our discussion here. The problem seems to be that the supervenience definition of physicalism in effect presupposes something like Hume's dictum, in that it uses failure of necessitation as a test for distinctness. But this means that someone who denies the dictum will have to find an alternative way of formulating physicalism.

In other words, supervenience physicalism isn't physicalism. Instead, it's physicalism with something added. What's been added? Being. How can the physicalist respond to this? He can't. He's back to square one. Up a ladder. Down a snake.

 

[Mercutio]

Why not?. It is a physical process occuring in grey matter, subject to the laws of nature.

Agreed. Why do you think this makes it publicly available? There is no reason at all that its first-person perspective requires it to be "subjective" (when the definition of "subjective" is necessarily mentalistic). This is a problem of your use of dualistic vocabulary when you have specified the assumptions of materialism. If you assume materialism, you cannot then bring the faults of some other system in as weaknesses.

In principle, it should be possible for ANY observer to have access to your brain processes. Let´s say we connect your brain to a monitor, then you carry it all the time. Why wouldn´t we be able to observe your brain waves and electrical impulses every second of the day?????. Unless you admit that there is some non detectable stuff going on in your brain.

There is some stuff going on that is currently only detectable to one person. It is not non-detectable, and not magic.

If you were to invent a machine that interpreted brain waves, and suddenly all my processes were available for you to observe, the only difference in them would be that the number of observers has increased. If you are going to find fault with materialism, you must demonstrate (not merely assume) that there is a qualitative difference between publicly observable and privately observable physical events. No one has ever done so; differences have always been assumed.

There is nothing special about you, mercutio. No subjective experience at all.

I agree; no subjective experience. Subjective is the wrong word; it is a dualistic term, when you have specified a material monism for this analysis. Under materialism, the experience you are currently calling subjective and mental is viewed as physical, but private. You would need to have evidence that it was not physical (so far, the technology argues against you) in order to find fault with materialism.

I do not deny, even in a P-zombie, private behavior. It exists (independent of monism), and is not a deal-killer for materialism or objective idealism.

 

[Mercutio]

But then it's no use to you how you just tried to use it. "Interaction with your environment" is what nervous systems do. There's no "lifetime of experience". There's no experience, remember?

Excuse me? Mary and I are speaking of the P-zombie known as Mercutio. Why do you think there is no experience?

The thing that makes me unique is not merely something I was born with, Geoff. Of course there is a lifetime of experience that makes up who I am currently. And who I am currently is different from who I was last year, or ten years ago, or 40.

Interaction with the environment is what organisms do (not merely nervous systems). We live. We learn. We change. If your view of who we are does not include these things, you have far greater problems with your philosophy than we have touched upon so far.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

This is crap.

No Paul, it's the bit you don't understand.

First of all, you have a dualism: Being and Neutral. You haven't said anything to convince me otherwise.

I cannot be blamed for this. I explained it perfectly clearly. You never told me what was wrong with the explanation.

Second, according to our new careful wording, materialism doesn't mention mind at all, so it is only describing reality in terms of one thing.

That is correct. If there's no such thing as mind, you don't need the noumena. All there is is matter. No qualia. No minds. No experiences. No 1st-person perspective. Just matter.

However, since I am no materialist, you could convince me that materialism is inherently dualistic.

It's not conceptually independent of dualism. I'm done trying to explain this to you. Let someone else have a go:

http://www.phil.gu.se/posters/prop.html

I would like to introduce a distinction between "false" and "proper" monism in order to achieve a clearer conception of the traditional mind-body problem. I aim to show that monistic claims made by typical reductionists, in fact, are conceptually conditioned by an acceptance of the very Cartesian model they want to reject. I will refer to this fallacy as the error of false monism. Materialists as a rule, typically tend to represent the mind-body problem as, basically, a choice between materialism and dualism. Materialists often portray their target enemies as Cartesian dualists; those defending the view that there exist an immaterial substance in a ghostly medium - somehow interacting with the body. I don’t know whether this is meant as a rhetorical move or if they really believe that the majority of dualists subscribe to Cartesian substance dualism. However, the serious and decisive mistake consists in believing that the physical is an ontologically neutral category - conceptually independent - from dualism. On the contrary, materialism is just one pole in the original Cartesian two-pole framework (see fig 1). It is in this respect we may say that materialists are in a way implicitly accepting the original distinction proposed by Descartes.

