The study of atoms in the brain doesn't explain the redness of red;Materialism = FAKE

[MohamedTaqi]

OK, then what does know what red looks like? The mind associated with tat particular brain?

I don't know, what is that supposed to be. All I know is that the brain has a "what is it like to be a brain" aspect. And that aspect presents itself as an experience of red.

That aspect is forever hidden from what a brain looks like from the outside. I don't claim it is not physical, indeed it is physical in that it depends on the brain itself.

How that is produced, no one knows.

 

[MohamedTaqi]

Right, but that still doesn't answer my question about what does know what red looks like if not the brain. Or perhaps you're a color nihilist and think there is no such thing as the color red as an experience.

I added that reply before reading your reply , refresh

 

[sir drinks-a-lot]

OK, but you said "your brain does not know what red looks like, it just runs the algorithm, that produces a subjective aspect, that is forever inaccessible to the brain itself."

But then would you say that the subjective aspect knows what red looks like?

 

[MohamedTaqi]

Or perhaps you're a color nihilist and think there is no such thing as the color red as an experience.

No, I am not a color nihilist.

I am probably a panpsychist ... that matter has two aspects of it : subjective and objective.

I don't know in fact, I am still thinking that through.

 

[MohamedTaqi]

But then would you say that the subjective aspect knows what red looks like?

It does not know , IT IS what red looks like.

It is not like someone watches a movie, it is the movie, the self-referential movie.
This is its property.


But I really don't know, this is all speculative.

 

[sir drinks-a-lot]

Most of that seems reasonable and in line with the current western scientific view of the brain. Except for the panpsychism part. It seems the evidence is that the level of conscious correlates with complexity of the arrangement of matter more than the amount of matter. Stars, for example, have an enormous amount of matter but very few would say that have anything like conscious experience.

Probably a lot of contemporary neuroscientists would also disagree that the subjective is in principle, completely inaccessible.

 

[MohamedTaqi]

And yes, no matter how hard you think about it, paradoxes and contradictions are not something to be surprised of.

It seems that there is an element in it, that cannot be fully described in formal terms.

 

[JoeMorgue]

It seems like you've invested an awful lot of emotion in a lot of these issues.

I care about the watering down of intellectual standards. Sue me.

Be honest. Do you have an actual intellectual argument to make against an actual statement I said or did you just feel the need to jump to "Philosophy's" defense when I snarked at it?

Because you got to the "Please explain to me what it is I'm arguing so I can tell you why you're arguing against it wrong" stage pretty goddamn quick.

My statements are:

1. There is no soul (regardless if you call it a soul or use one of many, many code-words for same.)
2. "The Mind Body Problem," "The Hard Problem of Consciousness," the Duality/Materialist debate, and similar concepts are all nonsense.
3. There is nothing in the human mental experiences that isn't already established as happening inside a normal functioning brain.
4. There are no "air gaps" that need explaining between our experiences and our sense.
5. "Qualia" is not a useful or meaningful term.
6. There is no difference between our senses detecting, to use the current example, the color red and the "experience of the color red."

If you disagree with any of those statements I will happily debate you. If you don't I don't know what the problem is. Either way I will not sit here and argue with you while you claim we aren't disagreeing about anything.

Again if you just feel the need to defend Philosophy's honor, admit it.

 

[sir drinks-a-lot]

And yes, no matter how hard you think about it, paradoxes and contradictions are not something to be surprised of.

It seems that there is an element in it, that cannot be fully described in formal terms.

Yes, some of the most interesting discoveries in science are those types of (disappointing) insights, where we learn that something cannot in principle be known or proven. As far as I know those types of results started accumulating around the start of the 20th century in both physics and mathematics. These types of insights are probably why you decided to use the word nightmare. :0

 

[MohamedTaqi]

Most of that seems reasonable and in line with the current western scientific view of the brain. Except for the panpsychism part. It seems the evidence is that the level of conscious correlates with complexity of the arrangement of matter more than the amount of matter. Stars, for example, have an enormous amount of matter but very few would say that have anything like conscious experience.

Probably a lot of contemporary neuroscientists would also disagree that the subjective is in principle, completely inaccessible.

