Proof of Immortality, VI

[jt512]

I don't believe that sequence would surprise you at all. Nor should it. It means nothing, signifies nothing.

Duh. Of course it shouldn't surprise anyone. Jabba's existence should surprise hm even less. Since could only observe his existence, there is absolutely nothing for him to be surprised about. And, yeah, I know your whole subjectivity/objectivity spiel by heart, and it is utter nonsense.

 

[Mojo]

I don't believe that sequence would surprise you at all.

Why not? You have already stated that we should be astounded that unlikely events happen.

 

[Mojo]

- I'm currently trying to focus on the sharpshooter issue...

Answering this question will help you to do that:

- If someone else existed in your place, and advanced the same argument for immortality as you are advancing, would that argument be valid?

 

[jsfisher]

Jabba, please consider this:

Let's say you selected a person, and you wanted to estimate the likelihood that person is Swedish. "The person is Swedish" is your hypothesis S; you can estimate P(S) as the simple ratio of the population of Swedes to the world's total population.

Oh, enter new information B: The person has blue eyes. If we know the likelihood a person would have blue eyes, P(B), and the likelihood a Swede would have blue eyes, P(B|S), we can use Bayes Theorem and this new information to improve our estimated likelihood the person is Swedish, P(S|B).

That would be P(S|B) = P(S) x P(B|S) / P(B).

That all works, but let's now switch to your immortality thing. You've selected a person (it happens to be you), and you are considering the hypothesis H the person exists in a materialistic reality. You make up a number for P(H); it is a wild-ass guess, actually. Now you want to apply new information to improve the estimate.

The new information -- the the person has a sense of existence, E -- isn't new information. The parallel to the Swede analogy stops here because the sense of existence is part of being a sentient human in a materialistic reality. The sense of existence "target" was already hit under H, so you cannot be surprised about it now. P(E|H) = 1.

If you work through all the constraints, you should conclude that P(E) >= P(H) and, from that, that P(H|E) >= P(H).

This is opposite the conclusion you desire.

 

[Toontown]

Duh. Of course it shouldn't surprise anyone. Jabba's existence should surprise hm even less. Since could only observe his existence, there is absolutely nothing for him to be surprised about. And, yeah, I know your whole subjectivity/objectivity spiel by heart, and it is utter nonsense.

You're losing a step.

You're losing the step where Jabba should be surprised that he has the opportunity to observe his existence, assuming the standard cosmological model and his interpretation of H are correct.

You don't know my whole subjectivity/objectivity spiel by heart. If you did, you wouldn't be calling it "utter nonsense".

 

[jt512]

If you work through all the constraints, you should conclude that P(E) >= P(H) and, from that, that P(H|E) >= P(H).

That's false.

 

[jt512]

Jabba, please consider this:

Let's say you selected a person, and you wanted to estimate the likelihood that person is Swedish. "The person is Swedish" is your hypothesis S; you can estimate P(S) as the simple ratio of the population of Swedes to the world's total population.

Oh, enter new information B: The person has blue eyes. If we know the likelihood a person would have blue eyes, P(B), and the likelihood a Swede would have blue eyes, P(B|S), we can use Bayes Theorem and this new information to improve our estimated likelihood the person is Swedish, P(S|B).

That would be P(S|B) = P(S) x P(B|S) / P(B).

That all works, but let's now switch to your immortality thing. You've selected a person (it happens to be you), and you are considering the hypothesis H the person exists in a materialistic reality. You make up a number for P(H); it is a wild-ass guess, actually. Now you want to apply new information to improve the estimate.

The new information -- the the person has a sense of existence, E -- isn't new information. The parallel to the Swede analogy stops here because the sense of existence is part of being a sentient human in a materialistic reality. The sense of existence "target" was already hit under H, so you cannot be surprised about it now. P(E|H) = 1.

If you work through all the constraints, you should conclude that P(E) >= P(H) and, from that, that P(H|E) >= P(H).

