The Girl with "X-ray" vision

[Interesting Ian]

Originally by me:...
Have you read Pinker for a good (imho) hypothesis for 'consiousness'?
He suggests 'Mind is what the brain does'.



I must bow to your superior wisdom.
Have you ever considered working as a book reviewer?

Consciousness is what a rock does when it rolls down a hill. Consciousness is what leaves do as they are blown about by the wind. Consciousness is what the Earth does as it orbits the Sun. Consciousness is what the brain does. All the statements are equivalent and all are trivially false.

Now if you were to say that certain physical process cause or elicit consciousness, that would at least not be a trivially false assertion. But leaves blowing about in the breeze are not numerically identical to consciousness. Neither is any of the physical process in the brain. Physical processes are physical processes are physical processes. They might cause consciousness, but they cannot be literally equated with consciousness.

 

[Jeff Corey]

You are going to provde evidence tomorow? I can hardly wait.

 

[askolnick]

You still here?

And there are so many many other reasons why this [JREF] challenge is utterly ludicrous I scarcely know where to begin. What's to prevent these guys from specifying a success level far to high to achieve? What bargaining power does the testee have? He or she has none whatsoever! The Randi organisation has a million to lose. The testee simply has to agree to whatever the Randi organisation specifies, and you can be sure that the success level will be sufficiently high so as to ensure failure. It's not a genuine attempt to try and establish whether this phenomena exists or not. It's a stunt to convince very very stupid people that this phenomena doesn't exist.

Strange that it hasn't convinced you and you are one of the stupidest woo-wooers I've ever suffered to read.

You really are hung up on this scientific evidence issue. In the 17th Century there was no scientific evidence that mobile phones could exist. There is no scientific evidence that consciousness exists (including ones own).

Oddly enough, in the 17th Century, no mobile phones existed to leave any evidence. What a strange coincidence. Obviously proof that something woowoo is happening. Smoking that bad stuff again, I see Ian.

There is no scientific evidence that I went to my local shop 2 hours ago. There is no scientific evidence for many many things. So what?

I'm sure if we launched a scientific investigation, we would find evidence to confirm that you went to the shop (or didn't) -- evidence like eye witnesses, security camera film, credit card receit, your finger prints on today's newspaper in the newspaper rack, etc. Man, you say the stupidest things. Ian, I'd like you to try something new -- read what you write before posting it. O.K.?

"I know that people on here think this. I knew that before they ever said anything -- they always say the same to any alleged phenomenon that challenges their belief system. But that also means their assertions mean nothing."

You know nothing, you silly fool. I love to have my belief system challenged. And I know a great many scientists who also do. But the rants of kooks and the delusions of the crowds are not enough to challenge them. We need compelling evidence. And when compelling evidence comes along and knocks over our beliefs, we roar with surprise and delight.

Maybe she looks like a faker -- maybe not.

Maybe she acts like a faker -- maybe not.

Maybe she gets results a faker -- maybe not.

Maybe you're an idiot -- maybe ... oh, forget it. No one here would believe that.

Look, a few hours ago, you huffed and puffed and said you were leaving this thread and not coming back. Do you ever say anything that is true?

I can conclude absolutely nothing from such assertions. Skeptics say exactly the same, for example, regarding alleged mediums. They allege they are cold reading when the information they give could not possibly be obtained by cold reading. And what is more they say exactly the same as you. It's absolute sheer lunacy! No matter how astounding impressive someone was they would say that they are obvious charlatans. It's meaningless noise which I have learnt to ignore.

Obviously not.





[

 

[Bronze Dog]

They allege they are cold reading when the information they give could not possibly be obtained by cold reading.

1) Argument from lack of imagination. Just because you don't know how someone could have retrieved that information doesn't mean he couldn't have done it by cold reading or some other method.

2) Straw man: Cold reading isn't the only weapon in the "psychic" arsenal, or skeptical alternative explanation. There's warm reading, hot reading, reliance on the subject's confirmation bias, retrospective falsification, confabulation, subjective validation, and probably lots of other methods I've missed.

3) Of course, I'd like to hear a case of a medium/psychic/whatever providing such information, along with appropriate documentation. I seriously doubt it's as impressive as you think it is, Ian.

4) Cold reading is a more reasonable explanation because it doesn't posit any new entities without necessity like the paranormal explanations do. See 3) if you want to establish necessity.

 

[askolnick]

Nothing but a chamber pot me mother sent to me...

