And we're back to special pleading. "We should unquestioningly respect the rule of law whenever a court rules against Amanda Knox, but whenever a court rules in favor of Amanda Knox, it was corrupt, incompetent, or mistaken."
Further, from the
judgment (translated from the French with Google Translate):
2. Application of general principles to the facts of the case
(a) The applicability of Article 6 of the Convention
147. The Court notes at the outset that the first question which arises in the present case is whether Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was applicable to the facts of the case. It recalls in this regard that, on 6 November 2007, the applicant was heard twice : at 1.45 a.m. and at 5.45 a.m.
148. It notes that the two statements had originally been collected as part of the police's acquisition of summary information, a phase during which the applicant had not formally been subjected to investigations.
149. As regards the statements taken at 1.45 a.m. , the Court reiterates that the guarantees afforded by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention apply to any " charged person " within the autonomous meaning of that term under the Convention. A " criminal charge " arises when a person is formally charged by the competent authorities or when the actions taken by those authorities in response to the suspicions against him have significant repercussions on his situation ( Simeonovi , cited above, §§ 110-111).
150. Applying this principle to the present case, the Court therefore questions whether, at the time of the hearings, the domestic authorities had plausible reasons to suspect that the applicant was involved in the murder of MK.
151. It notes in this regard that the applicant had already been interviewed by the police on 2, 3 and 4 November 2007 and that her phone had been tapped. It notes that it is also clear from the facts of the case that, on the evening of 5 November 2007, the investigators' attention was focused on the applicant (see paragraphs 12-14 above). It notes that, although the applicant had gone to the police station of her own accord, she was questioned in the corridor by police officers who then continued to question her in a room where she was subjected, on two occasions and for hours, to intensive interrogation.
152. However, in the Court's view, even assuming that these elements are not sufficient to conclude that, at 1:45 a.m. on 6 November 2007, the applicant could be considered a suspect within the meaning of its case-law, it must be noted that, as the Government acknowledged, when she made her statements at 5:45 a.m. before the public prosecutor, the applicant had formally acquired the status of a person under investigation. The Court considers that there is therefore no doubt that, at 5:45 a.m. at the latest, the applicant was the subject of a criminal charge within the meaning of the Convention ( Ibrahim and Others , cited above, § 296). [bolding mine]
You keep trying to pretend, like Mignini, that Knox
technically wasn't a suspect, so she
technically wasn't facing a criminal charge, and that therefore she
technically wasn't required to have a lawyer. However, as the ECHR stated, and you either don't know, or pretend not to know, the Convention doesn't make exceptions for loopholes and technicalities. Knox was clearly entitled to a lawyer under the ECHR, regardless of whatever Italian law has to say on the matter, and the Italian authorities clearly violated her right to have one, your whining to the contrary notwithstanding. And if she had had a lawyer, and she had still made her statement, then there would have been no question that it was actually voluntary, as you like to keep claiming it was.