This is opposite the conclusion you desire.

Oh, wait. You have P(E|H) = 1 as a premise. I didn't see that. Never mind.

 

[Fudbucker]

Duh. Of course it shouldn't surprise anyone. Jabba's existence should surprise hm even less. Since could only observe his existence, there is absolutely nothing for him to be surprised about. And, yeah, I know your whole subjectivity/objectivity spiel by heart, and it is utter nonsense.

I don't agree with this, and there's a useful analogy to explain it (can't remember who came up with it).

You're going to be executed by 20 sharpshooters from 20 feet away. They aim, fire, and you're still alive. They all missed. Would you be surprised by your continued existence? Certainly. You would very much want to know why you're not dead even though you know you're not dead. You would assume the outcome was rigged on your behalf.

In Bayes, this is the problem of old evidence, where things that are already known and have already happened obviously have a probability of 1. But if they have a probability of 1, how can they confirm anything? When Einstein developed relativity theory, its prediction of Mercury's orbit was hugely significant, but Mercury's orbit was already known at the time, so why should a theory get any credit for predicting something that was already known? The trick is to pretend the evidence wasn't already known. If Mercury's orbit hadn't already been known, would relativity's prediction of it be very confirming? Yes, because the theory wasn't ad hoc in anyway.

Jabba finds his existence surprising, for the obvious reasons (ancestor X has to be in right place and right time, etc.). Anyone's existence is like winning a fantastic lottery. The reason our existence isn't really surprising is there are a lot of lottery winners (and counterfactually, potential lottery winners). If I wasn't here, there a lot of potential someone elses like me who would be here and be wondering about their existence. Unlike the sharpshooter case, coincidence is an acceptable explanation for existence.

This is where I think Jabba gets it wrong. He thinks his existence is like winning a lottery, where the odds of winning are fantastically remote. OK, fair enough. But, where he goes wrong, is he thinks his winning ticket was the only ticket sold. If that were the case, he would be right to be surprised. If there was a lottery just for you, and the odds were fantastic, and you won, you'd be suspicious. But his ticket wasn't the only winning ticket. There is Jabba(a) who would have won, if the numbers were a little different (if sperm X had made it instead of sperm Y), and Jabba(b), and Jabba(c)...If enough tickets are sold, someone's going to win, no matter what the odds are.

So our existence is surprising, but not in any way that requires an explanation beyond coincidence or luck.

 

[JimOfAllTrades]

I'll tell you what would surprise you, if you're not a P-zombie. And even if you are a P-zombie, you would be compelled to simulate surprise...

Your random sequence of cards turns out to be a code which, when keyed into cyberspace, invokes a Genie who materializes and grants you one wish. The Genie marvels at your luck, explaining that there is a different card sequence code corresponding to every person on the planet. But a valid code can only invoke the Genie if the code is specifically communicated to another person.

And you would owe it all to me, for triggering you to post that particular sequence.

I guess that would be surprising, but I don't see where it's analogous to Jabba's scenario.

Jabba seems to be saying that for him to be alive at this moment in time is such a long shot that something analogous to stacking a deck of cards to achieve a "good" outcome must have happened to cause him to be alive now.

Everyone else seems to be saying that there is no stacking required, because once you have a functioning human brain consciousness and a sense of self will appear as a an emergent property of that brain. It won't be any specific consciousness, but whatever one it is will then be alive and aware and able to marvel at their "luck".

Using the paying card analogy, that seems to more like everyone gets a deck of cards and whatever sequence you deal is your sequence. There is no specific sequence required, it just needs to be the one that that person deals. Any sequence is just as unlikely as any other, but we shouldn't be surprised that a particular sequence appeared because once you start dealing some sequence must appear.

Looking at the equation that that quantifies the variables from an objective point of view may be able to tell us how likely it is for us to exist as a group, but looking at that same equation from the subjective point of view does us no good if the results are the same for everyone, namely that they exist.

