Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[jsfisher]

We really need to stop reinforcing Jabba's misrepresentation of the complement of H.

Since Jabba doesn't mean ~H when he uses that notation, and that leads to a huge equivocation in his reasoning, can we at least correct him and demand he use a different notation?

I suggest H₁. (Normally, I'd go with H', but that's not distinctive enough.)

H would continue to be one specific mortal hypothesis about existence and its perception (however ill-defined it may be). H₀ would be equivalent to H.

~H is, of course, everything and anything other than that one specific H.

H₁ would be some specific variant of Jabba being immortal.

 

[jond]

We really need to stop reinforcing Jabba's misrepresentation of the complement of H.

Since Jabba doesn't mean ~H when he uses that notation, and that leads to a huge equivocation in his reasoning, can we at least correct him and demand he use a different notation?

I suggest H₁. (Normally, I'd go with H', but that's not distinctive enough.)

H would continue to be one specific mortal hypothesis about existence and its perception (however ill-defined it may be). H₀ would be equivalent to H.

~H is, of course, everything and anything other than that one specific H.

H₁ would be some specific variant of Jabba being immortal.

Frankly, until Jabba acknowledges that H does not include anything other than his brain/body, it is all moot.

 

[JayUtah]

Now, I think that I can virtually prove that the scientific conclusion is wrong using Bayesian Statistics -- but I still haven't really convinced anybody...

Try to figure out why.

During a period when many youth experience an intellectual awakening -- chemical stuff starts happening in your brain at that age -- you came up with an idea to which you immediately formed an emotional attachment. Not just an attachment to the notion that you wanted to live forever, but an attachment to the notion that if this idea were true, you should be able to prove it by some objective means.

Now, decades later, you can't let go of it.

Jabba, in my career I've come up with dozens if not hundreds of ideas that I initially thought were good. Most of them, upon examination and development, turned out not to be. Most of them. This, I think, is par for the course. Since my youth I've worked with countless creative people, including some of the most stellar thinkers of our time. Among the success factors they share is the ability to let go something that just doesn't work. In economics it's called the sunken cost fallacy. You appear to be shoulder deep in it.

The reason you think you can prove, via Bayes, that you have an immortal soul is no more lofty than that you really, really, really want it to be true. You want immortality to be true, yes. But you also want to believe in your ability to make a great philosophical and scientific mark. But the objective facts are against you, Jabba. The errors you're making are not obscure or correctible. They are literally errors that I would expect a first-year philosophy student to identify without even breathing hard.

You need to quickly dispossess yourself of the notion that you're "somehow" still right and that your critics are "somehow" to blame for your inability to make a point. That's your ego getting in the way of doing good science. You've made your case to many smart people, all of whom have rejected it for the same good and valid reasons they've taken pains to articulate for you. You're not Aristotle or Plato or any of the other philosophers who tried and failed to prove the existence of a soul. And that's okay.

Anyway, the "Me" to which I'm alluding is a specific self-awareness that I experience (and, I assume that everyone else experiences)...

This is E in the model.

...and which I wish to continue. I certainly don't want it to be discontinued forever.

This is not part of E. An event in the Bayesian sense can't come attached with this sort of emotional baggage.

But that issue, I claim, is covered in the prior probabilities that I've suggested: P(H)=99%, and P(~H)=1%...

You're simply wrong, Jabba. You have done nothing for five years but "claim" things you can't prove. This doesn't make you smarter than Aristotle. This doesn't make your critics the entrenched morons you seem to want them to be. It's clear you don't understand enough about statistical modeling and inference to get this problem right. And I mean that: you can't produce a single statistics expert who hasn't given you a laundry list of everything -- including this -- that's wrong with your model.

Anyway, I think that my answer to the possibility that my existence requires a totally specific physical body as well as some other specific something is so improbable as to have no significant weight in our calculations...

You're just trying to play both sides of the specificity argument. You rely very heavily on the notion of specificity to try to falsify H, even if the thing you're being specific about doesn't exist in H. It's special pleading to say that specificity, or uniqueness comes into play for H, but not for your theory.

Seriously, Jabba, after five years and countless valid rebuttals, it's time to let the idea go. No one will fault you for believing you have an immortal soul. It's a common belief, and even among skeptics you'll probably hear some evolutionary theory for why we do that. But if you continue to try these patently bad arguments to live out a teenage dream, all you're really going to reap is continued rejection and ridicule. There is no objective proof for an immortal soul, and you're not a failure for missing that mark.