Yes, I have read about Integrated Information Theory (IIT) , it is about Phi , a measure of how information is integrated in a system : that is, how much does a state of a system constrain its behaviour in the past and future.



I am skeptic of this "theory" , but it is the best thing we have in this field.

By Panpsychism I do not mean that matter is conscious , but that it has a property that allows for consciousness to emerge as we know it.

But that property, has to be an 'inward' property if you will, it is only accessible to the system itself , the atom itself.

The atom surely is blind, but it has a property that can only be viewed from the perspective of "being" an atom. And this property is what evolves to be a conscious experience.


One might argue that consciousness is just like "wetness" .. Yes, both are emergent properties in that wetness emerges from a collection of water molecules, and consciousness emerges from a collection of firing neurons.

But the problem, is that wetness emerges from the shape and fundamental properties of polarity..etc of a single water molecule. Which is an objective property, and wetness is an objective emergent property too.

But consciousness is a subjective phenomenon, therefore, it has (I think) to emerge from a property that is not objective on the microscopic scales.

It is not consciousness like we know it, atoms don't see dark, they are not aware of anything, much like our state when we are in a coma or deep sleep.

But surely there is a side of what it is like to be a man in deep sleep, or an atom..etc. It is not like anything, but there is , if you will, a space (or screen) of possibilities that points inward, that makes it possible for any system to wake up onces some conditions are met.

 

[MohamedTaqi]

Yes, some of the most interesting discoveries in science are those types of (disappointing) insights, where we learn that something cannot in principle be known or proven. As far as I know those types of results started accumulating around the start of the 20th century in both physics and mathematics. These types of insights are probably why you decided to use the word nightmare. :0

That's one reason I call it a nightmare. I spent years and years thinking about what consciousness is all about. Oscillating between panpsychism and nihilism.

But since I started learning about philosophy, I realized that there are deeper questions than phenomenology , just Ontology is thriving with questions.

 

[LarryS]

I care about the watering down of intellectual standards. Sue me.

Be honest. Do you have an actual intellectual argument to make against an actual statement I said or did you just feel the need to jump to "Philosophy's" defense when I snarked at it?

Because you got to the "Please explain to me what it is I'm arguing so I can tell you why you're arguing against it wrong" stage pretty goddamn quick.

My statements are:

1. There is no soul (regardless if you call it a soul or use one of many, many code-words for same.)
2. "The Mind Body Problem," "The Hard Problem of Consciousness," the Duality/Materialist debate, and similar concepts are all nonsense.
3. There is nothing in the human mental experiences that isn't already established as happening inside a normal functioning brain.
4. There are no "air gaps" that need explaining between our experiences and our sense.
5. "Qualia" is not a useful or meaningful term.
6. There is no difference between our senses detecting, to use the current example, the color red and the "experience of the color red."

If you disagree with any of those statements I will happily debate you. If you don't I don't know what the problem is. Either way I will not sit here and argue with you while you claim we aren't disagreeing about anything.

Again if you just feel the need to defend Philosophy's honor, admit it.

I agree with #1 . . . after that no.

 

[shuttlt]

What kind of broken reasoning did you use to determine I would have taken issue with the statement that the brain creates the mind?

It's like looking out at the world through a window with somebody whose eyes haven't focused on the glass. They are focusing on the objective world and assume that is what you are talking about, hence you have to be questioning the objective physical explanations and processes. Until they become aware of the glass there is no possibility of progress.

 

[MohamedTaqi]

I care about the watering down of intellectual standards. Sue me.

Be honest. Do you have an actual intellectual argument to make against an actual statement I said or did you just feel the need to jump to "Philosophy's" defense when I snarked at it?

Because you got to the "Please explain to me what it is I'm arguing so I can tell you why you're arguing against it wrong" stage pretty goddamn quick.

My statements are:

1. There is no soul (regardless if you call it a soul or use one of many, many code-words for same.)
2. "The Mind Body Problem," "The Hard Problem of Consciousness," the Duality/Materialist debate, and similar concepts are all nonsense.
3. There is nothing in the human mental experiences that isn't already established as happening inside a normal functioning brain.
4. There are no "air gaps" that need explaining between our experiences and our sense.
5. "Qualia" is not a useful or meaningful term.
6. There is no difference between our senses detecting, to use the current example, the color red and the "experience of the color red."

