Cont: The Sinking of MS Estonia: Case Re-opened Part III

[Vixen]

Your link was to a different and much later model.

He is a fool if he thinks the buoys are the rescue system he 'trusts most'.

They are a last fallback. He may consider himself a 'navigation expert' but he is obviously not a sailor.

Come off it. The COSPAS SARSAT system is far superior to the Channel 16 VHF international distress channel and making 'Maydays'. On receipt of the EPIRB signal, the rescue services are immediately activated. It is a no brainer. Imagine if the Estonia EPIRB's had been present/properly coupled, then they would have been released (two of them) as soon as the list reached 40° or thereabouts and rescue would have been triggered a good half hour before it was. No needing MRCC's making phone calls to helicopter stations and what have you.

 

[Vixen]

Devil's advocate here, what evidence is there that the epirb on Estonia had a 'hydrostatic release mechanism' as opposed to being able to float free from their cages? It really doesn't make any sense to have a pressure triggered 'mechanism' releasing a manually activated epirb. The wikipedia page on epirb refers to different classes of epirbs including float-free manually activated devices.

Here is the evidence: the Rockwater Report and also the Asser Koivisto facsimile used at his presentation in January 1995 of the Estonia EPIRB.

BTW the suffix, 'F' as in KANNAD 406 F or FH refers to the automatically activating versions (the 'F' meaning free-floating).

ETA: For the avoidance of doubt, the range of products from Kannad are as follows:

There are 3 types:
• The survival type:
• KANNAD 406 S (manual activation),
• KANNAD 406 WS (manual activation and water activation).
• The float free type (automatic activation):
• KANNAD 406 F/P: Container made of polyester with an internal membrane (CAL87).
• KANNAD 406 FH/PH: Container fitted with a HAMMAR release system (CAL 89).
• KANNAD 406 WH: Container fitted with a HAMMAR release system (CAL 89).

Whilst the Kannad manual on the web might be a 2006 update, it is highly unlikely the product codes will have changed.

 

[Here_to_learn]

Come off it. The COSPAS SARSAT system is far superior to the Channel 16 VHF international distress channel and making 'Maydays'. On receipt of the EPIRB signal, the rescue services are immediately activated. It is a no brainer. Imagine if the Estonia EPIRB's had been present/properly coupled, then they would have been released (two of them) as soon as the list reached 40° or thereabouts and rescue would have been triggered a good half hour before it was. No needing MRCC's making phone calls to helicopter stations and what have you.

No, that is not how it works - you do not understand how MRCC operates, and how maritime emergencies are coordinated.

The EPIRB gets the information to the MRCC, but it is till up to MRCC to decide how to handle the situation, what resources to send and so on. The downside of the EPIRP is that it does not notify the ships in the vicinity.

So the EPIRB is not a replacement for CH16 - instead that has been improved by DCS distress calls on CH70, combined with calls on CH16.

All this is part of GMDSS (Global Maritime Distress and Safety System) where the different components have different roles in handling the different situation around an emergency at sea.

 

[Vixen]

No, that is not how it works - you do not understand how MRCC operates, and how maritime emergencies are coordinated.

The EPIRB gets the information to the MRCC, but it is till up to MRCC to decide how to handle the situation, what resources to send and so on. The downside of the EPIRP is that it does not notify the ships in the vicinity.

So the EPIRB is not a replacement for CH16 - instead that has been improved by DCS distress calls on CH70, combined with calls on CH16.

All this is part of GMDSS (Global Maritime Distress and Safety System) where the different components have different roles in handling the different situation around an emergency at sea.

Oh, OK. I'm guessing Koivisto ATT was simply trying to explain to the YLE journalist the importance of the EPIRB.

 

[Andy_Ross]

A short video on how EPIRBs work although he has simplified the function of the immersion switch.

 

[LondonJohn]

I'm not sure about that - I think it has been previously posted that the Hogland transmitter from time to time continuously broadcasted a carrier wave on CH16. Now if that was intentional or some kind of broken equipment doesn't really matter, it would be pretty irritating for anyone in the local area.