 

[Hokulele]

I don't agree with this, and there's a useful analogy to explain it (can't remember who came up with it).

You're going to be executed by 20 sharpshooters from 20 feet away. They aim, fire, and you're still alive. They all missed. Would you be surprised by your continued existence? Certainly. You would very much want to know why you're not dead even though you know you're not dead. You would assume the outcome was rigged on your behalf.

As I explained before, you are getting the Texas Sharpshooter completely backwards. In this analogy, you are the target, pretty much by definition. As more and more shots accumulate, you can refine the odds of each hypothesis.

With Jabba's existence, there is no target at all, no additional shots, and no possible way to change how the odds of each hypothesis are calculated.

The analogy is fine for understanding how Bayesian analysis works, but since Jabba's problem is that he is using Bayes inappropriately, this analogy is useless from the start.

 

[Jabba]

Dave,
- I now suspect that I was wrong about the Bayesian formulas accounting for the sharpshooter fallacy... Not to say that I won't change my mind (again), but for now I'm thinking that if there's nothing to set me apart from the crowd, the unlikelihood of my current existence, under the hypothesis being evaluated, has no relevance to the posterior probability of that hypothesis -- whoever exists will have that same unlikelihood.
- I know that's what you've been saying all along, but I was beginning to think that I might have a clear savior for my 'targetness' -- the formula itself!

- Anyway, I don't think so anymore...
- Not to worry -- I have a better savior: targetness. A target doesn't need to be pre-selected. More to come.

- But again, a theorist often has a 'feel' for a hypothesis before he/she can express it effectively.

If you really think that, then I don't think you know what the word target actually means.

Target:
A person, object, or place selected as the aim of an attack.
Select as an object of attention or attack.
An objective or result towards which efforts are directed.
Etc.

The word target loses any meaning if you don't need to declare what you intend to hit or achieve before you try and achieve your objective.

You're doing your utmost best to try and try and make everyone else think you're not guilty of the sharpshooter fallacy, but you're truly doing a lousy job of it. Either you don't actually understand what the sharpshooter fallacy is or you're being disingenuous in trying to sweep it under the carpet.

Jesse,
- You're right. I used the wrong word. I should have said "pre-specified."

- Try this.
- You and I move about 200 yards from a barn in Texas. I take my old M-14 with me, tell you that I'm a sharpshooter, and start firing away at the barn. We walk back to the barn and find a tiny shot group centered around a small hole in the barn wall.
- I didn't need to pre-specify my target...
- And, in this case, we'd have a high degree of targetness.
- If my shot group wasn't all that small, we'd have a lower degree of targetness.

Changing the phrase from "pre-selected" to "pre-specified" in no way addresses my point.
What's the difference between a pre-selected target and a pre-specified target?

Jesse,
- Pre-specified means that you have told someone, or have otherwise indicated your selection, prior to shooting. I'm saying that there are ways for others to know what your target was, without be told.

No. For the purposes of determining how to evaluate the significance of the data in your model, "telling someone else" or "others knowing about it" has nothing to do with it. Please stop just making stuff up.

<snip>...Jay,
- Sure it does. That way we know what the shooter is shooting at, and we can give him a score accordingly. I must not understand your objection...

Edited by Loss Leader: 

Edited for Rule 11, Moderated thread.

No, it doesn't.
The crux of the fallacy is when the significance of the data is determined, not whether that significance is communicated to someone else. You would do better to stop torturing analogies and look at your argument instead. You're conflating problems that arise only in your analogies, not in your argument.
Which is why I've asked you several times to attempt to explain what you think the Texas sharpshooter fallacy is and why it's a fallacy.

Jay,
- Note above that I included when the significance of the data was included -- "prior to shooting." That's typically how we know what the target was. I'm claiming, however, that there are other ways of being "pretty sure" what the target was. A farmer shoots a deer -- we can be pretty sure he was shooting at the deer.