The "real" metaphysical opposition is not between materialism and dualism but between materialism and phenomenalism! However, as argued earlier, there is a tendency among modern materialists to represent the problem as a choice between materialism and dualism. This is very misleading as a reductive materialist position in no sense provides an escape from the dualistic framework.

If you read that paper and still don't get then just give up, Paul.

Geoff

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Can anyone give a link to a definition of what an existent is and what it means for things to be the same existent or separate existents?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Would idealists run into similar logical problems in a statement like, "Matter is all in my mind"?

I'd argue their problems are slightly less serious because they don't have to redefine the dictionary, but there are still problems, and they are similar. Idealism is less of a problem in this respect because all of our prescientific language only makes sense from our own 1st-person perspective. So even though idealism is technically vulnerable to a version of the same logical problem it has got the dictionary definitions stacked in its favour.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I cannot be blamed for this. I explained it perfectly clearly. You never told me what was wrong with the explanation.

Being is undifferentiated, nothingness, the source of awareness, plays part of the role of "generating" the physical, timeless. Neutral is somehow differentiated, something, plays no part in awareness, plays the other part in the role of generating the physical, includes some notion of time. I do not see how these are the same fundamental existent. In particular, as you've said, the Neutral cannot assume the role of the source of awareness. Is this not a fundamental difference in type?

That is correct. If there's no such thing as mind, you don't need the noumena. All there is is matter. No qualia. No minds. No experiences. No 1st-person perspective. Just matter.

Or, the processes that we're referring to when we use all those words could be the result of states of matter.

I aim to show that monistic claims made by typical reductionists, in fact, are conceptually conditioned by an acceptance of the very Cartesian model they want to reject.

So you're suggesting we reject mind/body dualism and substitute Being/Neutral dualism.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Can anyone give a link to a definition of what an existent is and what it means for things to be the same existent or separate existents?

~~ Paul

It's not a philosophical term. I use it in conversations with you because you were using it and it seemed easier to go on using it rather than getting you to use a different word. It just means "something that exists".

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I'd argue their problems are slightly less serious because they don't have to redefine the dictionary, ...

Just thought I'd check the dictionary definition of mind:

1 : RECOLLECTION, MEMORY *keep that in mind* *time out of mind*
2 a : the element or complex of elements in an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons b : the conscious mental events and capabilities in an organism c : the organized conscious and unconscious adaptive mental activity of an organism
3 : INTENTION, DESIRE *I changed my mind*
4 : the normal or healthy condition of the mental faculties
5 : OPINION, VIEW
6 : DISPOSITION, MOOD
7 a : a person or group embodying mental qualities *the public mind* b : intellectual ability
8 capitalized , Christian Science : GOD 1b
9 : a conscious substratum or factor in the universe

Doesn't seem like we're required to assume a dualistic notion of mind. Let's try mental:

1 a : of or relating to the mind; specifically : of or relating to the total emotional and intellectual response of an individual to external reality *mental health* b : of or relating to intellectual as contrasted with emotional activity c : of, relating to, or being intellectual as contrasted with overt physical activity d : occurring or experienced in the mind : INNER *mental anguish* e : relating to the mind, its activity, or its products as an object of study : IDEOLOGICAL f : relating to spirit or idea as opposed to matter
2 a (1) : of, relating to, or affected by a psychiatric disorder *a mental patient* *mental illness* (2) : mentally disordered : MAD, CRAZY b : intended for the care or treatment of persons affected by psychiatric disorders *mental hospitals*
3 : of or relating to telepathic or mind-reading powers
–mentally \-t*l-*\ adverb

Hmm, pretty circular definitions going on here. But I still don't see how physicalists have to redefine the dictionary.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Being is undifferentiated, nothingness, the source of awareness, plays part of the role of "generating" the physical, timeless. Neutral is somehow differentiated, something, plays no part in awareness, plays the other part in the role of generating the physical, includes some notion of time. I do not see how these are the same fundamental existent. In particular, as you've said, the Neutral cannot assume the role of the source of awareness. Is this not a fundamental difference in type?

