Proof of Immortality, VII

[JoeMorgue]

No, because you ALWAYS exist when you exist.

It's scary how beautifully this sums up the entire counter argument.

 

[Jabba]

Caveman,
- (Einstein vs Bohr or Wheeler-Dewitt?)
- I'll try to do as you ask. I had revised my own expression in an attempt to make sure that my claim worked. I don't think that your attachment about "being born" is appropriate.


- Anyway, I think that P(E|I) > P(E|~I) because I currently exist and my current existence is more likely if I'm immortal than if I have only one finite life to live.

No, because you ALWAYS exist when you exist.

LL,
- P(E|I) is not P(E). It's how probable (likely) is E if I is true. It's conditional.
- It's as if we're currently experiencing a rain storm, but we ask, "How likely is it to rain if there are no clouds in the sky?"

 

[JoeMorgue]

It's as if we're currently experiencing a rain storm, but we ask, "How likely is it to rain if there are no clouds in the sky?"

No it's like walking outside, discovering that it is raining, and somehow making the stupid and illogical leap that the rain must be happening forever because the idea of a process stopping and starting scares and confuses you.

 

[jond]

LL,
- P(E|I) is not P(E). It's how probable (likely) is E if I is true. It's conditional.
- It's as if we're currently experiencing a rain storm, but we ask, "How likely is it to rain if there are no clouds in the sky?"

How does adding an unlikely soul increase the likelihood of your body existing?

 

[The Sparrow]

How does adding an unlikely soul increase the likelihood of your body existing?

I do admire your persistence. Unfortunately, like the going 60 mph question, it will be ignored as Jabba's goal is to generate quote mine-able content for his "map", not to engage in debate.

 

[jond]

I do admire your persistence. Unfortunately, like the going 60 mph question, it will be ignored as Jabba's goal is to generate quote mine-able content for his "map", not to engage in debate.

I know, I know... still, it must be asked.

 

[Dave Rogers]

LL,
- P(E|I) is not P(E). It's how probable (likely) is E if I is true. It's conditional.
- It's as if we're currently experiencing a rain storm, but we ask, "How likely is it to rain if there are no clouds in the sky?"

I think Jabba's got another bait-and-switch going on here, quite apart from the whole H vs ~H, I vs ~I, R vs ~R equivocation in which he implicitly suggests that materialism, atheism and mortality are all precisely the same hypothesis and that therefore the complement of materialism equates to religion and to immortality of the soul. The new bait-and-switch is where he tries to equivocate between the "I exist under materialism" vs "I exist under the complement of materialism" set and the "I exist now under materialism, given that I exist at some time" and "I exist now under immortality, given that I exist at some time". He's therefore trying to get away with comparing the unconditional probability of himself existing at any time under materialism with the conditional probability of himself existing at this specific time under immortality, given that he exists at some time. This, I think, is where he gets his certainty that his existence is more probable under immortality than materialism^[1]; he's not actually comparing like probabilities. He's comparing the supposedly vanishingly small probability of him existing precisely as he is now rather than as a slightly different person - neglecting the problem that P(x=X)=0 that the statistics forum identified as one of the many fatal flaws in his "proof" - with the probability, given that he exists as himself at some time, that he exists now, which of course under the immortality hypothesis is a certainty. I think that's the explanation of why he thinks it's obvious that his existence is more probable under immortality than materialism^[2]. In truth, of course, it's either the case that his existence at any time cannot be stated to be greater under one hypothesis than the other, or that the conditional probability of his existence at the time he's formulating his argument is the same under both; but he can't see that, because he can't distinguish between the conditional and the unconditional probability.

Dave

[1] I know, these aren't complementary. It's almost impossible to discuss Jabba's argument rationally because there are just so many gaping logical flaws in it.
[2] See [1].

 

[Mojo]

No it's like walking outside, discovering that it is raining, and somehow making the stupid and illogical leap that the rain must be happening forever because the idea of a process stopping and starting scares and confuses you.

