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The Sinking of MS Estonia: Case Re-opened Part II

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Thank you for the information, it's much of what I was thinking. Since my experience is manufacturing, I didn't want to assume the same for shipping since the stresses are going to much different.

Sure, load profiles and duty cycles vary greatly from industry to industry, as do individual safety requirements and cost expectations. But the underlying physical principles are the same, and the test techniques are similar enough. We know a lot about how to tell whether metal parts can still do the job they were designed to do. But the requirements to find that out on a periodic basis vary across different industries.

Another part of the problem, is that Vixen appears not to understand the nature of catastrophic failures. She keeps talking about a few strong waves, but totally disregards the years of wear that would lead up to the failure.

It's not even a "few strong waves" anymore: note how she's downplaying the strength of the waves the report mentions as the precipitating event, putting words in the JAIC's mouths to make their position less tenable.

But I agree, the nature of catastrophic failure seems to elude her. In the most prominent examples of material fatigue in the airline industry (the infamous BOAC Comet crashes, and the horrific Hawaiian airline incident), the airframes in question were operating well within their design limits. And in the Hawaii case, well within the prescribed maintenance schedules that ordinarily look for signs of fatigue. The point is that these were not perfectly sound airplanes that suddenly disintegrated from nothing more than ordinary duty. Vixen is trying to make it sound like MS Estonia was a perfectly sound vessel that someone claimed was destroyed by nothing more than ordinary wave action. The mainstream narrative is instead that this was a vessel whose condition had deteriorated -- probably undiscovered and unsuspected by its operators, although opinions vary -- to the point where it could no longer withstand conditions at the extremes of its operating evnelope.

Conversely there are perfectly sound ships that have sustained hull damage from extreme wave action. Because these had ordinary bow construction, the damage was not fatal to them. Most ships don't sink, but ships do sink at a rate that demonstrates that seafaring isn't a supremely tolerant activity.
 
Further clarification on the bow visor findings

The metal on the bow visor has been physically analysed by Norwegian expert, Ida Westermann who confirms that in her expert opinion, the damage seen is due to an act consistent with an explosive.

A recent press conference claimed that pieces from the bow visor taken from the MS Estonia, which sank in September 1994 with the loss of 852 lives, show signs of a potential explosion. The fragments analyzed, which appear to have been subject to extreme temperatures, were not retrieved in any of the recent dives to the wreck, which lies in around 100 meters of water south of Finland's Turku archipelago, but had been kept in storage in Sweden.

At a Tuesday press conference, Swedish former MP Lars Angstrom referenced segments of the MS Estonia's bow visor which had been in storage in Karlskrona, in that country, and one of which was the subject of extensive analysis by metallurgist Ida Westermann, from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology.

<snip>

The metal from the bow visor bore signs that it has been impacted by temperatures of at least 1,200C, suggesting an explosion.

Westermann told daily Postimees that: "One of the most interesting findings was that very different micro-structures were observed within a distance of just a few centimeters from one another."

"There are parts where the material has not been deformed or impacted," Westermann said, adding that traces of solidified material had been found in those zones where the metal had been impacted.

<snip>


Ida Westermann said that this is indicative of a great pressure and of metal having melted in the said area at a temperature of at least 1,200 degrees, and the changes appear to be consistent with the results of an explosion.

"I do not want to further speculate on what exactly happened," she said, adding that the said changes cannot occur in the process of ship construction or repairs.

"If this had been the case, the entire part would have been replaced," the researcher said.

<snip>

Westermann said that her study only concerned a small detail of the entire bow visor.
ERR


A timed device or devices at midnight would certainly explain the bow visor bolts coming loose.
 
How it was built and the standards it was built to are already known.

And it's important to know that those standards did not include the mechanisms for bow doors. This is not to say that the relevant engineering companies did not have their own standards and quality control measures that they believed would be sufficient. But at no time was the articulation of bow doors a matter for regulatory oversight.

There will be no NDT testing of fittings and welds, it is a paper exercise as far as construction goes.

Shipbuilding would be prohibitively expensive and time-consuming if such measures were required.

In high-stakes engineering endeavors, you can have verification-style testing, where each item produced is subject to individual tests to verify its quality. But another mode of quality control focuses on the manufacturing process. If your process adheres to certain regulations, and you can document that you followed that process without deviation, then you don't need to inspect or test each individual product.
 
...the damage seen is due to an act consistent with an explosive.

Remember when you made this same mistake with the twinning claim? Look carefully at the language being used. Look especially at the parts of your source that you left out, which provide evidence that contravenes the hypothesis of explosives.
 
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The views of a vehicle's axles on the SKOT video

Here are some stills of the car/lorry axle and wheels that can be seen on the Sverige Radio video released a few days ago.

What type of vehicle does this reveal?
 