Yes and no. There is a sort of dualism in my system, but it's not the dualism you think it is. The only dualism in my system is the dualism between phenomena and noumena - and this is a conceptual dualism and not an ontological one because the phenomena can be reduced to the noumena. You are claiming there is also a dualism which is restricted entirely to the noumenal realm, but there isn't. This is why I tried to describe the noumenal realm in terms of mathematics. Perhaps if you start thinking of the noumenal realm as a mathematical object it might help. Presumably you can see why the whole of mathematics is a "monistic system". There's no dualism in there. But there is differentiation. There are identifiable structures within mathematics which are different to other structures. But there is one concept within mathematics which has no structure and is unlike any of the other concepts within mathematics - the concept of zero (not my zero - yet - normal zero). Do you see how zero has a completely different set of characteristic to the rest of mathematics, but is still an integral part of mathematics? Do you think there is a dualism between zero and the rest of maths?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Hmm, pretty circular definitions going on here. But I still don't see how physicalists have to redefine the dictionary.

~~ Paul

They have a choice. They can either redefine half of the dictionary to mean something it doesn't mean or they can dispose of half of the dictionary. What don't you see? You've already had to do it!

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It's not a philosophical term. I use it in conversations with you because you were using it and it seemed easier to go on using it rather than getting you to use a different word. It just means "something that exists".

Yes, I should be saying "fundamental types of existent." But what do philosophers say?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Yes, I should be saying "fundamental types of existent." But what do philosophers say?

~~ Paul

They talk about different ontological categories of things, some of which are more fundamental than others. "Ontology" just means "the study of being" or "the study of that which exists". So ontological categories are categories of things which exist. There is a whole branch of philosophy dedicated to ontological categories:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/categories/

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Perhaps if you start thinking of the noumenal realm as a mathematical object it might help. Presumably you can see why the whole of mathematics is a "monistic system". There's no dualism in there. But there differentiation. There are identifiable structures within mathematics which are different to other structures. But there is one concept within mathematics which has no structure and is unlike any of the other concepts within mathematics - the concept of zero (not my zero - yet - normal zero). Do you see how zero has a completely different set of characteristic to the rest of mathematics, but is still an integral part of mathematics? Do you think there is a dualism between zero and the rest of maths?

I don't think the question of fundamental types of existents makes sense with math, because math is concepts. If you want to say that your Being/Neutral is just a gigantic mathematical concept, then I guess I have no issue with its dualistic nature. However, then awareness is nothing but a concept. In fact, the noumenon is nothing but a concept.

I guess the term dualism is really reserved for mind/body dualism.


~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

They have a choice. They can either redefine half of the dictionary to mean something it doesn't mean or they can dispose of half of the dictionary. What don't you see? You've already had to do it!

I don't see anything they have to redefine. I had to do it because people wouldn't let me use the word mind without making assumptions I was not implying.

~~ Paul

 

[chriswl]

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#2
It lists four problems with this position. The first three aren't that important to me but....

"Imagine a necessary being -- "

I can't. It's logical nonsense.

Remember in a previous discussion you ended up not understanding the difference between neccesary and sufficient?

The misunderstanding (or failure to read carefully) was all yours. Here is the exchange:

Geoff:
Brain processes are neccesary but insufficient conditions for minds.
Chris:
Which, even if it were true, still doesn't refute my point that the mental is entirely dependent on the physical for its existence.