It not uncommon in the area I live in - I'd say that a couple of times every year we have someone broadcasting noise on CH16, and with triangulation the offending transmitter is identified.

But regardless, the accident wasn't in the Hogland local area.

I'd say it's pretty difficult to see what benefit the Russians would/could have got from intentionally disrupting radio traffic on that band in that area.

But as you say, all of this (and what Russia's intent may or may not have been in this respect) is entirely moot in the context of the Estonia disaster and VHF radio traffic related to the disaster.

 

[Andy_Ross]

I'd say it's pretty difficult to see what benefit the Russians would/could have got from intentionally disrupting radio traffic on that band in that area.

But as you say, all of this (and what Russia's intent may or may not have been in this respect) is entirely moot in the context of the Estonia disaster and VHF radio traffic related to the disaster.

Deliberately disrupting channel 16 would also disrupt their own shipping, it makes no sense.

 

[LondonJohn]

That is not how I would use it.

Float free from a cage for me would mean that the unit floats, and just by its own force would break free from a holder.

A hydrostatic release mechanism is something that when it reaches a specified water depth cuts a strap or a rope that holds the unit in the holder.

The main difference would be - a float free unit could be dislodged by a wave, while a unit held by a strap with a hydrostatic release mechanism would not release the unit until the water pressure is at certain level (depth).


ETA - but I may be wrong here - It's just that I've seen solutions, for example for for lights that just float out of their holder. While hyrdostatic releases are used for example on life rafts.

Yes, you're correct.

Hydrostatic release switches are extremely simple - and almost foolproof - mechanisms. It's very easy indeed to design, manufacture, install and operate a switch that relies on the pressure differential between a) normal atmospheric pressure at sea level and b) water at a depth of as little as 1m or so.

By contrast - and this is the very reason why the Estonia's EPIRBs were fitted with hydrostatic release mechanisms but not with hydrostatic/immersion activation mechanisms - it's significantly more difficult (and costly) to build a water-pressure-activated or immersion-activated mechanism into the buoy itself, such that it will power up the buoy's transmitter automatically as/when the need arises.

In the past (ie prior to the Estonia disaster), international maritime regulators & legislators decided that the additional cost and complexity of auto-activated EPIRBs - if a ship was already fitted out with manual-activated ones - was not warranted. And the main thinking behind this decision was that no ship will ever sink like a stone within, say, less than a minute after the onset of a problem. And therefore (the thinking went), there would always be able time for a crewmember, once it had been concluded on the bridge that the ship was bound to sink, to step just outside the bridge (where EPIRBs were mandated to be located) and manually switch on the transmitter(s).

The Estonia disaster illustrated conclusively that EPIRBs couldn't rely on a crewmember to manually switch on the transmitters as required & intended, even though there would & should have been ample time for this relatively quick and simple task to have been carried out. As it turned out in the case of the Estonia, the failure of the crew to manually switch on the EPIRB transmitters ended up having no discernable bearing on the quality/efficacy of the rescue & recovery operation. But this factor was effectively irrelevant when considering that other ships in the future - in situations where EPIRB transmissions might have a very significant role to play in location and rescue efforts - might be placed at a major disadvantate if their crews (as with the Estonia) had also failed to manually switch on their EPIRBs before their ship sank.

Hence..... the consequent move to mandating auto-activated EPIRBs for all significant passenger-carrying ships.

 

[LondonJohn]

Almost all of your posts are irrational. the product of low intelligence (about this topic), bereft of any proper analysis, and stultefyingly ill-informed......you certainly ain't no quadruple nine that's for sure (about this topic, of course) . It's a statement of fact.

Is this the best "response" you've got?

 

[LondonJohn]

Come off it. The COSPAS SARSAT system is far superior to the Channel 16 VHF international distress channel and making 'Maydays'. On receipt of the EPIRB signal, the rescue services are immediately activated. It is a no brainer. Imagine if the Estonia EPIRB's had been present/properly coupled, then they would have been released (two of them) as soon as the list reached 40° or thereabouts and rescue would have been triggered a good half hour before it was. No needing MRCC's making phone calls to helicopter stations and what have you.

