Why Hitler Declared War On The United States

I agree.

Germany's forces were set up for Freddy the Great's preference for short, sharp wars - ready to deliver a series of quick hammer blows to drive the other side to the table before Germany's poor logistic and strategic situation kicked in.

It worked for them in 1870, not so much in 1914 and certainly not in 1939.
You're right in principle but this is worth noting. It worked against France in 1870, and it worked even better against France in 1940, so that Hitler thought his tactics would work in the USSR too. It seems that things fell apart when Blitzkrieg reached the limit of its effective range of operation, at Smolensk, short of Moscow. The Soviet state had absorbed the "hammer blows" and still not keeled over.

At that point the Nazis started to display hesitation and indecision; Hitler allowed himself to be distracted by a sideshow Blitzkrieg against Kiev, irrelevant to the general course of the campaign against the Soviet capital. Then attrition went to work, and Germany's "poor logistic situation" kicked in with a vengeance.
 
You are right - the initial campaigns of WWII were excellent examples of what an army set up for short, sharp wars could do.

The problem was the UK and its refusal to stop fighting and its strategic advantage of having a large natural ditch between it and the Germans that the Germans simply couldn't cross. This turned the war into a war of attrition that the German military and economy were not set up to wage.
 
You are right - the initial campaigns of WWII were excellent examples of what an army set up for short, sharp wars could do.

The problem was the UK and its refusal to stop fighting and its strategic advantage of having a large natural ditch between it and the Germans that the Germans simply couldn't cross. This turned the war into a war of attrition that the German military and economy were not set up to wage.

...and two of the reasons they could not proceed with Operation Sealion were, firstly, they failed to smash the RAF, and secondly, the Kreigsmarine wasn't en effective navy. If they tried to go ahead with it, the Royal Navy, accompanied by RAF air support, would have slaughtered many of them while crossing, and any that got through to land on the planned beachheads at Ramsgate, Folkstone, Bexhill and Brighton would have been mopped up by the British Army.
 
...and two of the reasons they could not proceed with Operation Sealion were, firstly, they failed to smash the RAF, and secondly, the Kreigsmarine wasn't en effective navy. If they tried to go ahead with it, the Royal Navy, accompanied by RAF air support, would have slaughtered many of them while crossing, and any that got through to land on the planned beachheads at Ramsgate, Folkstone, Bexhill and Brighton would have been mopped up by the British Army.

I'd say that it was worse than that: If they tried to go ahead with sealion and they had smashed the RAF or the RN but left the other, it would have failed.

Even if they had managed to land and the RN decided to steam to Canada for no apparent reason, the German lack of logistical capability would have caused them problems.
 
You are right - the initial campaigns of WWII were excellent examples of what an army set up for short, sharp wars could do.

The problem was the UK and its refusal to stop fighting and its strategic advantage of having a large natural ditch between it and the Germans that the Germans simply couldn't cross. This turned the war into a war of attrition that the German military and economy were not set up to wage.

Absolutely correct, and you can add the Japanese conquest of the Dutch East Indies as well. ABDA was utterly defeated. Hitler thought he could bring the Brits to sue for peace; Japan thought the same about the Americans. Both were wrong.

And it's not like Hitler didn't have the example of Napoleon for what can happen when you can't cross the channel and decide to invade Russia.
 
...and two of the reasons they could not proceed with Operation Sealion were, firstly, they failed to smash the RAF, and secondly, the Kreigsmarine wasn't en effective navy. If they tried to go ahead with it, the Royal Navy, accompanied by RAF air support, would have slaughtered many of them while crossing, and any that got through to land on the planned beachheads at Ramsgate, Folkstone, Bexhill and Brighton would have been mopped up by the British Army.

Their plans hinged on capturing a major port intact. Without it they couldn't bring across tanks, artillery or supplies.
So even if they had managed to drag a few barges onto the beaches they were doomed.
 
...at the worst possible time of year.
His operation was delayed for a month by the crisis in Yugoslavia, but he went ahead anyway. He effectively depended on a collapse in short order of the Soviet state under the force of the initial onslaught. As in the case of Britain the previous year, his enemy held out. He had no answer to that, except to take on yet another enemy. The USSR after failing against the U.K.; the USA after failing against the USSR.

He was off his head.
 
He had to turn to the USSR anyway. It's not clear he actually wanted or needed to defeat the UK.