Brain processes are "necessary" conditions for minds. We don't even need to bother with the second half of your sentence, you've said it right there. Check out post #469 if you think I'm misrepresenting this.

Water is "necessary" (but not sufficient) for human life. Without it you could not live. Therefore, you are dependent on it. Do I need to give any more examples?

Consciousness could not exist for one second if the physical conditions had not (by chance and quite recently) proved to be right, in one tiny corner of the universe for complex brains to evolve. And we (and thus consciousness) may not be around for much longer. Certainly we as individuals will not be around for very long. How much more dependent could consciousness be on the contingencies of the physical world?

The more I think about it I'm really quite amazed by the hubris involved in your attempt to be "neutral" between the tiny transient speck of human sentience on planet earth and the rest of the universe.

 

[Mercutio]

They have a choice. They can either redefine half of the dictionary to mean something it doesn't mean or they can dispose of half of the dictionary. What don't you see? You've already had to do it!

We had to redefine "sunrise" and "sunset" as metaphors, because we got better explanations for the phenomena. Did we redefine them to mean something they did not mean? Well, if you start from assuming that sunrise and sunset are as they appear, then yes.

But if you wish to choose the more useful view of heliocentrism, then we are "redefining half of the dictionary to be a better reflection of what we know."

There is no reason to assume that in redefining "mind" we are retreating from, instead of advancing toward, accuracy. Indeed, there are enough problems with dualism that I find it quite odd that you would defend the old meaning of mind.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I don't think the question of fundamental types of existents makes sense with math, because math is concepts.

That's just a claim, Paul. The ontological status of mathematics is hotly disputed, you can't just say "math is just concepts". For the purposes of my system, I want you to think of mathematical objects as being more than just concepts. Also, I'd like you to see that these particular concepts, unlike the concept of matter, do NOT have any mind/matter baggage attached to them. You cannot mistake numbers for mental concepts. You cannot mistake them for material concepts either. They are belong to neither category of things which exist.

If you want to say that your Being/Neutral is just a gigantic mathematical concept, then I guess I have no issue with its dualistic nature.

I didn't say it was a concept. You are putting words into my mouth. It would be just a concept if it wasn't for zero - which takes me right back full circle to the start of my description of neutral monism and the claim that zero isn't what we think it is. By replacing zero with Being, the whole system can now "come to life". The addition of "Being" serves no other purpose but this one. Changing zero to Being doesn't introduce any dualism. It leaves us with exactly the correct number of entities.

Perhaps this might help:

Chriswl made a post not long ago which tried to use the concept of supervenience to fix physicalism. But it turned out there was one chink in the armour of this approach.

4. The necessary beings problem

(Cf. Jackson 1998) Imagine a necessary being -- that is, a being which exists in all possible worlds -- which is essentially nonphysical. If such a non-physical being exists, it is natural to suppose that physicalism is false. But if physicalism is defined according to (2), the existence of such a being is compatible with physicalism. For consider: if the actual world is wholly physical, apart from the necessary non-physical being, any minimal physical duplicate of the actual world is a duplicate simpliciter. Since the non-physical being exists in all possible worlds, it exists at all worlds which are minimal physical duplicates of the actual world. So we seem to face a problem: the existence of the non-physical necessary being entails that physicalism is false, but the definition of physicalism permits it to be true in this case.

This is saying exactly what I am saying. If you try to employ the model you want employ you are left with the situation where one thing and one thing only appears to missing. That thing is Being.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Mercutio's observation leads me to ask another question. If I use the word pain in a physicalist context, will I be told that it has no referrent, as I'm told for the word mind?

~~ Paul

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

can't answer your question because I don't know what you mean by "awareness". Is it a verb or a noun? I am scared there's going to be another "The brains minds." statement lurking round the next corner.

In other words, being an a-hole is far more important to you than communicating ideas. OK, if that is how you want to live your life, be my guest.