Proof of Immortality, VI

[Pixel42]

Define 'you'.

What is it about the process currently running in your brain that makes it 'you', and what is different about the identical process running in the duplicate brain that makes it not 'you brought back to life'?

 

[RoboTimbo]

Dave,
- Still just trying to establish exactly where we diverge.

How about the places where everyone says exactly we diverge?

I think you agree

I think you're so accustomed to saying this that you don't realize how offensive your lie has become.

that the new brain would not bring you back to life.

What does this mean in terms of the materialist hypothesis that you're trying to refute?

If so, doesn't that mean that the new self would not be you HAVEYOUR SAME SOUL?

FTFY. If there are an infinite number of potential going 60 mph, doesn't that mean that the materialist hypothesis for Volkswagens is incorrect and they therefore have souls and are immortal?

 

[Dave Rogers]

Dave,
- Still just trying to establish exactly where we diverge. I think you agree that the new brain would not bring you back to life. If so, doesn't that mean that the new self would not be you?

Repeating the same assertion for five years doesn't make it true. And repeatedly claiming that everyone agrees with you doesn't make everyone actually agree. In five years, the only progress you seem to have made is that, instead of begging everyone to agree with you on everything, you're now just pretending that everyone agrees with you on everything.

Dave

 

[SOdhner]

I think you agree that the new brain would not bring you back to life. If so, doesn't that mean that the new self would not be you?

I don't know why I bother replying, but:

1. When we say someone is "brought back to life" we mean that their body was non-functional and now is working again. When someone is dead they aren't conscious and don't have a sense of self, but their sense of self isn't hanging around wearing a bedsheet, either. It just doesn't exist, because it's a non-countable emergent property of the brain so when the brain isn't generating it it's just not there. Likewise, people often don't have a sense of self even while alive for various reasons (going into a coma, arguably even a nice deep sleep, etc.). So you're correct in saying that making a copy of someone wouldn't bring them back to life because, for one thing, the original in this scenario isn't necessarily dead but also because the copy hasn't been dead at any point so it wouldn't be correct to say they are 'back' to life. This doesn't change what people have been trying to demonstrate to you about things that are both identical and distinct and it doesn't prove that souls exist.

2. The copy wouldn't be you, from your perspective. That's correct. That's because we assign value to things and you assign value to your own person. Likewise, if a loved one bought you a souvenir snowglobe you would value it far more than another identical snowglobe because you would assign it extra value. If the snowglobe is destroyed that sentimental value doesn't magically get reincarnated into a keychain or something. If we compare two identical snowglobes we'll find that sentimental value isn't a real thing that can be measured or that exists in a scientific sense as a property of snowglobes. If we swap your snowglobe with another when you're not looking you'll now assign that value to the new snowglobe and be none the wiser - likewise, if we make a copy of you they will think they're the original and will go on about how no copy would possibly be them... but that doesn't mean there's a materialistic difference between the two Jabbas.

 

[Belz...]

- Still just trying to establish exactly where we diverge. I think you agree that the new brain would not bring you back to life. If so, doesn't that mean that the new self would not be you?

That's where you diverge: you keep talking about an emergent property of the brain as if it's a spirit or soul. Stop doing that.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- Still just trying to establish exactly where we diverge. I think you agree that the new brain would not bring you back to life. If so, doesn't that mean that the new self would not be you?

I already said it wouldn't be me. It would be an exact copy if me. It would be exactly like me in every respect. Just like the second load of bread would be exactly like the first loaf of bread. It would be identical to me.

Where we diverge is that you are using a different definition for the word "identical" when it's applied to selves than when applied to everything else. You seem to be implying that if two selves were identical then they would really be the same self in two locations.

 

[JayUtah]

Still just trying to establish exactly where we diverge.

No, you're not. You know everything that's wrong with your argument. You're just stalling while you come up with yet another way to obfuscate your already-confessed quiestion-begging.

I think you agree that the new brain would not bring you back to life. If so, doesn't that mean that the new self would not be you?

Same post as yesterday.

 

[Mojo]

- Still just trying to establish exactly where we diverge.

We diverge at the point at which you claim that the materialist model includes souls.

 

[Monza]

Dave,
- Still just trying to establish exactly where we diverge. I think you agree that the new brain would not bring you back to life. If so, doesn't that mean that the new self would not be you?

There is nothing to be brought back to life, since no one died in this thought experiment. If the new person/brain were a perfect copy of the original you, then yes, the new person is you. Only now there are two of you. They are separate but identical.

The new you has all of the same memories, thoughts, and feelings. There is no way to distinguish one from the other. You would never know if you were the original or the copy.