1) " They allege they are cold reading when the information they give could not possibly be obtained by cold reading." -- Interesting Ian

Ah, the same argument used by the wife of the old drunk in the Irish folk song, "Seven Drunken Nights" -- which she used every night to dismiss the evidence of her cheating -- such as her husband's finding another man's hat on the bedroom chair:

"Ah, you're drunk, you're drunk you silly old fool, so drunk you can not see. That's just a lovely chamber pot that me mother sent to me ..."

And that's where Interesting Ian's arguments belong, kept under his lovely chamber pot

 

[steenkh]

Now about cold readings, it must be kept in mind that a good cold reader will usually be able to produce readings where the clients afterwards will believe that there is no way this information could have been gained by natural means. A standard practice in cold reading is also to spice the reading with a few "lucky guesses". If they miss, no harm is done because the client will not remember. If they hit, it is just overwhelming proof that it was not done by cold reading!

 

[Interesting Ian]

OK here's my proof that epiphenomenalism cannot possibly accurately describe the mind/brain relationship which I list in a series of points below. But first an introduction might be appropriate.


Epiphenomenalism is the thesis that consciousness exists and is distinct from brain processes, but is entirely dependent upon the brain for its existence (just as shadows exist even though their existence is entirely dependent upon the body casting that shadow). More importantly epiphenomenalism holds that everything we ever say, do or think is wholly caused by the physical processes occurring in the brain. Consciousness has no input whatsoever -- in other words it is wholly causally inefficacious.

Why isn't this materialism? Well materialism would either typically hold that consciousness is literally identical to the physical processes in the brain (identity theory), or that it is literally nothing over and above what the brain does (functionalism), or that consciousness is an illusion i.e it doesn't really exist (eliminitive materialism).

It tends to be regarded that materialists should not hold the epiphenomenalist position that the brain, or the processes within the brain, cause or elicit a wholly causally inert consciousness. (Nor can they say that it causes or elicits a causally efficacious consciousness as, operating independently of the physical processes within the brain and affecting the processes within the brain, this would be interactionist dualism. It would still be interactive dualism even if this causally efficacious consciousness still owed its existence entirely to the processes within the brain.) The existence of things which are entirely without any causal powers is anathema to the materialist's position. This is because if something is entirely without any causal powers, then it has absolutely no effect on its environment whatsoever. If it has no effect on its environment whatsoever, then it seems to follow that we could never ever know about it since our perceptual senses could not then be stimulated by the existent, whether directly or indirectly.

But if they hold that we are directly aware of our own consciousness, then by definition it cannot be causally inefficacious. Their only option then, apart from simply denying the existence of consciousness, is to literally identify consciousness with some thing or process.


Im going into this in some detail because people seem to constantly confused by materialism and epiphenomenalism. It seems if many people on here and possibly most who declare themselves as materialists are actually epiphenomenalists. So I wanted to clear up this confusion.

OK here's the logical refutation of epiphenomenalism.

1) My first premise, and with the greatest of disrespect to the eliminative materialists, is that we are directly aware that we have experiences. In other words we cannot possibly be in error in our conviction that at least we ourselves are conscious and have experiences. Of course maybe we are in error about other people being conscious and having experiences. But I assert that each and every one of us knows with absolute certitude that at least they themselves are conscious and are presently having experiences.

It's simply a confusion to say we might possibly be mistaken about this. I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am having experiences since there is no distinction between seeming to be having experiences(which no-one denies) and really having experiences. Moreover it is very clear that it is my experiences which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for if "I" were not having any experiences, then "I" would not be conscious. But if this were so "I" could not think "I" am having experiences, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think of anything at all!

Now if you don't accept this first premise then there is nothing more to be said. You might as well stop reading now (or at least after the next paragraph) because my argument is completely dependent upon this assumption that I know with incorrigible certitude that at least myself am conscious and that I have experiences.


But I want to clear up a possible source of confusion here. I am not saying that I know with complete certainty that I am a self. A self is different from mere consciousness. For example it might well be the case that I am literally ceasing to exist every infinitesimal fraction of a second only to be recreated. Or that it might be the case that when for example I listen to music and experience it, and at the same time am enjoying the taste of a choc ice that I am eating, there is not literally one unified self which is having these experiences. Maybe there is just the separate experiences and the notion that there is a self experiencing both is simply an illusion.

