Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

[HighRiser]

I almost guarantee he's thinking 'god' but dares not say it here.

I don't think that's exactly right. It's not that Jabba doesn't dare to invoke divine intervention, it's more like he believes that his unwavering dedication to unevidenced assertion will eventually convince the opposition to accept those assertions as truth.

Personally, I don't believe that anyone would sincerely pursue such a folly, but I have no evidence to support my belief.

 

[Mojo]

- I think that the difference is that the particulars of each VW are all cause and effect traceable. With the emergent property of consciousness we have an "identity" that is not cause and effect traceable, and we're stuck with random -- which is why the likelihood of a particular self is something over infinity.

Only if you're allowed to beg the question by assuming that such an "entity" exists. Under H, it doesn't.

 

[JayUtah]

"With the emergent property of consciousness we have an "identity" that is not cause and effect traceable, and Jabba asserts random"

Again Jabba confuses complexity with randomness. That something is not practicably predictable does not mean it is without surmissory cause, nor that it cannot be traced generally. We consider the roll of a die random only because it eludes us to discern and model all the fine-grained applications of dynamics that result in the final outcome. The behavior is chaotic, but not random. If it were random, each individual bounce of the die must offer an equivalent opportunity to twist and fly in any direction. The die's behavior is traceable in the sense that the laws of dynamics which govern it are straightforward and comprehensive. It is unpredictable, however, because the complexity with which those straightforward rules apply over the course of a die toss crosses over into the realm of chaos.

Jabba has said that if the sense of self were cause-and-effect traceable to the operation of the human brain, then it should be possible to predict the self. Observing that it is not, he concludes it must not be traceable. He ignores the mechanism of traceability to focus solely on its outcome, which is more dominantly governed by chaos theory. Chaotic behavior is not random, but can practically substitute for randomness.

BTW Jabba, do you know of an identity absent an organic brain?

Under ~H the notion that a pre-natal soul is the be-all and end-all of self is absurd. Jabba's observation of self is not the pre-natal form, but the incarnate form -- ostensibly also after it has possibly lived for many years. That agglomeration of soul, body, and environment form the self in his model. Even if he were to assert that a pre-natal soul has a sense of identity, it is not the sense of identity in his model. Nor would it be the same sense of identity were it embodied in a human organism different than the one it now inhabits. Jabba's model of what the self is and what constitutes it is laughably naive.

 

[John Jones]

- Yeah... I think we (you and me) already accepted that.

You have a long history of putting words in other people's mouth. Show us where this acceptance took place, or let your honesty stand besmirched again.

 

[godless dave]

You have a long history of putting words in other people's mouth. Show us where this acceptance took place, or let your honesty stand besmirched again as always.

In this case he is correct, I agree that there are an infinite number of potential Volkswagens in exactly the same way there are an infinite number of potential humans.

And those infinities of potentials are completely irrelevant to the likelihood of a particular Volkswagen or human existing, for the same reasons.

 

[The Norseman]

I don't think that's exactly right. It's not that Jabba doesn't dare to invoke divine intervention, it's more like he believes that his unwavering dedication to unevidenced assertion will eventually convince the opposition to accept those assertions as truth.

Personally, I don't believe that anyone would sincerely pursue such a folly, but I have no evidence to support my belief.

He's essentially said as much on other boards and his own blog/forum; he doesn't say it here because he's trying to maintain that thin veneer of "science" and "logic" to "prove" stuff he simply believes in.

 

[Dancing David]

I almost guarantee he's thinking 'god' but dares not say it here.

So 'god' is brainless?

 

[Jabba]

- But, the Bayesian likelihood provides the probability of an actual, particular event occurring under a particular hypothesis. The issue in Bayes is whether or not H is true -- it is not, whether or not E is true. Bayes accepts that an event has occurred -- what it provides is how well that event supports, reconciles with, a particular hypothesis.

1) No, it provides a ratio of likelihood that an event will occur under one hypothesis versus another hypothesis. 2) In this case, a physical brain is a given in both H and ~H. H requires only a physical brain, whereas ~H requires that same physical brain plus "something more." You insist -- without evidence -- that the likelihood ratio in this case favors ~H when, in fact, it cannot.

As I said, you're still wallowing in the very basics of proper formulation. This isn't a matter of you being a master at Bayesian inference. You admitted you didn't understand it. This isn't a matter of Bayesian statistics being some magical, obscure branch of study that none of your critics knows about. This is a very simple and straightforward case of you not having the faintest clue what you're doing.

Don't pretend your critics cannot confidently see just how very and obviously wrong your argument is.



But your formulation is wrong in that it changes what the event E is from H to ~H. You incorporate elements of the hypothesis into the observation.

