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Cont: The Sinking of MS Estonia: Case Re-opened Part III

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Which question is that supposed to answer, and what about the other questions?

The Oceans started rolling at 21:30pm and finally sank next day at 15:30 - eighteen hours, is your answer, notwithstanding the explosion in the ventilator pipes causing a breach in the watertight hull and flooding the engine room.

The Estonia sank in 35".

In addition, everybody was successfully evacuated and saved.

All 571 people on board were saved. Hills organized the orderly evacuation of passengers[7] by the helicopters and is generally acknowledged as the leading hero of the event. Hills and fellow entertainer Julian Butler[8] directed the efforts of the entertainment staff, which included Hills' wife Tracy and Robin Boltman,[9] to assist the passengers. According to Boltman, "later in the morning, Captain Avarnasi (sic) even contacted me from shore to ask how things were going."
wiki


So much for the [he thought] brilliant gotcha by London John.
 
It does not begin to mention the maintenance of the bow visor. The independent University of Hamburg (H Hoffmeister) appointed by Meyer-Werft found the various components to have been worn, stress-fractured and corroded long before the accident.

It's conclusion is that its Finite Element (FEM) calculations of the side locks and bottom lock shows that the failure was in the sequence of first the starboard lock, then the port side and the bottom (Atlantic) lock last of all.

This is in direct contradiction tot he JAIC that has the Atlantic Lock failing first, thereby increasing the stress tension on the other two locks.

It is a shame the Atlantic lock bolt was thrown back onto the seabed and the bolt of Diana II used instead as the facsimile for the JAIC.

You didn't read the report did you?

Section 3.3.6 Surveys, maintenance, damage and repairs mentions the maintenance and repair of the bow visor

What does it have to do with the bolt though? that was intact.

How does Meyer-Werft changing the failure sequence and claiming the parts were already worn change things?
 
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Irrelevant though it is, you keep stating this as fact, when you have yet to produce any confirmation that it is.

It is a statement of fact. The JAIC had to use the bolt from Diana II for its calculations.

The parts officially recovered from the wreck on behalf of the JAIC

1 visor hinge bushing (steel bushing + bronze bushing + securing plate)
all 3 lugs of the Atlantic lock
the bolt of the Atlantic lock
1 broken lug of the port inner ramp hinge
2 steel distance rings from the port outer ramp hinge
1 EPIRB storage case
1 GPS receiver
1 portable lifeboat radio set
1 ship's bell
several smaller bits and pieces
JAIC

See here for the details of the atlantic lock treatment when divers examined the focsle forepeak deck of the bow visor.

The explanation of the photos on sheet 8 - The Atlantic Lock - shall be continued with images

- Nos. 10/11 showing the bolt of the Atlantic lock, which had been brought up by the divers on 3 December 1994, but was subsequently thrown back into the sea by Börje Stenström, because allegedly the helicopter taking the Swedes back home could not carry the weight ashore of both the bolt and the ship's bell. Apparently no one onboard had the idea of simply leaving the bolt on board the big diving support vessel SEMI I subsequently proceeding to Stavanger/Norway from where excellent mail connections do exist to Stockholm.

In any event, one of the most important pieces of evidence for the JAIC casualty scenario, then determined already with certainty, was destroyed forever without even taking a couple of good photographs of it. Nevertheless the available video footage is sufficiently clear to establish the condition of the bolt, which explains why Stenström threw it back into the sea.

The evaluation of the relevant videos revealed the following and for easy reference the Atlantic lock installation is shown again on one drawing looking from aft to forward and on the other one looking from starboard to port.

1 - indicates the contact plate for the sensors
2 - points to the bolt being in open condition
3 - indicates the actuator for the bolt.
EFD

These engineering scientists argued that it was not a 'design flaw'

- The contact plate (Arrow 1) had originally been straight as can be seen from the above drawing which is copied from the original von Tell drawing 4911-373 dated 09.10.79. It has been confirmed by the von Tell representative G.Todsen (Enclosure 2.4.2.21 - Statement G.Todsen) as well as by the BV-surveyor G.Lohmann in a personal discussion that the Atlantic lock had been installed as per approved drawings. Consequently the contact plate was originally straight.

- This was no more the case at the time of the casualty as can be seen from images 13/15 and from the image below made from the ROV videos of 02.10.94 and 09.10.94, because evidently the contact plate was bent from starboard to port when the bolt was in original condition.

The explanation for the bent contact plate of the bolt was presented by the last chairman of the JAIC and its Estonian part, Uno Laur, already at a meeting on 17.01.95 in his office in Tallinn when also a member of this 'Group of Experts' was present. He was asked whether he had an explanation for the many fresh footprints on the 2nd and 3rd stringers inside the visor and he replied as follows:

The inside of the visor was not tight and filled quickly with seawater up to outboard level when the vessel was on full speed at sea.
All hydraulic installations, i.e. also the actuators of the Atlantic lock, the bow ramp and the visor were leaking. This caused hydraulic oil to float on the water surface inside the visor.

As soon as the vessel reduced speed and consequently the bow wave became smaller, the water streamed out of the visor and the hydraulic oil settled on the stringers, bottom, etc. - as explained in Chapter 30.

