I'm calling attention to the following excerpt, with the inline citations included, from the final ECHR judgment Knox v. Italy for the following reasons:
1. There is considerable ECHR case law justifying the ECHR judgment. In fact, from that case law, it is relatively straight-forward to have anticipated the judgment would be against Italy - that is, that Italy had violated Knox's Convention rights under Articles 6.1 with 6.3c as well as 6.1 with 6.3e. That refutes the guilter proposition that the ECHR judgment was a fluke, mistake, or due to improper influence.
2. The wording of the judgment suggests clearly that Italy cannot re-convict Knox for calunnia by shifting the claimed evidence to her English language Memoriales, in part because the defects in the investigative proceedings (denial of defense lawyer, denial of fair interpreter) preceded those renunciations of her interrogation statements.
3. The wording of the judgment makes clear that the Memoriales, letter to Knox's lawyers, and phone call to her mother were all renunciations of the interrogation statements. Again, this is a point against the recent re-conviction for calunnia based upon the Memoriales.
(Google translation; emphasis by bolding and italics is mine)
*Here's paragraph 138.
1. There is considerable ECHR case law justifying the ECHR judgment. In fact, from that case law, it is relatively straight-forward to have anticipated the judgment would be against Italy - that is, that Italy had violated Knox's Convention rights under Articles 6.1 with 6.3c as well as 6.1 with 6.3e. That refutes the guilter proposition that the ECHR judgment was a fluke, mistake, or due to improper influence.
2. The wording of the judgment suggests clearly that Italy cannot re-convict Knox for calunnia by shifting the claimed evidence to her English language Memoriales, in part because the defects in the investigative proceedings (denial of defense lawyer, denial of fair interpreter) preceded those renunciations of her interrogation statements.
3. The wording of the judgment makes clear that the Memoriales, letter to Knox's lawyers, and phone call to her mother were all renunciations of the interrogation statements. Again, this is a point against the recent re-conviction for calunnia based upon the Memoriales.
(Google translation; emphasis by bolding and italics is mine)
153. The Court notes that, although the domestic courts concluded that the impugned statements could not be used against the applicant for the offences of murder and sexual assault, as the Government indicated, in accordance with domestic case-law (see paragraph 142 above), those same statements could have been used, in the absence of counsel, insofar as they themselves constituted a criminal offence.
154. It further reiterates that restrictions on access to a lawyer for compelling reasons are permitted during the pre-trial phase only in exceptional cases, and that they must be temporary in nature and based on an individual assessment of the specific circumstances of the individual case (see Beuze, cited above, § 142).
155. In the present case, however, the Government refers to a case-law interpretation permitting the use of spontaneous statements made by a person subject to investigation in the absence of legal counsel when they constitute an offense in themselves.
156. Even if this argument were to be interpreted as a "compelling reason" within the meaning of its case-law, the Court nevertheless notes that the case-law interpretation relied on has general application. Moreover, the Government have not established the existence of exceptional circumstances that could have justified the restrictions imposed on the applicant's rights. It is not for the Court to seek them on its own initiative (Simeonovi, cited above, § 130).
157. The Court therefore finds no compelling reason that could justify the aforementioned restrictions in the present case.
158. In such circumstances, the Court must assess the fairness of the proceedings by carrying out a very strict review. The burden of proof thus rests on the Government, which must convincingly demonstrate that the applicant nevertheless received a fair criminal trial overall. The Government's inability to establish compelling reasons weighs heavily in the balance and may incline the Court towards a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(c) (Beuze, cited above, § 165).
159. In this exercise, the Court will examine, to the extent that they are relevant in the present case, the various factors arising from its case-law (Ibrahim and Others, cited above, § 274, and Simeonovi, cited above, § 120).
160. The Court first highlights the vulnerable state of the applicant, a young foreign woman aged twenty at the material time who had only recently arrived in Italy and did not speak Italian fluently (Kaçiu and Kotorri, cited above, §§ 119-121 and Salduz, cited above, § 54). 161. The Court cannot but note that, just a few hours before the impugned hearings, the applicant had promptly retracted her statements, in particular through a text written on her own initiative on 6 November 2007 at around 1 p.m. and submitted to the police (paragraph 20, point 3 in fine and point 4, letter e above), another text written on 9 November 2007 for her lawyers (paragraph 24, point 14 above), and the telephone call to her mother on 10 November 2007 while the line was tapped. The Court notes that, however, six months later, on 14 May 2008, the applicant was charged with [calunnia]. 162. It should also be noted that, as is apparent from the judgment of the Florence Court of 14 January 2016, the applicant's statements of 6 November 2007 were taken in a context of intense psychological pressure (see paragraph 103 [above]).
163. As to the use made of the evidence, the Court observes that the impugned statements themselves constituted the offence with which the applicant was charged and, therefore, the material evidence for her conviction for malicious denunciation [calunnia] (see, a contrario, Gäfgen, cited above, § 178, mutatis mutandis; Kaçiu and Kotorri, cited above, § 118; and, mutatis mutandis, Sergey Ivanov v. Russia, no. 14416/06, §§ 90-92, 15 May 2018).
164. The Court further notes that the circumstances in which the impugned statements were obtained could not be [had not been] clarified during [or by] an investigation (see paragraph 138).*
165. Finally, it notes that it is not apparent from the case file, in particular from the record of the applicant's interrogation at 5:45 a.m., that she was notified of her procedural rights (Ibrahim and Others, cited above, § 273).
*Here's paragraph 138.
138. It must therefore be concluded that the applicant did not benefit from an investigation capable of clarifying the facts and possible responsibilities in her case. Article 3 of the Convention, in its procedural aspect, was therefore infringed in this case.
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So Knox, using her DNA analysis kit and fingerprint identification database, managed to remove all forensic evidence of herself from the bedroom, but managed to leave multiple traces of Guede? Wait a minute...how is that "covering for Guede" as you've previously claimed?





