From the judgment in the ECHR case Knox v. Italy, the section on the admissibility and merits of the alleged violation of Convention Article 3. Note that because of the linkage of the issues of admissibility and merits, the ECHR considered the admissibility within the discussion of merits, as allowed under the Convention. The translation is by Google, with my help including occasional resort to Collins Reverso.
"ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION
114. The applicant complains of the alleged ill-treatment during her hearings on 6 November 2007, in particular the two slaps she allegedly received on her head. She invokes Article 3 of the Convention in this respect. She also complains that she was subjected to extreme psychological pressure on the same occasion and that she was forced to speak when she was in a situation of lack of judgment and will, which she said had undermined her right to respect for private life protected by Article 8 of the Convention.
115. The Court, as master of the legal characterization of the facts, finds that these complaints are identical and considers it appropriate to examine the applicant's allegations solely in terms of Article 3 of the Convention (Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], No. 23380/09, § 55, ECHR 2015, and Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], Nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, March 20, 2018). This article reads:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
A. Admissibility
116. The Government submitted firstly that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies because she had not lodged any complaint with the public prosecutor or the civil authorities. According to it, the applicant could also have complained of the pressure she claimed to have suffered at the time of her hearing {the interrogations of November 6, 2007} or of the hearing validating her arrest before the preliminary-investigation judge.
117. The applicant claims to have denounced the treatment she allegedly suffered several times during the proceedings, in particular during the hearings, including that of 13 March 2009 {during the proceedings before the Massei court}.
118. The Court considers that the central issue in the present case is closely linked to the substance of the complaints raised by the applicant, especially as to whether the applicant benefited from an effective investigation, as required by Article 3 of the Convention. Therefore, it decides to join this objection to the merits.
119. It considers, in the light of all the arguments of the parties, that these complaints raise serious issues of fact and law that can not be resolved at this stage of the examination of the application, but require examination in the merits. It follows that these complaints can not be declared manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground of inadmissibility has been raised.
B. On the merits
1. Arguments of the parties
120. The applicant submits that her acquittal in the proceedings for false accusations against the police and the public prosecutor is evidence that her statements made during the hearings concerning the pressure and ill-treatment she claimed to have suffered were in no way false accusations and corresponded to the reality of the facts. She indicates that several passages in the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 3 October 2011, among others, confirm it (see paragraphs 84-85 above).
121. As to the blows on her head that the complainant alleges to have been inflicted on her, the Government submits firstly that, during her hearing on 13 June 2009, the applicant herself admitted that she had not been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. It states that the applicant stated that the police officer who inflicted the blows did not really hurt her physically but frightened her (see paragraph 76 above).
122. The Government goes on to say that the national authorities were aware that the applicant's interviews by the police had been slightly stressful for the applicant. It stated that the national authorities had, however, considered that this had not affected the latter's will and self-determination: the applicant's behavior in performing gymnastic exercises and spontaneously appearing at the police station had shown that that she was sufficiently capable of providing useful information. The Government submits that the statements of 6 November 2007 were the result of a deliberate and conscious choice made by the applicant and that there was no coercion of such a nature as to induce her to make the statements in question in this case.
2. The Court's assessment
123. As regards the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment, guaranteed by Article 3 of the Convention, the general principles concerning the material and procedural aspects of this complaint are recalled in Bouyid (cited above, §§ 81-90 and 114-123).
124. In examining the procedural aspect of the applicant's complaint, the Court observes that, the text drafted for the police at approximately 1 pm on 6 November 2007, only a few hours after the incriminating statements made by the applicant against D.L., clearly described the state of shock and extreme confusion in which she had been {at the relevant time} (see paragraph 20 above).
125. The applicant stated that she was not able to distinguish what appeared to her to be the reality of the facts, namely that, on the night of the murder, she had stayed with R.S. at his home, from another representation of the facts, in which she saw D.L. as being the person responsible for the offense, and to which representation she would have come because of pressure, threats of incarceration, slaps on her head and shouting directed at her by the police, in a general climate of fear and anguish.
126. The Court also notes that two days later, at the validation hearing of her arrest on 8 November 2007, the applicant immediately described her extreme state of confusion, the unreliability of her statements and the impairment of her ability of self-determination that she had suffered.
127. The Court notes that this state of confusion is apparent from the two minutes {reports or verbatim records; Memoriales 1 and 2} relating to the incriminating statements. The applicant states indeed that she has difficulty remembering the facts and remembers only in a confused manner that D. L. had killed M.K. (paragraph 15, paragraph 3 above). The applicant further states that her thoughts were very confused, so that she was unable to recall the unfolding events because she was in shock. The Court observes that the applicant was therefore according limited to maintaining that, at the material time, she "imagined" what could have happened and that she had encountered D.L. (paragraph 16, points 2 and 3 above).