Why & how would the Estonia's EPIRBs been released* activated "as soon as the list reached 40° or thereabouts"? And what the heck do your mean by "properly coupled"?


* Released" has little or no relevance here. You should have written "activated" or "switched on". I'd say this is further evidence that you simply don't understand this whole area well enough.

 

[LondonJohn]

Oh, OK. I'm guessing Koivisto ATT was simply trying to explain to the YLE journalist the importance of the EPIRB.

Plenty of your arguments stand or fall on this sort of thing, don't they?

 

[Mojo]

That is not how I would use it.

Float free from a cage for me would mean that the unit floats, and just by its own force would break free from a holder.

A hydrostatic release mechanism is something that when it reaches a specified water depth cuts a strap or a rope that holds the unit in the holder.

The main difference would be - a float free unit could be dislodged by a wave, while a unit held by a strap with a hydrostatic release mechanism would not release the unit until the water pressure is at certain level (depth).


ETA - but I may be wrong here - It's just that I've seen solutions, for example for for lights that just float out of their holder. While hyrdostatic releases are used for example on life rafts.

No, because if an automatic buoy just floats free there won't be any pressure to activate them. They need to be retained until they are deep enough to turn, they tend to have a latch that is released either manually or by a pressure switch.

If you have a range that has both auto and manual only models they will both come with the same bracket.

Thanks.

 

[Vixen]

No, that is not how it works - you do not understand how MRCC operates, and how maritime emergencies are coordinated.

The EPIRB gets the information to the MRCC, but it is till up to MRCC to decide how to handle the situation, what resources to send and so on. The downside of the EPIRP is that it does not notify the ships in the vicinity.

So the EPIRB is not a replacement for CH16 - instead that has been improved by DCS distress calls on CH70, combined with calls on CH16.

All this is part of GMDSS (Global Maritime Distress and Safety System) where the different components have different roles in handling the different situation around an emergency at sea.

Further to this issue of marine communications. If the EPIRB's had deployed as they should we would not have had the shambles that followed from a weak Channel 16 signal.

From a Safety Research pdfwhich looks at numerous shipping accidents and makes recommendations, it says of Estonia:

At around 01.22 ESTONIA received the first weak vague request for assistance on VHF channel 16. At 01.24 ESTONIA called Channel 16 on Silja and Viking Line on VHF channel, passenger ferries which it knew would be nearby. After SILJA EUROPA responded to the invitation, ESTONIA stated distressed Mayday a couple of times and said they have a bad tilt to the right, while asking for help. ESTONIA was not able to report its position at that time. At 01.29 ESTONIA was able to announce its location while saying it looked really bad. After this, the vessel no longer responded. ESTONIA quickly sank behind the stern and disappeared from the radar images of ships in the area at about 1:50 a.m. The place of sinking was about 40 km south of Utö.

MRCC Turku did not respond to ESTONIA's emergency call, although it had heard it. Instead, the MRCC launched rescue operations.

SILJA EUROPA and MARIELLA tried to get information about ESTONIA's problems to MRCC Helsinki and Helsinki Radio, but finally succeeded. After that, they believed that Helsinki Radio would lead the radio traffic.
For a long time, radio traffic was routinely operated on VHF channel 16. No one sent an emergency message on behalf of ESTONIA, although
the other vessel no longer responded to SILJA EUROPA's invitations. Helsinki Radio sent a pan-pan message about the matter, although MRCC Turku had ordered it to send an emergency message on behalf of ESTONIA.

In the event of an accident, ESTONIA's radio electrician had just ended his watch. He did not have time to participate in the management of radio traffic. Radio traffic was handled by coxswains with an appropriate certificate of competency. ESTONIA had 989 people, including the crew. Only 137 people were saved.

