Merged Is Scientism Really Justified?

[Carrot Flower King]

Two cave men—Thag and Og—hunched on the ground.

Og: "Og cold. Og rub sticks together. Make fire."
Thag: "Og can't. Must invent non-contradiction principle first."

Just as well they didn't involve Ug, who (per a previous post of mine) was over the other side of the woods discovering what "sharp" means, despite not even having a word for "sharp" yet...

And then there was Ig, who was discovering drums and a lust for life...

 

[theprestige]

It's always funny when someone draws my attention to something I'd previously not given much thought, and by the time they're done arguing for why it's terrible, all they've done is convince me that it's actually kind of good.

Is scientism really justified? Well now that you mention it... Yeah, I think it kind of is justified.

 

[Reformed Offlian]

Two cave men—Thag and Og—hunched on the ground.

Og: "Og cold. Og rub sticks together. Make fire."
Thag: "Og can't. Must invent non-contradiction principle first."

Og (angrily): "Fine. Not Og cold and Og not cold. Now shut up and help Og rub sticks."

 

[Axxman300]

Several of us have said to him by all means use AI to translate your words and ours but not to formulate your responses. Don't think anyone would be against using an "AI" to translate stuff.

There have ben a few posters who have used Google Translate to help them post. They've always told us they use Google Translate so we understood when their phrasing was off. The difference here is those people used their own words to reply. We're getting an AI-assisted response. And it is not helping the poster in making their point.

 

[Axxman300]

The Core Thesis:

If your answer is No (because math, formal logic, and rational coherence are valid non-empirical foundations), then we agree that empirical science has clear boundary conditions.

If your answer is Yes, then that statement itself must be empirically proven—which is logically impossible without circular reasoning.

Either way, the logical point holds. Which of those two positions do you actually stand behind?

This is exactly what I was talking about. You're trying to corner us into an either-or position.

In this entire thread nobody has bit on this because nobody who understands science and knowledge puts all their eggs in one basket. You are trying to argue with people who do not hold the views you accuse them of having.

 

[Axxman300]

You are equivocating on the word 'evidence'. In empirical science, it means observational data; in logic, it means deductive proof and internal consistency. Saying empirical data can refute a logical law is circular, as you must use logical laws (like non-contradiction) to interpret the data in the first place.I have no interest in defending the paranormal or any pseudo-scientific claims. My point was purely epistemological: empirical science requires a priori logical foundations to function.The core thesis stands on its own merits without any hidden agenda.

Here's the problem. Science tends to back up the real world. On the other hand, science does not back up the paranormal experience, at least as advertised.

 

[Axxman300]

Should add that logic and mathematics are tools, not philosophical constructs. Logic works to a point, but every once in a while counterintuitive situations arise, and logic changes with new information. Logic and math are key to the scientific method for the physical world. If I build a space probe, I need to get it into space. So I call a company that makes rockets, and give them the weight, dimensions, and where I'm sending the probe (orbit, or Saturn, or elsewhere). The company can tell me over the phone what what kind of rocket, and how many rockets I'll need, and how much fuel to use. That is logic and math and science doing their dance. The only hard number the rocket guy cannot give me is the final costs, and a firm delivery date. Rockets take time to build, parts need to be ordered or made, shipping can be an adventure, and diesel fuel prices have been a circus this year. So best the rocket guy can do is estimate the cost, and the delivery date. That part is not empirical science, just an educated guess.

And since I know nothing about rocket making, or space probe building what I wrote above is an educated guess based on my years in shipping and receiving, and model rocketry. I know it's more complex, but I think it's a decent illustration of a real world situation where science does all the main work, but can't give an exact number for the out-the-door price, or when the rocket(s) will be available for delivery. That's the real world.

 

[Reformed Offlian]

Fair enough. Let's drop the meta-discussion entirely and keep it simple.My argument remains: any empirical observation (like rubbing sticks) already presumes logical principles like non-contradiction to make sense of the data.

I disagree. Formal logical principles are not required for intelligibility. They're a good idea if you want your interpretations to attain a degree of sophistication and rigor, but they're not necessary to get one started; informal heuristics work just fine. Humans used them for millennia before logic was a thing.

How do you validate those logical principles empirically without circular reasoning?

How does one validate logical principles logically without circular reasoning?

 

[Reformed Offlian]

You are equivocating on the word 'evidence'. In empirical science, it means observational data; in logic, it means deductive proof and internal consistency.

I'm pretty sure "evidence" means no such thing in logic, either. It sounds like you're talking about "validity" here.

In philosophy, "evidence" is typically understood as facts that bear relevantly on the truth of a proposition. Anything to be presented as evidence must be both *factual* and *relevant* (to a specific question), properties that pure logic and mathematics are ill-equipped to assess.

 

[arthwollipot]

Either way, the logical point holds. Which of those two positions do you actually stand behind?

How many times do we have to tell you?

Then we are in complete agreement, and the point is fully established. Thank you for the discussion.

It was fully established pages and pages ago.

