No, the JAIC hasn't explained it at all.
Let’s go back to your post that I responded to:
[…]
So between 01:02 - when the bow visor fell off - to 02:02 when MRCC Stockholm finally effected rescue, there was a communications blackout. […]
If there was 'no communications blackout' explain in which way?
As we can all see, you looked at the timespan until MRCC Stockholm sent out the notification to Swedish rescue services. Now, the responsibility to coordinate all rescue operations falls with Finland, since it’s within their SAR area, so rescue operations started earlier.
At 01:26 (ship) and 01:36 (helicopter).
But your end time above is important for a later point.
As for the starting time in your timespan above,
JAIC reports that the Bow Visor fell off at about 01:15.
Adopting a scolding tone doesn't hide the fact it evaded:
[*]dealing with why the mayday didn't come from the bridge
What is your source that the mayday didn’t come from the bridge?
[*]why the mayday via a walkie talkie was only received at 01:21 some twenty minutes after the 40° list.
The list started at around 01:15, so not 20 minutes after the list.
Chapter 7.3 lists all the stations that received the first and the second mayday call, and the times the logged for it.
[*]why Ainsalu and Tammes heroically sacificed their lives by hanging off the bridge to get the SOS through.
What is your source for this? We know that they didn’t survive but what is your source where they were at the time?
[*]Why Capn Thoresson could not get through to MRCC Turku.
Mariella was trying to reach Helsinki Radio at 01:27. MRCC Turku was already in the loop by this time.
Chapter 7.3.3.
The fact of the staff levels is irrelevant.
You may wish that it was so, but in fact the
number of staff available limits how much can happen at any given time.
”JAIC ch 17.2” said:
The Commission finds no other explanation of the fact that Helsinki Radio did not hear the distress traffic than that the distress frequencies were not kept watch continually. With only one officer on duty for many hours there must be, for natural reasons, periods when the watchkeeping will be interrupted. This was also noted and accepted in the agreement between the National Maritime Administration and Telecom Finland regarding the conduct of distress radio traffic.
Lt Capn Mikko Mononen who was on duty that night said that although he didn't get the message until 01:36 all of the 'maydays' had been automatically recorded by their systems. He couldn't get through to Helsinki Radio or Mariehamn until circa 01:44.
Mariehamn heard the 2nd mayday call, and was involved since 01:27 according to their log.
Helsinki Radio could do nothing until it had the location.
Yes they could. They could have sent out a Mayday Relay directly. You do not need an exact position to do that. The exact position can follow in a later transmission.
No explanation of why VHF Channel 16 and 2182hz were down across the region.
It wasn’t down. We knew that since the VHF channel 16 traffic is recorded, and
we can listen to it.
And MF 2182 was not down – the reason nobody answered was covered above.
Ships in the area got the Mayday via Silja Europa but there is little a high-sided ship some kilometres away can realistically do.
Exactly why any delay was fatal. Had the Finnish radio stations/Rescue stations had more staff available, we might have seen helicopters being launched earlier, and possibly they might have been able to save some more lives.
There you have it, information about what JAIC explained, with links to each chapter.