David Mo
Philosopher
That is tribalistic. For example, there's no reason to exclude non-human animals from consideration that doesn't amount to tribalism.
But empathy is quite bad at the job of turning our concern to other men. Instead, we feel a great deal of empathy for people who are socially proximate, and very little for some poor beggar on the other side of the world. It's almost like it's something we developed when we were living in small kinship groups.
Well, yes, but you will then be saying very different things.
There are a million and one necessary conditions for engaging in moral reasoning. For example, the universe has to exist. And you have to be alive. But it would be foolish to say "The universe is the basis of morality" or "Being alive is the basis of morality." You are intentionally conflating different ideas in order to try to rescue a failed argument.
Neither is empathy. Earlier you intimated that we might be too empathic or not empathic enough. In what terms would you make that argument? What is the good you seek in hoping we will be ideally empathic? The answer can't be "Empathy!" which means there is some more fundamental value at work here, and empathy is therefore not the basis of your morality. Or you can keep insisting that it is, and flail around in the dark forever.
What you need is a normative basis that will make sense out of any of this. You can say "Empathy! Science! Serial killers!" but none of that does or can amount to morality.
No, you don't. You're still failing to appreciate what Hume means. You need an ought before you can get anywhere. Feelings are not normative. If I feel someone else's pain, that's just a declarative fact about the world. It does not imply that I ought to feel their pain.
This is gobbledygook. Hume does not present a solution to the is-ought problem.
This is you disingenuously retreating from what you initially claimed to a triviality (without even doing any work to establish that it's true).
There are a million of conditions of the fall of the Roman Empire. Without the formation of the solar system, the Roman Empire would not have fallen. But no one says that the formation of the solar system "generated" (your word) the fall of the Roman Empire. We are talking about specific conditions.
Empathy is the capacity to understand and feel what another person is experiencing. If directed toward a limited group (tribalism), to the humankind (humanism) or is extended to animals (animalism) would be decided by reasoning and learning. I have not said that empathy is the only condition for morality. I have said that is the only one that entails action and moral feelings and that it is the only one that surpasses the test of Hume's guillotine.
What follows is a summary of an encyclopedia of philosophy. I hope it's clear.
"It ought to be" is a different way of saying "this is good" and "being good" is nothing but the positive emotion that a disinterested action awakes in me. With this translation I can undertake all moral reasoning without falling into the undue leap from being to ought. With this explanation Hume has surpassed the guillotine.Hume argues against moral rationalism by observing that the ordinary way of reasoning, makes an unremarked transition from premises whose parts are linked only by “is” to conclusions whose parts are linked by “ought” — a deduction that seems to Hume “altogether inconceivable” (T3.1.1.27). This implies “that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason” (ibid.).
Our moral evaluations of persons and their character traits, on Hume’s positive view, arise from our sentiments. The virtues and vices are those traits the disinterested contemplation of which produces approval and disapproval. These moral sentiments are emotions (in the present-day sense). The moral sentiments are produced by sympathy with those affected by a trait or action. Such sympathetically-acquired feelings are distinct from our self-interested responses, and an individual of discernment learns to distinguish her moral sentiments from the pleasure or uneasiness she may feel when responding to a trait with reference to her “particular interest”.
Whether this is a subjectivism or not, is another question we can discuss if you want. But don't tell me that Hume doesn't give a solution to the guillotine problem because this is wrong. Another thing is that you don't like that solution.