Conclusion The Turku Maritime Rescue Center should have responded to ESTONIA's emergency call. All traffic should have been subject to emergency traffic procedures since ESTONIA uttered the distress signal Mayday. Someone should have sent an emergency message on behalf of ESTONIA at the latest when the accident vessel did not respond to the calls. In that case, not only the old but also the GMDSS (DSC) procedures should have been used. At least SILJA EUROPA, MARIELLA, Helsinki Radio and MRCC Turku would have had the opportunity to do so.

From JAIC: Chapter 7
A second distress call from the ESTONIA was received at 0124 hrs by 14 radio stations. One of these was MRCC Turku, which assumed control of the SAR operation.


Actual fact

Only Silja Europa and Viking Mariella made contact with Estonia and then it was apparent Estonia was not responding or responding in a way that indicated they had not heard.

It is no good listening or receiving a Mayday alert if nobody does anything about it.

1:43 Finnjet Finnmerchant and Mariella are told by Silja Europa that they have now managed to get in touch with Helsinki Radio by NMT.
1:46 Radio Helsinki to Europa asks whether Europa has Estonia’s position yet (NB: Estonia sank at 1:48!)

So two problems here: Silja Europa just three minutes before the Estonia sank completely, had to contact Helsinki Radio by mobile phone (Helsinki is nearer Hoagland Island than it is to Utö and then Radio Helsinki had to ask Europa whether she had Estonia's position yet.

I hear what you say about how Channel 16 works and the role of MRCC, which is appreciated, but is being ignored by the JAIC is the interference that night and a large cruise ferry having to use a mobile phone to ring up the MRCC and then the radio station responsible for sending an official Mayday - as Estonia could not, themselves had to contact a nearby ship to ask for the stricken ship's location.

Then sending a pan-pan instead of a Mayday.

If the Epirbs had been in place and Channel 16 not interfered with...

 

[Vixen]

How the JAIC lies by omission

Looking at the JAIC's report and comparing it to the distress call transcript, together with the early police statements of the officers on duty at the MRCC, I noticed some strange anomalies.

What JAIC say:

At 0129 hrs the ESTONIA’s position became known, and after receiving the distress message vessels in the vicinity turned towards the scene of the accident. The MARIELLA was by that time about nine nautical miles away from the ESTONIA. The SILJA EUROPA, which had direct radio contact with the ESTONIA during the distress traffic, assumed control of the distress radio traffic and at 0205 hrs MRCC Turku designated her master as the On-Scene Commander (OSC).

The Nauvu coast guard Winberg said he got the Mayday about 1:23 but could not get Estonia on his radar so he turned the frequency up to 24 from 12 and then saw ‘a target on the outer edge of the screen just southeast of Utö, which he later discovered was where Estonia had been located. He said there were ‘radar disturbances’ and the ‘target’ was only visible for a moment before disappearing into the ‘clutter’. and immediately contacted MRCC Turku.

Coastguard Kärppälä of MRCC Turku says he got the Mayday at 1:24 (so missed the first Mayday at 1:21:55) and he contacted Nauvo (Nagu) and Pärnäs and they confirmed they also heard it. Kärppälä contavted Duty Officer of MRCC Turku, Mikko Montonen at 1:33 and he was on duty by 1:40. The Coastguard ship, M/V Tursas was on its way towards the scene at 1:37.

At 1:40 Kärppälä contacted the helicopter centre. Kärppälä explains in his statement the crew were on a pager and they had one hour in which to be on standby. Kärppälä said the last crew member to respond was at 1:55. Kärppälä also contacted the duty Lieutenant Commander Heikki Himanen and he arrived at his duty desk at 02:03. Kärppälä said although he heard the Mayday exchanges, he did not join in but at 1:50 had heard the Helsinki Mayday relay. (This was after Helsinki Radio had contacted Europa to ask for Estonia’s position, see above.)

At 1:48 (the same time the Estonia disappeared from radar) MRCC Turku had contacted Helsinki Radio to instruct them to put out a Mayday call. This was now half an hour since Ainsalu made his first (received) Mayday.