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Deformations in parts of the bow visor

Here are a couple of stills from the film released by the Fokus group showing the parts they claim are deformed by what looks like 'very high heat' (=aka a detonation). This would confirm Brian Braidwood's own views from an earlier expedition.

The other clip shows a thick piece of metal from the bow visor area completely twisted out of shape, on each of the x, y and z axis.

Could a few strong waves really cause this type of deformation? Or hitting the seabed?
 

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Here are a couple of stills from the film released by the Fokus group showing the parts they claim are deformed by what looks like 'very high heat' (=aka a detonation). This would confirm Brian Braidwood's own views from an earlier expedition.

The other clip shows a thick piece of metal from the bow visor area completely twisted out of shape, on each of the x, y and z axis.

Could a few strong waves really cause this type of deformation? Or hitting the seabed?

For the 14th time. It was not a 'few strong waves'
It was fifteen years of strong waves.
You yourself have p0osted detail of how the visor was deformed to such an extent it had to have it's fixings hammered in to place.
We also know that repairs had to be carried out in the past.

How do the pieces in the pictures look like they are deformed by 'very high heat'? they look like they fractured and twisted to me, where is the evidence for 'very high heat'?
 
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Here are a couple of stills from the film released by the Fokus group showing the parts they claim are deformed by what looks like 'very high heat' (=aka a detonation). This would confirm Brian Braidwood's own views from an earlier expedition.

The other clip shows a thick piece of metal from the bow visor area completely twisted out of shape, on each of the x, y and z axis.

Could a few strong waves really cause this type of deformation? Or hitting the seabed?

Or it was twisted when the visor was partially hanging loose?
 
... What type of vehicle does this reveal?

A solid axle with no differential in the middle and the hint of another wheel to the lower left beyond the wheel in the last image makes my first guess a twin axle goods vehicle trailer.

Do I win anything?

<edit> Oh, wait, did you want me to say "an army truck"? No, an army truck would typically be rigid rather than articulated construction and would be rear wheel drive so there would be a large and obvious differential in the middle of the axle.
 
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There are simply too many fittings on a ship for their welds to be routinely tested, and for the components to be routinely checked by any means for metal fatigue. In shipping the most common protection against metal fatigue is to overengineer the component by a large factor. An experienced ear can hear the effect of advanced fracturing using a hammer strike. You take a 3-lb sledge and strike the fitting lightly. Sound parts "ring" while parts compromised by extensive fracturing sound more dull. If someone sufficiently experienced had thought to do that, it might have been instructive. But it was by no means prescribed.

In civilian aircraft, dye-penetration tests (or x-ray or ultrasound) for critical components are called out in the schedules for C and D checks. That would be a difficult check to perform on an articulated hull element because it requires preparing the surface of the component to receive the dye. Ultrasound might actually be a more workable test method if the vessel's mechanism cannot be easily disassembled.

It's important to recall that at this time there were no prescribed design or test procedures for the fittings belonging to articulated bow doors. This is not to say that owners and operators did not realize the importance of keeping those elements in good condition. But there was no industry-wide agreement about what specific activities that entailed.


Absolutely.

And this speaks to the biggest problem underpinning this disaster: the fundamental failures in design and sign-off inspection - before this ship ever set sail.

I (and I think others) have made reference before to the gross error in the design of the bow opening mechanism: a total lack of redundancy, in a mechanism that, if it failed, would probably lead to the loss of the vessel. As we saw, all it took on this ship was the failure of one part of one component - the bottom lock of the bow visor - to set of a near-inevitable catalogue of events in a very short timeframe that ended with the ship sinking.

The designers (who also built the ship) should clearly have mitigated or prevented this situation by designing in proper redundancy, such that it would have been very much more difficult for the bow opening mechanism to have failed in this way.

And this, of course, is the underlying reason why the design/construction shipyard is currently doing all it can to search for alternative causes for the sinking....
 
Absolutely.

And this speaks to the biggest problem underpinning this disaster: the fundamental failures in design and sign-off inspection - before this ship ever set sail.

I (and I think others) have made reference before to the gross error in the design of the bow opening mechanism: a total lack of redundancy, in a mechanism that, if it failed, would probably lead to the loss of the vessel. As we saw, all it took on this ship was the failure of one part of one component - the bottom lock of the bow visor - to set of a near-inevitable catalogue of events in a very short timeframe that ended with the ship sinking.

The designers (who also built the ship) should clearly have mitigated or prevented this situation by designing in proper redundancy, such that it would have been very much more difficult for the bow opening mechanism to have failed in this way.

And this, of course, is the underlying reason why the design/construction shipyard is currently doing all it can to search for alternative causes for the sinking....

If the captain had been competent then the sinking might not have occurred and if it did more would have survived.
 
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