 

[jt512]

When Einstein developed relativity theory, its prediction of Mercury's orbit was hugely significant, but Mercury's orbit was already known at the time, so why should a theory get any credit for predicting something that was already known? The trick is to pretend the evidence wasn't already known. If Mercury's orbit hadn't already been known, would relativity's prediction of it be very confirming? Yes, because the theory wasn't ad hoc in anyway.

And that's where Jabba goes wong. His hypotheses are ad hoc. Neither of his hypotheses predicted Jabba, specifically, would exist. In fact, there was no hypothesis that Jabba, specifically, would exist until Jabba noticed his existence and then tailored hypotheses to fit that evidence. I contrast, what would have be impressive is if there had been a pre-existing hypothesis that predicted that Jabba, specifically, would exist.

Again, the card analogy. Jabba finds a deck of cards laying on the table and observes they are in the following sequence: JC, QS, 9H, 3H, JS, KH, 5D, 10H, JD, 6S, 5S, 8S, 5H, 7H, 6H, QC, JH, 4C, KS, QH, 3D, 7D, 3C, 9C, 10S, 5C, KC, 3S, 10D, 7S, 7C, 8D, 2S, 6D, AD, QD, 9D, AC, 9S, 2H, 2D, AS, 6C, 8H, 8C, 4H, 2C, 4D, AH, KD, 10C, 4S. He reasons that the probability that a random shuffle would have produced that sequence is 1 in 10⁶⁸, but if they were intentionally set in that sequence, then the probability of the sequence would be 1. Therefore, they almost certainly were intentionally set in that sequence. The problem is that there was no hypothesis before the sequence was observed that predicted that that specific sequence would be the set sequence. That was hypothesis was tailor-made after observing the sequence. The hypothesis itself was conditioned on the observed data.

Jabba is committing the same fallacy.


Jabba finds his existence surprising, for the obvious reasons (ancestor X has to be in right place and right time, etc.). Anyone's existence is like winning a fantastic lottery. The reason our existence isn't really surprising is there are a lot of lottery winners (and counterfactually, potential lottery winners). If I wasn't here, there a lot of potential someone elses like me who would be here and be wondering about their existence. Unlike the sharpshooter case, coincidence is an acceptable explanation for existence.

This is where I think Jabba gets it wrong. He thinks his existence is like winning a lottery, where the odds of winning are fantastically remote. OK, fair enough. But, where he goes wrong, is he thinks his winning ticket was the only ticket sold. If that were the case, he would be right to be surprised. If there was a lottery just for you, and the odds were fantastic, and you won, you'd be suspicious. But his ticket wasn't the only winning ticket. There is Jabba(a) who would have won, if the numbers were a little different (if sperm X had made it instead of sperm Y), and Jabba(b), and Jabba(c)...If enough tickets are sold, someone's going to win, no matter what the odds are.

So our existence is surprising, but not in any way that requires an explanation beyond coincidence or luck.[/QUOTE]

 

[Toontown]

I guess that would be surprising, but I don't see where it's analogous to Jabba's scenario.

It's more analogous than you think. That sequence was jt512's lucky sequence before he dealt it. He just didn't know it was his lucky sequence until after he dealt it and the Genie popped in. If he had dealt any other sequence, the Genie would have remained in his bottle.

Likewise Jabba's specific brain. From the moment of the big bang, assuming H (always assuming H), there was (presumably) one possible brain, and only one possible brain, that would be none other than Jabba, if said brain were to come into existence. A reasonably acceptable fact which, when viewed subjectively, quite reasonably brings Jabba's interpretation of H into question.

Everyone else seems to be saying that there is no stacking required, because once you have a functioning human brain consciousness and a sense of self will appear as a an emergent property of that brain. It won't be any specific consciousness, but whatever one it is will then be alive and aware and able to marvel at their "luck".

Well, if they're saying that, then I don't know what the hell they're talking about. No "stacking" is required, but the subjective perspective very strongly implies that a different interpretation of H damn well might be required.

