They were highlited in the post that Monza re-posted. You saw it and responded to it.
But by asking for it he gets to make his critics run around doing various clerical things instead of arguing the substance of his argument and its flaws. It's the classic hamster wheel. Shucks, guys, I just don't remember and don't feel like going back to re-read the thread. Could you all just say all the things all over again? I promise I'll remember them until tomorrow when I pretend again to be all flustered and forgetful. Contrast this with the laser-beam accuracy he can muster in finding all the posts that seem to lead to a "gotcha!"
Without memories it has no ability to even have an impression that it's the same self as the other "life". Ergo, he's not you.
This is important to Jabba's argument. Jabba is correct in claiming that a person only exists in any conceivable way under materialism for the century or so in which his brain is alive. He then goes on to present that in a probability context where the potential field for human existence is modeled as 140 million discrete centuries in a uniform distribution, leading to a miniscule likelihood, given a person, that this would be the century that person would occupy. We've discussed at length what's wrong with that argument. Jabba is uninterested.
In contrast, Jabba claims that under his model existence is thought of as a soul that has always existed and will always exist. Therefore he insinuates that it can be incarnated in any number of those 140 million centuries, and that all such incarnations are functionally equivalent. Thus in his model, given a person, the likelihood that this would be the century in which that person would exist approaches tautology because that person existed in more than one century, and perhaps all centuries. That rationale relies upon equivocating the distinctions among persons and kinds of existence. It relies specifically on saying that all incarnations of Jabba are statistically equivalent events, even though elements of his description of a disembodied soul contradict that equivalence.
The only one you keep trotting out. 1/10100 is made up. You have not justified it.
I'm sure he believes he has. He has explained where he got it. It seems that in Jabba's mind there is a distinction between simply choosing a number arbitrarily, and naming a number provided with a nonsensical rationale. Jabba does not seem to consider the latter as "making up" a number.
Jabba's original argument tried to introduce the nonsensical concept of "virtual zero." This, in his argument, was a magical entity that exhibited exactly and only all of the properties of finite numbers that he needed to satisfy his proof, and simultaneously exactly and only all the properties of infinity for the same purpose. It was a magical concept that let him, as he is wont to do, simply define his way to success.
Now that he has realized he cannot foist this made-up concept, he's resorted to a finite number that's obviously very small and would differ from zero only negligibly for most purposes. In choosing a finite number he avoids all the problems that infinity causes in his argument. But now he's just trying to sweep under the carpet all the problems a finite number causes. Specifically he's trying to avoid the prospect that useful, valid finite numbers ultimately have rational, finite, discrete derivations -- and he has none for this one. He chose it to be arbitrarily close to zero, and upon no other criterion.