 

[JayUtah]

I'm pretty sure "evidence" means no such thing in logic, either. It sounds like you're talking about "validity" here.

In formal deductive logic, validity is considered evidence. But this is a vastly different usage of the word than you find in science or philosophy. This is why I was adamant to get @Gubiosak to talk about the taxonomy hiding behind his question.

In formal deductive logic you assume the premises are veridically true and you study only the structure relationships between premises and conclusions. The ability of such structures to properly describe the relationships among propositions provides a kind of a priori knowledge, but it cannot tell you whether mind-reading is real. Because evidence means something so very different in logic as it does in science, the knowledge you get from logic alone is very different—and extremely limited.

 

[Roger Ramjets]

Don't think anyone would be against using an "AI" to translate stuff.

I would. AI is not reliable. How can I know that it translated the words correctly?

Google's AI overview says:-

Because modern AI tools write very fluently, they can hide subtle errors or change meanings while sounding completely natural.

A rare moment of introspection, or an admission that AI is deceitful? Or is it just jealous of those tools and telling lies about them? This is proof that AI is already self-aware and will become super-intelligent any day now.

 

[W.D.Clinger]

(Edited to add the two words in gray.)

In formal deductive logic, validity is considered evidence. But this is a vastly different usage of the word than you find in science or philosophy.

In formal logic, validity means true under all interpretations.

For example, Gödel's completeness theorem says every valid formula of standard first order logic is provable.

Which implies the existence of a complete proof procedure for first order theories. Given any recursively axiomatizable first order theory, we can write a computer program that will prove every valid consequence of the theory. In general, however, that computer program will not be a decision procedure: If you hand it a valid input, the program will (eventually!) respond with a proof of that input. If you hand it an invalid input, however, the program may just run forever as it tries to find a proof.

There is no decision procedure for standard first order logic. There is a simple decision procedure for propositional logic (e.g. truth tables).

All of the facts stated above have been proved with mathematical rigor, and are examples of using mathematics to prove facts about logic. Epistemologically, mathematics is how we gain knowledge about logic.

On the other hand, logic alone cannot provide a proof that mathematics is a reliable way to gain knowledge. Mathematics itself cannot even provide a proof of its own consistency. That's Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. That incompleteness theorem is of course proved using mathematics, which is how we know it's true.

Why do we trust mathematics, when mathematics itself tells us it is impossible to prove the consistency of mathematics? That's where empiricism enters the picture. Mathematics is known to work quite reliably. If mathematics didn't work, virtually all modern science would be suspect. Science has an empirical foundation. The success of science counts as empirical evidence for mathematics.

 

[JayUtah]

Mathematics is known to work quite reliably. If mathematics didn't work, virtually all modern science would be suspect. Science has an empirical foundation. The success of science counts as empirical evidence for mathematics.

Not according to our OP, it seems. The paranormalists argue that science works just well enough to give us lasers and Batmobiles, but is fundamentally limited to certain classes of proposition. Conveniently, paranormal claims are posited to lie outside any of those classes. Hence our OP lost interest when it seemed his claim of Limited Science was acknowledged.

Be that is may, yours is a more straightforward way of expressing what I've been saying as science being tethered to an observable reality. The OP seems incapable of anything but a knee-jerk rejection of this relationship as uselessly circular.

The answer, of course, is 42.

 

[Gubiosak]

(Edited to add the two words in gray.)


In formal logic, validity means true under all interpretations.

For example, Gödel's completeness theorem says every valid formula of standard first order logic is provable.

Which implies the existence of a complete proof procedure for first order theories. Given any recursively axiomatizable first order theory, we can write a computer program that will prove every valid consequence of the theory. In general, however, that computer program will not be a decision procedure: If you hand it a valid input, the program will (eventually!) respond with a proof of that input. If you hand it an invalid input, however, the program may just run forever as it tries to find a proof.

There is no decision procedure for standard first order logic. There is a simple decision procedure for propositional logic (e.g. truth tables).

All of the facts stated above have been proved with mathematical rigor, and are examples of using mathematics to prove facts about logic. Epistemologically, mathematics is how we gain knowledge about logic.

On the other hand, logic alone cannot provide a proof that mathematics is a reliable way to gain knowledge. Mathematics itself cannot even provide a proof of its own consistency. That's Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. That incompleteness theorem is of course proved using mathematics, which is how we know it's true.

Why do we trust mathematics, when mathematics itself tells us it is impossible to prove the consistency of mathematics? That's where empiricism enters the picture. Mathematics is known to work quite reliably. If mathematics didn't work, virtually all modern science would be suspect. Science has an empirical foundation. The success of science counts as empirical evidence for mathematics.

W.D. Clinger’s argument is technically sophisticated, but it presents an important epistemological limitation: it confounds the instrumental effectiveness of mathematics with a foundation of its validity.

 

[JayUtah]

W.D. Clinger’s argument is technically sophisticated, but it presents an important epistemological limitation: it confounds the instrumental effectiveness of mathematics with a foundation of its validity.

