Cheetah
Master Poster
Exactly.
What is boring is scientists holding forth on things like reductionism, emergence, free will and "something from nothing" without really defining their terms or not realising that anything useful they can say on the subject has already been said decades or even centuries ago and if they had only just deigned to talk it over with someone in the philosophy department they could have saved themselves valuable time.
I don't mind people not wanting to do philosophy, but if so they should stay away from those subjects and not try to reinvent philosophical wheels, especially those that philosophers themselves have long given up as a pointless exercise.
To digress slightly, I (a physicist) am perfectly capable of doing quite a lot of plumbing perfectly competently, because (a) I understand the basic physical principles involved very thoroughly, and (b) some of my experimental work as a physicist has involved quite a lot of plumbing that was required to be of very high quality. I suspect (a) is not true of many philosophers, and I'm pretty sure (b) is true of even fewer.
Dave
You have shown many times that you have no idea of philosophy or the history of science: Not only Hawking (who gets into philosophical matters without having much idea) but the great theoreticians of physics were concerned about philosophy. Even if they weren't interested in religion. I could give you a list, if it weren't for the fact that it's also proven that you're "autistic". (It is not oly I that says so).I don't think many scientists do "hold forth on reductionism, emergence, free will etc." I expect you are probably thinking of the tiny minority of scientists who are filmed on YouTube (or who write books criticising religion) where they are continually asked to respond to such philosophical ideas.
There are now (21st century) lots of very different people in the world, in very different branches of academia or industry, who are all called "scientists'. But there is a vast difference between people who work in (say) engineering or computer science, or even things like "social science" or medicine vs. people working in mathematical physics or physical/mathematical chemistry. But if you are talking about that latter group of actual research scientists working in core science areas of physics, chemistry biology and most of maths, then 99.9% of them never mention philosophical debates at all, ie such philosophical discussions are no part of that genuine cutting-edge science research.
But that's why Stephen Hawking said philosophy is dead. He did not mean that philosophy is no longer taught in universities. He meant that we no longer use philosophy as our best way of understanding and explaining the observable/detectable world of “reality” around us. At one time, before the new subject of science emerged with people like Galileo circa.1600 onwards, philosophers were claiming to explain all things in the world around us (religions were also making that claim, and claiming that all things were explained by the existence of a miraculous God). But gradually, we found through advancing science that philosophy (and religion) are not accurate, or even remotely credible, ways of discovering the correct accurate explanations for the world around us.
Does philosophy still have a place in explaining anything really important for any of us? Well if people find philosophy interesting then I suppose that's a matter for them. But although philosophers don't like it, and although philosophy supporters on forums like this often object vehemently, the fact is that scientists do not need any ancient philosophers or any philosophy courses, to tell them how to study and explain the world through science and maths …. scientists can can think of all the relevant factors for themselves.
If you want to relate that to the OP question of whether clever people “overthink” things, then if we take those scientists, or just take the most successful and well-known amongst them, as being reasonably clever (though most of what they achieve comes from a lot of hard work), then I don't see any evidence for thinking they are failing by thinking too much or thinking too deeply about their research in science.
The more deeply you think about the methods and results of your scientific research, and the more time you spend doing that to check & test things carefully, the more likely I think you are to get accurate answers.
And immediately after saying that he announces his own philsophic position, which is a rehash of Logical Positivism.But that's why Stephen Hawking said philosophy is dead. He did not mean that philosophy is no longer taught in universities. He meant that we no longer use philosophy as our best way of understanding and explaining the observable/detectable world of “reality” around us.
I can't think of any who were. Perhaps you could give some examples.At one time, before the new subject of science emerged with people like Galileo circa.1600 onwards, philosophers were claiming to explain all things in the world around us
Better still: examples of current philosophers who say such a thing.I can't think of any who were. Perhaps you could give some examples.
And immediately after saying that he announces his own philsophic position, which is a rehash of Logical Positivism.
I can't think of any who were. Perhaps you could give some examples.
And science didn't just sprout around the 17th century, it had a much, much longer arc than that.
You can't think of any philosophers who claimed to explain how the world around us worked? ….
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_philosophy
Is science today (“modern” science) different from the historic ancient subject of “philosophy” -
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/philosophy-is-not-a-science/
http://www.differencebetween.net/mi...on/difference-between-science-and-philosophy/
does that mean they cannot understand wisdom that is available to simple people.
My great-grandson who’s 2, his mother’s back was hurting really bad. She was hurting so bad that she was laying on the bed crying. And he went up to her. Jeremiah, 2 years old, put his hand on her, said, ‘Jesus, Mommy, ouchie, amen.’ And her back quit hurting!
Televangelist Joyce Meyer: You Need To Be Stupid To Believe In God
https://www.patheos.com/blogs/progr...eyer-you-need-to-be-stupid-to-believe-in-god/
And then he pooped in his pants.
Televangelist Joyce Meyer: You Need To Be Stupid To Believe In God
https://www.patheos.com/blogs/progr...eyer-you-need-to-be-stupid-to-believe-in-god/
My great-grandson who’s 2, his mother’s back was hurting really bad. She was hurting so bad that she was laying on the bed crying. And he went up to her. Jeremiah, 2 years old, put his hand on her, said, ‘Jesus, Mommy, ouchie, amen.’ And her back quit hurting!

In case anyone is actually interested, rather than just wanting to bag philosophy, here is an example.
One common criticism of the philosophy of science is that Ernst Nagel claimed that any higher level principle in physics is reducible to lower level principles. The criticism is that he claimed this without evidence.