 

[JayUtah]

Since Jabba doesn't mean ~H when he uses that notation, and that leads to a huge equivocation in his reasoning, can we at least correct him and demand he use a different notation?

I've tried at least twice. Good luck.

I suggest H₁.

I suggested H is materialism and K (a member of the set ~H, everything-but-materialism) is whatever his theory is. I got no takers. As I wrote a few times previously, Jabba relies heavily on his ability to switch between a H and ~H as the singular hypothesis at will in order to squeeze out from the corner. Fringe argumentation is so heavily based on the false dilemma I don't think anyone will succeed in convincing Jabba to abandon it.

 

[Mojo]

SOdhner & Jond,
- I'm going to address Jond's version of the issue for now, due to its minimalism.

- When I was 14 it occurred to me that the probability of my current existence -- given the one finite life conclusion of science -- was just about zero. That pretty much convinced me that I (and everyone else) must be immortal... And, science was wrong.
- I wasn't able to convince anyone else at the time, but that didn't quell my enthusiasm. Now, I think that I can virtually prove that the scientific conclusion is wrong using Bayesian Statistics -- but I still haven't really convinced anybody...

- Anyway, the "Me" to which I'm alluding is a specific self-awareness that I experience (and, I assume that everyone else experiences), and which I wish to continue. I certainly don't want it to be discontinued forever.

- I accept that for our selves to be immortal, we need that something exist that is not what we would currently call physical. Apparently, we do need a physical organism, and something else. Obviously, something that requires both is less probable than something that requires only one. But that issue, I claim, is covered in the prior probabilities that I've suggested: P(H)=99%, and P(~H)=1%...
- I didn't mean to imply that a specific self requires a specific physical specimen as well as a specific non-physical specimen. That would make my particular existence even less likely (if mathematically possible) under H, and decrease the posterior probability of H -- except that it would be increasing the prior probability of H by an unknown amount...
- Anyway, I think that my answer to the possibility that my existence requires a totally specific physical body as well as some other specific something is so improbable as to have no significant weight in our calculations...

Jabba, if someone else existed instead of you, would your argument for immortality be valid if they presented it?

 

[jt512]

Dave, write down the sample space for the problem. Is "absence of a soul" an event with positive probability in the sample space?

No. That was my point.

Strange point, as it implies that in your sample space everybody must have a soul.

Before you argue further, actually write out or draw the sample space.

 

[godless dave]

Strange point, as it implies that in your sample space everybody must have a soul.

Before you argue further, actually write out or draw the sample space.

What about absence of a ham sandwich?

Absence of a soul, like absence of a ham sandwich, isn't an event at all. In a model where souls are not a necessary part of existence, the likelihood of one existing is irrelevant.

 

[RoboTimbo]

Jabba, can you explain the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy to me and give some examples of it?

- When I was 14 it occurred to me that the probability of my current existence -- given the one finite life conclusion of science -- was just about zero. That pretty much convinced me that I (and everyone else) must be immortal... And, science was wrong.

You keep giving the same example. You're drawing a circle around the hole after the bullet has hit the side of the barn.

Why do you keep giving the same example of the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy?

 

[carlitos]

When I was 14 I realized that I was immortal.

QED, bitches.

 

[Dave Rogers]

When I was 14 I realized that I was immortal.

We're only immortal for a limited time.

Dave

 

[jt512]

Strange point, as it implies that in your sample space everybody must have a soul.

Before you argue further, actually write out or draw the sample space.

What about absence of a ham sandwich?

Absence of a soul, like absence of a ham sandwich, isn't an event at all. In a model where souls are not a necessary part of existence, the likelihood of one existing is irrelevant.

If the question of the existence of ham sandwiches is irrelevant to the problem, then the sample space needn't include the events "ham sandwiches" and "no ham sandwiches." If, in contrast, the question involves whether ham sandwiches exist or not, then the sample space had better include both the event "ham sandwiches" and the event "no ham sandwiches."

I have twice suggested that you write out, or draw a figure representing, the sample space for the probability problem you are trying to reason about. This will force you to think rigorously about the events that have to be represented for the problem to make any sense. You still haven't done this, and thus, not surprisingly, you continue to be confused.

 

[godless dave]

If the question of the existence of ham sandwiches is irrelevant to the problem, then the sample space needn't include the events "ham sandwiches" and "no ham sandwiches."

Bingo, expect for the part about "no ham sandwiches" being an event.

We're comparing two models. In one model, the existence of souls is irrelevant.

 

[jt512]

Bingo, expect for the part about "no ham sandwiches" being an event.

We're comparing two models. In one model, the existence of souls is irrelevant.