The JAIC states:

At 0142 hrs the MARIELLA informed Helsinki Radio about the accident. Instead of transmitting a Mayday Relay Helsinki Radio transmitted a Pan-Pan message at 0150 hrs.

As we see from the transcript of the messages conveyed what Radio Helsinki actually radioed Europa about was whether she had Estonia’s position yet.

From the transcript – which the JAIC must surely have had – the pan-pan message was at 1:54, not 1:50.

 

[Kid Eager]

Looking at the JAIC's report and comparing it to the distress call transcript, together with the early police statements of the officers on duty at the MRCC, I noticed some strange anomalies.

What JAIC say:



The Nauvu coast guard Winberg said he got the Mayday about 1:23 but could not get Estonia on his radar so he turned the frequency up to 24 from 12 and then saw ‘a target on the outer edge of the screen just southeast of Utö, which he later discovered was where Estonia had been located. He said there were ‘radar disturbances’ and the ‘target’ was only visible for a moment before disappearing into the ‘clutter’. and immediately contacted MRCC Turku.

Coastguard Kärppälä of MRCC Turku says he got the Mayday at 1:24 (so missed the first Mayday at 1:21:55) and he contacted Nauvo (Nagu) and Pärnäs and they confirmed they also heard it. Kärppälä contavted Duty Officer of MRCC Turku, Mikko Montonen at 1:33 and he was on duty by 1:40. The Coastguard ship, M/V Tursas was on its way towards the scene at 1:37.

At 1:40 Kärppälä contacted the helicopter centre. Kärppälä explains in his statement the crew were on a pager and they had one hour in which to be on standby. Kärppälä said the last crew member to respond was at 1:55. Kärppälä also contacted the duty Lieutenant Commander Heikki Himanen and he arrived at his duty desk at 02:03. Kärppälä said although he heard the Mayday exchanges, he did not join in but at 1:50 had heard the Helsinki Mayday relay. (This was after Helsinki Radio had contacted Europa to ask for Estonia’s position, see above.)

At 1:48 (the same time the Estonia disappeared from radar) MRCC Turku had contacted Helsinki Radio to instruct them to put out a Mayday call. This was now half an hour since Ainsalu made his first (received) Mayday.

The JAIC states:



As we see from the transcript of the messages conveyed what Radio Helsinki actually radioed Europa about was whether she had Estonia’s position yet.

From the transcript – which the JAIC must surely have had – the pan-pan message was at 1:54, not 1:50.

I'm concluding from this posting that one good lie from omission deserves another.

Carry on....

 

[Vixen]

The Strange Case of the Swedish Helicopters in the Night

JAIC then relates:

Maritime Rescue Subcentre (MRSC) Mariehamn informed MRCC Stockholm of the accident at 0152 hrs, whereupon the alerting of Swedish maritime rescue helicopters was initiated. The first of these, stand-by$ helicopter Q 97, took off at 0250 hrs.

Kärppälä says he can’t remember to whom or when Sweden was called but according to an operations log in Sweden, this was confirmed as 0202 and ETA 0300. (Expected arrival time of the first Swedish helicopter: 3:00am)

Yet JAIC claims the first Swedish helicopter, Q97 ‘took off at 02:50’. If this was local time (for Sweden) that would be 03:50 for the Estonia local time, allowing another hour for it to get there.

At 2:27 (distress transcript) Turku MRCC informs Europa (now designated leader ship)’The first helicopter from Sweden will be here in about ten minutes’.

The JAIC writes:

OH-HVG arrived as the first helicopter at the scene of the accident at 0305 hrs, arriving from Turku, about 80km away setting off at 2:30 and Q 97 arrived at 0350 hrs.
About 0450 hrs there were four helicopters and eight vessels on the scene, and the number of rescue units continued to increase. The TURSAS arrived at 0500 hrs.

OH-HVG is the Finnish Helicopter. Q97 is supposedly the first Swedish helicopter arriving 50 minutes after MRCC Turku’s transcripted radio confirmation 'the first Swedish helicopter would arrive in circa ten minutes' as from 2:27 as timed in the transcript. (Recorded live at the time.)