So it is not by definition nonsensical to suppose the self is an illusion, but regardless of what the eliminative materialists say, I assert that it is by definition nonsensical to suppose ones own consciousness and having experiences is an illusion. Also when I experience something it might well be the case that I am not experiencing what I think I am. But what cannot be an error is that there really do exist experiences. If I, for example, am experiencing greenness, then it is nonsensical for me to doubt the existence of the experience itself, even though the greenness that I experience might not correspond to anything out there in the external world.


But if you're not convinced of this you may as well stop reading now.



2) Now if epiphenomenalism is true, then when I assert I know with complete certitude I am conscious and am now experiencing, for example, greenness, this is wholly and entirely caused by an unbroken chain or chains of physical cause and effect, most notably occurring within the brain. Most crucially consciousness together with my actual experience of greenness -- which is distinct from such physical events even though caused by them -- plays absolutely no role whatsoever in my utterance that I am conscious and am now experiencing greenness.



3) But this even applies to any thought that I am conscious and am now experiencing greenness. My realization, conviction, or feeling that I am conscious and am presently having experiences cannot be caused or elicited by the experiences themselves (since they are causally inefficacious), but is entirely caused or generated by the processes within the brain.

4) So neither my consciousness, nor my present experiences (such as greenness) nor my belief I am presently having such experiences, can be justified by the experiences themselves since my consciousness and my experiences are wholly causally inefficacious. This therefore entails it is conceivable I could be mistaken in my belief that I am now presently having experiences or that these experiences exist.

5) But now we get a logical contradiction because from "1" it was concluded that I know with incorrigible certitude that I am conscious and am presently having experiences. But if epiphenomenalism is true I could be mistaken about this. Thus an internal inconsistency is generated.

 

[Garrette]

And there are so many many other reasons why this challenge is utterly ludicrous I scarcely know where to begin. What's to prevent these guys from specifying a success level far to high to achieve? What bargaining power does the testee have? He or she has none whatsoever! The Randi organisation has a million to lose. The testee simply has to agree to whatever the Randi organisation specifies, and you can be sure that the success level will be sufficiently high so as to ensure failure. It's not a genuine attempt to try and establish whether this phenomena exists or not. It's a stunt to convince very very stupid people that this phenomena doesn't exist.

For any new folks out there who may be swayed a bit by Ian's command of language (he does have that along with a facility of communication and brevity I envy): this is an example of why I long ago concluded that Ian is at best a troll and certainly a liar.

Ian knows the challenge and its terms. He knows that what he posts here is simply untrue.

Don't take my word for it, or his, though. Read the Challenge Rules and compare it to this, then decide for yourself.

Well perhaps, but if I were to experience a crisis apparition and later find out that the person which the apparition represented died more or less at the same instant I had the vision, then that would be sufficient evidence for me. At some point you have to be sensible and just accept your materialist metaphysic is hopelessly wrong.

And here's another. Ian is well-versed in subjects of the mind and psychology. He is aware of alternative explanations for this phenomena including the explanation that the belief that such an event occurred as remembered is simply incorrect.

He lies. He does it well, but he still lies.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Now if you were to say that certain physical process cause or elicit consciousness, that would at least not be a trivially false assertion. But leaves blowing about in the breeze are not numerically identical to consciousness. Neither is any of the physical process in the brain. Physical processes are physical processes are physical processes. They might cause consciousness, but they cannot be literally equated with consciousness.

When you say "X is identical to Y" you mean numerically equal? Gosh, no wonder I've misunderstood many things you've said.

Certain brain functions give rise to inner experiences that we call, as a whole, consciousness. I don't think anyone has ever suggested that the brain is numerically equal to consciousness, just as no one has suggested that a rose is numerically equal to red.

~~ Paul

 

[Mojo]

Ian is well-versed in subjects of the mind and psychology.

Although he claims not to have studied psychology. Or at least, not very much. I'm not sure why.

He is aware of alternative explanations for this phenomena including the explanation that the belief that such an event occurred as remembered is simply incorrect.

Ah, yes, That would be it.

 

[drfrank]

The philosophical definition of epiphenomenalism is that qualia* have no effect on the brain. If this were the case, we would not be having this conversation, because we would have no way to make our mouths talk about qualia.

A very good point indeed Infinitely more concise than Ian's version, too.

 

[Complexity]

"Interesting" Ian gives me the creeps.

He knows lots of words, and may even understand many of the ideas, but there is something twisted inside of him. I do not trust him at all.

 

[Garrette]

Let me see if I grasp this.

Epiphenomenalism holds that:

1. Consciousness exists
2. It is caused by physical processes
3. It can cause nothing

I think that’s it. Not hard so far.


