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Cont: The Sinking of MS Estonia: Case Reopened Part V

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You appear to be assuming that the ship went from vertical to "a near right angle to the sea" almost instantaneously. Epic fail.

By the time the engine room flooded and the ship lost all power, it would already have been sitting low in the water. So, immediately, the lower public-area windows were already significantly more susceptible to wave damage than they ever would have been in normal operation.

And when the ship ended up starboard-beam-on, even a 20-degree list would have created a serious problem for these lower windows: the ship's hull was now forming a wedge with the ocean surface, which would further have focused the energy of oncoming waves onto the side of the ship. Including those lower windows.

It's probable that the windows were broken when the ship was anything between a 20-degree and 60-degree list to starboard. Not when the ship was almost lying flat on the water (as per your stupid assumption).


Oh and the answer to your last question (purely from memory, so I might be wrong) is that the crew did steer hard to port, but the ship ended up turning well beyond 90 degrees such that it ended up presenting its starboard beam to the oncoming swell from the south-west (approx).

No. The engines cut out (four of them) because of the final heavy list of apx >40°.

After the initial violent list, the ship then righted itself to apx 15°, which enabled many of the survivors to have a ten-minute window of escape, [the JAIC does not mention this at all] before it lurched to 45° this time cutting off the engine completely. In other words, the first lurch following a bang or series of bangs or feelings of a collision, were followed by a frantic attempt to get dressed and/or run up to the upper decks, some not even bothering to dress. This fits the reported timings of 0100 and the final fatal list circa ten to fifteen minutes later.

The people who did not do this were likely doomed.

Attached is the direction the vessel turned, according to the JAIC, basing its timing on Treu's testimony.
 

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- vessel that was designed only for coastal operations not open sea
- metal fatigue and corrosion
- poor state of loading and trim
- stormy conditions
- decision to steam at full speed on direct route despite previous items
- no special crew vigilance despite the risks inherent in the previous item

Only the first two factors had anything to do with the inherent seaworthiness of the vessel, but all six of them contributed to the disaster.

Gradual scenarios of gradually accumulating adverse factors are exactly what leads to sudden cataclysmic failure, more often than not. The straw that breaks the camel's back doesn't break the camel's back slowly, it happens all of the sudden. You can try argue that the straw couldn't have broken the camel's back because the straw was added slowly and the back broke suddenly, but that's not how reality works. The "cataclysmic and sudden" deterioration of conditions on Estonia followed, and resulted from, years of compromises and hours of negligently bad decisions.

I agree with you about the poor care and maintenance of the ship but what you are not getting is that is not the JAIC's findings.
 
Some survivors confused their timings. It was a chaotic, frightening and terrifying experience.
We have enough different, independent timings to construct a reliable timeline.

No several witnesses independently of each other verified it as being Swedish midnight, either because of alarms on their clock or watch, asking their partner for the time having been rudely awoken by the list or because of a stopped travel alarm clock thrown to the floor because of the list.
 
It says the ship was turned to port. After the bow was lost and the ship started listing to starboard it would try to turn away from the waves itself due to the force on the flat bow. A list to starboard would unbalance the rudder and the change in underwater form would both tend to push the head to port.
It would have been difficult to keep the head in to the waves or try to turn the ship to starboard.
If a ship is listing it is best to turn in to the list to try and right the ship. A ship hull heels to the outside of the tur. Deliberately going to port would have increased the list.
I don’t think the crew had any choice in the matter.

In this video see how the ship leans to starboard as it turns to port.


Would could should.


It wasn't for the JAIC to guess or speculate, its task was to find out. (Or at least it would have been had it been a genuine task.)
 
No. The engines cut out (four of them) because of the final heavy list of apx >40°.

After the initial violent list, the ship then righted itself to apx 15°, which enabled many of the survivors to have a ten-minute window of escape, [the JAIC does not mention this at all] before it lurched to 45° this time cutting off the engine completely. In other words, the first lurch following a bang or series of bangs or feelings of a collision, were followed by a frantic attempt to get dressed and/or run up to the upper decks, some not even bothering to dress. This fits the reported timings of 0100 and the final fatal list circa ten to fifteen minutes later.

The people who did not do this were likely doomed.

Attached is the direction the vessel turned, according to the JAIC, basing its timing on Treu's testimony.
The diagram indicates the point at which the visor is believed to have detached. Have you considered, by comparison, at what point in that diagram the engines are believed to have stopped?