Kärppälä also said in his statement dated 16 January 1995 that the ETA of the first Swedish helicopter was 03:00.

From JAIC:

Q 97 (Super Puma)
The Swedish stand-by helicopter Q 97 took off from Visby at 0250 hrs, arriving at the scene of the accident at 0350 hrs. The OSC requested the helicopter to pick up as many people as possible from the sea.

Y 65 (Boeing Kawasaki)
The Swedish stand-by helicopter Y 65 took off from Berga at 0320 hrs. <snip>

On arriving at the scene of the accident at 0400 hrs

So, the journey time from Visby is circa one hour and from Berga 40 minutes.

In effect, if ETA of first helicopter was logged at 2:02 to arrive at 3:00, how come JAIC claims the first helicopter to arrive Q97 got took almost two hours, not arriving until 3:50?

Curiously, the helicopters from Helsinki – 220 km away from the wreck, Visby 660 and Berga 400 km.

“OH-HYD (Agusta Bell 4I2)
OH-HVD was on stand-by at its base in Helsinki. At 0218 hrs MRCC Turku asked MRCC Helsinki to call out OH-HVD. The crew were alerted at 0225 hrs in their homes. They arrived at 0255 hrs at the base and reported to MRCC Helsinki, which responded that MRCC Turku was in charge of the rescue operation and that they would be given their assignment as soon as MRCC Turku and MRCC Helsinki had clarified the situation. At 0320 hrs MRCC Helsinki reported that the ESTO- NIA had sunk and ordered OH-HVD to take off. The helicopter arrived at the scene of the accident at 0532 hrs. (JAIC)

It took off at 3:20 and took over two hours to arrive, when it was one third of the distance of either Visby or half that of Berga.

According to Aftonbladet 29 Sept 1994, the first Swedish helicopter left after 0200 from Berga Naval Base outside of Stockholm. So if Q64 took 40 minutes, as with other Berga 'copters then it will have arrived circa 03:40 ten minutes ahead of Q97, which came from Visby, further away.

If we make an assumption that the expected Turku helicopter plus two from Sweden - as referred to in the MRCC distress transcript to Europa – saying the Swedish one should arrive in ten minutes, shortly followed by two more, why does JAIC claim the first helicopter to arrive was the one from Turku (OHG) at 03:05 - as one would expect - but then claims the first Swedish one – Q97 - did not arrive until 3:50, with the Q65 puma arriving next, at 04:00?

What happened to Q64 which took off according to Aftonbladet just after 0200 and with an ETA of 3:00, as stated by Kärppälä in his police statement, in which he confirms Operations in Sweden logged the request for helicopters at 0202 and confirmed ETA at 3:00 (Sweden being one hour behind Finnish time)? [Time is recorded in local time.]

The pilot of Q64, Kenneth Svensson, received a medal for his heroism and according to Aftonbladet the next day, saved nine persons, one of whom was dead, whom he transported to Huddinge Hospital in Stockholm.

Yet JAIC claims Svensson and Q64:

Y b4 (Boeing Kawasaki)
Y 64 took off from Berga at 0445 hrs, picked up a physician and a nurse from Huddinge Hospital and arrived at the scene of the accident at 0552 hrs. <snip> Y 64 brought the survivor to Utö.

Wait! A hero, yet only arrived 0552 and rescued one?

Are you thinking what I am thinking? Yes, JAIC are lying. Not the distress transcript, not Kärppälä of MRCC Turku, not the operations log in Sweden. Y64 DID arrive at 0300 or thereabouts, did rescue nine people, did transport them to Huddinge, did return at 0552, was fatigued and did injure himself.

I also wonder whether OH-HYD Augusta Bell 412 which was also on standby in Helsinki, with the crew all present at 0255, but only arrived 0532,for a 40 minute journey at most, was possibly also an early arrival, which, like Q64 made a return journey, with the first made 'classified' due to the missing Estonia survivors. The JAIC has made no attempt to explain the nine survivors - one died - including the Chief Engineer, Chief Medical Officer, and Second Captain Piht, having been listed as 'survivors' and later stated to have not been. The Estonian government officially believes these are still alive.

