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Proof of Immortality, VI

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godless dave said:
Reproducing something does not mean bringing it back, it means making a copy. If I reproduce a loaf of bread, I don't get the original loaf back, I get a new loaf of bread.
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- I think that's just a confuser of the issue.

- You're right to that extent. But that doesn't change the fact that something would be missing -- were we to reproduce the brain -- that would have no analog, were we to reproduce the bread. The second brain would also deliver the emergent property of consciousness, but our best guess is that it would not deliver the specific self of the first consciousness, The specific self of the new consciousness would be different than the specific self of the old consciousness.
- Whereas, the loaves of bread would appear to have no such difference.
 
Jabba said:
- I think that's just a confuser of the issue.

- You're right to that extent. But that doesn't change the fact that something would be missing -- were we to reproduce the brain -- that would have no analog, were we to reproduce the bread. The second brain would also deliver the emergent property of consciousness, but our best guess is that it would not deliver the specific self of the first consciousness,
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Of course it wouldn't, because one self can't be in two places at once. It would deliver an identical copy of that specific self, just like following a bread recipe a second time would result in an identical copy of the first loaf of bread.

Jabba said:
The specific self of the new consciousness would be different than the specific self of the old consciousness.
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It would be different in exactly the same way as the second loaf of bread is different from the first loaf of bread - made of different atoms.

Jabba said:
- Whereas, the loaves of bread would appear to have no such difference.
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There's no reason to think the selves would either.

Why are you treating the word "reproduce" differently for selves than for loaves of bread?

Why can two identical loaves of bread exist, but two identical selves can't?
 
Jabba said:
- I think that's just a confuser of the issue.

- You're right to that extent. But that doesn't change the fact that something would be missing -- were we to reproduce the brain -- that would have no analog, were we to reproduce the bread. The second brain would also deliver the emergent property of consciousness, but our best guess is that it would not deliver the specific self of the first consciousness, The specific self of the new consciousness would be different than the specific self of the old consciousness.
- Whereas, the loaves of bread would appear to have no such difference.
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NO, Jabba, that is not OUR guess. That is YOUR guess. OUR guess (as in the materialist's guess) is that it would bring the specific self of the first brain.

Get over it, and continue from there.

Hans
 
Jabba said:
The second brain would also deliver the emergent property of consciousness, but our best guess is that it would not deliver the specific self of the first consciousness, The specific self of the new consciousness would be different than the specific self of the old consciousness.
- Whereas, the loaves of bread would appear to have no such difference.
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So what you're saying is, in the materialist concept the first and second selves would have two different souls?
 
MRC_Hans said:
Jabba, how long will it take for you to get this?

Yes, the above makes sense to you. Yes, the above is your belief. Yes, you are entitled to that belief.

But no, this is not the claim you are purporting to argue against. The claim of the opposition is that your current sense of self would be reproduced. That is what you think you are able to disprove.

However, you can't argue that it must be wrong because you think otherwise.
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Not only can be do it, he's been doing it for several years.
 
I smell another Fringe Reset upwind.

Don't do it, Jabba. Fight the urge. We'll have much more respect for your arguments if you continue painting yourself into a corner.
 
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Jabba said:
- I think that's just a confuser of the issue.

- You're right to that extent. But that doesn't change the fact that something would be missing -- were we to reproduce the brain -- that would have no analog, were we to reproduce the bread.
Click to expand...


Jabba, the thing you claim would be missing is the thing that you are trying to prove exists.
 
Jabba said:
- I think that's just a confuser of the issue.

- You're right to that extent. But that doesn't change the fact that something would be missing -- were we to reproduce the brain -- that would have no analog, were we to reproduce the bread. The second brain would also deliver the emergent property of consciousness, but our best guess is that it would not deliver the specific self of the first consciousness, The specific self of the new consciousness would be different than the specific self of the old consciousness.
- Whereas, the loaves of bread would appear to have no such difference.
Click to expand...

Identical but distinct.
 
Jabba said:
- You're right to that extent. But that doesn't change the fact that something would be missing -- were we to reproduce the brain -- that would have no analog, were we to reproduce the bread. The second brain would also deliver the emergent property of consciousness, but our best guess is that it would not deliver the specific self of the first consciousness, The specific self of the new consciousness would be different than the specific self of the old consciousness.
Click to expand...

Your self is different every second.

- Whereas, the loaves of bread would appear to have no such difference.
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That's because you ascribe a special, magical property to the self.
 
Jabba said:
but our best guess is that it would not deliver the specific self of the first consciousness...
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No.

That's not "our best guess." That's your frantically begged question. There's no concept of a "specific" property because properties are not discrete. Under materialism the second one would have to be identical and indistinguishable.
 
Argumemnon said:
Your self is different every second.



That's because you ascribe a special, magical property to the self.
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Let's get over this: It doesn't matter what Jabba ascribes, assumes, or believes.

Jabba is arguing against the material position, according to which the self is an emergent property of a sufficiently complex brain.

This is the position Jabba must refute. Period. Over and out.

Hans
 
Jabba said:
- I think that's just a confuser of the issue.

- You're right to that extent. But that doesn't change the fact that something would be missing -- were we to reproduce the brain -- that would have no analog, were we to reproduce the bread. The second brain would also deliver the emergent property of consciousness, but our best guess is that it would not deliver the specific self of the first consciousness, The specific self of the new consciousness would be different than the specific self of the old consciousness.
- Whereas, the loaves of bread would appear to have no such difference.
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Objection! Assuming facts not in evidence!
 
Jabba said:
- I think that's just a confuser of the issue.

- You're right to that extent. But that doesn't change the fact that something would be missing -- were we to reproduce the brain -- that would have no analog, were we to reproduce the bread. The second brain would also deliver the emergent property of consciousness, but our best guess is that it would not deliver the specific self of the first consciousness, The specific self of the new consciousness would be different than the specific self of the old consciousness.
- Whereas, the loaves of bread would appear to have no such difference.
Click to expand...

Jabba, at this point, I have not the foggiest clue what your claim might be and I am almost certain that you do not either.
 
abaddon said:
Jabba, at this point, I have not the foggiest clue what your claim might be and I am almost certain that you do not either.
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As I've asked many times now: How does immortality change the infinitely small chance that a specific person would be born? Even the existence of souls doesn't answer this. Why does that specific soul have a greater chance of existing than any other hypothetical one?

Jabba will ignore this because thinking about it would be inconvenient.
 
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