The problem with "everyone else"'s reasoning is the obvious fact that all those other "unlikely" events are not really unlikely at all. Spacetime kicked in. Things had to happen. Only specified events can be unlikely. Like, for example, one specific brain which is (specified by H) to be the only brain that could ever be you.

Looking at the equation that quantifies the variables from an objective point of view may be able to tell us how likely it is for us to exist as a group, but looking at that same equation from the subjective point of view does us no good if the results are the same for everyone, namely that they exist.

"That they exist" is not the "result" of the equation. "That (I) exist" is a prerequisite given - an observation.

Nor does the equation "tell us how likely it is for us to exist". That would have to be estimated using available information. The estimate may not need to be very precise, depending on the other variables.

The equation is tailored to attempt to choose between discrete hypotheses purporting to account for one's (observed) existence.

The "marveling" at the unlikelihood of one's existence (under H, always under H) is more properly viewed as the degree of skepticism toward the interpretation of H that purports to account for said (observed) existence.

 

[Loss Leader]

A farmer shoots a deer -- we can be pretty sure he was shooting at the deer.

But Jabba -

You're not talking about a farmer shooting A deer. You're talking about a farmer shooting one specific deer out of all the deer in the entire world. You're talking about running DNA tests and saying, "Yes, this was exactly the deer the farmer intended to shoot." If the farmer let that be known beforehand, we might be impressed that he was able to hunt and kill one specific deer. Otherwise, it doesn't matter.

You keep talking about the very small chance that you would be born and raised exactly as you were. If you were talking about the chance that anyone anywhere ever in the entire universe were to start a thread like this, it would be the same as a farmer shooting any old deer.

As it stands, your analogy actually hurts your argument. It certainly doesn't help it.

 

[JayUtah]

Note above that I included when the significance of the data was included...

But then you went on to obfuscate that most important part with all sorts of irrelevant quibbling over the mechanics of selection. You're trying to draw attention away from the broken chronology in your argument.

Rather than quoting walls of posts from our previous discussion, which I can read just fine by myself, why don't you try to tell us in your own words what the Texas sharpshooter fallacy is, and why it's a fallacy? Maybe it will help you understand why your argument is wrong.

I'm claiming, however, that there are other ways of being "pretty sure" what the target was.

Your way begs the question.

A farmer shoots a deer -- we can be pretty sure he was shooting at the deer.

No, we can't without asking the farmer. Why would you think otherwise? You really don't seem to grasp the notion that you can't define a target simply as whatever was hit. This is why you need to buckle down and explain to your audience what you think the Texas sharpshooter fallacy is and why it's a fallacy.

 

[Fudbucker]

And that's where Jabba goes wong. His hypotheses are ad hoc. Neither of his hypotheses predicted Jabba, specifically, would exist. In fact, there was no hypothesis that Jabba, specifically, would exist until Jabba noticed his existence and then tailored hypotheses to fit that evidence. I contrast, what would have be impressive is if there had been a pre-existing hypothesis that predicted that Jabba, specifically, would exist.

Again, the card analogy. Jabba finds a deck of cards laying on the table and observes they are in the following sequence: JC, QS, 9H, 3H, JS, KH, 5D, 10H, JD, 6S, 5S, 8S, 5H, 7H, 6H, QC, JH, 4C, KS, QH, 3D, 7D, 3C, 9C, 10S, 5C, KC, 3S, 10D, 7S, 7C, 8D, 2S, 6D, AD, QD, 9D, AC, 9S, 2H, 2D, AS, 6C, 8H, 8C, 4H, 2C, 4D, AH, KD, 10C, 4S. He reasons that the probability that a random shuffle would have produced that sequence is 1 in 10⁶⁸, but if they were intentionally set in that sequence, then the probability of the sequence would be 1. Therefore, they almost certainly were intentionally set in that sequence. The problem is that there was no hypothesis before the sequence was observed that predicted that that specific sequence would be the set sequence. That was hypothesis was tailor-made after observing the sequence. The hypothesis itself was conditioned on the observed data.