#1. No, it provides a ratio of likelihood that an event will occur under one hypothesis versus another hypothesis.
- You're right in the sense that the formula doesn't provide just how well that event supports, reconciles with, a particular hypothesis -- it also provides how well the event supports or reconciles with a different hypothesis.
#2. In this case, a physical brain is a given in both H and ~H. H requires only a physical brain, whereas ~H requires that same physical brain plus "something more." You insist -- without evidence -- that the likelihood ratio in this case favors ~H when, in fact, it cannot.
- H and ~H both do require the physical brain (a), whereas, ~H requires something more (b). Consequently, the prior probability of ~H cannot be more than the prior probability of H.
- But then, both H and ~H accept P(a) as being 1.00 -- so the prior probability of ~H, and the likelihood of E|~H are not affected by ~H's inclusion of a...

 

[JayUtah]

You're right in the sense that the formula doesn't provide just how well that event supports, reconciles with, a particular hypothesis -- it also provides how well the event supports or reconciles with a different hypothesis.

No.

The comparative semantics of the likelihood ratio is not just a handy add-on feature; it's a requirement of the method. This is especially acute in your model because you were shown how your formulation is a false dilemma. H/~H is the wrong formulation because ~H is not actually a hypothesis but rather a catch-all category of everything -- no matter how contradictory -- that isn't materialism. As such, not all of ~H can ever be simultaneously true. You once gave lip-service to that concept, but now it seems you've forgotten it again and must be reminded of it.

Further, you propose to render your conclusion solely on the basis of having computed P(H|E) without doing anything to look at P(K|E), where K is whatever flavor of immortality you're trying to prove. Without a credible story for reckoning P(E|K) you can't conclude -- having done only half the work -- that P(H|E) < P(K|E). And you can't do anything with P(~H|E) without any sort of piecewise formulation because of your false dilemma.

But then, both H and ~H accept P(a) as being 1.00...

No.

There is a difference between reckoning some P(x|h) as if some arbitrary h were true, and the actual P(h). Accepting h arguendo is not tantamount to saying P(h) = 1. You're mixing and matching dissimilar concepts from different parts of the inference process.

the prior probability of ~H, and the likelihood of E|~H are not affected by ~H's inclusion of a...

If you want to factor out the physical brain, in the broken way you're suggesting, then you'd be left with the notion that P(H) = 1 and P(~H) = P(b), where b is whatever "something else" your pet theory K would require. Even if P(b) = 1 you couldn't argue that K were more probable than H, only -- at best -- that it was equally probable.

But since all this conflates priors with likelihoods, it's all moot anyway. You once confessed you didn't really understand how the Bayesian formulations arrived at their values. Perhaps now is the time to own the consequences of that confession rather than bluster your way through this ongoing nonsense.

 

[Loss Leader]

With the emergent property of consciousness we have an "identity" that is not cause and effect traceable

Prove it.

 

[JesseCuster]

- I think that I agree.

Given what you've said about a limitless pool of potential selves, why wouldn't you agree that there's also a limitless pool of potential Volkswagens?

Do you think the existence of a limitless pool of potential Volkswagens implies that Volkswagens are immortal or non-physical or have souls?

 

[JesseCuster]

- I think that the difference is that the particulars of each VW are all cause and effect traceable. With the emergent property of consciousness we have an "identity" that is not cause and effect traceable, and we're stuck with random -- which is why the likelihood of a particular self is something over infinity.

You've got a truly bizarre idea here for how you think consciousness comes into existence.

First, you've got this ineffable undefined 'limitless pool' of 'potential selves'. Then, because you don't know the nitty gritty details of how a functioning brain gives rise to a self, you declared that any particular self is therefore 'random' (whatever that actually means), and that because there are an infinity of potential selves for the random self to come from, the odds of it coming into existence are something in infinity, which is zero (or 'virtually zero' in your weirdly insistent terminology), therefore it can't happen.

It would make just as much sense for someone who had never seen a car before and who had no idea how cars were made, to see a Volkswagen and declare them impossible using the exactly same logic because they don't know how to 'cause and effect trace' the coming into being of a Volkswagen, and thus declare that any individual Volkswagen is randomly plucked from an infinite pool of potential Volkswagens.

I genuinely can't make sense of this and why anyone would think that's the way consciousness and selves work in the physical world, and I can only imagine that it's just a bizarre idea dreamed up in order to be able to point at it and declare that it's wrong, so you can promote your alternative to it.

 

[Mojo]

With the emergent property of consciousness we have an "identity" that is not cause and effect traceable

Prove it.

That's what he's trying to prove. By assuming that it exists. "Identity" is just another term for "soul".

 

[Mojo]

You've got a truly bizarre idea here for how you think consciousness comes into existence.

