A proof that p-zombies are logically incoherent.

Originally Posted by Ian :
Of course we can. It is obviously in principle possible to program a computer, robot or android who acts exactly like a human being. They would not of course be conscious since it is our souls which are conscious.

Paul
Really? So our souls are contributing absolutely nothing to our internal experience or our behavior that can't be simulated mechanistically?

Why shouldn't it be able to be simulated?? Imagine a chess playing computer again. I know that they don't really play like human beings, but there is no reason why they could not be programmed to play human like moves. An android simply is a computer which does everything that we can do instead of just one thing like chess. There's no reason to suppose that a robot couldn't simulate the entirety of our behaviour.

Or if there is some reason then please enlighten me.
 
Ian,

[edit due to cross post with Ian]

In your post above (two posts above the last) you are being deliberately thick, as in closed-minded. You are much brighter than that. Paul made a thoughtful response to you. It's a bit rude and over the top to dismiss it as you seem to have done.

I have never heard of either of those words either, but I can deduce their meanings from the context and from their prefixes. I'm sure you can too.

Dennett's point is well taken. It's deeper than you seem to be giving it credit for. Since none of us can peer into the mind of another, we necessarily have to assume heterophemenology in order to conclude that we are not the lone humans awash in a sea of p-zombies. It's not a difficult concept, but it's deeper than you seem to be willing to ascribe to Dennett.

AS
 
Let me bring up a thought experiment that Stimpy mentioned previously.

Let's say we have a zombie world that appears identical to ours, except that the people are p-zombies. The causal laws are different so that the resulting physical facts are identical to ours, even though there is no phenomenal consciousness. Suddenly, one day, all the causal laws change so that the people are no longer p-zombies, phenomenal consciousness pops into existence, and the world is identical to ours.

Would the people of that world notice the change?

~~ Paul

Not if memories are physical or are entirely dependent or caused by the physical. It would be like creating a duplicate of you. The duplicate certainly wouldn't think it has just popped into existence unless it was informed.
 
Ian said:
Obviously it would be ludicrous in the extreme to say such an android is conscious, right? So we can reject behaviourism.
I am awash in glibness. Which aspects of consciousness would it be ludicrous to claim this robot has? All of them? And why should I reject a stimulus-response model here?

But the 2 androids are externally absolutely indistinguishable. I'm assuming though that people on here would wish to say the 1st android is definitely not conscious, but the 2nd one definitely is?
Not me. I don't know how to work with such a discrete definition of consciousness.

~~ Paul
 
Ian said:
He either believes it or he doesn't. He has stated he does. Should I suppose he is lying?
No, I think you should suppose he is being provocative.

There is only one sense that we can be a p-zombie, ...
That's clearly not true, since we can't even decide whether faking behavior is allowed or not.

~~ Paul
 
Ian said:
Why shouldn't it be able to be simulated?? Imagine a chess playing computer again. I know that they don't really play like human beings, but there is no reason why they could not be programmed to play human like moves. An android simply is a computer which does everything that we can do instead of just one thing like chess. There's no reason to suppose that a robot couldn't simulate the entirety of our behaviour.
If you're including internal behavior, then I see no reason even to postulate a soul. Why bother, if everything works just the same without one?

~~ Paul
 
Originally Posted by 69dodge :
This sounds like, what if the world were created a moment ago, all of us with all our (fake) memories?

We wouldn't know that's what happened.

So neither would the p-zombies who became conscious.

Paul
Doesn't sound the same to me.

Huh?? Are you joking??

The p-zombie people existed prior to the change, with their experiences and memories.

They don't have any experiences or memories, they are not conscious. They only appear to have them from the 3rd person perspective.

Part of our confusion here is that we can't decide exactly what it is that p-zombies are missing.

They are missing any consciousness. They are automatons merely operating according to physical laws and have no more consciousness than a boulder rolling down a hill.

They certainly have brains, experiences, memories, thoughts, etc., otherwise they would be distinguishable from us.

Bar the brain they have none of these.

For that matter, they must have some sort of qualia, or they couldn't talk about them.

Of course they could.
 
Ian said:
No the default assumption is to suppose they [p-zombies] are [logically possible]. Why on earth shouldn't they be?
Cripes Ian, do you have no glibnometer at all? If a thing is logically possible simply because we can name it, then everything is logically possible. We have to talk about logically possible in some framework, don't we?

In the framework of reductive materialism, a p-zombie is impossible by definition. For that matter, I don't see how a p-zombie is possible in your monism. You say that everything is mind, so how can I remove consciousness and leave anything else behind to stand in for the p-zombie?

~~ Paul
 
Ian said:
They don't have any experiences or memories, they are not conscious. They only appear to have them from the 3rd person perspective.
A p-zombie has no memory mechanism? How does it work then? I thought we removed qualia or self-awareness or something, not memory.

They are missing any consciousness. They are automatons merely operating according to physical laws and have no more consciousness than a boulder rolling down a hill.
Even a boulder has a memory mechanism.

Bar the brain they have none of these [experiences, memories, thoughts, etc.].
This is so bizarre I don't know how to respond.

Of course they could [talk about qualia].
How? They don't even have memory in which to record stock phrases.

~~ Paul
 
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Ian said:
It doesn't. I believe in free will, remember?
Since you utterly refuse to define free will in any mechanistic way, then I don't see how it has an effect on the world, and so, again, I repeat: Why bother, if everything works just the same without a soul?