But you have to admit that the likelihood of it being that particular rain is virtually zero. This means that seeing it raining just like that is much more likely if it always rains just like that than it is if it can rain in other ways, or even not rain at some times. So Jabba can prove that it must rain just like that for all of eternity.

The good news is that this means that the current Ashes series must end in a draw rather than a 4-0 win for Australia.

 

[Loss Leader]

LL,
- P(E|I) is not P(E). It's how probable (likely) is E if I is true. It's conditional.
- It's as if we're currently experiencing a rain storm, but we ask, "How likely is it to rain if there are no clouds in the sky?"

No, it's like a raindrop asking what the chance is would be raining at the exact moment the raindrop happens to find it exists. It will always be raining at the moment the raindrop measures its own existence.

 

[JayUtah]

P(E|I) is not P(E). It's how probable (likely) is E if I is true.

But your sample space for E is a condition in which E is always true. This is what those statisticians you consulted earlier were trying to tell you, but you obviously didn't understand what they were talking about. You don't know how to formulate a Bayesian inference.

That's fatal flaw no. 1 on the list of flaws you've proven you can't answer.

 

[Jabba]

No, it's like a raindrop asking what the chance is would be raining at the exact moment the raindrop happens to find it exists. It will always be raining at the moment the raindrop measures its own existence.

- Sure. But how likely is it that time would happen to be at the point that a particular raindrop fell? The sharpshooter argument should be your only objection in that situation.

 

[jond]

- Sure. But how likely is it that time would happen to be at the point that a particular raindrop fell? The sharpshooter argument should be your only objection in that situation.

How would adding an unlikely soul change the circumstances under which that particular raindrop came into existence?

 

[JoeMorgue]

- Sure. But how likely is it that time would happen to be at the point that a particular raindrop fell? The sharpshooter argument should be your only objection in that situation.

How would adding an unlikely soul change the circumstances under which that particular raindrop came into existence?

 

[Pixel42]

- Sure. But how likely is it that time would happen to be at the point that a particular raindrop fell? .

If it's raining it's always going to be the time that a particular raindrop fell.

The sharpshooter argument should be your only objection in that situation

It's a fatal objection. No other objections are needed.

 

[JayUtah]

- Sure. But how likely is it that time would happen to be at the point that a particular raindrop fell? The sharpshooter argument should be your only objection in that situation.

And it's a valid objection. And it's the propositional logic behind what those statisticians were trying to tell you about how you can't do what you're trying to do.

It's like you don't even care whether you're right or wrong as long as all attention is on you.

 

[halleyscomet]

It's like you don't even care whether you're right or wrong as long as all attention is on you.

It like you’re a prophet.

 

[MRC_Hans]

Caveman,
- I am a currently existing human self. My claim is that this event is more likely if human selves are immortal than if each potential self has only one finite life at most. Do you still disagree?

We all agree that this seems to be your claim. The part of us that does not include you agree that you have yet to present even a shred of evidence for this notion.

Hans

 

[JoeMorgue]

I really want to understand what Jabba thinks he is doing when he just says "I claim" because I don't think it means for him what it means for everyone else.

 

[RoboTimbo]

- Sure. But how likely is it that time would happen to be at the point that a particular raindrop fell? The sharpshooter argument should be your only objection in that situation.

The raindrop isn't making other idiotic claims.

Have you been able to think of an answer to the problem that you are very obviously engaging in the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy?

 

[The Norseman]

LL,
- P(E|I) is not P(E). It's how probable (likely) is E if I is true. It's conditional.
- It's as if we're currently experiencing a rain storm, but we ask, "How likely is it to rain if there are no clouds in the sky?"

By definition, if it's raining, there are clouds producing the rain. So if you see what appears to be rain, but no clouds, then is it actually rain you're experiencing? Or could it be raining but the clouds are too high for you to see? Or are raindrops spontaneously appearing just meters above the ground?

I really want to understand what Jabba thinks he is doing when he just says "I claim" because I don't think it means for him what it means for everyone else.

This is what we mean: CLAIM THEN SUPPORT

Jabba must think: CLAIM IS SUPPORT