First, you've got this ineffable undefined 'limitless pool' of 'potential selves'. Then, because you don't know the nitty gritty details of how a functioning brain gives rise to a self, you declared that any particular self is therefore 'random' (whatever that actually means), and that because there are an infinity of potential selves for the random self to come from, the odds of it coming into existence are something in infinity, which is zero (or 'virtually zero' in your weirdly insistent terminology), therefore it can't happen.

It would make just as much sense for someone who had never seen a car before and who had no idea how cars were made, to see a Volkswagen and declare them impossible using the exactly same logic because they don't know how to 'cause and effect trace' the coming into being of a Volkswagen, and thus declare that any individual Volkswagen is randomly plucked from an infinite pool of potential Volkswagens.

I genuinely can't make sense of this and why anyone would think that's the way consciousness and selves work in the physical world, and I can only imagine that it's just a bizarre idea dreamed up in order to be able to point at it and declare that it's wrong, so you can promote your alternative to it.

It's a hybrid of begging the question (arguing that immaterial souls exist because they exist) and strawman (asserting that they are part of the materialist hypothesis to make it easy to refute).

 

[jond]

- But then, both H and ~H accept P(a) as being 1.00 -- so the prior probability of ~H, and the likelihood of E|~H are not affected by ~H's inclusion of a...

OK, let's test this with actual numbers:
Since we've agreed that the brain is a given, this means the likelihood of H is 1. Now lets look at the likelihood of ~H. We need to determine the likelihood of the something else (soul). Being generous, we'll grant that the likelihood of the soul is also 1. That means that H and ~H are equally likely.

But there's still a problem: because, as you stated, the soul doesn't depend on your specific brain, we also need to address the likelihood that your soul connects with your brain. This is where your 7B/infinity comes in. But we need a number, so we could instead say that your soul had 7B brains to choose from and chose yours. So 1/7B. But when you were born there were only maybe 5B, and indeed most of those were already taken. So how many people were born on your birthday? Lets say 200K. This means your soul had a 1/200,000 likelihood of selecting your brain. (I keep making it more likely for you!)

So: the likelihood of your current existence under ~H is 1 (brain) x 1 (soul) x 1/200,000 (connection). By my math, that's .000005.

And again, the likelihood of your existence under H is 1.

Tell me how ~H is more likely than H?

 

[Jabba]

- I think that the difference is that the particulars of each VW are all cause and effect traceable. With the emergent property of consciousness we have an "identity" that is not cause and effect traceable, and we're stuck with random -- which is why the likelihood of a particular self is something over infinity.

Prove it.

LL,
- My reasoning:
1. A perfect replication of my brain would not bring ME back to life.
2. That ME is not cause and effect traceable.

 

[John Jones]

OK, let's test this with actual numbers:
Since we've agreed that the brain is a given, this means the likelihood of H is 1. Now lets look at the likelihood of ~H. We need to determine the likelihood of the something else (soul). Being generous, we'll grant that the likelihood of the soul is also 1. That means that H and ~H are equally likely.

But there's still a problem: because, as you stated, the soul doesn't depend on your specific brain, we also need to address the likelihood that your soul connects with your brain. This is where your 7B/infinity comes in. But we need a number, so we could instead say that your soul had 7B brains to choose from and chose yours. So 1/7B. But when you were born there were only maybe 5B, and indeed most of those were already taken. So how many people were born on your birthday? Lets say 200K. This means your soul had a 1/200,000 likelihood of selecting your brain. (I keep making it more likely for you!)

So: the likelihood of your current existence under ~H is 1 (brain) x 1 (soul) x 1/200,000 (connection). By my math, that's .000005.

And again, the likelihood of your existence under H is 1.

Tell me how ~H is more likely than H?

Quoted in case Jabba missed it the first time.

 

[John Jones]

LL,
- My reasoning:
1. A perfect replication of my brain would not bring ME back to life.
2. That ME is not cause and effect traceable.

That's not proof. That's restating your premises.

 

[godless dave]

LL,
- My reasoning:
1. A perfect replication of my brain would not bring ME back to life.
2. That ME is not cause and effect traceable.

Both the original you and the perfect replica of you would be cause and effect traceable.

 

[Jabba]

...- But then, both H and ~H accept P(a) as being 1.00 -- so the prior probability of ~H, and the likelihood of E|~H are not affected by ~H's inclusion of "a"...

...No.
There is a difference between reckoning some P(x|h) as if some arbitrary h were true, and the actual P(h). Accepting h arguendo is not tantamount to saying P(h) = 1. You're mixing and matching dissimilar concepts from different parts of the inference process.

Jay,
- Must admit, having difficulty following your meaning, however...
- Assuming that "h" is same thing as "H", h is OOFLam, and P(OOFLam) is not 1.00 in my argument -- it's only .99.
- I'm accepting arguendo that "a" (the existence of my physical brain) is true (recognizing that you guys might disagree) and is tantamount to saying P(a) = 1.