Jabba is committing the same fallacy.


Jabba finds his existence surprising, for the obvious reasons (ancestor X has to be in right place and right time, etc.). Anyone's existence is like winning a fantastic lottery. The reason our existence isn't really surprising is there are a lot of lottery winners (and counterfactually, potential lottery winners). If I wasn't here, there a lot of potential someone elses like me who would be here and be wondering about their existence. Unlike the sharpshooter case, coincidence is an acceptable explanation for existence.

This is where I think Jabba gets it wrong. He thinks his existence is like winning a lottery, where the odds of winning are fantastically remote. OK, fair enough. But, where he goes wrong, is he thinks his winning ticket was the only ticket sold. If that were the case, he would be right to be surprised. If there was a lottery just for you, and the odds were fantastic, and you won, you'd be suspicious. But his ticket wasn't the only winning ticket. There is Jabba(a) who would have won, if the numbers were a little different (if sperm X had made it instead of sperm Y), and Jabba(b), and Jabba(c)...If enough tickets are sold, someone's going to win, no matter what the odds are.

So our existence is surprising, but not in any way that requires an explanation beyond coincidence or luck.

[/QUOTE]

I don't exactly follow the card analogy, but I get the gist. I think we are both saying the same thing: our existence, improbable as it may be, is not surprising (i.e., does not require us to look beyond coincidence).

 

[jt512]

In my previous response, I failed to delete some of the post I was responding to. The post should have looked like this. If a moderator reads this and is willing to fix my post, that would be great. Otherwise, here is what I meant to post:

When Einstein developed relativity theory, its prediction of Mercury's orbit was hugely significant, but Mercury's orbit was already known at the time, so why should a theory get any credit for predicting something that was already known? The trick is to pretend the evidence wasn't already known. If Mercury's orbit hadn't already been known, would relativity's prediction of it be very confirming? Yes, because the theory wasn't ad hoc in anyway.

And that's where Jabba goes wong. His hypotheses are ad hoc. Neither of his hypotheses predicted Jabba, specifically, would exist. In fact, there was no hypothesis that Jabba, specifically, would exist until Jabba noticed his existence and then tailored hypotheses to fit that evidence. I contrast, what would have be impressive is if there had been a pre-existing hypothesis that predicted that Jabba, specifically, would exist.

Again, the card analogy. Jabba finds a deck of cards laying on the table and observes they are in the following sequence: JC, QS, 9H, 3H, JS, KH, 5D, 10H, JD, 6S, 5S, 8S, 5H, 7H, 6H, QC, JH, 4C, KS, QH, 3D, 7D, 3C, 9C, 10S, 5C, KC, 3S, 10D, 7S, 7C, 8D, 2S, 6D, AD, QD, 9D, AC, 9S, 2H, 2D, AS, 6C, 8H, 8C, 4H, 2C, 4D, AH, KD, 10C, 4S. He reasons that the probability that a random shuffle would have produced that sequence is 1 in 10⁶⁸, but if they were intentionally set in that sequence, then the probability of the sequence would be 1. Therefore, they almost certainly were intentionally set in that sequence. The problem is that there was no hypothesis before the sequence was observed that predicted that that specific sequence would be the set sequence. That was hypothesis was tailor-made after observing the sequence. The hypothesis itself was conditioned on the observed data.

Jabba is committing the same fallacy.

 

[JimOfAllTrades]

Likewise Jabba's specific brain. From the moment of the big bang, assuming H (always assuming H), there was (presumably) one possible brain, and only one possible brain, that would be none other than Jabba, if said brain were to come into existence. A reasonably acceptable fact which, when viewed subjectively, quite reasonably brings Jabba's interpretation of H into question.

(small snip)

No "stacking" is required, but the subjective perspective very strongly implies that a different interpretation of H damn well might be required.