If you are trying to reason about the probability that one model or the other is true, then both models have to be in the sample space.

If you don't force yourself to write out the sample space you will continue to make foolish statements about what is and is not an event. I'm assuming you actually know what an "event" and a "sample space" are.

 

[carlitos]

In that case, the sample space would have to include every possible imaginary event in the world. This is why defining H specifically without souls is important.

 

[Belz...]

I think that I can virtually prove that the scientific conclusion is wrong using Bayesian Statistics -- but I still haven't really convinced anybody...

Why do you "assume that there is an infinity of potential souls"?

 

[Jabba]

- Try this:
1. I say that we have to accept that there is such a thing as potential selves -- i.e., on day one, all the selves to come in the future were just potential selves.
2. If we assume that there is no limited pool of potential selves -- which most of us have assumed -- the number of potential selves is simply unlimited, and each new self is, simply, a brand new creation...
3. Also, we already accept that each self has a physical source. So consequently, we are not comparing the probability of a claim that has two requirements to a claim that has only one of the requirements -- all members of the set we're considering are already accepted as having one of the requirements, and it's just an issue of whether or not they have the second.
4. The prior probabilities in the Bayesian formula address that issue, and my estimate is that the probability of the single source surpasses the probability of the double source by 99% to 1%.

 

[John Jones]

- Try this:
1. I say that we have to accept that there is such a thing as potential selves -- i.e., on day one, all the selves to come in the future were just potential selves.
2. If we assume that there is no limited pool of potential selves -- which most of us have assumed -- the number of potential selves is simply unlimited, and each new self is, simply, a brand new creation...
3. Also, we already accept that each self has a physical source. So consequently, we are not comparing the probability of a claim that has two requirements to a claim that has only one of the requirements -- all members of the set we're considering are already accepted as having one of the requirements, and it's just an issue of whether or not they have the second.
4. The prior probabilities in the Bayesian formula address that issue, and my estimate is that the probability of the single source surpasses the probability of the double source by 99% to 1%.

Fail at point 1. You're begging the question from the get-go.

 

[Jabba]

Argumemnon,
- I wrote the above before I read your post above that.

 

[godless dave]

- Try this:
1. I say that we have to accept that there is such a thing as potential selves -- i.e., on day one, all the selves to come in the future were just potential selves.

Why do you say this? Are there potential Volkswagens as well?

2. If we assume that there is no limited pool of potential selves -- which most of us have assumed -- the number of potential selves is simply unlimited, and each new self is, simply, a brand new creation...

How is this different from each Volkswagen being a brand new creation?

-
3. Also, we already accept that each self has a physical source. So consequently, we are not comparing the probability of a claim that has two requirements to a claim that has only one of the requirements -- all members of the set we're considering are already accepted as having one of the requirements, and it's just an issue of whether or not they have the second.

If we already accept one of the requirements, then P(E|H) = 1, because that requirement is the only requirement for E given H.

 

[jond]

- Try this:
1. I say that we have to accept that there is such a thing as potential selves -- i.e., on day one, all the selves to come in the future were just potential selves.
2. If we assume that there is no limited pool of potential selves -- which most of us have assumed -- the number of potential selves is simply unlimited, and each new self is, simply, a brand new creation...
3. Also, we already accept that each self has a physical source. So consequently, we are not comparing the probability of a claim that has two requirements to a claim that has only one of the requirements -- all members of the set we're considering are already accepted as having one of the requirements, and it's just an issue of whether or not they have the second.
4. The prior probabilities in the Bayesian formula address that issue, and my estimate is that the probability of the single source surpasses the probability of the double source by 99% to 1%.

1. This indicates that selves exist as a separate entity that are waiting to exist. I accept no such concept. Selves, in the materialistic sense, are generated by a functioning brain, they do not exist outside of the brains that generate them. In the material world you could conceptually count potential bodies, but that's not what you want to do.

2. If we don't accept the concept of potential selves, the quantity of them is moot. If the self is an emergent property of a functioning brain, as is the materialistic theory, each self is the only self it could be. It is an ongoing process in a functioning brain. Brain stops functioning, self stops functioning.

3. You, apparently do not accept that selves have a physical source. You insist they are non physical. And if you think they have a physical source, how do you expect them to somehow become non physical? Under H, the materialistic theory, your self is your functioning brain. However unlikely that is, that all you need to account for. If you wish to add a non physical entity on top of that, you have to account for the existence of your functioning brain, as well as that other entity and further you need to find a way for that entity to connect with your brain.

4. You've already lost by this point.