But if you read the chapter in question (in The Structure of Science) he didn't claim this at all, didn't claim anything in fact. Rather he said "if we are to ask if higher level principles are reducible to (or derivable from) lower level principles then first we should have as clear an idea as possible about what we mean by 'reducible to'".
He begins the chapter by pointing out that many eminent physicists do not believe higher level principles are reducible to lower level principles and concludes by apologising that he has come to no conclusion.
However he has still performed a useful function in suggesting what we might mean by the phrase.
Then Jerry Fodor comes along with "The Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)" where he provides an argument to show that it is reasonable to suppose that higher level principles are not reducible to lower level principles in the way defined by Nagel.
Note that he doesn't "assert" this, he deliberately uses the term "working hypothesis".
The next step is that Mark Bedau (in "Weak Emergence") can say, in effect, "OK, so higher level principles are not reducible to lower level principles in the Nagel sense, but can they be said to be reducible in some other, more useful, sense?"
Then he provides a definition of another kind of reduction, based on the distinction between strong and weak emergence. He also gives a practical working definition for these. He suggests (not asserts) that nothing is strongly emergent, but that every principle is weakly emergent from (and therefore reducible to) fundamental physics.
Is that useful?
I think so. Suggesting clear definitions and providing arguments supporting various positions seems a useful function to me.
For a start anyone who wants to have a discussion about this doesn't have to reinvent the wheel and it does seem as though quite a few scientists do want to talk about these subjects. Any such discussion can be a continuation, rather than a rehash.
It also provides a clear way to explain why irreducibility does not lead to any woo conclusions.
Maybe someone could just explain to me why the fact that science can tell us about the beginning of the universe makes it a good idea for scientists to try to rehash subjects that have already been covered in detail without having tried to inform themselves about what has previously been said on the subject.
And what did all these bods come up with for Planck time?In case anyone is actually interested, rather than just wanting to bag philosophy, here is an example.
One common criticism of the philosophy of science is that Ernst Nagel claimed that any higher level principle in physics is reducible to lower level principles. The criticism is that he claimed this without evidence.
But if you read the chapter in question (in The Structure of Science) he didn't claim this at all, didn't claim anything in fact. Rather he said "if we are to ask if higher level principles are reducible to (or derivable from) lower level principles then first we should have as clear an idea as possible about what we mean by 'reducible to'".
He begins the chapter by pointing out that many eminent physicists do not believe higher level principles are reducible to lower level principles and concludes by apologising that he has come to no conclusion.
However he has still performed a useful function in suggesting what we might mean by the phrase.
Then Jerry Fodor comes along with "The Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)" where he provides an argument to show that it is reasonable to suppose that higher level principles are not reducible to lower level principles in the way defined by Nagel.
Note that he doesn't "assert" this, he deliberately uses the term "working hypothesis".
The next step is that Mark Bedau (in "Weak Emergence") can say, in effect, "OK, so higher level principles are not reducible to lower level principles in the Nagel sense, but can they be said to be reducible in some other, more useful, sense?"
Then he provides a definition of another kind of reduction, based on the distinction between strong and weak emergence. He also gives a practical working definition for these. He suggests (not asserts) that nothing is strongly emergent, but that every principle is weakly emergent from (and therefore reducible to) fundamental physics.
Is that useful?
I think so. Suggesting clear definitions and providing arguments supporting various positions seems a useful function to me.
For a start anyone who wants to have a discussion about this doesn't have to reinvent the wheel and it does seem as though quite a few scientists do want to talk about these subjects. Any such discussion can be a continuation, rather than a rehash.
It also provides a clear way to explain why irreducibility does not lead to any woo conclusions.
In case anyone is actually interested, rather than just wanting to bag philosophy, here is an example.
One common criticism of the philosophy of science is that Ernst Nagel claimed that any higher level principle in physics is reducible to lower level principles. The criticism is that he claimed this without evidence.
But if you read the chapter in question (in The Structure of Science) he didn't claim this at all, didn't claim anything in fact. Rather he said "if we are to ask if higher level principles are reducible to (or derivable from) lower level principles then first we should have as clear an idea as possible about what we mean by 'reducible to'".
He begins the chapter by pointing out that many eminent physicists do not believe higher level principles are reducible to lower level principles and concludes by apologising that he has come to no conclusion.
However he has still performed a useful function in suggesting what we might mean by the phrase.
Then Jerry Fodor comes along with "The Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)" where he provides an argument to show that it is reasonable to suppose that higher level principles are not reducible to lower level principles in the way defined by Nagel.
Note that he doesn't "assert" this, he deliberately uses the term "working hypothesis".
The next step is that Mark Bedau (in "Weak Emergence") can say, in effect, "OK, so higher level principles are not reducible to lower level principles in the Nagel sense, but can they be said to be reducible in some other, more useful, sense?"
Then he provides a definition of another kind of reduction, based on the distinction between strong and weak emergence. He also gives a practical working definition for these. He suggests (not asserts) that nothing is strongly emergent, but that every principle is weakly emergent from (and therefore reducible to) fundamental physics.
Is that useful?
I think so. Suggesting clear definitions and providing arguments supporting various positions seems a useful function to me.
For a start anyone who wants to have a discussion about this doesn't have to reinvent the wheel and it does seem as though quite a few scientists do want to talk about these subjects. Any such discussion can be a continuation, rather than a rehash.
It also provides a clear way to explain why irreducibility does not lead to any woo conclusions.