Now regarding the refutation of epiphenomenalism:

1. We are conscious and have experiences

2. The experience is separate from our awareness of it

3. Awareness of an experience is caused by physical processes separate from both conscious and the experience itself

4. Because of #3, the awareness may be mistaken, and the experience itself may not be real

5. The doubt of #4 is incompatible with the certainty of #1, therefore epiphenomenalism is logically inconsistent and is refuted.


Perhaps I missed something.

While I see that (at least according to this) epiphenomalism holds that the conscious can cause nothing, where does it hold that an experience can cause nothing?

I see no explicit nor implicit claim to that regard.

And if an experience can be causally efficacious, then Step #3 fails and the refutation falls apart.

I’ll grant that this is not my field and it is possible I have misread or misunderstood.

Edited for font which I hope comes out okay

 

[Garrette]

I posted the previous before seeing Paul's bit about qualia.

I'll leave my comment, though, as a mental exercise.

If I'm correct, too, then Ian will be shown to be mistaken on two counts: His definitions and his logic.

But I might be wrong.

 

[Interesting Ian]

When you say "X is identical to Y" you mean numerically equal? Gosh, no wonder I've misunderstood many things you've said.

Certain brain functions give rise to inner experiences that we call, as a whole, consciousness. I don't think anyone has ever suggested that the brain is numerically equal to consciousness, just as no one has suggested that a rose is numerically equal to red.

~~ Paul

If brain processes give rise to consciousness, then consciousness is distinct from those processes. But it is those physical processes in the brain, and those processes alone, which wholly determine everything we ever say, do or think. But that is epiphenomenalism which I've just refuted.

On the other hand saying that consciousness is literally identical to physical processes is flat out false. Leaves being blown about in the wind is just that and nothing more. Same goes for any other physical processes. Physical processes might cause or elicit consciousness, but in and of themselves they are not consciousness.

This means we are compelled to retreat to interactive dualism at a minimum.

 

[Garrette]

Not sure I follow that consciousness must be distinct from the brain processes that give them rise else we are wind-blown leaves.

Leg processes give rise to running, yet I would not call running distinct from leg processes.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally Posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos :
The philosophical definition of epiphenomenalism is that qualia* have no effect on the brain. If this were the case, we would not be having this conversation, because we would have no way to make our mouths talk about qualia.

drfrank
A very good point indeed Infinitely more concise than Ian's version, too.

I scarcely think an epiphenomenalist would be impressed by what Paul said! His statement just hints at the profoundly counter-intuitional nature of epiphenomenalism. Our mouths talk about qualia because of a continous physical chain of cause and effect. We do not talk about qualia because of the existence of the qualia themselves. Likewise, when we argue about anything we do not say what we do because of a conscious understanding of the issues leading us to say what we do. No, everything is simply the result of a physical chain of cause and effect. This physical chain of cause and effect is distinct from consciousness and thus any conscious understanding. Thus conscious understanding plays no role in anything we ever say -- or indeed think. This lays the groundwork for my refutation, but what Paul said is not a refutation in and of itself.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Not sure I follow that consciousness must be distinct from the brain processes that give them rise else we are wind-blown leaves.

Leg processes give rise to running, yet I would not call running distinct from leg processes.

Running means nothing over and above certain leg processes carried out in a specific environment resulting in movement of ones body relative to the ground. This is transparently clear.

Consciousness, on the other hand, does not mean leaves blowing about in the wind, it does not mean the Earth orbiting the Sun, it does not mean a boulder rolling down a hill, it does not mean neurons firing in the brain. Any or all of these processes might elicit consciousness, but they are not identical to such processes.

 

[Interesting Ian]

"Interesting" Ian gives me the creeps.

Wow! Are you a guy?

People have always said I'm weird -- most noticeably women -- but I don't believe I generally frighten people.

 

[Garrette]

Running means nothing over and above certain leg processes carried out in a specific environment resulting in movement of ones body relative to the ground. This is transparently clear.

I could as easily and legitimately state that Consciousness means nothing over and above certain neurological processes carried out in a specific environment resulting in a neurologically-based awareness relative to one's experiences.

Consciousness, on the other hand, does not mean leaves blowing about in the wind, it does not mean the Earth orbiting the Sun, it does not mean a boulder rolling down a hill, it does not mean neurons firing in the brain. Any or all of these processes might elicit consciousness, but they are not identical to such processes.

It seems dependent on your definition of consciousness, then. What, exactly, does it mean?