If you disagree with any of those statements I will happily debate you. If you don't I don't know what the problem is. Either way I will not sit here and argue with you while you claim we aren't disagreeing about anything.

Again if you just feel the need to defend Philosophy's honor, admit it.

I agree with these statements :

1. There is no soul (regardless if you call it a soul or use one of many, many code-words for same.)
3. There is nothing in the human mental experiences that isn't already established as happening inside a normal functioning brain.
6. There is no difference between our senses detecting, to use the current example, the color red and the "experience of the color red."


I don't agree with the following :

2. "The Mind Body Problem," "The Hard Problem of Consciousness," the Duality/Materialist debate, and similar concepts are all nonsense.

There seems to be a problem, and it is the mission of philosophy to probe the problem. Or at least, why there appears to be a problem if there is no problem.

4. There are no "air gaps" that need explaining between our experiences and our sense.

There are gaps, between the fact that being a bee does not feel like anything you have access to, and being You feels like something. This is the gap : why is it that you are you and not the bee, and why you cannot have access to what it is like to be a bee, just from bee anatomy.

5. "Qualia" is not a useful or meaningful term.

No, It is useful, we cannot say the quality of "redness" and "blueness" all the time, so we refer to them collectively as different qualia.

 

[RedStapler]

I agree with these statements :

1. There is no soul (regardless if you call it a soul or use one of many, many code-words for same.)
3. There is nothing in the human mental experiences that isn't already established as happening inside a normal functioning brain.
6. There is no difference between our senses detecting, to use the current example, the color red and the "experience of the color red."


I don't agree with the following :



There seems to be a problem, and it is the mission of philosophy to probe the problem. Or at least, why there appears to be a problem if there is no problem.



There are gaps, between the fact that being a bee does not feel like anything you have access to, and being You feels like something. This is the gap : why is it that you are you and not the bee, and why you cannot have access to what it is like to be a bee, just from bee anatomy.




No, It is useful, we cannot say the quality of "redness" and "blueness" all the time, so we refer to them collectively as different qualia.

Completely meaningless statements, especially the bee part.

 

[arthwollipot]

Could you recommend a couple of articles on progress of neuroscience in these dates? Thank you.

https://lmgtfy.com/?q=recent+developments+in+neuroscience

 

[MohamedTaqi]

Completely meaningless statements, especially the bee part.

Certainly I know what I mean by them.

 

[xjx388]

I agree with these statements :

1. There is no soul (regardless if you call it a soul or use one of many, many code-words for same.)
3. There is nothing in the human mental experiences that isn't already established as happening inside a normal functioning brain.
6. There is no difference between our senses detecting, to use the current example, the color red and the "experience of the color red."


I don't agree with the following :



There seems to be a problem, and it is the mission of philosophy to probe the problem. Or at least, why there appears to be a problem if there is no problem.



There are gaps, between the fact that being a bee does not feel like anything you have access to, and being You feels like something. This is the gap : why is it that you are you and not the bee, and why you cannot have access to what it is like to be a bee, just from bee anatomy.




No, It is useful, we cannot say the quality of "redness" and "blueness" all the time, so we refer to them collectively as different qualia.

I can imagine being a bee. Why do I need to have the actual experience? It’s enough for me to know that a bee can’t even imagine what it’s like to be me.

 

[xjx388]

I can’t even tell you what it feels like to be me. But I’d bet I experience myself in much the same way as everyone else does. It just kind of is what it is, no? I don’t ever really think about being me. Unless I’m high.

I’ll be back in about an hour.

 

[MohamedTaqi]

I can imagine being a bee. Why do I need to have the actual experience? It’s enough for me to know that a bee can’t even imagine what it’s like to be me.

No, you cannot, because you've never been a bee to know if a bee even has an internal conscious experience of itself.

Some seafood, snails..etc are boiled alive. We do not know whether they have their internal conscious experience or not. We don't know what it feels like to be them, if there is a feeling to begin with.

This opens ethical questions, whether it is moral to boil them alive or not.