~~ Paul
 
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Folks, I think it's become clear that when we say "let's remove consciousness," some of us are saying a quite different thing from others of us.

~~ Paul
 
They don't have any experiences or memories, they are not conscious. They only appear to have them from the 3rd person perspective.

So... a computer has no memory because it is not conscious ?

They are missing any consciousness. They are automatons merely operating according to physical laws and have no more consciousness than a boulder rolling down a hill.

Yeah, but they don't know that. Do we ?

Bar the brain they have none of these.

Okay, that's just wierd. Even for you.
 
Then if we asked the p-zombie "Are you conscious?," what would make it say "Yes."?
What makes you say "yes"?

I mean, it feels like you hear the question and understand what it means and then decide on an answer and say it. But that's just what it feels like to you. If an external observer looked closely at what was going on in your ears and brain and mouth, he'd just see physical stuff following physical laws. A p-zombie consists of the same physical stuff, following the same physical laws, so how could it not respond the same way you do?
 
I believe in free will, remember?
So do you think a p-zombie could exist? It seems to me that you wouldn't think so. Could a p-zombie, which lacks free will, behave the same as a person, who has it? If so, in what way is the person's will free, after all, if his behaviour can be perfectly well described as his physical body following physical laws?
 
Every bit of "psychological manipulation" is done through physical means--the inputs are visual, verbal, tactile, etc.--we cannot directly manipulate "the mind".

Right - the machine will have some sort of "senses" - allowing it to interact with the external world. We can either manipulate it through those senses (which is how it experiences "qualia"), or we can manipulate it purely at the mental/psychological level, which is what propaganda is all about.

If it is capable of developing new psychologies other than what we programmed it to, and in the psychology continues to show an understanding of its environment, then how is it not conscious?

Note that I'm not saying "humanly" conscious, just conscious.

Suppose we have programmed it to try random variations and use what works? Both Natural Selection and Operant Learning use that mechanism.

Since we'll have programmed it, we will know what it is capable of in terms of psychology. When it begins changing its program - making re-writes - according to its experience of the external world via senses (qualia, to some) then there is no difference, without invoking a God, to how we do it.

When the psychology changes to something unexpected, we'll look to see whether there were merely lines added onto the original programming (not necessarily consciousness, simply learning) or whether lines were deleted from the original programming and replaced with new lines (a sure indication of an awareness of 'self' and adaptability to the exteneral world according to its senses, motivated by 'self').

This might not be clear enough, but we can still dig deeper to find an answer. :)
 
69dodge said:
Huh. I don't imagine p-zombies as having any additional brain mechanisms. I figure they have exactly the same brains as we do, except that in the hypothetical world in which they exist, such brains aren't accompanied by consciousness.

me said:
Then if we asked the p-zombie "Are you conscious?," what would make it say "Yes."?

69dodge said:
What makes you say "yes"?

I mean, it feels like you hear the question and understand what it means and then decide on an answer and say it. But that's just what it feels like to you. If an external observer looked closely at what was going on in your ears and brain and mouth, he'd just see physical stuff following physical laws. A p-zombie consists of the same physical stuff, following the same physical laws, so how could it not respond the same way you do?
I can't answer this until you tell me which metaphysic we're assuming. If we are assuming reductive materialism, then there are no p-zombies by definition and your original statement (above) doesn't make sense. So you must have been assuming some metaphysic in which p-zombies might make sense, such as dualism. Yet now you say "same physical stuff, same physical laws."

In the case of dualism, removing consciousness could have two results: (1) The p-zombie is missing some experience we call consciousness or qualia, in which case he would answer something other than "yes" to "Are you conscious?" But then he would not be a p-zombie, because he is supposed to be indistinguishable from us.

(2) The p-zombie is not missing any experience. Then we have two possibilities. Either nothing was removed, in which case what the heck is dualism? Or something was removed that has no effect on the p-zombie's brain, in which case we have some silly form of epiphenomenalism.

So, the only scenario I can imagine that would produce the result we want under dualism is to remove consciousness, whatever that is, and then augment the physical brain to cover for the missing experience. But that's just a conversion from dualism to reductive materialism, isn't it? And it's not the intent of the p-zombie concept, I don't think.

~~ Paul
 
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I don't know about that. I don't think we talk about them very well. What we say about qualia only makes sense to other people because they've already experienced the qualia for themselves. We don't really describe them at all completely. So why couldn't a p-zombie who lacks them also describe them very incompletely?

It's not a matter of being able to describe them, it's whether or not they can experience them. Since qualia, the indiescribable input from our senses, are the foundation of how we continue to experience, then once the p-zombie stops experiencing qualia, it can no longer experience new things.

This isn't a matter of green or red apple, it's a matter of abstract. If the p-zombie has no qualia, it has no abstract. If it has no abstract, it has no difference in meanings of words such as "beauty" or "ugly" or "passion" or "hate". It also has no "ambition", which would provide it with no "motivation" to do anything. It would just do nothing - or as is the case of the frame problem, it would never focus on anything relevant.

Such a machine, or p-zombie, would be completely incapable of understanding art or philosophy, so I agree with whoever it is who said that they would not be able to carry on a conversation about art or philosophy. They would eventually run into a problem when their programmed language fails to relate their ideas - they would have to think of other ways to express themselves. Self-expression would require that they have experienced qualia, so that they could attempt to relate their ideas to similar qualia you've experienced.

In fact, merely having ideas that they cannot express through programmed language requires qualia, by the definition of qualia.
 
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