proto-consciousness field theory

[RecoveringYuppy]

Sure, why not? This is the science subforum after all.

Woosh!

 

[baron]

Defining consciousness as a strictly subjective phenomenon, not amenable to objective study, is a philosophical approach that can lead nowhere.

That doesn't mean it's not correct.

If someone behaves consciously then they are conscious.

That's the definition of begging the question.

 

[RecoveringYuppy]

Now, if you are saying that awareness isn't measured at all by the study, I would point to the last paragraph and say that comas and vegetative states are a lack of awareness.

Show me how they demonstrate the presence of awareness.

 

[baron]

To figure this out, the team analysed 36 patients in hospital with brainstem lesions - 12 of them were in a coma (unconscious) and 24 were defined as being conscious...

The problem with such studies is that the consciousness is generally seen as the patient being awake and responsive. If the patient can squeeze your hand in response to a command, say, then are said to be conscious (or minimally so). If they just lie with their mouth open they are said to be unconscious. This has nothing whatsoever to do with the hard problem of consciousness.

 

[Crawtator]

But this is a pretty important step in the right direction...

"The team double-checked their work by looking at fMRI scans of 45 patients in comas or vegetative states, and showed that all of them had the network between these three regions disrupted."

Now, I'm not saying that this is the definitive cause of consciousness. Hell if I know where consciousness comes from. But it points to a possible objective cause of consciousness. Much like the DE and DM cases, we don't have to understand the absolute causes of the phenomena to believe that they are objectively present. I really don't see how this is any different.

 

[RecoveringYuppy]

But it points to a possible objective cause of consciousness.

OK. What objective cause is it pointing at?

 

[Crawtator]

OK. What objective cause is it pointing at?

I'm beginning to wonder if you are intentionally being difficult or JAQ'ing around. The quoted sentence discusses the functionality of the three regions of the brain and that when those regions are disturbed and the network is no longer functioning, consciousness is not present.

 

[RecoveringYuppy]

I'm beginning to wonder if you are intentionally being difficult or JAQ'ing around. The quoted sentence discusses the functionality of the three regions of the brain and that when those regions are disturbed and the network is no longer functioning, consciousness is not present.

Can you tell me the "cause" of consciousness that the article is "pointing at" or not?

 

[kellyb]

If someone behaves consciously then they are conscious. It comes down to determining what behavior is indicative of consciousness and then determining the internal cause of that behavior.

And what do you do if you can't find any behaviors that can't be done by non-conscious entities?

Then I would come to believe that the distinction between conscious and non-conscious entities isn't as sharp a line as others might assume.

See, I think you could program an AI/robot to perfectly emulate consciousness, but that wouldn't mean it was conscious at all. It would only indicate that robot programming had reached a advanced stage.

 

[kellyb]

The quoted sentence discusses the functionality of the three regions of the brain and that when those regions are disturbed and the network is no longer functioning, consciousness is not present.

I'm just not sure what all that tells us beyond elucidating some specifics we didn't have before. It's just adding a bit more detail to "functionality in the brain somehow causes consciousness."

 

[Crawtator]

I'm just not sure what all that tells us beyond elucidating some specifics we didn't have before. It's just adding a bit more detail to "functionality in the brain somehow causes consciousness."

And that was the answer to the exact question being asked by RecoveringYuppy. I agree with your last statement. We don't know the exact cause of consciousness, but "functionality in the brain somehow causes" it seems like an important first step in determining that consciousness may be objective and not completely subjective as some posters have posited.

 

[Chanakya]

See, I think you could program an AI/robot to perfectly emulate consciousness, but that wouldn't mean it was conscious at all. It would only indicate that robot programming had reached a advanced stage.

Sure, if the robot's programmed to simply ape consciousness, then, as you say, all it is is a mimic, even if an advanced model.

But I don't see why, given sufficient complexity, a robot cannot break through to 'true' consciousness.

 

[baron]

And that was the answer to the exact question being asked by RecoveringYuppy. I agree with your last statement. We don't know the exact cause of consciousness, but "functionality in the brain somehow causes" it seems like an important first step in determining that consciousness may be objective and not completely subjective as some posters have posited.