Hint: while the ship continues on course, that is because its engines were still driving it on.
 
The part which read, 'How do the blustery gales and ferocious waves manage to sneak under the bow', when obviously, as the ship was listing heavily toward starboard it was a reference to ... the starboard side.

Laughable.
 
No. Several survivors noted it was midnight/0100. One person even had his travel alarm clock stop at that time as the battery fell out during the list, when it crashed to the floor. Demonstrably before the claimed JAIC time of 0115, when it claims the bow visor failed 'all at once'.

All the ones you quoted say they noticed it was midnight (or 0100), and then, some unspecified time later the ship began to list.
 
The part which read, 'How do the blustery gales and ferocious waves manage to sneak under the bow', when obviously, as the ship was listing heavily toward starboard it was a reference to ... the starboard side.

What on earth do you imagine 'typo' means?
 
No. The engines cut out (four of them) because of the final heavy list of apx >40°.

After the initial violent list, the ship then righted itself to apx 15°, which enabled many of the survivors to have a ten-minute window of escape, [the JAIC does not mention this at all] before it lurched to 45° this time cutting off the engine completely. In other words, the first lurch following a bang or series of bangs or feelings of a collision, were followed by a frantic attempt to get dressed and/or run up to the upper decks, some not even bothering to dress. This fits the reported timings of 0100 and the final fatal list circa ten to fifteen minutes later.

The people who did not do this were likely doomed.

Attached is the direction the vessel turned, according to the JAIC, basing its timing on Treu's testimony.


1) Prey tell us how the ship self-righted itself from this "initial violent list" (Hint: in the context of this disaster, that is not possible - so this must be a case of misremembered testimony straight off the bat).

2) There are plenty of datum points from which a timescale of events can be reconstructed. People overestimate and underestimate all the time; and in any highly-charged situation of great jeopardy, people often swear (after the event) that certain things happened at certain times - when sometimes those things didn't happen at all, or sometimes those things did happen but at different times. A contextual analysis of the totality of witness statements, plus the radio calls, plus the physical evidence found subsequently, point to the most likely (by far) sequence of events. It is not your CT sequence of events.

3) As I said, the ship turned hard to port, which is ultimately what exposed its starboard beam to the oncoming swell from the south-west. Had the ship not turned to port, it would have been the port beam which ended up facing the oncoming seas. Better still would have been a quarter turn to starboard, which would have had an element of correction on the list, plus it would of course have brought the ship closer to the Finnish coast.
 
I agree with you about the poor care and maintenance of the ship but what you are not getting is that is not the JAIC's findings.
Why do you think the JAIC went out of their way to say the ship was seaworthy when they were trying to concoct a narrative that involved mechanical failure of important parts of the ship?

How does the JAIC lying about the seaworthiness of the ship fit into your narrative?
 
Vixen,

Which part of your post was a 'typo'?

The part which read, 'How do the blustery gales and ferocious waves manage to sneak under the bow', when obviously, as the ship was listing heavily toward starboard it was a reference to ... the starboard side.


That's not a typo.
Merrian-Webster said:
Definition of typo
: an error (as of spelling) in typed or typeset material
source
Collins English Dictionary said:
A typo is a typographical error.
source
 
Obviously "Seaworthy" equals "Unsinkable".
But why would the JAIC want to portray the ship as being in tip-top condition when they're trying to fake a narrative that involves it sinking because of a mechanical failure?

Surely, they'd want to concoct a story of a ship in a poor condition to fit with their narrative? :confused:

Of course the JAIC actually explain why the ship was not in a great condition at all, but Vixen keeps hammering on about how the JAIC said the ship was seaworthy, as if that proves something about something. I don't get it.
 
Would could should.


It wasn't for the JAIC to guess or speculate, its task was to find out. (Or at least it would have been had it been a genuine task.)

We know the ship was listing to starboard, turning to port against the wind would have been difficult.
They turned the bow away from the waves when they realised what the problem was. They left it too late.
We know that after the engines stopped the ship would turn sideways on to the wind and waves, we can see where that happens on the diagram.
 
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No several witnesses independently of each other verified it as being Swedish midnight, either because of alarms on their clock or watch, asking their partner for the time having been rudely awoken by the list or because of a stopped travel alarm clock thrown to the floor because of the list.

The bow didn't go from OK to off in an instant. It broke free and was being pounded up and down by the ship pitching in to the waves. Water was entering the ship before it completely detached.
 
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