But if the subjective view tells everybody the same thing (Hmmm, funny I should exist now given my idea of what H is) then we learn nothing new from it. If my subjective view gave me different information than your subjective view gives you, then there might be something to be gained by "compare and contrast".

That leaves the objective view: given that there could have been almost an infinite number of brains, any of which would have caused a "self" to emerge, why we should we be surprised that one of the possible combinations occurred?

Why should we give more credence (or any credence) to the subjective view?

 

[Mojo]

Jay,
- Note above that I included when the significance of the data was included -- "prior to shooting." That's typically how we know what the target was. I'm claiming, however, that there are other ways of being "pretty sure" what the target was. A farmer shoots a deer -- we can be pretty sure he was shooting at the deer.

If there's only one deer, or a sufficiently small number of deer that it would be unlikely that a shot fired at random would hit one, then there is something special about hitting a deer. That is not analogous to your "particular self" rather than one of your "potential selves" getting to inhabit your body. You have not established that there is anything special about your "particular self".

If the farmer was completely surrounded by deer, so that wherever he fired the shot it would hit one, how would you know that he was aiming for the particular deer that he hit?

 

[Jabba]

Jabba, please consider this:
Let's say you selected a person, and you wanted to estimate the likelihood that person is Swedish. "The person is Swedish" is your hypothesis S; you can estimate P(S) as the simple ratio of the population of Swedes to the world's total population.
Oh, enter new information B: The person has blue eyes. If we know the likelihood a person would have blue eyes, P(B), and the likelihood a Swede would have blue eyes, P(B|S), we can use Bayes Theorem and this new information to improve our estimated likelihood the person is Swedish, P(S|B).
That would be P(S|B) = P(S) x P(B|S) / P(B).
That all works, but let's now switch to your immortality thing. (1) You've selected a person (it happens to be you), and you are considering the hypothesis H the person exists in a materialistic reality. (2) You make up a number for P(H); it is a wild-ass guess, actually. Now you want to apply new information to improve the estimate.
3)The new information -- the the person has a sense of existence, E -- isn't new information. 4) The parallel to the Swede analogy stops here because the sense of existence is part of being a sentient human in a materialistic reality. The sense of existence "target" was already hit under H, so you cannot be surprised about it now. P(E|H) = 1.
If you work through all the constraints, you should conclude that P(E) >= P(H) and, from that, that P(H|E) >= P(H).
`This is opposite the conclusion you desire.

Jabba, please consider this:
Let's say you selected a person, and you wanted to estimate the likelihood that person is Swedish. "The person is Swedish" is your hypothesis S; you can estimate P(S) as the simple ratio of the population of Swedes to the world's total population.
Oh, enter new information B: The person has blue eyes. If we know the likelihood a person would have blue eyes, P(B), and the likelihood a Swede would have blue eyes, P(B|S), we can use Bayes Theorem and this new information to improve our estimated likelihood the person is Swedish, P(S|B).
That would be P(S|B) = P(S) x P(B|S) / P(B).
That all works, but let's now switch to your immortality thing.
(1) You've selected a person (it happens to be you), and you are considering the hypothesis H the person exists in a materialistic reality.
- I'd like to re-word that in order to make sure that we are really talking about the same thing. I would say that H (OOFLam) implies that reality includes only what we currently consider to be physical.

(2) You make up a number for P(H); it is a wild-ass guess, actually. Now you want to apply new information to improve the estimate.
[- What percentage of credible scientists would you think suspect that there is probably more than what we now consider to be physical? Is 10% too much?

3) The new information -- the the person has a sense of existence, E -- isn't new information.
- It is new info if it wasn't considered in the prior probability of H.

4) The parallel to the Swede analogy stops here because the sense of existence is part of being a sentient human in a materialistic reality. The sense of existence "target" was already hit under H, so you cannot be surprised about it now. P(E|H) = 1...
- I think that the answer is that I/we should be surprised -- we just take our existence for granted, when it's the very last thing we should take for granted.