The JAIC writes:

At 0320 hrs MRCC Helsinki reported that the ESTO NIA had sunk and ordered OH-HVD to take off. The helicopter arrived at the scene of the accident at 0532 hrs.

Who believes Helsinki 'only knew the ship had sunk at 0320' when she disappeared off Finland’s own radar at 01:48, the crew were hauled out of bed to be on standby at 02:18, and, indeed, Silja Europa reports in the Mayday transcript the ship Estonia can no longer be seen circa 01:50.

 

[Here_to_learn]

So two problems here: Silja Europa just three minutes before the Estonia sank completely, had to contact Helsinki Radio by mobile phone (Helsinki is nearer Hoagland Island than it is to Utö and then Radio Helsinki had to ask Europa whether she had Estonia's position yet.

I hear what you say about how Channel 16 works and the role of MRCC, which is appreciated, but is being ignored by the JAIC is the interference that night and a large cruise ferry having to use a mobile phone to ring up the MRCC and then the radio station responsible for sending an official Mayday - as Estonia could not, themselves had to contact a nearby ship to ask for the stricken ship's location.

Well, not quite.

You see, when you want to talk via VHF to MRCC or Helsinki Radio, the transmission does not go through a radio tower in Helsinki or Turku - the coastal radio stations use the radio transmitter that is closest to the position of the ship. So the communication goes through the tower at Utö.

The Hogland transmitter broadcasting on Ch16 would result in noise on CH16 on the closest transmission towers to Helsinki (Espoo for example), but not on Utö. So Helsinki radio and MRCC could use VHF ch 16 and talk to the ships.

If the Epirbs had been in place and Channel 16 not interfered with...

So VHF interference is not an issue.

Then EPIRB - I don't think the EPIRBs of the time had GPS built into them. that didn't happen until after 1998. So before that you had to rely on triangulation/doppler effect measurements from the satellites to get a specific position. So I'm not sure if the EPIRBs no Estonia (had they been activated) would have resulted in a position more exact compared to what Silja Europa had initially.

A modern EPIRB is of course a different thing. But so are modern ships.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Well, not quite.

You see, when you want to talk via VHF to MRCC or Helsinki Radio, the transmission does not go through a radio tower in Helsinki or Turku - the coastal radio stations use the radio transmitter that is closest to the position of the ship. So the communication goes through the tower at Utö.

The Hogland transmitter broadcasting on Ch16 would result in noise on CH16 on the closest transmission towers to Helsinki (Espoo for example), but not on Utö. So Helsinki radio and MRCC could use VHF ch 16 and talk to the ships.

So VHF interference is not an issue.

Then EPIRB - I don't think the EPIRBs of the time had GPS built into them. that didn't happen until after 1998. So before that you had to rely on triangulation/doppler effect measurements from the satellites to get a specific position. So I'm not sure if the EPIRBs no Estonia (had they been activated) would have resulted in a position more exact compared to what Silja Europa had initially.

A modern EPIRB is of course a different thing. But so are modern ships.

At that time an EPIRB was a last resort, a fallback in case a mayday couldn't be made or for those in a raft after a ship sank.

 

[Here_to_learn]

The Nauvu coast guard Winberg said he got the Mayday about 1:23 but could not get Estonia on his radar so he turned the frequency up to 24 from 12 and then saw ‘a target on the outer edge of the screen just southeast of Utö, which he later discovered was where Estonia had been located. He said there were ‘radar disturbances’ and the ‘target’ was only visible for a moment before disappearing into the ‘clutter’. and immediately contacted MRCC Turku.

He probably changed the range on the radar screen, not the frequency.

And Clutter_(radar)^WP is exactly what you expect to get in a storm.

 

[JayUtah]

Are you thinking what I am thinking?

Almost certainly not.