 

[JoeMorgue]

-It's pathetic that in 5 years literally the only direction Jabba's argument has made is from "Begging for agreement" to "Claiming agreement where there is none."
- That being said it's been obvious for a while that the end game in all of this was Jabba eventually just retreating completely in a self insert fantasy where our participation is symbolic at best.
- Please stop saying "materialist." Jabba doesn't understand what it means and refuses to learn so it just confuses him and for some reason that term is a lightning rod for hair splitting thread nannying. I detest the term anyway as it frames "Reality" as "Just another opinion."

 

[Jabba]

I already said it wouldn't be me. It would be an exact copy if me. It would be exactly like me in every respect. Just like the second load of bread would be exactly like the first loaf of bread. It would be identical to me.

Where we diverge is that you are using a different definition for the word "identical" when it's applied to selves than when applied to everything else. You seem to be implying that if two selves were identical then they would really be the same self in two locations.

- I thought you had, but I wasn't sure, and figured that asking would be quicker than trying to track it down.
- I see what you mean about "identical." How about if I just say that the two selves are different -- in that the second self would not be you?

 

[Belz...]

- I thought you had, but I wasn't sure, and figured that asking would be quicker than trying to track it down.

Yes, doing the latter might require effort and a desire to learn.

- I see what you mean about "identical." How about if I just say that the two selves are different -- in that the second self would not be you?

What difference does it make? How is he not you? Remember, no souls in materialism.

 

[Monza]

- I thought you had, but I wasn't sure, and figured that asking would be quicker than trying to track it down.
- I see what you mean about "identical." How about if I just say that the two selves are different -- in that the second self would not be you?

That is simply stating the definition of copy. A copy is not the original. A copy of a VW is different from the original in that it is not the original.

A copy of you is not the original you. It is a second you.

 

[Filippo Lippi]

- I thought you had, but I wasn't sure, and figured that asking would be quicker than trying to track it down.
- I see what you mean about "identical." How about if I just say that the two selves are different -- in that the second self would not be you?

Oh, a big welcome back to befuddled old Jabba!

 

[jond]

- I thought you had, but I wasn't sure, and figured that asking would be quicker than trying to track it down.
- I see what you mean about "identical." How about if I just say that the two selves are different -- in that the second self would not be you?

What difference does it make? The second has all your thoughts, memories, etc. The second would self identify as Jabba. How is it in any way meaningful to say it isn’t you?

 

[JayUtah]

I thought you had, but I wasn't sure...

I don't believe you. You've had the internet equivalent of people shouting the answers into your ear from inches away for years. At this point there is no viable excuse for not knowing what your critics are saying.

...and figured that asking would be quicker than trying to track it down.

No. If you aren't capable of keeping up with the debate, it's your responsibility to compensate for that by taking extra effort to review the debate. It's rude to constantly ask your opponents to repeat themselves and to ask everyone to wait while you come up to speed -- especially when attrition is one of your tactics. Further, we've seen you -- even recently -- put together large anthology posts that quote from many previous responses. You're clearly willing and capable of reviewing the thread and finding pertinent posts when you think you have a "gotcha!" moment. Please apologize for wasting everyone's time.

I see what you mean about "identical."

No, I don't think you do. You got caught in yet another equivocation and you sent Befuddled Old Man out onto the stage to try to defuse it.

How about if I just say that the two selves are different -- in that the second self would not be you?

Under materialism neither of those would be true. Under materialism, a perfect copy would exhibit all the properties of the other, perfectly. That's what perfect means. Under materialism there is no indivisible, unduplicatable entity that houses identity separately from the organism. There is no "you" separate from the organism, and there must be a "you" everywhere the organism exists -- however it may have been brought into existence.

 

[MarkCorrigan]

Jabba, serious question here. Have you ever seen Star Trek The Next Generation?

 

[RoboTimbo]

How about if I just say that the two selves are different -- in that the second self would not be you?

And we agree beforehand that "different" means "separate but distinct" as opposed to "dissimilar".

You aren't going to do a dishonest bait and switch on the meaning, are you?

 

[Loss Leader]

- I see what you mean about "identical." How about if I just say that the two selves are different -- in that the second self would not be you?

You aren't even you. The "self" is not the same even from moment to moment. It is a constantly changing process of a constantly changing physical brain. Electrical energy is discharged, nutrients are used up, molecules are shuffled around, oxygen is added, etc. Every moment brings forth a new brain that had not existed before.

Heck, in some ways a perfect copy would be more like you than you are, because at least it has the same everything as your brain for a single moment.

 

[Mojo]

How about if I just say that the two selves are different -- in that the second self would not be you?

Then you would be equivocating between two meanings of the word "different".

I see you've tried the underlining now. It still doesn't magically change the word so as to prevent your use of it being equivocation. Will we see the nested italic tags soon?