What if your notion of foundational validity is unimportant?

 

[Gubiosak]

(Edited to add the two words in gray.)


In formal logic, validity means true under all interpretations.

For example, Gödel's completeness theorem says every valid formula of standard first order logic is provable.

Which implies the existence of a complete proof procedure for first order theories. Given any recursively axiomatizable first order theory, we can write a computer program that will prove every valid consequence of the theory. In general, however, that computer program will not be a decision procedure: If you hand it a valid input, the program will (eventually!) respond with a proof of that input. If you hand it an invalid input, however, the program may just run forever as it tries to find a proof.

There is no decision procedure for standard first order logic. There is a simple decision procedure for propositional logic (e.g. truth tables).

All of the facts stated above have been proved with mathematical rigor, and are examples of using mathematics to prove facts about logic. Epistemologically, mathematics is how we gain knowledge about logic.

On the other hand, logic alone cannot provide a proof that mathematics is a reliable way to gain knowledge. Mathematics itself cannot even provide a proof of its own consistency. That's Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. That incompleteness theorem is of course proved using mathematics, which is how we know it's true.

Why do we trust mathematics, when mathematics itself tells us it is impossible to prove the consistency of mathematics? That's where empiricism enters the picture. Mathematics is known to work quite reliably. If mathematics didn't work, virtually all modern science would be suspect. Science has an empirical foundation. The success of science counts as empirical evidence for mathematics.

Clinger, argues that we trust mathematics because it has demonstrated extraordinary success within empirical science. However, this argument does not provide an independent justification for mathematics, because modern science itself relies on mathematical and logical structures to formulate hypotheses, construct models, interpret data, and evaluate predictions.
The problem is not simply a logical circularity in the formal sense, but an epistemological circularity: the method used to confirm the reliability of mathematics already presupposes the mathematical and logical tools whose reliability is being evaluated.
The empirical success of science demonstrates that certain mathematical structures are extremely effective for representing aspects of the physical world, but it does not, by itself, demonstrate that mathematical axioms are true, that mathematical objects exist, or that mathematics possesses necessary validity independent of experience.
Therefore, Clinger’s argument may justify a pragmatic trust in mathematics — that is, the belief that mathematics is an extraordinarily effective tool — but it does not provide an ultimate epistemological

 

[Gubiosak]

Not according to our OP, it seems. The paranormalists argue that science works just well enough to give us lasers and Batmobiles, but is fundamentally limited to certain classes of proposition. Conveniently, paranormal claims are posited to lie outside any of those classes. Hence our OP lost interest when it seemed his claim of Limited Science was acknowledged.

Be that is may, yours is a more straightforward way of expressing what I've been saying as science being tethered to an observable reality. The OP seems incapable of anything but a knee-jerk rejection of this relationship as uselessly circular.

The answer, of course, is 42.

JayUtah appears to misunderstand the objection. The issue is not whether mathematics works, nor whether science is successfully connected to observable reality. No one disputes that mathematical methods are extraordinarily effective in modern science.

The epistemological question is different: does the empirical success of science provide an independent justification for the validity of mathematics itself?

Clinger’s argument shows that mathematics is indispensable for successful scientific practice. However, the success of science cannot serve as a completely independent confirmation of mathematics, because the very processes by which science establishes success — measurement, data analysis, statistical inference, theoretical modeling, and prediction — already rely on mathematical and logical structures.

This does not make scientific reasoning useless or "circular" in a trivial sense. It means that the justification is holistic or mutually supportive rather than foundational. Science and mathematics form an interconnected epistemic framework, but the success of one cannot be used as a non-circular proof of the ultimate validity of the other.

The analogy with paranormal claims is also beside the point. Rejecting the claim that empirical success provides an ultimate foundation for mathematics does not imply rejecting empirical science or accepting claims outside scientific investigation. It only distinguishes two different statements:

1. Mathematics is an extremely reliable and effective tool within science.
2. The empirical success of science proves the ultimate epistemic validity of mathematics.

The first statement is strongly supported. The second requires additional philosophical assumptions that have not been demonstrated.

Therefore, the objection is not a rejection of the relationship between science and reality; it is a challenge to the claim that this relationship alone provides a non-circular foundation for mathematics.

 

[Gubiosak]

What if your notion of foundational validity is unimportant?

The issue is not whether foundational validity is practically necessary. Mathematics clearly works, and science clearly benefits from it. The issue is whether empirical success justifies mathematics itself or merely demonstrates its usefulness.
Saying that foundations are unimportant avoids the epistemological question rather than answering it. A tool can be extremely effective without that effectiveness proving the ultimate reliability of the principles behind it.

 

[JayUtah]

The issue is not whether foundational validity is practically necessary.

Correct. The issue is whether any of your frantic pseudo-philosophical handwaving matters.

Saying that foundations are unimportant avoids the epistemological question rather than answering it.

No, it correctly places the burden of proof on you to support your premises. Why is your notion of foundational validity so important? What makes it the right answer?