Thermal
August Member
Which words confused you?
Isn’t it rather strange that you claim that determinism is impossible within the known laws of physics, but you can’t point to where it would go wrong, whereas nobody has as yet accommodated spirits in physics, but that is OK?No its not.
Not claimed.Isn’t it rather strange that you claim that determinism is impossible within the known laws of physics,
No idea what spirits have to do with anything.but you can’t point to where it would go wrong, whereas nobody has as yet accommodated spirits in physics, but that is OK?
No it is based on the laws of physics as we currently understand the.
So, is the idea that we don’t have a free will based the laws of physics as we currently understand them, or were you replying to something else?No its not.
Really, truly, honestly, have no idea where you are coming from.Do you really need reminding:
So, is the idea that we don’t have a free will based the laws of physics as we currently understand them, or were you replying to something else?
If you could describe the existing physics of decision making, I'd be very interested. No one else has, ever.As I said earlier, we’ll not come to agreement here, because there is no clinching argument on either side. To me, the most important argument is that “no free will” can be accommodated within existing physics, whereas “free will” needs new physics. I continued the discussion when you claimed exactly the opposite. If I have misunderstood you, I apologise.
There's a difference between valid and sound. That someone can come up with a valid arguments for the Many Worlds Interpretation doesn't make it any more valuable than any other unfalsifiable hypothesis pulled out of one's ass.I think it should also be mentioned that there are other valid interpretations than the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Physics. There is also the Many-Worlds Interpretation which has no “observations”, and no collapse of the wave function.
Reading this again, it seems you are saying that 'free will' is not exercised in a perfect vacuum, but is influenced by other stuff. On that, I totally agree. Experience with almost anything will linger upstairs somewhere, and factor into future decisions without the subject being aware of the influence. Little Albert being a perfect example. But my argument is that free will can override that base impulse to choose in a certain direction. That's what the Libet-esque vetos showed; even when the brains activity was preemptively primed to say 'yea', Libet and the others found his subjects, without runup, saying 'nay'.“Freest of free will models”. Interesting concept. Influencing and nudging is apparently not going against even this freest of free will. Perhaps you could elucidate.
My point was, by the way, not that influencing and nudging by pheromones and such stuff would be a killer argument, but it certainly shows that what people experience as free will (your argument) cannot be taken granted as advertised.
But you can prove the Copenhagen Interpretation?The same thing is true for String Theory, the Eternal Inflation Theory, the Multiverse Theory, Cosmological Natural Selection Theory and God.
You can't prove or disprove any of them.
Oooohhhh no they don't.Oh yes they do.
Physics doesn't have rules. We have rules that we apply to physical observances. We have seen that the way matter and energy behave is consistent and mostly predictable. When matter and energy do something we don't expect, we modify our model to account for it. We don't just make ◊◊◊◊ up, we observe, theorise, and test, and by doing this we produce a model that best approximates what we observe.Physics quite happily breaks its own rules when it feels like it.
I'm not convinced you can. This is quantum mechanics which while it can be predictable, it is not deterministic.But you can prove the Copenhagen Interpretation?
Exactly, the rules/laws of physics are descriptive, not prescriptive.Physics doesn't have rules. We have rules that we apply to physical observances. We have seen that the way matter and energy behave is consistent and mostly predictable. When matter and energy do something we don't expect, we modify our model to account for it. We don't just make ◊◊◊◊ up, we observe, theorise, and test, and by doing this we produce a model that best approximates what we observe.
Ya that's what I said, but I did so more concisely. Tell the no-free-willers who have been harping on those very rules that they say we must invariably obey all about it, Squidlly.Physics doesn't have rules. We have rules that we apply to physical observances. We have seen that the way matter and energy behave is consistent and mostly predictable. When matter and energy do something we don't expect, we modify our model to account for it. We don't just make ◊◊◊◊ up, we observe, theorise, and test, and by doing this we produce a model that best approximates what we observe.
Let's put Libet aside for a moment, because I want to see if we're on the same page about something:Reading this again, it seems you are saying that 'free will' is not exercised in a perfect vacuum, but is influenced by other stuff. On that, I totally agree. Experience with almost anything will linger upstairs somewhere, and factor into future decisions without the subject being aware of the influence. Little Albert being a perfect example. But my argument is that free will can override that base impulse to choose in a certain direction. That's what the Libet-esque vetos showed; even when the brains activity was preemptively primed to say 'yea', Libet and the others found his subjects, without runup, saying 'nay'.
Seems a bit of a self-fulfilling premise? "If everything was identical, would it be identical?"Let's put Libet aside for a moment, because I want to see if we're on the same page about something:
A person throws a rock through a window today. Assuming that everything leading up to that moment would have been completely the same, could he have willed himself not to throw a rock through the window?
The question of willpower is ultimately a question of an arbitrary electrochemical state in a human brain, and its reaction to stimuli. If the circumstances leading from the big bang to the current electrochemical state are predetermined, and the circumstances leading from the big bang to the stimuli are predetermined, then the state and its response will be predetermined.Let's put Libet aside for a moment, because I want to see if we're on the same page about something:
A person throws a rock through a window today. Assuming that everything leading up to that moment would have been completely the same, could he have willed himself not to throw a rock through the window?