128. At the hearing on 17 December 2007, the evidence concerning the alleged modalities of her interrogation is clear and consistent with the text she drafted on 6 November 2007, including the slaps she allegedly received on the head twice. The Court observes that, on that occasion, the applicant also stated that she was deprived of sleep until she had accused D.L. and complained of the restricted selection of food which had been offered to her during the hours in question.
129. Moreover, the extreme emotional shock suffered by the applicant during the hearings is mentioned in her testimony and that of A.D. of 13 March 2009. The applicant stated, among other things, that she had been treated in an aggressive and offensive manner and that she had been slapped, circumstances which she described in the same terms at the hearings on 12 and 13 June 2009 and that she consistently denounced later in her appeal {of the first instance judgment} and in her appeals to the Supreme Court of Cassation (paragraphs 82-83, 86 and 95 above).
130. The Court observes that, in its judgment of 3 October 2011, the Court of Appeal also emphasized the excessive length of the interrogations, the applicant's vulnerability and the psychological pressure suffered by her, a pressure which was likely to compromise the spontaneity of her statements, as well as her state of oppression and stress. It considered that the applicant had, in fact, been in a real torment, resulting in an unbearable psychological situation from which, in order to extricate herself, she had made incriminating statements in respect of D.L. (see paragraph 85 (8) and (10) above).
131. Moreover, the Court can not overlook, on the one hand, the confusion of the roles which characterized the activity of the interpreter A.D., who was acting both as a "mediator", which was in no way required as part of her function (paragraph 103 points 10-12 above).
132. On the other hand, it notes that R.I., a police officer, had taken the applicant in his arms, caressed her and took her hands in his, thus adopting clearly inappropriate behavior, particularly when it considers that, in the context thus described, the applicant had made accusations subsequently classified as malicious false accusation and leading to her conviction (see paragraphs 38 and 103, paragraph 5 above).
133. In the Court's opinion, this conduct, providing information as to the general context in which the applicant's {interrogation} hearing took place, should have alerted the national authorities to the possible undermining of the dignity of the applicant and her capacity for self-determination.
134. In that context, it should be noted that the minutes of the statements at issue are very succinct, that they do not indicate the start or end time of the hearings and that they therefore do not faithfully represent the investigators' activities (see paragraph 103 and paragraph 7 above).
135. Having regard to all of those circumstances, the Court considers that the facts complained of by the applicant give rise to an arguable claim that she was subjected to degrading treatment while she was entirely under the control of the police, attaining the minimum seriousness required to fall under Article 3 of the Convention (Poltoratski v. Ukraine, No. 38812/97, §§ 125-128, ECHR 2003-V).
136. This provision required that an effective official inquiry be conducted in the present case, in order to lead to the identification and punishment of those who may be responsible. In that regard, the Court can only find that, despite the applicant's repeated complaints, the treatment she denounced was not the subject of any investigation (Kaçiu and Kotorri v. Albania, nos. and 33194/07, § 94, 25 June 2013, see also the findings of the Perugia court in its judgment of 22 March 2013, paragraph 101). It notes in particular that the request for transmission of the {court} documents to the prosecution made by the applicant's defense on 13 March 2009 remained unanswered (paragraph 47).
137. The Court further notes that, as a result of that hearing {before the Massei court}, the applicant herself was the subject of criminal proceedings for malicious false accusations {again, but} this time, against the authorities whom she had accused of causing the infringement of her rights protected by Article 3 of the Convention. It observes that, at the end of that proceedings {for malicious false accusations against the authorities}, the applicant was also acquitted, since there was no evidence that her allegations deviated from the reality of the facts. The Court also notes that, obviously, this latter proceedings {being a criminal trial of the applicant} could not constitute an effective inquiry, required by Article 3 of the Convention, concerning the complaints which the applicant raises before the Court.
138. It must therefore be concluded that the applicant did not benefit from an investigation capable of clarifying the facts and possible responsibilities in this case. Article 3 of the Convention, under its procedural limb, was therefore violated in this case.
139. Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government's preliminary objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
140. With regard to the substantive limb of Article 3 within the complaint, the Court considers that it lacks elements of evidence to show that the applicant has been subjected to the inhuman and degrading treatment of which she complains. It therefore concludes that there is no violation of Article 3 of the Convention in its substantive limb."