First, that experiment doesn't suggest that some parts of the brain are causing consciousness, it shows only that failure of certain parts of the brain prevent it. A very different conclusion as demonstrated in the TV set analogy I'm sure you're familiar with.

Furthermore, it's conscious experience that I and others allege to be subjective, not the entirety of consciousness itself. And it can't be any other way. Perhaps brevity of expression and fluid definitions of the word 'consciousness' has meant I have not always been clear on this. I don't believe consciousness itself is any more subjective than gravity. Indeed, how could it be?

 

[Chanakya]

If by "split personalities" you mean "multiple personality disorder", that probably doesn't exist, at least not as portrayed in dramatic, supposedly true story movies.

You've read that correctly, my 'understanding' of "multiple personality disorder" does derive from fiction, and movies, and the odd article in newspapers or magazines or online. :--)

Still, although no doubt different about the details from movies, multiple personalities is still fact, right? I was wondering if this kind of pathology might not be evidence of sorts for diffused consciousness 'centers'.

... It doesn't seem outlandish to me that there might be a significant degree of independent autonomy happening within the separate hemispheres much of the time. ...

As far as the two brain hemispheres, yes, there does, like I said, appear to be some evidence of diffused consciousness centers.

 

[Chanakya]

... Our brains are constantly doing all sorts of "consciousness-like" things we're completely unaware of (the sorts of things Daniel Dennett sees as virtual proof that consciousness is nothing but an illusion altogether - a claim I take great issue with, which I think baron was alluding to earlier.)

I cannot readily quote (or even recall) my specific 'sources' for thinking this, but it was my understanding that neuroscience has already shown that free will and consciousness are no more than illusions. I agree, that is a discomfiting and disorienting idea, no less so than a theist first considering the implications of atheism.

You seem to disagree with this?

I was fairly sure this is a done thing, but I can't begin to 'defend' this impression of mine without digging around afresh for sources.

 

[Myriad]

See, I think you could program an AI/robot to perfectly emulate consciousness, but that wouldn't mean it was conscious at all. It would only indicate that robot programming had reached a advanced stage.

I think the opposite: that an AI/robot that was not conscious would not be capable of behaving like a conscious human. Nor is a functional p-zombie possible, which is why we didn't evolve to be p-zombies.

 

[RecoveringYuppy]

I think the opposite: that an AI/robot that was not conscious would not be capable of behaving like a conscious human. Nor is a functional p-zombie possible, which is why we didn't evolve to be p-zombies.

Which behavior(s) can't be done by non conscious entities?

 

[Belz...]

See, I think you could program an AI/robot to perfectly emulate consciousness, but that wouldn't mean it was conscious at all. It would only indicate that robot programming had reached a advanced stage.

That's the problem of p-zombies, but as discussed at death on this forum in the past, the concept of p-zombies is incoherent.

 

[The Great Zaganza]

I think the opposite: that an AI/robot that was not conscious would not be capable of behaving like a conscious human. Nor is a functional p-zombie possible, which is why we didn't evolve to be p-zombies.

I doubt the difference would be detectable by humans.

 

[Darat]

I *knew* I shouldn't have gotten involved !



Does pinpointing where consciousness lives in the brain tell us what consciousness is? I'm pretty sure baron is defining "consciousness" as "subjective experience" which makes it kind of non-empirical by definition.







I loathe the so-called "hard problem" partly because I'm not sure why it's a problem at all. Perhaps brain meat starts secreting thought just as a function of complexity. I'm perfectly willing to believe that. But, that said, I feel like baron is doing a reasonably good job of explaining himself. Or maybe I'm just finally ready to discuss the topic.

The good old HPC, I used to joke I was a p-zombie as I couldn't understand this idea of "experience of red". Turns out I am actually a p-zombie, as I don't ever have an "experience of red" apart from when there are photons hitting my retina and the following cascade of measurable changes in the chemicals in my brain and other tissues as I have no "mind's eye".