Judge Cannon did, in her ruling.
Then why didn't you quote this pages ago when I first asked? It would have saved a lot of time.
I have looked up the passage in question. For those who want to check themselves, here's the source:
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000190-b6c3-d6f8-add2-bef7423b0000
And here's the passage originally from Nixon, reproduced by Cannon on pages 53-54.
Under the authority of Art. II, § 2, Congress has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the United States Government. 28 U.S.C. § 516. It has also vested in him the power to appoint subordinate officers to assist him in the discharge of his duties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515, 533. Acting pursuant to those statutes, the Attorney General has delegated the authority to represent the United States in these particular matters to a Special Prosecutor with unique authority and tenure. The regulation gives the Special Prosecutor explicit power to contest the invocation of executive privilege in the process of seeking evidence deemed relevant to the performance of these specially delegated duties.
So is that precedent? Smith wants it to be, but there's a hiccup in his interpretation. As Cannon argues on page 54,
The issue of the Attorney General’s appointment authority was not raised, briefed, argued, or disputed before the Nixon Court. Nixon is undoubtedly precedential in several areas—for example, in its pronouncements on the justiciability of an intrabranch controversy; the test for issuing Rule 17(c) subpoenas; and application of executive privilege in the face of a valid subpoena. Those issues were presented, argued, and carefully considered. The same is not true of the Attorney General’s statutory appointment authority. At most, Nixon assumed that antecedent proposition, without deciding it.
I don't think that's an unreasonable interpretation of the Nixon case. Perhaps the SC will disagree with it, but if they don't, then Nixon isn't precedent here and she's not going against it.