As the Atlantic lock could no more be closed hydraulically already since some time before the casualty (probably since the ice winter, March/April 1994) crew members had to go down inside the visor each time before arrival and after departure Tallinn and hammer the bolt open respectively closed through the deformed lugs of the Atlantic lock. Thus they walked from forward to aft and back over the stringers through the freshly settled oil which caused the footprints as can be seen on the next pictures.

The above was confirmed by another participant of the meeting, Captain Arvi Myyryläinen, then Hull Manager of The Pohjola Insurance Group, Helsinki. His statement is attached as Enclosure 12.5.175.
ibid


You need to scroll down for the images.

In other words, the JAIC was only guessing that the Atlantic lock and the side locks would have worked normally if not for the 'design flaws'. However, it fails to mention the key pivot on which their conclusions are based, the Atlantic lock, was not available for independent transparent objective examination for other engineers, insofar a key part was thrown back in the sea.
 
Once again you are merely improvising.

Master Mariner, Arvo Myyryläinen, and Master Mariner, Laur - who was also one of the key members of JAIC concurred with him, in his police witness statement, that the bolt was indeed hammered home as a matter of course.

Stop contradicting established facts/on-field experts with your own guesswork interpretation.

Where is this mentioned in the JAIC Report?

How did they do it when it was behind the bow visor?
How did the hammer the end of it when it was connected to a hydraulic ram?

From the report

The visor locking devices and their operation were inspected every year by the MacGregor service base in Turku. The locking devices operated properly every time. According to information obtained from the service base it is very unlikely that any repair work would have been done on the visor locking devices without their knowledge during the period they maintained the operating and control system.

also

Survey of the bow visor and ramp for class was part of the continuous hull survey scheme. The bow door area was last inspected under this five-year rolling scheme in October 1993. No remarks related to the bow visor and the ramp have been recorded from any of these surveys.

If there had been any problem then it would have been noted in the survey.
 
The Oceans started rolling at 21:30pm and finally sank next day at 15:30 - eighteen hours, is your answer, notwithstanding the explosion in the ventilator pipes causing a breach in the watertight hull and flooding the engine room.

There was no explosion in a 'ventilator pipe'
One of the sea pipes connected to the waste system fractured causing flooding in the machinery spaces.
There was no 'breach in the watertight hull' whatever that is supposed to be.

According to your reckoning if there was a 'breach' in the hull caused by and explosion it should have gone down in minutes.

The Estonia sank in 35".

In addition, everybody was successfully evacuated and saved.

wiki

So much for the [he thought] brilliant gotcha by London John.

I take it the 35" means 35 minutes.

Estonia was smaller and had the entire bow missing. Don't you see a difference?
 
It is a statement of fact. The JAIC had to use the bolt from Diana II for its calculations.

The parts officially recovered from the wreck on behalf of the JAIC

JAIC

See here for the details of the atlantic lock treatment when divers examined the focsle forepeak deck of the bow visor.

EFD

These engineering scientists argued that it was not a 'design flaw'

ibid
[/SPOILER]

You need to scroll down for the images.

In other words, the JAIC was only guessing that the Atlantic lock and the side locks would have worked normally if not for the 'design flaws'. However, it fails to mention the key pivot on which their conclusions are based, the Atlantic lock, was not available for independent transparent objective examination for other engineers, insofar a key part was thrown back in the sea.

All the damaged parts were analysed. the bolt was not damaged.

They looked at the lock from Diana because it was of the same design and importantly, was intact and operating.
 
You didn't read the report did you?

Section 3.3.6 Surveys, maintenance, damage and repairs mentions the maintenance and repair of the bow visor

What does it have to do with the bolt though? that was intact.

How does Meyer-Werft changing the failure sequence and claiming the parts were already worn change things?

It was not a design flaw.

That was its conclusion, which from an objective distance looks defective.

We don't know the bolt was intact as there is no photograph of it.

Attached: Atlantic lock design.

Hamburg University, Hoffmeister, states that had the this lock failed then it would measurably increase the stress tension in the side locks. However, his conclusion is that it would have been the starboard side lock that failed first and then the port side, with the bottom lock last of all.
 

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How did they do it when it was behind the bow visor?
How did the hammer the end of it when it was connected to a hydraulic ram?

From the report



also



If there had been any problem then it would have been noted in the survey.

Inspected every year in Turku refers to when it was owned by Viking Line and known as Viking Sally.
 
You didn't read the report did you?

Section 3.3.6 Surveys, maintenance, damage and repairs mentions the maintenance and repair of the bow visor

What does it have to do with the bolt though? that was intact.

How does Meyer-Werft changing the failure sequence and claiming the parts were already worn change things?

It is claiming there was no design fault, as concluded by JAIC to have been the cause of the entire accident.
 
Mojo, If you read the first few paragraphs of the report, it explains comprehensively what the scope and remit of the report is.


Are you claiming that the Estonia was sabotaged by means of “corrosion fatigue [initiated] a considerable time ahead of the accident”, and carefully timed so that the eventual catastrophic failure took place precisely at midnight Swedish time?
 
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