The US was the real spoiler.

This signature is intended to irradiate people.
 
He had to turn to the USSR anyway. It's not clear he actually wanted or needed to defeat the UK.

The US was the real spoiler.

This signature is intended to irradiate people.
He went to war with France and the UK, because he had been warned that his invasion of Poland would entail that. What do you mean he didn't want or need to do it? He didn't need to attack the USSR. Stalin was doing all he could to appease Hitler. He was under no obligation to fight the Soviet Union, except for his hostility to communists and Jews. It was an ideological imperative. Defeating France and the U.K. was a political imperative. They were rival powers that stood in the way of German supremacy.
 
He went to war with France and the UK, because he had been warned that his invasion of Poland would entail that. What do you mean he didn't want or need to do it? He didn't need to attack the USSR. Stalin was doing all he could to appease Hitler. He was under no obligation to fight the Soviet Union, except for his hostility to communists and Jews. It was an ideological imperative. Defeating France and the U.K. was a political imperative. They were rival powers that stood in the way of German supremacy.


Yeah, its not as if he needed to invade the USSR for fuel and materiel... an an Axis Ally, Stalin was happy to sell him the stuff.
 
Yeah, its not as if he needed to invade the USSR for fuel and materiel... an an Axis Ally, Stalin was happy to sell him the stuff.

Stalin was only happy to do that to the extent it would stall an inevitable confrontation. He was hoping to be able to initiate a first strike in 1943 or so.

Anyway, invading Russia was the literal purpose of the war in the first place. That's pretty much what Lebensraum meant - invade Russia.
 
Anyway, invading Russia was the literal purpose of the war in the first place. That's pretty much what Lebensraum meant - invade Russia.

This here.
Which is why any alternative histories that try and ask "what if Germany hadn't invaded Russia" sort of miss the point. Because none of the stuff in '39 or '40 would have happened without that eventual goal in mind.
 
This here.
Which is why any alternative histories that try and ask "what if Germany hadn't invaded Russia" sort of miss the point. Because none of the stuff in '39 or '40 would have happened without that eventual goal in mind.
Agreed. The war on Russia was an ideological imperative. But it was not forced on Hitler by Stalin. It was a choice made by Hitler. A foolish one, as was pointed out at the time, because the UK was still in the field against Germany.

If you fail to knock out one enemy, don't take on another. But when Hitler then failed to knock out the USSR, he at once declared war on the USA. This pattern of behaviour is not rational.
 
If you fail to knock out one enemy, don't take on another. But when Hitler then failed to knock out the USSR, he at once declared war on the USA. This pattern of behaviour is not rational.

As I say above (and I think is the line taken by Weinberg in his Big Book of WW2) is that Hitler really thought that the US would be concentrating in the Pacific, leaving little naval strength to patrol the Atlantic, allowing his subs a free hand. And German intelligence was really (ideologically in fact) dismissive of the US capacity to wage a war.

They proved very good at deluding themselves about the world around them. The Japanese were very similar in this regard.
 
German Subs wouldn't have had a free hand. Once the USA joined the war RN escorts could operate into US territorial waters. I would have been bad for the subs whatever the US decided to concentrate on first.
 
German Subs wouldn't have had a free hand. Once the USA joined the war RN escorts could operate into US territorial waters. I would have been bad for the subs whatever the US decided to concentrate on first.
At first the German subs did very well against US shipping, because of the imbecility and stubbornness of the US naval high command.
 
At first the German subs did very well against US shipping, because of the imbecility and stubbornness of the US naval high command.

Yes, there was a delay in instigating coastal convoys but to be fair there were some voices in the Admiralty that doubted the convoy system.
One big problem was with ships being sihluetted against shore lights when passing coastal towns and cities.
 
German Subs wouldn't have had a free hand. Once the USA joined the war RN escorts could operate into US territorial waters. I would have been bad for the subs whatever the US decided to concentrate on first.

I never said it made sense...:)
 
Yes, there was a delay in instigating coastal convoys but to be fair there were some voices in the Admiralty that doubted the convoy system.
One big problem was with ships being sihluetted against shore lights when passing coastal towns and cities.
Convoys and blackouts had previously been found to be indispensable in the U.K. That's what I mean by imbecility and stubbornness: having to rediscover things already learned by the Royal Navy.
 

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